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ABSTRACT
The Dream World of Consumption
Its Emergence in French Thought 1880 - 1914
May 1978
Rosalind H. Williams, B. A.
,
Harvard College
M. A.
,
University of California, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed By: Professor William Johnston
From about 1880 to 1914 patterns of consumption in western
Europe altered dramatically. The traditional environment of severely
limited choice was transformed by the advent of mass consumption,
characterized by geographical uniformity, temporal discontinuity, a
large volume of sales, easier credit, pervasive advertising, the pro-
liferation of new products, a rise in disposable income, and above all
by an unprecedented dominance of consumption in personal and social
life. The topic of this dissertation is the interpretation of this con-
sumer revolution by French thinkers of the period who were general
cultural critics rather than narrow specialists in their disciplines.
The purpose of examining their ideas is, first, to illuminate French
intellectual and cultural life in that fertile period, and secondly, to
revive concepts and analyses that will help us create our own social
ethic of consumption.
The first of the four parts of the dissertation is devoted to a
description of the essential character of modern consumption as it
was revealed at the international expositions held in Paris in 1889
and 1900. The consensus that emerges from contemporary response
to these expositions is that they present a new and decisive conjunction
between fantasy and commerce. The phrase "the dream world of
consumption" signifies the crucial imaginative dimension of modern
merchandising. The traits of the dream world of consumption mani-
fested at the expositions are compared with analogous examples from
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contemporary culture outside their walls. Next, J. -K. Huysmans'
novel X Rebours (1884) is interpreted as a critique of mass con-
sumption and as a failed attempt to create an alternative dream world
in a decadent lifestyle.
Part Two examines another critique of mass consumption, this
time made by decorative arts reformers who sought to substitute a
simple, lean design in consumer products for the exotic, ornamented
models characteristic of modern commerce. The theory behind
functional design is discussed--both the genesis of the idea that
beauty derives from utility, and subsequent efforts to arrive at a
generous definition of utility encompassing physical, social, and spir-
itual functionality. Next, the origins, evolution, and decline of the
decorative arts movement in France are traced by following the career
of Camille Mauclair, one of its more articulate advocates.
Part Three describes how French economists tried to come to
terms with the consumer revolution by debating the benefits and
liabilities of superfluous consumption, or luxury. The two sides
in the debate are liberal economists upholding luxury as a sign and
an agent of the progress of civilization, and critics of liberalism who
condemn luxury as destructive of personal and social harmony and
who enunciate instead an ethic of self-restraint and austerity. This
unresolved quarrel represents a serious tension in bourgeois culture
between an attraction towards luxury justified by appeal to modern
scientific authority and a distrust of it based on ancient Christian
authority.
The beginning of an, ethic of consumption that transcends the
inadequacies of both aesthetic and economic thought is found in social
ideas arising from a general search for a secular code of social
morality focusing on the concept of solidarity. The solidarist ideas
of Charles Gide, Emile Durkheim, and especially of Gabriel Tarde
are discussed as particularly fruitful responses to the political and
personal dilemmas posed by the dream world of consumption.
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INTRODUCTION
In the latter nineteenth century, a twenty-year old girl named
Denise Baudu and her two younger brothers emigrate to Paris from a
provincial village to live with their uncle after the death of their
parents. They arrive early in the morning after a night on the hard
benches of the third-class railway car and set out at once to find their
uncle's shop. As they make their way through the unfamiliar streets
of the capital, they find themselves in the middle of a vast and busy
square. Here they stop short, awestruck by their first sight of an
urban monument more enormous, more impressive than anything they
have ever seen before: a department store. "Oh look, " Denise mur-
murs to her brothers, "Now there is a store!" She had worked at a
variety store in her quiet village, but this sprawling structure is so
much more impressive that she feels her heart rise within her and
forgets her fatigue, her fright, everything except this grand apparition.
Directly in front of Denise is the central doorway over which two
allegorical figures of laughing women flaunt a sign with the name of the
store, "Au Bonheur des Dames" [To the happiness of ladies]]. Beneath
these seductive figures a landslide of gloves, scarves, and hats tumbles
from the racks and counters inside to tempt the passer-by. It reminds
Denise of a gigantic fair. As far as she can see, store windows unroll
along the street. The three >oangsters begin to walk slowly by them,
stopping at each one to admire its display. In one window an intricate
arrangement of \imbrellas seems to form the roof of a rustic cabin.
1
2In another a rainbow of silks, satins, and velvets is folded in a
dazzling arc, and Denise notes that the prices of the fabrics are con-
siderably lower than those in the store where she had clerked. At a
final window displaying ready-to-wear clothing, the three migrants
are once again glued to the sidewalk in speechless wonder. At the
back of the window shimnners a snowfall of expensive laces, while in
the foreground pirouette elegant mannequins, one draped in a velvet
coat trimmed with silver fox, another in a white cashmere opera
cloak, a third in an overcoat bordered with feathers. Their heads have
been removed to be replaced by large labels proclaiming the prices of
the garments. Mirrors placed on either side of the window endlessly
reflect and multiply the images of these lovely ladies carrying price
tags instead of heads until they seem to fill the whole street. Denise
awakens from her reverie with a start. She and her brothers still have
to find their uncle. They discover they are on the very street where he
keeps his shop and turn around to see his fabric store on the opposite
side. It is housed in an ancient building with three bare windows in the
front; inside can be glimpsed a dim showroom with a low ceiling,
greenish woodwork, and tables cluttered with dusty bolts of cloth.
After the glitter of Au Bonheur des Dames, Uncle Baudu's shop evokes
the humid shadows of a cave.
Denise is the heroine of ^mile Zola's (1840-1902) Au Bonheur
des Dames (1884), and the book opens with this description of her
arrival in Paris. ^ Because actual newcomers to the capital rarely
recorded their first impressions, we must rely on Zola's social
3research and artistic imagination to portray for us in vivid terms the
sudden confrontation of traditional patterns of consumption, those which
Denise knows from her village and which still survive in her uncle's
shop, with a completely alien culture of consumption. Her first
encounter with a department store is a dramatic symbol of the way
society as a whole encountered the advent of mass consiimption about a
century ago. Until then the needs of most consumers had been satis-
fied in three major ways: self-manufacture, occasional fairs, and
small shops. Choice was severely limited in quantity, and in quality
consumption was mainly restricted to the types of goods used by pre-
ceding generations. Au Bonheur des Dames represents a radically
different environment of consximption- -large volume, bargains, credit,
seductive imagery, continual novelty, advertising, geographic uni-
formity, a seemingly limitless proliferation of merchandise. Here
was a gigantic, permanent fair. The limits of traditional consump-
tion- -limits in choice, in novelty, in the availability of disposable
income, most of all in the limited importance of consumer activities
in life- -were overthrown. The role of consumption expanded to assume
an unprecedented dominance in personal and social affairs. Since then
mass consximption has offered choices far beyond what our ancestors
would have dreamed, and temptations unlike any they faced. With
Denise the hackneyed theme of the young peasant girl who loses her
innocence in the city is reworked so that now the seduction is commer-
cial. Having gazed upon the charms of the department store, Denise
4can never again be satisfied with what a simple, unadorned shop has
to offer.
In this commercial sense we have all lost our innocence. In
developed countries today we exist in an environment of department
stores, discount houses, supermarkets, chain stores, mail-order
houses, and perpetual advertising by newspaper, magazine, telephone,
radio, television-
-a world always inviting us to consume whether we
can afford to or not. At infancy our parents are lavished with mer-
chandise, and at death our survivors purchase a funeral plan. To be
sure, occasional reminders of an older pattern of consumption linger-
-
a cramped and musty bookstore, a corner spa, a flea market--but for
the most part the culture of mass consumption is the one in which we
live and move and have our being. This culture is so pervasive that
we scarcely appreciate how recent and novel it is. Zola's vision of
provincial migrants staring at the multiple reflections of merchandise
in a department store window is a compelling reminder that the con-
siimer revolution transformed personal and social life less than a
century ago, in the latter decades of the nineteenth century.
The concept of an industrial revolution is familiar while that of
a consumer revolution is not; but the second is the complement and
completion of the first, for mass consumption inevitably follows mass
production. The 1870 's is approximately the decade in which the con-
sumer revolution originated, and in the subsequent quarter century or
so capitalism underwent a profound mutation. In the first place,
thanks to a general rise in real income despite a worldwide agricultural
depression in the 1880's. the majority of the population in western
Europe and the United States could for the first time in history devote
less than half its income to food. The percentage of disposable income
therefore passed a critical point in those decades. In the second place,
the dominant source of energy shifted from steam, the distinctive pro-
ductive force of the industrial revolution, to the internal combustion
engine and above all to electricity. To be used most efficiently, steam
power is generally found in large installations, such as factories or
locomotives, but the internal combustion engine and electrical power
are much more portable and reducible to a scale where they may be
utilized by the individual consumer. In connection with this change, the
significant type of invention shifted from the area of productive
machinery to that of consumer goods: the bicycle, automobile, chemical
products, the telephone, electrical lighting, photography, and the
phonograph are just a few examples. These economic and technological
transformations meant a new way of life for the individual consumer-
-
in his clothing, food, furnishings, tableware, heating, lighting, all
these fundamentals of daily life- -as well as a new social environment
resulting from the advent of subways, buses, outdoor electrical dis-
plays, the mass press, the cinema. These material changes were
accompanied by less visible but equally significant transformations in
the consumption of money, or banking. To speak in general terms, the
last several decades of the nineteenth century saw the domination of
industrial capital give way to that of finance, so that capitalism shifted
6from an industrial to a commercial basis. Banking systems were
overhauled to allow more commercial credit both for businesses and
for individuals. All this happened in little over a quarter of a century.
Denise Baudu would have seen it all by the time she was fifty, and her
children would grow up in an entirely different culture of consumption
than she had done. In the twentieth century these developments have
continued, but there has never again been another generation so
crammed with changes in patterns of consumption as that pivotal epoch.
Furthermore, the impact of these changes was all the greater because
they overturned habits which stretched back beyond memory.
The subject of this dissertation is the intellectual response to
this consumer revolution on the part of thinkers who lived through it.
Because the event transcended national boundaries, thinkers from many
countries could have been considered, but for the sake of clarity and
brevity I have restricted this essay to French thinkers. In part this
choice is accidental, resulting from my general familiarity with the
language, literature, and history of France, but there is also a logical
basis to this decision. It is not by chance that a French novel has been
called upon to furnish a symbol of the global consumer revolution.
While Great Britain indisputably provides the paradigm of the indus-
trial revolution (and it is still argued whether this event ever really
•
took place in France), a strong case can be made for French leader-
ship in the subsequent consumer revolution. The signs of that
supremacy are not to be sought in the construction of factories or
7mills, but in the more general and pervasive construction of a modern
environment of consumption. For this Paris represents a sort of pilot
plant. Its famous transformation from the c-lamped city of Victor Hugo
to a modern capital of consumption, of boulevards, cafes, traffic,
apartments, the M€tro, restaurants, and parks, with production largely
exiled to a belt outside the city, this transformation generally associ-
ated with the projects of Baron von Haussmann in the 1860's by no means
halted afterwards but indeed increased at an accelerating pace into the
twentieth century. In the same era France came to lead the world in
merchandising innovations, both in the exploitation of snob appeal in
specialty shops and in the invention of the department store for the mass
market. The advertising poster is at once a minor glory of French art
and a striking commercial innovation. The same desire to marry
artistic and consumer appeal motivated the French state to encourage
the development of preeminent consumer industries at home and the
marketing of luxury goods abroad. The famous international exposi-
tions held in Paris during these decades (in 1878, 1889, and 1900) con-
stitute state-sponsored advertising of French consumer goods
presented with much imagination and on a great scale.
All these events took place in a society which had a tradition of
cultivating la joie de vivre , that is, civilized and enlightened values in
consumption. France prided itself on being the home of fine wines,
haute couture, and flaky croissants, so therewasan inherent sense of
setting a standard for the world in these matters. This long-standing
8pride made French thinkers peculiarly responsive to the changes
wrought by the consumer revolution. Their consciousness of the advent
of mass consumption is especially acute because they find themselves at
a crucial conjunction where treasured cultural and intellectual tradi-
tions run headlong into rapid material changes which challenge those
traditions. They all sense that their society is undergoing a critical
age of transition from which there can be no returning to the former
state of things, a situation that arouses great hopes and great appre-
hensions. In this respect French intellectuals in the era under
review- -approximately 1880 to 1914, when the tempo of the consumer
revolution was at its height- -may be compared with English ones writing
in the 1820's through the 1840's. In both cases, in England of the young
Victoria and in France of the young Third Republic, there was relative
political stability but material change so drastic that thoughtful obser-
vers were pervaded by an awareness that "There is a deep-lying
struggle in the whole fabric of society; a boundless grinding collision
of the New with the Old" (the words are those of Thomas Carlyle,
3
writing in 1829). And as with their English counterparts a half-century
earlier, the French thinkers to be examined here concluded that their
ideas would have to be reworked to accomodate new social realities.
New concepts had to be devised, new values formed to deal with an
emergent culture; there was much mental churning and thrashing about
as new combinations of thought and feeling were ventured. It was an
age of intellectual experiment rather than of summing up. As a result,
9many ideas were tried out and feelings expressed which were never
brought to fruition in coherent and well-defined concepts. Awareness
of the impact of mass consumption far outran the capacity of inherited
concepts to contain and express that awareness.
Most of all the crucial term "consumption" remained ill-defined.
In fact this dissertation might well be titled "essays toward a definition
of consumption, " for we shall witness a gradual awakening of con-
sciousness regarding its complexities and multiplicities of meaning,
the beginning of distinctions among its varieties, and of delineations of
its boundaries. A few preliminary remarks should be made, however,
regarding this key term. It is still a many-sided category which has
no clearly defined content. We speak of the consumption of bread, of
entertainment, of steel, of heat, of time, or of energy: what can
possibly be the common element among them? Cons\imption is often
defined in a general (and pejorative) sense as the using up of something
in order to maintain life. Another common understanding of its meaning
is as the opposite of production. Hannah Arendt has refined our
appreciation of the term by pointing out that these two definitions are
somewhat contradictory: consiomption cannot be the converse of pro-
duction when in truth labor and consumption together form a reciprocal,
4
interdependent cycle of activity necessary to maintain life. But her
definition of the category in terms of this cycle is also inadequate, for
many forms of consumption- -that of art, of pearl necklaces, of books,
of lemon meringue pie- -are not at all clearly related to life maintenance.
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The basic problem, needless to say, is that the word "consump-
tion" is used to cover a vast range of activities which are entirely
different in character-
-embracing as this term does both objects and
experiences, the collective and the personal, the transient and the
enduring, necessity and superfluity, activity and passivity. The word
is a catch-all for all of life that is not clearly productive, Arendt has
suggested that the concept of production should be broken down into two
distinct categories, labor and work, the first performed by men in
order to live and the second that they may make a home for themselves
5
in the world. If a similar distinction were applied to consumption, we
might find that one type deals with life mamtenancis , while another con-
sists of activities which attempt to provide a sense of meaning to life.
Something like this distinction, interestingly enough, is found in
the two different Latin expressions which have served as sources for
the single word "consumption" in modern Romance languages. The
English word "consumption" comes from the Latin root consumere , a
conjunction of cum and sumere , the latter word meaning "to take, " so
that the expression as a whole signifies "to take away with" or "to use
up entirely. " Given this derivation, it is understandable why the
English word "consumption" refers not only to the use of material
goods but also to the wasting away of the body (specifically in
tuberculosis), for in both cases the process referred to involves the
destruction of matter. That destruction may be active and rapid, as
in the case of the consumption of food or fuel, or it may be much
11
more gradual and passive, as when paintings are displayed in an art
gallery for public viewing and the processes of decay are resisted as
much as possible. But always consumption is considered equivalent
to destruction, to decay, in short, to a death-directed process.
The second Latin root suggests a much more positive under-
standing of the human use of materiality. This is the term consum-
mare, from cum summa
,
"to make the sum" or "to sum up" as in
arithmetic: to carry to completion, to terminate in perfection. The
best-known use of this expression is the Latin translation of Jesus'
last words on the Cross, "Consummatum est. " The usual English
translation of this statement, "It is finished, " is inadequate because it
suggests only termination without conveying the meaning of a life
summed up and perfected in the moment of death. A better (and more
typical) English translation of consummare is "to consummate, " which
does encompass an understanding of death, and therefore of life, as
achievement despite and indeed through the inevitable destruction of
corporal and non-corporal matter.
Now, in the French language the word which fills the role of the
English "to consume" - - consommer , and its related noun la consomma -
tion--is derived not from the first but from the second Latin root,
consummare. For example, the French word consomm€ which signi-
fies a rich broth has nothing to do with the fact that this broth is used
up as a food, but rather refers to its being the distilled essence of
bouillon. The French also have a term consumer that is derived from
the Latin consumere, but it is properly reserved for specific actions
12
of destruction like that of fire, corrosion, or wasting disease. The
fact that the two French words consommer and consumer have often
been confused in popular usage since the sixteenth century is an
instructive confusion, contravening as it does French pride in linguis-
tic precision and clarity. It suggests the ambiguity of consumption
itself, its mingled nature as achievement and destruction. We shall
see how thinkers discussed in this dissertation keep moving back and
forth between these two poles of definition without settling finally at
one or the other, in an effort to arrive at an understanding of
consumption that will encompass both. ^
As this discussion of terminology makes clear, issues of con-
sumption are not expressed in any standard vocabulary. Furthermore,
they are not comprehended by any one technical or scholarly disci-
pline. Intellectuals who deal with consumption usually do so indirectly
while working in another context, such as that of economics, philosophy,
or sociology. This situation places special burdens on the historian of
ideas. He has no clearly defined institution or discipline to turn to as
a framework for inquiry, no standard vocabulary, no well-defined
literature. He has to draw relevant ideas from a wide variety of con-
texts and then must order and relate them according to a conceptual
structure he himself provides. The guiding hand of the historian is
unusually evident both in the choice of subject matter and in the
organization of that material according to a framework which exists
in his mind rather than in the minds of the thinkers he is discussing.
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Objections to this methodology can only be countered by the
observation that all historians of ideas, indeed all historians, have to
operate under similar conditions. It is in the nature of the enterprise.
Events of consciousness, like any other events, whether those occur-
ring in human history or in the non-human natural world, are com-
prehensible to us only when organized in patterns. This means, first
of all, that certain events must be selected from a welter of pheno-
mena, and second of all that these selected events have to be ordered
according to organizing concepts. The measure of validity is the
capacity of the organizing principles to clarify and relate a wide variety
of relevent experiences. In the particular case of this dissertation,
written evidence from a particular time and place has been sifted with
an eye to discerning patterns of intellectual response to the advent of
mass consumption. Of course the sifting process is incomplete: let
us pity the poor historian of modern ideas who must live with the know-
ledge that libraries are jammed with books, journals, pamphlets, many
of which might be of great relevance to his topic but of which he will be
able to examine only the minutest fraction. Again, this is simply a
condition of the enterprise. In this dissertation the evidence surveyed
was narrowed down to the writings of well-educated, well-informed,
broadly intelligent commentators, not necessarily the central geniuses
of thought in their time {although there are a few of these too), but
hardly representative of mass opinion either. In many cases they
occupy a crucial middle ground in touch with both the world of ideas
and that of ongoing social, political, and artistic activity. The written
14
evidence of such observers is not readily amenable to scientific
sampling or to statistical analysis. It has to be interpreted rather with
alertness to figurative language, to allusion, to the emotional import
of words, for how people express themselves can be as significant as
what they are expressing. With such techniques, which may be termed
h\imanistic but not unscientific, patterns of response were detected in
the way these observers noticed the same events, described them in a
similar tone, made similar distinctions, and become trapped in similar
contradictions. When such patterns emerge, they suggest that we are
dealing with collective responses, with events of collective feeling and
•7
thought, rather than with purely personal reactions to social change.
In establishing such patterns, it can be enormously helpful to
locate a particular historical event to serve as a clarifying focal point
of the larger process being examined. Accordingly, this dissertation
begins with a study of reactions to the Paris expositions of 1889 and of
1900. Both for contemporaries and for the intellectual historian, these
expositions provide a distillation of the consumer revolution. There
the cultural changes emerging elsewhere in society in more diffuse
form were presented in a concentrated manner. To be sure, exposi-
tions had been held before, most notably the Crystal Palace exhibition
in London in 1851 and those held in Paris in 1867 and 1878, but the
quality of these events changed markedly over the decades. The 1889
and 1900 fairs, which took place when the consumer revolution was
well under way, were less tributes to the forces of industrial produc-
tion than monumental displays of consumer merchandise. This
15
transformation in character was by no means total, for it was the
Gallery of Machines at the 1889 exposition that inspired Henry Adams'
ode to the dynamo. Still, many other visitors to the fairs were equally
overwhelmed by the exotic entertainments of the Rue du Caire, or by
the sight of luxury automobiles, or that of mannequins in glass cages
modelling the latest fashions. Theirs was a different kind of awe, that
aroused by images of a new culture of consumption. The writers dis-
cussed in the first chapter try to understand the meaning of these
images, to trace their relationships, and to discern their import for
personal and social life.
The consensus which emerges is that the expositions signify a
new and decisive juxtaposition between the desires of the human imag-
ination and material desires, between dreams and commerce, between
events of collective consciousness and those of economic fact. The
essence of the new culture of consumption is the exploitation of fantasy
by business. To use the language of Paul Val'ery, in modern society
g
"the fabulous is an article of trade. " The role of consumption in ful-
filling physical needs such as those for food and shelter is familiar;
less familiar, but of overwhelming significance in understanding mass
consumption, is its role in fulfilling needs of the imagination. The
expression "the dream world of cons\imption" refers to this imagina-
tive dimension of modern commerce. As far back as the human record
has been traced, we find indications that the human mind has trans-
cended concerns of physical survival to imagine a finer, richer, more
satisfying life. Through most of history, however, only a very few
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people wo\iLd think of trying to approximate such dreams in daily-
existence; most people had to hope for fulfillment of them in the here-
after. In the late nineteenth century, many people were for the first
time able to buy market commodities that woxild provide some approxi-
mation of their dreams. For the first time consumer goods, rather
than other areas of culture, became a focal point for fantasy. In this
period the imaginative component of consumption increasingly came to
overshadow its functional component in responding to physical needs.
To put it another way, business appealed to consumers by inviting them
to enter a fantasy world of pleasure, comfort, and amusement.
In order to comprehend this world more f\ally, the description of
its revelation in the expositions is supplemented by a second chapter
describing how it appears in a significant novel of the time,
J.-K. Huysmans' A Rebours [Against the grain} (1884). The interpreta-
tion which is offered of Huysmans' prophetic book should help illuminate
that work by seeing it in a new context; indeed much of the literature of
the period might be reconsidered as enunciating responses to mass
consumption. The main purpose for discussing X Rebours here, how-
ever, is to substantiate the contention that a significant juxtaposition
of commerce and imagination has occurred in modern society. These
two chapters comprising the first part of the dissertation are therefore
devoted to a description of the essential nature of the modern culture
of consumption.
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The rest of the dissertation describes efforts by French thinkers
to comprehend and evaluate this phenomenon in aesthetic (Part Two),
economic (Part Three), and sociological thought (Part Four). Of these
three areas that of aesthetic thought is most in need of defense from
charges of irrelevance. Aesthetic reflection is too often considered
a topic of subsidiary interest, fit only for art historians and aesthetic
philosophers, of marginal concern next to the mainstream of economic,
political, and social ideas that dominates attention today. But in
French intellectual life from 1880 to World War I, aesthetic ideas
occupy a central position. Both in theory and in practice it was an age
of artistic genius, a time when aesthetic concerns enjoyed far more
favor and attracted far more energy and talent than we accord them
today. Those involved in this artistic upheaval were for the most part
young, buoyant, financially insecure, scornful of the bourgeoisie,
sympathetic to the left, and lovers of the city. In music and literature
and the visual arts they created an exhiliarating cacophony of schools,
manifestoes, alliances, quarrels, experiments, always expressing an
overriding yearning to cast off old forms and to serve as midwives to
the future. Whatever that vague entity called modernism may be, most
agree that its birth was heralded in that epoch and largely in France.
There can also be little argument that its arrival is linked somehow
with that of the cons\imer revolution, which is expressed in artistic
terms as the advent of a vie factice , an artificial environment, a glut
of objects, a plethora of matter, machine-made and store -bought,
smothering older forms of human life. This transformation of the
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material environment is connected with the transformation in aesthetic
values, much as there exists an undeniable if indefinable connection
between the industrial revolution and romanticism in the arts.
The second part of this dissertation will examine some of the
connections among aesthetic and social change by looking at the theory
of functionalism and at practical steps taken to reform the decorative
arts according to that theory. Both the functionalist ideal and the
decorative arts movement were generated by the desire to present an
alternative to the aesthetic characteristics of the dream world of con-
sumption such as fantasy, exaggeration, and exoticism. Functionalism
proposes a contrary set of standards for the design of consumer objects,
those of understatement, logic, and utility. It cannot be emphasized
too much that this was also to propose a wholly different social ethic.
Speculation about standards of beauty appropriate for modern objects
of consumption led effortlessly to evaluation of the social environment
of modern consumption. Artistic and social issues merge, especially
in the consideration of the concept of utility, which is, after all, a
moral and social rather than a strictly visual standard for the evalua-
tion of design. We shall see an impressive effort on the part of
aesthetic thinkers of that era to forge a vocabulary that will weld
artistic, social, and moral criticism into a general criticism of the
9consumer culture.
The same kind of desire to surpass disciplinary boundaries in
order to attain a general critique of society is found also among the
economists to be discussed in Part Three. The concept of luxury is
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the one they turned to in order to achieve such a general evaluation of
contemporary society. Their vigorous defense of superfluous con-
sumption, based on an appeal to scientific theories of evolution, ends
up very much like a defense of a bourgeois lifestyle. U anything needs
justification in this third part it is not the importance of economic
thought, which is largely taken for granted today, but rather the point
of examining so closely economists who are distinctly bourgeois in
their outlook. Certainly the leading French economists of that day
were of a very different mold than the artistic group examined in Part
Two. For the most part they were older, professionally secure, more
academic, opponents of socialism, upholders of respectability, better
fed, more worried, and generally less talented. What makes them
particularly significant is the way their ranks were divided. The pro-
ponents of luxury engaged in a protracted dispute with some of their
brethren, equally middle class and respectable, who advocated a
Christian morality of austerity in consumption. Part Three describes
this quarrel between two ethics of consumption, one rooted in science
and one in Christianity, each having great appeal to the middle classes
and yet irreconciliable. This opposition suggests a serious fault line
in bourgeois culture between an urge to enjoyment based on appeal to
scientific authority and an urge to restraint based on appeal to
Christian authority. The fact that the dispute was never resolved, but
only faded away as those involved died or reiterated fixed positions,
suggests that it represents an underlying contradiction in middle-class
mentality.
20
The beginnings of the creation of an ethic of consumption that
transcended the terms of the economists
' quarrel came from general
social speculation centered around the idea of solidarity. The final
part of the dissertation will examine some social thinkers who applied
solidarism to matters of consumption. Solidarism is the most impor-
tant manifestation of a concerted attempt on the part of late nineteenth-
century French intellectuals to devise a non- religious moral code to
unite and uplift French society, to provide a social consensus above
and beyond political and economic ties. The consequences of this quest
for the whole area of social theory are generally unappreciated. In
particular the origins of sociology need to be reexamined from this
.perspective. Whatever the quarrels of leading French sociologists like
Emile Durkheim and Gabriel Tarde, they agree that it is vitally neces-
sary to recreate a common moral consciousness in modern times, and
that this goal can be achieved only through the establishment of a new
scholarly discipline. This moral concern is above all what prompted
the creation of French sociology. By bringing to the foreground social
attitudes, as opposed to social systems, this sociology marks a decisive
break with positivism and a step forward in the late nineteenth-century
"discovery of consciousness, " which should be seen more specifically
in this case as the discovery of moral consciousness.
Each of the four parts of the dissertation covers approximately
the period 1880 to 1905, although some topics extend to 1914 and even
beyond when appropriate. While there is some chronological develop-
ment in the two middle parts, organization within each part is generally
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by thinkers rather than by dates. The four parts are like transparent
diagrams laid down over the same period, each superimposed on the
other, so that taken together they reveal a more accurate representa-
tion of thought on consumption than any one of them could do regarded
separately. Only when aesthetic, economic, and social ideas are
superimposed do the general patterns which are being sought emerge.
There is no reason why other transparent diagrams could not be added
to give an even more complex view of these patterns. Only limitations
of time and energy have dictated the number of parts, and much
material remains which needs to be explored for its relationship to the
topic.
The most obvious and regrettable omission here is that of French
socialist thought. Throughout this dissertation, socialism is the
invisible yet omnipresent antagonist. Every thinker discussed is to
some degree its opponent, ranging from extremely sympathetic ones
connected with the decorative arts movement to implacable adversaries
like some liberal economists. The objection that keeps being raised is
that socialists, by seeking to collectivize and equalize consumption,
would take away the right of the individual to choose for himself in
these matters. To evaluate the fairness of such accusations would
require a thorough study not only of the speeches and writings of
French socialist leaders, but also of socialist-inspired Utopias in the
imaginative literature of the period. A very limited acquaintance with
these sources suggests that socialists combined the contradictory
tendencies to denounce private luxury (like mink coats) but to welcome
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grandiose projects of collective luxury (like breathtakingly fast and
sleek means of mass transportation). K the latter tendency represents
a sort of collectivized dream world of consumption, the former reminds
us that the Marxist as well as the Christian tradition embodies an ethic
of austerity in consuniption. A central concept of Marxism is that of
unnecessary production, that is, production to satisfy frivolous needs
of the bourgeoisie which contributes to the enslavement of the pro-
letariat. Therefore Marxism calls for absolute limitation of needs as
well as their equalization. So perhaps the split noted in bourgeois
thought between the justification of superfluous consumption by science
and its condemnation by Christian dogma is mirrored in socialist
thought as a contradiction between the appeal of the technological
sublime and the call for restraint in Marxist dogma.
A basic mental block in socialist thought on these matters is the
equation of production with the heroic working class and of consump-
tion with the parasitic bourgeosie. Consuniption is thereby condemned
from the outset, and the result is an uninspired and limited view of
human needs when they are considered at all. Yet because a socialist
society would produce ever more efficiently, at some point the primary
needs of all would be satisfied- -and then what? Because Marxist
thinkers regard personal identity and social ethics as arising from
labor relations, they have difficulty imagining an authentic, as opposed
to an exploitative, role for the consumer. It might be added- -and
these remarks also arise from only cursory acquaintance with the
relevant literature - -that French anarchists seem to have a
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considerably richer view of the possibilities for an authentic consump-
tion beyond the level of primary needs. Although their numbers were
far less than those of the socialists, and although they were by defini-
tion less organized, they had an extraordinary influence on French
intellectual life, especially in the 1890's. We shall see in Part Two
that many of the generation of young artists described there went
through an anarchist phase. Along with socialist ideas, those of
anarchists like Pierre Kropotkin and the R^clus brothers (^lie and
^lisg'e) deserve considerable attention in any further study of the
intellectual interpretation of the consumer revolution in France.
One reason to study other groups like these would be to deter-
mine whether with them also there is a gradual tapering off of intellec-
tual initiative in the first decade of the twentieth century. Such is the
conclusion of this study. There is not a sudden halt but a gradual
decline after the fertile stirrings of the 1880's and the climax of
activity in the 1890's. World War I only confirmed the previous fading
of mental vigor. The war did, however, have a decisive effect in that
it directed intellectual attention away from matters of consumption,
which seemed not only frivolous after its slaughter but also irrelevant
since its destruction of so much productive capacity sharply reduced
opportunities to consume. During and after the war intellectuals
interested in the social effects of technological change were pre-
occupied rather by the consequences of the union of modern technology
with warfare. The overriding concern was whether modern technology
was compatible with the very survival of civilization.
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This discussion has in its own time worn thin, in part because
those two enormous abstractions, technology and civilization, have to
be broken down into more discrete terms in order to be manageable.
What is beginning to be recognized now is that our present technologies
of consumption-
-now that production has more than recovered from the
effects of two world wars- -also pose a threat to civilization. Every-
where demands to consume are grov^dng while natural resources are
limited absolutely and are also distributed at the present in a grossly
uneven way. Unless human beings limit their desires to consume, the
overconsumption of the powerful will be balanced by the severe under-
consumption of the weak, a situation fraught with danger to the world
order. The population explosion, the hunger crisis, the energy crisis,
the environmental crisis, all these central concerns of the 1970's are
rooted in our habits of consumption. The so-called energy crisis is
the most obvious place where the need to limit consumption is being
faced immediately and directly. The call to cut energy consumption
sharply has raised issues with which we are ill equipped to deal either
as individuals or as societies. These issues are much more political
and moral than technical ones. The great hope of the nineteenth
century was that production could be expanded indefinitely to meet
rising consumption everywhere. The expansion of production can be
regarded as a technical matter. But this hope of the last century has
been buried, and the problems of restricting consumption faced by our
own century are very different in character, involving not technical
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know-how but political choice, personal consciousness, social ethics,
and intellectual understanding of all of these. That understanding is
now lacking. Decisions are made ad hoc and inconsistently, motiva-
tions are unclear, needs and standards are undefined, and conscience
is troubled as we sense we have too much, yet always want more.
Our personal and intellectual dilemmas may be helped by re-
examining ideas about consumption raised in France before World
War I. The thinkers we shall discuss were prophetically aware that
consumption would have to be restricted at some point- -that the endles
multiplication of merchandise Denise saw in the department store
window was a deceptive illusion. While no one can solve our problems
for us, these social critics do raise issues we now confront, define
problems, point out dead ends, and provide a starting point for inquiry
By examining their contributions, we may hope to arrive at a fuller
understanding of the intellectual life of what is unquestionably one of
the great creative periods in French letters. But even more I hope
that this act of intellectual recovery may further our understanding of
the social ethics of consumption and enable us to create a new ethic of
our own.
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PART I
THE NEW CULTURE OF CONSUMPTION
CHAP TE R I
FAR-OFF PLACES AND FAIRYLANDS, ROMANCE AND
RICHES: DREAMS OF CONSUMPTION
The Dream World of the Expositions
"We are at the very curious moment when the physiognomy of a
new generation is delineated, when a new society takes shape, assumes
a form, and replaces a society forever extinct. " This sense of witness-
ing a social revolution was inspired by a tour of the universal exposi-
tion of 1889 held in Paris to commemorate the French Revolution a
century earlier. The witness is Francis Nautet, a French-speaking
Belgian who wrote extensively on modern literature and who was sym-
pathetic to non-doctrinaire socialism. His remarks were published in
Nouvelle socigte
,
a mildly socialist Belgian review begun in 1884 to
promote discussion of new possibilities in European literature, art,
philosophy, and sociology. ^ But the new society which Nautet sees
taking shape at the exposition bears little resemblance to the possibili-
ties envisioned either by the revolutionaries of 1789 or by contemporary
socialists. Instead, Nautet writes, recent expositions like that of 1889
are "fairs of incredible wealth where pure science is obliterated by the
commercial element, simple mercantilism, selling, and even more by
the picturesque element. " Sightseers tour the industrial exhibitions in
the Gallery of Machines not to examine inventions but to enjoy the
airy immensity of the building which makes "a delicious promenade. "
The "banal curiosity" of the crowd is even more aroused by the sight
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of luxurious sleeping-cars and locomotives which inspire reveries of
travel. This curiosity is so naive, so childlike-
-for the crowd re-
sponds to the most trifling amusement with gaiety and awe-
-that it is
almost charming in its absurdity. When by chance visitors wander into
pavilions featuring serious exhibitions, they scowl and hurry to rum-
mage around elsewhere for amusement. "In general, the French
masses are interested in something only if it serves as an element of
pleasure. "
Nautet explains that pleasure may be found at the exposition in the
form of theaters, concerts, circuses, palaces, panoramas, in twenty
different kinds of locomotion, but most of all in the pleasures of visiting
far-off places without having to budge. This painless voyaging is what
Nautet means by the dominance of the "picturesque element. " The
French are able to have
the entire universe.
. .place before their eyes its palaces, its
masterpieces, the variety of its spectacles, even reproducing
all the human types, with decor set up, with local color, with
the music, literature and customs of each nationality
represented. ^
Most pervasive of all is the picturesque element of the Orient: "The
whole Exposition is strewn with orientalism, with pure orientalism. "
The colonial annex on the Esplanade des Invalides is heaped with imita-
tions of Eastern temples and palaces and fortresses, pagodas and
mosques and minarets. On the Rue du Caire, "which positively takes
one to Egypt, " dark-haired maidens perform dances so sinuously
seductive that when he watches them Nautet feels he must be seeing
Salome dance before Herod. Only when the last gong is struck does
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the charm dissipate, the image of the Orient fade, the heady perfume
evaporate, and the dream disappear.^
Nautefs description of the 1889 exposition makes two major
points: the preference of the crowd for amusement over more serious
forms of edification, and the particular pleasure found in illusions of
the exotic. Nautet' s remarks may be tinctured by a Belgian sense of
superiority over the French, but his observations are by no means
unique. For example, they are seconded by the report of Octave
Mirbeau (1848-1917), who is thoroughly French--a middle-aged, suc-
cussful man of letters whose writing tends towards a biting virulence
and whose political loyalties, based on a pity for the unfortunate and a
rage against injustice, tend towards anarchism. His caustic descrip-
tion of the 1889 exposition is, however, published in the eminently
respectable, politically conservative Revue des deux mondes: disgust
with the pleasure-seeking crowds of 1889 is found at all points on the
political spectrum. In an article pointedly titled "Pourquoi des Expo-
sitions ?" [why expositions?!
,
Mirbeau denounces the fair as a fraud.
"If gigantic galleries and ruinous palaces are constructed in honor of
industry, it is basically only to try to cover over with the noise of their
machines the noise of the orgy which rages outside. . . The falsity
and confusion of the exposition are revealed in its architecture, a heap
of styles from all times, all places, constructed from false stone,
false marble, false gold, imitation iron, and fake earthenware. Even
the intelligent visitor, laments Mirbeau, can hardly retain his self-
possession in the midst of the chaos.
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Mirbeau concludes his remarks with the parable of an unnamed
(and possibly imaginary) "philosopher friend" who initially finds the
exposition a horrible mixture of international fair and religious pilgrim-
age, a place where he keeps bumping into people and things until he
has the impression that the exposition marks the end of something,
possibly of everything. Finally, even this sober philosophic spirit
grows excited as if there were an aphrodisiac in the air. Despite his
sixty-five years and white beard and lifetime of calm enjoyments, he
confesses, "I felt unknown desires run through my veins, fevers of
pleasures which I had not suspected before.
.
.
" Forgetting about meta-
physical discussions, the philosopher puts a flower in his lapel and
heads for exotic restaurants to drink champagne, flirt with women, and
admire Javanese and African dancing girls
who dance with their throats, with their bellies, with everything.
I watch them, not as an observer, not as a philosopher,
. . .1
watch them for pleasure only, and my pleasure is base.
. . O
Verlaine ! O Swinburne ! who would ever have thought that I would
someday experience the execrable passions you have sung!
Mirbeau wrote his comments in 1895, at a time when plans for the
1900 exposition were being laid amid general debate over the morality
and utility of such events. ^ When the plans went ahead despite opposi-
tion from Mirbeau and others, the critics had the satisfaction of
claiming prescience when the 1900 exposition, by general consensus,
turned out to be even more commercialized and chaotic than its pre-
decessor. The exotic flowers of 1889 which disturbed Nautet and
Mirbeau only bloomed more vigorously after eleven years' dormancy.
33
The continued shift in emphasis from the heroic realities of production
to enjoyable dreams of consumption was visibly evident in the physical
appearance of the two fairs. In 1889 the two outstanding structures
were the Eiffel Tower and Gallery of Machines. The Eiffel Tower,
whose architecture was derived from that of iron railway bridges, was
intended as a monument to the productive forces of science and industry
and was further justified as an eminently useful structure for meteoro-
logical, aeronautical, and communications research. Despite these
pretenses to a serious purpose, the Tower was first and foremost
known for the thrilling view from the top. The Gallery of Machines
had a similarly ambiguous character. An enormous hall alive with
pounding hammers and churning wheels and clanking gears, the Gallery
was clearly intended as a monument to production but it too made a
"delicious promenade, " in Nautet's words. In 1900 the Eiffel Tower
stood firm, all three hundred meters of it, since its value as a tourist
attraction overwhelmed any doubts as to its scientific utility. Mean-
while, the vault of the Gallery of Machines had been cut up and overrun
by a display of food products:
In 1900 the visitor. . .will not find this tableau of a universal
workshop there j^as in 1889!]. A festival hall has invaded the
center of the structure. The extremities are abandoned to
the rustic charms of agriculture and to the fattening joys of
eating. No more sharp whistles, trembling, clacking trans-
^
mission belts; nothing being released except champagne corks.
The triumph of consumption in the 1900 exposition was also evident in
its display arrangements. For the first time machines were not
gathered into one place but were scattered throughout the grounds next
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to the items they produced. The forces of production, formerly viewed
in isolation as pure monuments to human progress, were now regarded
as hopelessly bormg unless placed next to the items they turned out for
the market. And in the 1900 fair the means of production were less
prominent not only because they were dispersed, but also because the
greater reliance on electricity meant the working parts were more
often hidden and silent.
The difference in character between the two events is eloquently
described by Eug^ne-Melchior de Vogu4 ( 1848- 19 1 0), who wrote eight
articles on the 1889 exposition and one lengthy one on the 1900 fair, all
of which were published in the Revue des deux n^ndes
. Both the
first set of articles and the one on the 1900 exposition will be described
here in order to show how the spectacle of crowds enjoying a fantasy
world, already discerned by de Vogue in 1889, had by 1900 become so
dominant and disturbing that it made him extremely pessimistic about
the future of France. Like Nautet and Mirbeau, de Vogue published
literary criticism, his best-known work being a study of contemporary
Russian novelists such as Tolstoy and Dostoevsky which first introduced
them to French readers. His social background, however, was far
more elegant than Nautet's or Mirbeau's, and his politics considerably
more conservative. Of aristocratic lineage, a member of the French
Academie, frequent guest in the best salons, a former diplomat,
de Vogiie was a mildly progressive Catholic democrat who served as
an Opportunist deputy and sought to reconcile the revolutionary tradition
35
with the Catholic Church, and capital with labor. These political
interests combined with his literary talents earned him a reputation as
"the Chateaubriand of the Third Republic. "^"^
In observing the 1889 exposition, however, the aristocratic
de Vogu^ shares the feeling of the socialist Nautet and the demi-
anarchist Mirbeau that he is seeing an unprecedented transformation,
"a rupture of the old equilibrium by new conditions of existence.
. . a
crisis of history, " next to which political revolutions, even that of
1789, are only a game. In the "monumental chaos" along the Seine he
discerns the vague outline of a new society, "the eye of a world that
1
2
will be tomorrow. " He too notes the jumbled nomadism and
debauchery of the 1889 fair, but despite his apprehensions about these
qualities he finds much to admire, especially in the display of lighted
fountains which light up the night like artificial flowers, bringing
"indulgence and illusion" in a blend of engineering and poetry. Even
here, though, de Voglie is disquieted by the atavistic submission of the
crowd to the hypnotic spectacle of falling rainbows, cascading jewels,
and flaming liquids. At first, he observes, the crowd cheered each
change in the fountain display: ".
. . people were still in France. Little
by little silence was imposed, hypnotism worked its effects, the
onlookers were melted down into. . . the placid soul of the perfect fakir. '
Yet de Vogiie refuses to be too disturbed by the wide-eyed rapture of
the crowd before these lovely illusions:
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Welcome progress, if one considers that without this charming
sorcery, the majority of these men would stupefy themselves in
the desolating absurdities of the caf6-concert! Who knows,
besides, if the lighted fountain, today a simple object of amuse-
ment, will not be for the painter and the thinker the occasion of
fertile thoughts and experiences. 13
Indeed, it is another lighting display which occasions de Vogue's
most optimistic and lyrical article on the 1889 exposition. He
tells how he climbed the Eiffel Tower at dusk to view Paris as its
different quarters were one by one plunged into an abyss of shadow:
A few lights were illuminated, soon multiplied to infinity; myriads
of fires filled the bottom of this abyss, outlining strange con-
stellations, joining those of the celestial vault at the horizon. One
might have said a reversed firmament, continuing the other, with
a greater richness of stars.
Suddenly gigantic spotlights at the top of the Tower were turned on and
moved to and fro across the city, touching the spires of Notre Dame.
De Vogue sees them as symbols proclaiming the essential unity of the
forces of science and industry with those of faith and tradition. He
imagines a dialogue of reconciliation exchanged by the new iron tower
and the ancient stone ones. As he descends the Eiffel Tower, the spot-
lights sweep around to trace "a dazzling cross, a gigantic labarum .
The sign of pity and of prayer was raised on the Tower by this new
light, this immaterial force which becomes brightness on high. " Lest
his readers think that he is becoming too serious in what is generally
a gracefial, deftly written series, de Vogue warns, tongue in cheek,
"That is what I thought I heard on the Tower. Up there one is subject
to dizziness; this night was made for dreaming, and one might have
had at least a moment of hallucination. "-^^ Still, the lovely vision of
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Christian reconciliation and hope remaix^ more then compensating for
the more disturbing hallucination of spectators transformed into pagan
worshippers before the lighted fountains.
Even when the dazzling visions are fled, de Vogii^ retains his
optimism that the transformation revealed by the 1889 exposition is
basically a promising one. After the exposition has ended, de Vogue
wanders around its site under bleak November skies and wonders,
"Was it then a dream, the departed vision? Were they also dreams,
our refound forces, our grandeur which we do not tire of contemplating
in this mirror? " Without hesitation he responds to his own question:
"No. The image may disappear, it has produced its useful effects.
France had experienced a surge of national energy, pride, and unity. "
The dream was genuine and beneficial, for it served to strengthen
France in reality.
In 1900 the only dreams he finds inspired by the exposition are
debased ones of merchandising. The imposing, and for de Vogue
unforgettable, vista of the Gallery of Machines now reminds him of a
secularized temple, for it is crammed with champagnes and chocolates.
In 1900 crowds are mesmerized only the the "irresistible attraction"
of glass boxes where under the glare of electric lights "waxen prin-
cesses" display the creations of leading couturiers. De Voglie notes
with disgust that bourgeois and working class women, counter girls
and streetwalkers alike shove for room in this "ladies' paradise. "
Even more disturbing than the fact that most visitors come for
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amusement rather than self-instruction- - "That's not dignified, but
that's the way it is"--is the exposition's utter lack of organization, in
contrast to the 1889 event where the Eiffel Tower and Gallery of
Machines had provided focal points. ^ The 1900 exposition has many
spectacular individual effects, but nothing holds them together. The
overall impression is that of incoherence and anarchy:
Order- -this word which used to be ordinary, and which dis-
appears along with the need which it expressed in days when
a work of art, a book, a festival, a group of buildings was
valued only for the subordination of all its parts to a directing
idea- -order is more and more absent. 18
When de Vogue contemplates the "deceased exhibition" of 1900, he fears
the French people are being poisoned by the false idea that it is an
honor to entertain the world in halls stiiffed with merchandise. If this
base concept of grandeur continues to spread, if the French are unable
to wake up to reality, they might celebrate a jubilee in the year 2000 by
holding up a colossal mirror which reveals not French grandeur but
national decadence.
The Significance of the Expositions
The remarks of Nautet, Mirbeau, and de Vogue on the expositions
are by no means unique in their tone and judgments. They have been
selected from a much larger number of commentaries for their succinct
and vivid expression of patterns of response found in these other
sources too. They were also selected because they demonstrate how
similar interpretations of the expositions may be found in writers of
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very different political and cultural backgrounds. What are some com-
mon elements of the commentaries made by Nautet, Mirbeau, and
de Vogul? To begin with, all three understand the expositions as
visions of what France is, or rapidly is becoming. They see the rela-
tionship between what is happening in the fairgrounds and what is
happening in France at large not as one of causality-
-one localized
event leading to larger ones--but of prophetic vision--one event pro-
viding a focal point for larger changes. Those changes might be sensed
in a vague way as they gradually occur, but the expositions provide con-
crete evidence of them and the immediacy of the sense impressions they
convey is far more powerful than any intellectual awareness alone.
Therefore de Vogue's analogy of a mirror is especially apt. In both
his relative optimism of 1889 and his pessimism of 1900 he assumes
the expositions reflect larger changes in French society, because a
mirror sends back an image of reality which is selective, focused, and
thus clarifying. In another context de Vogue uses a more contem-
porary analogy and compares the expositions to instantaneous, invol-
untary photographs which show the imprint of grand historical move-
2 1ments on things. But the metaphor which de Vogiie and others use
most frequently to describe the significance of the expositions is that
of a city. The expositions are seen as microcosms of Paris itself. In
de Vogue's words, the 1889 exposition constitutes "the city of today.
. .
the city of iron, the cosmopolitan and knowledgeable city, built of us
22in our own image. '"''^ In other words, the expositions provide a scale
model not of all France, but of urbanized, progressive France--the
France of the future, not of the past.
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Nautet, Mirbeau, and de VogUe share not only an awareness of
the prophetic significance of the expositions, but also an emotional
reaction to that prophecy, a reaction which might best be described as
apprehensive bewilderment or ill-defined foreboding. The bewilder-
ment comes from the feeling that the future revealed by the expositions
does not conform to any of the standard expectations -
-not to socialist
expectations of a workers' society, nor to the solid bourgeois ideals
represented by Mirbeau's philosopher friend, nor to de Vogue's hopes
for a Catholic republic. Instead, the culture of the expositions seems
a strange new mutation, alien and therefore bewildering to all three
commentators. They are apprehensive about this phenomenon which is
so difficult to understand. Their reaction to the exposition-city of
pleasure, fantasy, and exoticism, this jumbled chaos of gadgets and
attractions, is one of unease. The future revealed here is not one they
welcome. Even if they are not sure just what is being revealed by the
expositions, they are disturbed by it,
Raymond Williams has suggested that the cultural historian
look for "structures of feeling" in analyzing emotional response to his-
torical changes. For example, he discerns a pattern of extension and
then withdrawal of sympathy for working class militancy underlying the
23
plots of various English novels of the 1840's. Perhaps it is too
ambitious to call the common response of Nautet, Mirbeau, and
de Vogue a structure of feeling, but we are dealing here with at least
a unity of mood in the mixture of confusion and \inease which underlies
the narrative lines of these three disparate observers. Finding this
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common emotional response to the expositions is not proof of anything
for the historian, but only a clue, a suggestion that similarly ambig-
uous responses might be sought among other contemporaries
witnessing the same cultural changes. The expositions provided a
mirror of the future for French thinkers then and also provide a
mirror of the past for the historian today who wants to define and
clarify the vague but nonetheless powerful feelings of those who first
confronted an important cultural change. Once alerted to a pattern of
emotional response, the historian may legitimately attempt to define
reasons for that pattern, reasons which may not have been evident to
contemporaries. We have already noted that Nautet, Mirbeau, and
de VogUe are uneasy about what they see at the expositions without
being able to explain very precisely the source of their unease. May
not the historian attempt to be more precise? Let us venture an hypo-
thesis which might illuminate their response and then test it by seeing
if it also obtains in other appropriate contexts besides that of the
expositions.
First of all, it is necessary to reject the notion that Nautet,
Mirbeau, and de Vogue are simply puritanical snobs who do not want
people to have a good time. This is the accusation made by Henri
Chardon in. a 1896 response to Mirbeau's "Pourquoi des Expositions?"
Their exchange was part of the general debate at that time over the
desirability of holding another fair to usher in the new century.
Chardon asks why Mirbeau, or anyone else, should become uneasy at
the sight of people enjoying themselves:
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It is because the crowd is iovful fh^t if ; ^
back home, unfortunate ones
! this ephemeral joy^ll pI;syou have caught a glimpse of splendors and will beZlv mo;.
tt:=1 ZT'--'- di^n': s^el^n^o^: "
Chardon's point is legitimate, but Mirbeau, nor Nautet nor de Vogue"
for that matter, is not objecting to pleasure per se. There is some-
thing about the quality of that pleasure which unsettles them, and in the
rest of his article Chardon himself unintentionally suggests what that
quality might be. His theme is the commercial success of expositions.
While admitting that the original idea behind expositions was for visitors
to come as students learning the "lesson of things" which their cen-
tury of progress has to teach them, Chardon makes it clear that in
favoring the 1900 exposition he regards the visitors first and foremost
as consumers. Expositions are "huge store counters" because
Commerce today lives by advertising Expositions secure for
the manufacturer, for the businessman, the most striking public-
ity. In one day they bring before his machine, his display, his
shop windows, more people than he would see in a lifetime in
his factory or store. They seek out clients in all parts of the
world, bring them at a set time, so that everything is ready to
receive them and seduce them. That is why the number of
exhibitors increases steadily. 25
The prizes and ribbons awarded at the conclusion, which provide even
more persuasive means of advertising, are only supplementary induce-
ments. The bulk of Chardon's article is devoted to a windy defense of
the role of expositions in "encouraging new spending" and iri'developing
26consumption, " backed up by statistics on numbers of visitors and
how much they spend.
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Only after all this testimony to the commercial purpose of
expositions does Chardon pause and jokingly apologize for having
treated visitors to them as simply "a herd of consumers, rich prey
for the exhibitors to fight over. "^^ it is at this point that Chardon
goes on to defend the joyful crowd against would-be moralists like
Mirbeau. What Chardon fails to point out--and this is the very point
which, I suggest, troubles Mirbeau, Nautet, and de Vogue-- is that
the joyful crowd and the "herd of consumers" are identical people, that
the pleasures they indulge in are business products or means of adver-
tising those products. The conjunction of retailing and of fantasy, of
advertising and pleasure palaces, of sales pitch and amusement is
more disturbing than either element taken in isolation. The expositions
serve two purposes at once- -that of the crowd in seeking fun-filled
escape from the workaday world, and that of the businessman in selling
products, either directly in the form of selling entertainment like cafe-
concerts or theatrical performances, or indirectly in using the exposi-
tions as huge store counters. These purposes are not contradictory
but complementary. The world of business, far from being the polar
opposite of the world of pleasurable reverie, exploits the customer's
imagination to sell its merchandise. The blend of fantasy and business
is bewildering because illogical and novel: it is disturbing because in
its pleasures the public is being duped on a vast scale. Their dream
world is no dream at all, only a sales pitch.
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If the expositions were indeed unreal cities revealing what was
happening in the real c.ties of France, then this symbiosis of fantasy
and commerce should be observable elsewhere in France at that time
and ^ve rise to similar responses. In presenting the evidence that this
is indeed so. the discussion will shift back and forth between the
expositions and French society at large in order to demonstrate that
the dream world of the expositions does indeed mirror the development
of a larger dream world outside its gates. Three specific types of
illusion that serve commercial purposes will be described as they
appear both within the expositions and without: illusions of exotic
places, of fairyland kingdoms, and of wealth. (A few remarks will also
be made regarding the commercial exploitation of erotic fantasies.
)
Discussion of exotic and fairytale fantasies will involve a number of
writers who were for the most part too limited in their production to
acknowledge as major thinkers; nonetheless they produced writings of
particular insight and succeeded in combining aesthetic and social
commentary in a general criticism of contemporary culture. Discus-
sion of the fantasy of wealth, the most pervasive dream of all, will focus
on the work of Georges d'Avenel, whose contribution as an historian of
consumption is at once significant and unrecognized. In all cases these
writers transcend disciplinary boundaries and attain the status of social
prophets. By social prophecy is not meant detailed predictions of the
crystal ball variety, but precocious awareness of the significance of
general social changes then in progress. At times their ability to
conceptualize those changes is inadequate, but at least they begin to
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furnish intellectual categories and to direct attention to cultural develop,
rnents which would be of i„,^ense in^portance in the future we now
inliabit.
Exotic Themes: The School of Trocad^rn
One of the most vivid impressions left by the 1889 and 1900
expositions, as recorded not only by the three commentators cited here
but also by many others, was the predominance of exhibits intended to
convey the illusion of being in faraway, romantic places. Both fairs
were permeated by (to use Nautefs term) the "picturesque. " In 1889
the colonial annex located at the Trocad^ro on the right bank of the
Seine--a gaudy jumble of mosques, fortresses, and palaces, of which
the Rue du Caire was by far the most notorious quarter-shared honors
with the Eiffel Tower as the most popular attraction. In 1900 the
colonial annex retained its popularity, while other exhibits which gave
a dynamic illusion of travel, such as traversing Siberia in a railroad
car or sailing across the Mediterranean, were also thronged by visitors
eager to fulfill dreams of voyaging to exotic places where only the
exceptionally rich or adventurous could journey in reality. Those
dreams are the common motivation behind the colonial exhibits, which
depended on static decorative styles to convey an illusion of the exotic,
and the imaginary voyages exhibits, which depended on dynamic
techniques. We shall discuss these two categories separately, for the
implications of each are rich enough to merit individual attention. In
rom
m
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both cases discussion will center around a description of relevant
exposition exhibits by one who n.ight be called an exceptionally
perceptive and critical tour guide.
Our guide to the colonial exhibits is Maurice Talmeyr (1850-
1933), a conservative nationalist who reported on the 1900 exposition
for the Catholic journal Le Correspondant in a series which ran frc
early 1899 to the opening of the exposition in the spring of 1900. 28
That series proved a seedbed for themes which were summarized i:
another article, "L'f cole du Trocad^ro" [The school of Trocad^ro]
,
published in Revue des deux mondes in November 1900 as the exposition
drew to a close. ^9 The title of the latter article, which will be the
focus of this discussion, is an ironic reference to innumerable solemn
proclamations that the expositions are educational, that their chief pur-
pose is to teach lessons in the arts and industry, in sociology and
ethnology, ineconomic and military and scientific subjects, in every-
thing imaginable. Talmeyr suggests he has indeed learned a lesson at
the colonial annex of the Trocad^'ro, but not necessarily what the
exhibit intended to teach. The Trocad^'ro is a schoolroom of "Hindu
temples, savage huts, pagodas, souks, Algerian alleys, Chinese,
Japanese, Sudanese, Senegalese, Siamese, Cambodian quarters. .. a
bazaar of climates, of architectural styles, of smells, of colors, of
cuisine, of music. " How can any lesson be derived from such chaos?
Talmeyr is startled by the way all this exotic decor is crammed into
one village:
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^^^^^^^ to\^;d^^.K^e^L^4'
^ir^p-r^-^^'
half' V ^ universe in a garden! A territory as bi. as
a dLi ^"""""^^ "^^^ condensed into five hundred square metersesert was recapitulated in a straw-hut a <.p^ i^Jt 'North met south, and the pole the equa^^r'. The same ^^^rentof air carried to you the smell of rushes from OceamaTndfurs from Kamchatka. 30 eani and of
Here is a veritable collapse of the world, which like a dying star
implodes to an unheard-of density.
But Talmeyr contends that the supreme lesson of the Trocad^ro
lies not in this disorderly syncretism but in its separate details. He
begins to look closely at particular exhibits and finds even more
startling evidence of discontinuities and illogicalities. At the Javanese
exhibit, for example, he notes that idols placed around the reproduction
of a Far Eastern temple bear the sign "Fire Alarm" on their sides. The
sturcture itself, supposedly a reproduction of the ruined temple of
Djandi-Sari, is in perfect condition, looking as Djandi-Sari must have
appeared before the invading Chinese had destroyed it centuries before.
Talmeyr asks himself just what this elaborate replica is supposed to
represent:
Java today? No, because [the temple] is in ruins. Ancient
Java?
. . .
We doubt it, and [ancient Java] does not seem to me
to be felt in this edifice all white, all fresh and all new, over
which firemen watch. One is instinctively put on guard by
new plaster. One could almost believe oneself in the room of
a new crematory on the eve of its inauguration. ... Is this
really old Java? 31
The details of the Indian exhibit make as little sense. It features a
carefully contrived pantomine, acted out by a group of stviffed animals,
showing an elephant with uplifted trunk trumpeting a speech to some
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hens between his feet, while next to him a wild boar browses near a
serpent which is coiled and ready to strike. In the same neighborhood
a couple of stuffed jaguars are shown feeding their young, while a rose
ibis, "evidently surprised, " surveys the whole tableau while standing
on one foot. Just as the colonial exhibit as a whole represents the
collapse of vast regions into a few acres, the Indian exhibit shows the
wildlife of an entire sub-continent condensed into one scene. Talmeyr
confesses that the exhibit is as entertaining as rereading the fables of
La Fontaine,
But the "lesson? " The lesson that they are giving us? . . . Once
again, that all trickery is childish. They don't want to show
us anything serious, and we have nothing to ask that's serious.
But isn't this precisely the vice of all these exoticisms of the
exposition? They offer themselves as serious in not being so,
and when they cannot be. 32
Talmeyr finds the same deception-
- childish fancies masquerading
as serious realities --in the remainder of the Indian exhibition, devoted
to stacks of merchandise, rugs, cotton balls, plates, sacks of rice,
fabrics, jams, all of which remind him of a "sort of Louvre or Bon
March^ of Tyre or Baghdad. " (The Louvre and the Bon March^ are
two of the largest department stores in Paris. ) Here is the spectacle
of India as a land of overflowing treasure chests, as enticing and
exciting a vision of the exotic as any child could imagine. But that
vision hides what is "serious and adult" about India, the reality of
India, the reality of India as a subjugated English colony:
The notion of such an India, of an India- store, so magnificent
and so partially true as it may be, is true only partially, so
partially to be false, and all these overflowing rooms. . . speak
to me only of an incomplete and truncated India, that of the
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cashiers. And the other? That of the famine? For this landof enormous and sumptuous trade is equally that of a friohteninglocal degeneracy, of a horrifying indigenous misery. A^who'e
'
phantom-race dies there and suffers there xn famine. India isnot only a warehouse, it is a cemetary. The prosperousEnglishman collides there with the emaciated Indian.
. Onelooks for Indian humanity in the India of the Trocad€ro butone doesn't find it there, and we see only, as natives, five orSIX guards, very ugly, very yellow.
. . but dressed in dazzling
costumes, encircled by gold belts, a:nd so perfectly healthy
that although they are Indians they still represent for us onlvprosperous England. 33 '
For the moment, Talmeyrdoes not dwell on this somber analysis
of what the seemingly harmless deceptions of the Trocad^ro are
covering up. Instead, he continues to give examples of the misrepre-
sentations which abound there. At an exhibit representing Andalusia in
the time of the Moors, he attends a sort of circus where camels replace
the usual horses-
-"Camel exercises, camel cavalcades, trained camels
which kneel, camels which bow, camels which dance "-
-while spectators
are sold lemonade and beer by hawkers in a room lined with rugs for
sale, their prices prominently marked. For two cents the public may
also view licentious scenes through a stereoscope. "Perhaps, after
this spectacle, there still remained something for us to learn about the
Moors of Andalusia, " Talmeyr remarks sarcastically, so he tells how
he went down a staircase to a small courtyard, "deliciously archaic, "
full of pretty and curious items, complete with vaults, colvimns, an
old well, armaments, and so forth:
We are here, evidently, in the most legendary Spain, and there
is indeed, this time, a well-done reproduction, of great fidelity
and delicacy. I feel, in these old walls, in this broken well, in
these small columns which are crumbling, in coat of arms which
is obliterated, five centuries of mystery and of sunshine. . . Then,
I look, I observe more closely, and I notice, above the door, in
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the patina of the stone, like the tracing of Gothic letters
I approach, and what is it I make out?
Simply: Menier Chocolate.
. .
Talmeyr attends a performance at the Egyptian theater, a vast room,
rich and comfortable, with balconies and boxes and orchestra seats,
although there has never been any sort of theater in Egypt at all. The
so-called Egyptian play is a potpourri of Persian, Arab, and Turkish
themes. Talmeyr feels it is unnecessary to keep adding to his list of
absurdities, since all these exhibitions show the same character "of
nullity, of buffoonery, and gross alteration or absolute falsity. ""^^
What kind of lesson, then, does Talmeyr learn at this school of
the absurd? One lesson has already been noted, that these laughable,
childish attractions divert attention from what is serious and real about
colonialism, its poverty and misery and exploitation. As Talmeyr
brings his article to a close, he goes on to state another lesson, not
what the exhibits hide but what they reveal. Behind the "ornamental
3 6delirium" of the Trocad^ro, behind the seemingly mad disorder and
absurd incongruities, lies a strictly logical ordering principle: the
submission of truth, of consistency, of taste, of all other considera-
tions to the principle of business. Talmeyr's summary of the lesson
of the Trocad^ro is worth quoting at length:
An exposition must, above all, be an exposition, which is to say
a certain type of didactic banking whose first goal is to attract,
to hold, and to attract and to hold by the exclusive means of the
bank. As a result, were there a scholar of the most serious
merit, the exhibitor of exoticism will begin by plundering the
scholar. A framework is provided for him, and he will confine
himself within it. Obligations of price, of economy, of place-
ment, of health are imposed on him, and he submits to them.
And the quest for success, for attraction, for show, for excite-
ment, for everything that amuses, for all that diverts, will
necessarily be his guideline. Truth, history, common sensewill be arranged afterwards as best they can. So w^y the
-fi^e
fs b "th-
°'
K
°' whose^rchaism. assured^;
IS y this submitted to a severe ordeal? Because there existsno consideration of archaism to prevail, in an exposition
against considerations of safety.
. . . And why does the old'temple
which IS a rum in Java, become, on the banks of the Seine a
'
pretty crematory thrown up completely new? Because the'simple
reproduction of ruins would not make.
. . much of an impression
and It IS necessary to make an impression. And why, in English
India, do the panther, the wild boar, the partridge, the elephant,
the monkey, the ibis, and the serpent present themselves all in
a family, and form this touching commune? Because this fablegathers them together, and it matters, above all, to gatherthem together. And why is starving India incarnated in well-
coiffed, well-nourished, well-bedecked Indians? Because
famine is not and cannot be an exposition item And why does
Andalusia--in the time of the Moor s
-- recommend Menier
Chocolate to us? Because the authentic Moors and the authentic
Andalusia do not, according to all appearances, sufficiently
allow for advertisements, and an exposition is not going, never
has gone, and never will go without advertisements.
. . . And why,
especially, an Egyptian theater, when Egypt and the theater
exclude each other? Always by the same necessity to amuse and
to solicit and because everything, in an exposition, gives way to
this necessity. What is more enticing than a theater ?-
-Nothing
!
--We shall therefore open an Egyptian theater !-- But there has
never been an Egyptian theater! --We shall present Egyptian sub-
jects! --But your subjects. .. are only Turkish, Arabic, or
Persian subjects, and your spectacles, instead of the history of
the Pharoahs, tell us that of the Caliphs !
--That's because
Persia is more scenic, Arabia more heroic, and the Caliphs
more elegant !- -And you are still the Egyptian theater? --We are
still the Egyptian theater! 37
By this time, Talmeyr's slashing pen has just about demolishe(
the suspiciously new plaster and pasteboard facades of the Trocaderc
A host of other contemporary writers remark on the jumble of exotic
decor at both the 1889 and 1900 expositions, and most of them, like
Nautet, Mirbeau, and de Vogiie, are themselves confused by all the
confusion, instinctively distressed without quite knowing why.
Talmeyr is unique in seeing through the chaos to the logic behind.
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Moreover, he demonstrates that the exploitation of exotic themes for
business purposes inevitably results in falsehood. Over and over the
claim is made that the colonial exhibits present the real Java, the real
China, and so forth, so that a visit to them is supposed to constitute a
genuine fulfillment of the dream of visiting these places. Talmeyr
exposes this claim as false advertising. Blatant lies and subtle ones,
lies of omission and ones of commission, lies in details and in the
ensemble--Talmeyr shows the heap of exotica as a heap of lies. When
exotic dreams are exploited by business, he says, they are corrupted
by falsehood.
A distinction should be made here between dream and falsehood,
between fantasy and deceit. Fantasy which openly presents itself as
such may claim to point to truth beyond everyday experience, what
Keats called the "truth of the imagination" as opposed to concrete fact.
Dreams are truthful as long as they retain their distinct status as
dreams. At the Trocadero, however, fantasy is passed off as reality,
in this case as colonial reality. Fantasy loses its independent, auton-
omous status to become subservient to commerce. It takes on con-
crete form, masquerading as the real thing, and so loses its liberating
possibilities as an alternative to daylight reality in becoming a disguise
for the reality of merchandising. There are all sorts of levels of
dreaming, ranging from mild wishful thinking, when one is qmte aware
of indulging in a daydream, to the much more serious level when
mental images are substituted for external reality in a thorough and
tenacious way. What is involved here is the latter pathological type of
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ma-
fantasy. The possible consequences are troubling if indeed the imag
tion, that uniquely hunnan capacity which allows people to live beyond
their imnriediate experiences, can be so readily captured by the market.
Before taking leave of Talmeyr, it is important to note his con-
clusion that truthfulness demands not less exercise of the imagination
but more. If people only stare at the Indian bazaar and buy its rugs or
fabrics with no questions asked, the realities of colonialism will
remain buried beneath the merchandise. Talmeyr's imagination is too
active to be satisfied with a lazy acceptance of the decor. He goes
beyond what is displayed to what is not displayed, imagining the
emaciated Indians who are not exhibited, and furthermore imagining
why they have been omitted. Talmeyr contends that laziness accounts
for the success of business in exploiting dreams, for everyone wants
to see far-off places but no one wants to go to the trouble of traveling:
It is not we who go to the mountain but the mountain which comes
to us! Only, is it the real Japan, the real New World, and the
genuine Honolulu which come? Isn't it a suspect Japan, a con-
traband New World, a Honol\ilu from a menu?. . .
Bah! We don't look to closely at it, and our whole concern
has become to avoid all effort above all. 39
Talmeyr concludes his article by arguing that this horror of effort,
especially the effort necessary to use enough imagination to confront
reality rather than to evade it, lies at the root of many other distressing
social trends. Business only exploits a widespread passivity. People
love to assume there is a short cut, an easy way out of every difficulty,
and they want to be deceived because it is easier that way:
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Neither the voyage difficult to make, nor the language difficultto speak nor the marriage difficult to endure, we want nomore of that, and the same psychology is at the basis of thelaw on divorce, the decrees which suppresses participles,
and that which authorizes the opening of a Malasian sectionCat the exposition!. The first tells us, "To be married, youdon t need to be " The second: "To write French, you don'tneed to know It. " And the third: "To go to Malasia, you don'tneed to go there. " Easy methods! But are we really sure ofswimming m the ocean by putting a box of salt in our bathtub
and of returning from China, India, or the Sudan in returningfrom the Trocad€ro?40 ^
The Decor of Exoticism Outside the Expositions
Talmeyr therefore concludes that the colonial exhibits which pur-
port to tell us pleasing truths about distant places actually tell us
some unpleasant truths about French society. The Trocad€ro is a
microcosm not of India, nor of Egypt, nor of Japan, but of France.
The parallels which Talmeyr draws are extremely general, for they
rely on a broad accusation of mental laziness among the French people.
He compares what he sees at the Trocadero to other phenomena outside
its walls which are much less visible and precise, such as changes in
attitudes towards marriage and language. This is not to say that
Talmeyr 's analogy is invalid, only that it is difficult to demonstrate its
validity. However, the analogy which we seek to demonstrate between
the commercial exploitation of exotic dreams within the exposition and
similar exploitation elsewhere may be substantiated by finding quite
precise visual parallels in the use of exotic (especially colonial)
themes in decor. Talmeyr 's comments on the 1900 exposition
suggest that certain decorative traits inevitably result when "didactic
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banking" entices customers through appealing to exotic fantasies:
syncretism, anachronism, illogicality, flamboyance, childishness.
It is a style which without undue flippancy might be termed the chaotic-
exotic. This decor is the visual result of the desire to put visions of
distant places into palpable form. If this style were a rare bloom
which needed the lush soil of the expositions' never-never land, then
its absurd foliage would not so easily take root in the ordinary clay of
the real world. But if Talmeyr is correct in claiming that the principle
of business is what plants and fertilizes this strange vegetation, then
its efflorescence would appear outside the exposition in other situations
where business seeks to attract customers. Our assumption is that
similar distinctive decorative styles suggest similar motivating princi-
ples; as de Vogiie said when he toured the 1889 exposition, we must
look above all for "the latent ideas \inderneath the sensible forms. "'^^
It is not necessary to look far or long for examples. From an
abundance of possibilities we shall examine one, the Paris Automobile
Salon, which demonstrates with particular clarity that there is no
significant distinction between commercial practices inside and outside
the expositions. Beginning in 1901 an annual Automobile Salon was
held in the Grand Palais, a massive iron structure topped by an
enormous glass dome. Located off the Champs-Elysees, it was
originally built for the 1900 exposition. Like the expositions, the
Salons claimed an educational function in demonstrating recent advances
in automotive technology, but like them their educational function was
strictly subordinate to their commercial one of attracting present or
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future customers, in this case for a novel and incredibly promising
product. As miniature expositions, the Automobile Salons attracted
truly impressive crowds. In 1904 the opening was attended by forty
thousand people (compared to ten thousand who attended the opening
of the annual painting salon), and thirty thousand came each day for
the first week. Each afternoon the Champs
-Elys ^es was thronged
with crowds making their way to the Grand Palais. ^2 Because it was
so tremendously popular and because the Grand Palais and the auto-
mobiles inside were so visually novel and striking, the Salons elicited
comment from a number of writers who tried to assess the spectacle
both for its aesthetic and moral significance. (Some of these remarks
will be examined in more detail later in discussing the electrical
lighting of the Grand Palais. ) It is fair to summarize the overall mood
of the writers as similar to that of Nautet, Mirbeau, and de Vogue
commenting on the expositions: they are somewhat bewildered and
apprehensive and above all conscious that something important is being
revealed by this spectacle of crowds, cars, lights, glass, iron, and
noise.
On the decoration of the exhibition stands, however, these critical
visitors pass judgment without hesitation. They are appalled. The
booths featured everything from doorways plastered to resemble those
of Persian mosques or Egyptian temples, to bamboo huts hung with
Japanese lanterns, to Gothic arcades, to ships' masts complete with
ropes, sails, and flags. Neo-Grecian porticos nestled next to palm
trees, while sphinxes made from false bronze rested on false
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mahogany. In the words of one critic, horrified by this "so-called
artistic elenraent" of the Automobile Salon, the stands are "an inco-
herent heap of the most laughable imaginings" which the French should
feel thoroughly ashamed to display to the world, except that the displays
of foreigners were equally ridiculous.
This is the decorative style of the Trocad^ro set down in the
middle of a herd of automobiles. What are these colonial themes
doing there? There is no reason to convince the customer that he is
being transported to the real South Seas or to the real Egypt. Outside
the exposition setting, exotic decor tends to mean the use of particular
motifs scattered here and there, juxtaposed with the merchandise,
rather than its use to create a total illusion of being in a distant land.
But what does a motif like a sphinx or a palm tree have to do with the
merchandise in question, an automobile? The connection is not logical,
obviously, since the product and place have only the most tenuous rela-
tion at best. The association is that of fantasy: a product is elevated
above the everyday through its connection with a romantic place. Thus
exotic motifs helped resolve the discrepancy, so often noted by con-
temporaries, between the power and beauty of productive machinery
and the banality of what it produces. By being associated with
glamorous places, the product is elevated in glamor, and consequently
in consumer appeal. The apparent lack of connection may be as total as
the incongruity of a sign advertising Menier Chocolates above a Moorish
doorway, but the same business logic is at work, to entice the customer
by appealing to his imagination. Again, however, deception reigns.
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The visual impact of the exotic decor distracts the onlooker from the
fact that there may be less to the product than meets the eye.
These points may be illustrated more fully by looking at anothe
example of exotic motifs in merchandising, this time from their use
department stores. Talmeyr's observation that the Indian exhibit at
the Trocad^ro resembles an Oriental Louvre or Bon March^ may be
reversed to say that French department stores increasingly resembled
exposition attractions. The development of large retail establishments
is almost as intimately related to the expositions as the inauguration of
the Automobile Salons. The evolution of the expositions and of depart-
ment stores alike had its source in the growing prosperity of France,
in "the transformation of techniques and the movement of business. "^^
Although histories of retailing furnish information on merchandising
practices, let us return to Zola's novel Au Bonheur des Dames
,
already
referred to in the Introduction, for an especially vivid and scarcely less
reliable description. According to his usual practice, Zola filled note-
books with research data before beginning to write, and he prided him-
self on the correspondance between the factual details in his novels and
historical actuality. Although Denise Baudu has been called the heroine
of Au Bonheur des Dames, in truth the department store itself domi-
nates the novel. The leading male character, Octave Mouret, owner of
the store, is an entrepreneur who experiments with the most advanced
retailing practices such as easy exchanges and credit; but like Denise,
who goes to work as a salesgirl there and eventually ends up marrying
Mouret, he is a cl\imsy, crude figure compared to the giant store
itself. Au Bonheur des Dames is described in lavish detail, and it
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seems to have much more vitality and personality than Mouret, Baudu,
or certainly its faceless customers. This is how Zola carefully de-
scribes the physiognomy of the store vestibule on the day of a big sale:
... the vestibule [was] changed into an Oriental salonFrom the doorway, it was a marvel, a surprise which
ravished them all. Mouret.
. . had just bought in the near Eastm excellent condition, a collection of old carpets and new car-
^v^^^
'^'^ carpets which only specialty merchants had
sold till then.very dearly: and he was going to flood the market,he gave them up at cut rates, extracting from them a simply
splendid decor, which ought to attract to this place the elegant
clientele of the art. From the middle of Place GaiUon, one
saw this oriental salon made only of rugs and curtains 'which
the stock boys had hung according to his orders. First of allfrom the ceiling were hung rugs from Smyrna, whose com-
plicated patterns stood out from the red background. Then,from the four sides, hung curtains: curtains of Karamanie'and
of Syria, zebra- striped in green, yellow and vermillion; cur-
tains from Diarbekir, more common, rough to the touch, like
_
shepherds' tunics; and still more rugs, which could serve as
wall hangings, long rugs from Hispahan, Teheran, and
Kermancha, larger rugs from Schoumaka and Madras, strange
flowering of peonies and palms, fantasy released in the garden
of dream. Underfoot, the rugs began again, a scattering of
thick fleece.
. . .
This tent of a sumptuous pasha was furnished
in armchairs and divans.
. . Turkey, Arabia, Persia, the Indies
were there. They had emptied the palaces, stripped the
mosques and the bazaars. Tawny gold dominated.
. .And visions
of the Orient floated under the luxury of this barbarous art, in
the midst of the strong odor which the old wools had kept of the
land of vermin and sunshine.
. .
[it was] the decor of a harem, planted at the door."^^
Zola adeptly conveys the emotional excitement caused by this display.
He tells of the increasing tempo of movement as customers drift into
the store through the vestibule, until by afternoon the building is filled
with a crush of noisy, excited, eager customers. At the end of the day,
some women arrange to meet in the Oriental salon so they can depart
together:
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They were leaving, but it was in the midst of a babbling crisisof admiration. Mme. Guibal herself was thrilled.
— Oh! delicious!...
— Isn't it truly a harem? And not expensive I
— The Smyrnan ones, ah! the Smyrnan ones! what tones
what finesse ! '
— And this one from Kurdistan, look! a Delacroix I "^"^
It turns out to be the most profitable day in the history of the store.
The lavish Oriental display not only sells rugs but also lures customers
into the store in the first place so they will buy other goods. All items
in the store are elevated in glamor and desirability by association with
the rug display.
We have already noted that syncretism-
-the illogical coexistence
of styles from all times and places--is a common element in exotic
decor, making it chaotic as well. The spectator is assaulted by dis-
connected stimuli which leave him satiated if not exhausted by their
sheer variety. Mouret's rug display suggests another way of satiating
the senses, this time through a barrage of repetition. In this technique
of display, an item is repeated over and over, with minor variations on
the same theme, so that the sheer accumulation becomes overwhelming
--just as the Andalusian exhibit described by Talmeyr featured camels
here, camels there, camels everywhere. In the rug display Mouret
achieves this crushing of the senses through repetition by piling rugs
over the floors, the walls, the ceiling, over all surfaces of the vesti-
bule, so that the shopper finds himself completely surrounded by
tawny luxury. If the same number of rugs were hung along a long wall,
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immerthe whole effect of being surrounded and the resulting thrill of
sion would have been lost. Zola gives other examples of the heightening
of excitement through repetition. For example, Mouret displays
umbrellas by covering an entire hall, top to bottom, along columns and
balustrades and staircases, with an ocean of opened umbrellas, which
thereby lose their ordinariness and instead seem like "large Venetian
lanterns, illuminated for some colossal festival, " a sight which makes
one shopper gasp, "It's a fairyland ! "^"^ Through repetition Mouret
manages to elevate the ordinary to the exotic and even the fairylike.
His genius for such display attains its most stunning coup in the
"exposition of white" he organizes to inaugurate the opening of a new
building. In the final chapter of the novel, where the description of this
exposition is obviously intended as a climactic hymn of praise to modern
merchandising, Zola describes in caressing detail the realm of white
Mouret creates. Once more the sense of the exotic is achieved through
repetition as shoppers are overcome by an Oriental architecture of
"white columns,
. . . white pyramids,
. . . white castles" constructed from
white handkerchiefs, "a whole city of white bricks.
. . standing out in a
50mirage against an Oriental sky, heated to whiteness. " In such dis-
plays exotic fantasies blend with oceanic ones, with dreams of bathing
in a realm of passive bliss, surrounded on all sides by comfort, a
fantasy of a return to the womb which has become a womb of
merchandise.
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According to Zola, the "crisis of admiration" excited by such
displays is comparable only to a crisis of sexual excitement in its
intensity and irresistibility. In fact, the plot of Au Bonheur dl^es
Dames centers on Mouret's attempts to seduce Denise in a literal
sense. All the time he is trying to conquer her sexually, he boasts
that he intends to seduce all the women of Paris in a commercial
sense, to lure them into his store, to arouse their passions to such a
pitch that they cannot resist submitting-
-and buying. The atmosphere
of the harem he constructs with rugs is entirely appropriate to his
whole operation. Similarly the exoticism of the expositions is closely
allied with the eroticism of a harem, especially at the notorious Rue
du Caire where dancing girls inflame the passions of male spectators.
In both cases the dream of the Orient is allied with a dream of sexual
passions which are supposedly liberated in more primitive places.
But if Zola is quite clear in comparing commercial and sexual
pleasures, he is quite confused in his moral judgment on the matter.
As we have seen in the Introduction, Denise is seduced by Au Bonheur
des Dames like any female shopper. Zola initially approves of her
response. For him the department store represents the forces of
progress resisted only by blind reactionaries like Denise's uncle
Baudu, who shakes his fist in impotent rage when the department store
across the street lures away his clientele. But then Zola applauds
Denise for her long and determined resistance to Mouret's attempts at
physical seduction, in contrast to many other female employees who
have readily submitted to him. Here her will is so strong and
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steadfast that he finally has to n.arry her in order to gratify his sexual
passions. Zola at once praises the surrender of commercial virginity
and retention of physical virginity. The commerce of the future depends
on gratifying one's lust to buy, while in the sphere of sexual conduct
those lusts are supposed to be restrained according to traditional
moral codes of conduct. Can desire be newly liberated in one area
while being restrained according to conventional morality in the other?
Zola's novel presents an unresolved conflict between an appeal to prog-
ress and an appeal to tradition which (as we shall see in Part Three)
keeps recurring in assessments of the consumer revolution.
The Aesthetic of Exoticism
The department store displays Mouret creates to inflame com-
mercial passion are unquestionably impressive: but are they art?
Zola certainly thinks so, for he praises Mouret as an aesthetic genius
as well as a financial one. In Zola's mind the two types of genius can-
not be distinguished. The aesthetic success of the exposition of white,
of the rug display, of the sea of open umbrellas, is in each case judged
by its success in arousing the passion to buy. Aesthetic criteria are
inextricably tangled with commercial ones, for the rug display would
not be judged an artistic success had it failed to attract customers to
the sale. The same confusion of values is implied in Mouret's repeti-
tious displays and also in the chaotic -exotic style of arched doorways,
columns, upturned roofs, and sphinxes which characterizes the
Trocadero exhibits and the stands of the Automobile Salon. No
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aesthetic criterion would defend such a heap of visual themes,
wrenched from their original context and dumped next to each other
without regard to beauty or order. However, this accumulation of
themes does serve a commercial purpose in attracting the attention
of the crowd by suggesting the romance of exotic locales. In all
cases the commercial motivation has distinctive visual results--the
overdone, the extravagant, the lavish, the silly, the bizarre-
-for
when the goal is first to startle and then to overwhelm the spectator,
these visual means are the most effective ones.
So to criticize the decorative style of exotica as "bad taste"
simply misses the point. As a quality of aesthetic judgment, taste does
not apply to displays whose primary purpose is to arrest the spectator's
attention, whether by repetition of one visual element or by accumula-
tion of many. The objective visual qualities of the display, its colors
and lines and textures, are not under scrutiny, but rather its ability to
attract and excite the viewer. What about all that fake mahogany, fake
bronze, fake marble? The purpose of the materials is not to express
their own character but to convey a sense of the lavish and foreign.
What about the hodge-podge of visual themes? The purpose is not to
express any internal consistency but to bring together anything that
expresses a distance from the ordinary. Thus the exotic decorative
style is impervious to objections of taste. It is not lady-like but
highly seductive. In this aesthetic demi-monde, exotic decor exists
as an intermediate form of life between art and commerce. It
resembles art, it has recognizable themes and stylistic traits, its
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comnnercial purposes are disguised in elaborate visual trappings; but
it does not participate m traditional artxstic goals of creating beauty
and harmony. Thxs hybrid form is an illusion of art, a "so-called
artistic element" deceptively posing as the genuine article.
By way of summary, let us return to Talmeyr. who m his series
-Notes sur 1 'Exposition" [Notes on the Exposition] in Le Correspondant
addresses himself directly to the question of why, in over fifty years,
expositions had not produced any art in their constructions, only a
"type of frightful plastered and clumsy heaviness, twisting or declama-
tory, of all those domes, all those balconies, all those pediments, all
those columns. " He finds the reason by making a distinction between
monuments and decors
,
the latter term meaning stage sets or scenery.
True architecture involves the construction of monuments, while
expositions require only decors
,
and it is pointless to judge the latter
by the standards of the former. "Why.
. . insist on transferring to that
which is ephemeral in intention, to that which is decor by nature, the
principles and procedures of that which is durable and permanent in
essence, monument by raison d' etre? " The purpose of the exposition
buildings is to "make.
. .
in their fashion the weighty and proud show, "
the same goal which inspires posters advertising "a new shoe polish
or a new brand of champagne in a manner vaguely derived from that of
Raphael. " The goal is to convey an "industrial image, " not an artistic
one, and the search for magnitude or lavishness will never bridge the
gulf between the two:
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You can imagine the [industrial] image as enormous ;,rr.hif.
nLrsa^^Iv'inlprYo^
' wmberie^:; ^Iw^y'^d^^ece sarily mept. u can even imagine the facade, the friezeor the columns pushed to the furthest limits of richness thev willbe no less equally stupid. 52 ncnness, y
Talmeyr concludes with a suggestion that dgcor might be able to
invent its own authentic style as long as it gives up the attempt to
imitate art and instead realizes its own nature. Talmeyr notes that
the only modern edifice of the 1900 exposition which he is tempted to
praise is the famous Monumental Gateway surmounted by the equally
famous statue "La Parisienne. " This gateway (and the following des-
cription of it is not by Talmeyr but by another observer) was generally
considered "pretty frightful" at the time and was severely criticized as
being in wretched taste. It consisted of "two pale-blue, pierced
minarets and polychrome statues surmounted by oriflammes and
adorned with cabochons, " ending in "an immense flamboyant arch"
above which, perched on a golden ball, "stood the flying figure of a
siren in a tight skirt, the symbolic ship of the City of Paris on her
head, throwing back an evening coat of imitation ermine-
-the
53Parisienne. " Talmeyr is the first to agree the gateway is heavy,
clumsy, bizarre, gaudy, and that "La Parisienne" is reminiscent of a
peasant girl in a cape; nonetheless, they possess
a unique merit, that one has never seen anything like them any-
where, that they resemble nothing ! They are absurd? . . . this is
also true ! But their quality is precisely to be absurd, in an
order of ideas where it is logical to be that, and where the only
true absurdity, by consequence is to wish to be reasonable. 54
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Distant Visions
Let us now turn to the exhibits of the 1900 exposition which
recreated the dynamic illusion of travelling to distant lands as well as
of the impressions one might have there upon arrival. The decorative
style of the Trocadgro did not involve much new technology except for
the continual improvement of imitation materials to substitute for
expensive ones. During the 1890's, however, technological changes
were taking place which for the first time made possible a dynamic
sense of motion. The rapidity with which these techniques developed
may be appreciated by comparing their virtual non-existence at the
1889 exposition with their dominance at the 1900 one. Our guide to the
exhibits which used illusions of motion to convey dreams of voyaging
is Michel Corday [LouIs
-Leonard Pollet] (1869-1937). His article
"Visions lointaines" [Distant visions, or visions of the faraway] is one
of four he wrote for the Revue de Paris on the 1900 exposition.
Corday was well prepared to appreciate what he saw both from a
technical and from a broader cultural perspective. He had attended
the Ecole Polytechnique, France's prestigious training ground for
engineers, and had later received further engineering training while
serving for five years as a military officer. Although he served in the
army with distinction, he became increasingly interested in writing
novels and articles, until in 1895, at the age of twenty-six, he left
military life to devote himself to letters.
68
In "Visions lointaines" Corday begins by noting that twenty-one
of the thirty-three major attractions at the 1900 exposition involve the
illusion of voyage. Like Talmeyr, he is aware of the commercial
element involved, and he suggests that this preponderance is in part
due to a desire to repeat the financial successes of the Rue du Caire
and of the "transatlantic panorama" in 1889. But Corday is consider-
ably further to the left in his political sympathies than Talmeyr, and,
because of his democratic sentiments, he sees more in these exhibits
than their profitability. Corday takes seriously the educational pur-
pose of the exposition which Talmeyr rejects as a sham. Between
1889 and 1900, Corday says, the masses have experienced the rapid
development of a "budding curiosity about new horizons, a confused
desire to widen a little, if only in appearance, the framework of life. "
Because modern technology makes it possible to satisfy this curiosity
on the part of those who will never have the money to travel to distant
horizons in actuality, these exhibits are part of a "great current of
democratization which offers to the masses the precious joys until now
reserved for a few. " Mechanical devices "show to millions of human
beings the mirage of a reality which they will not have the leisure to
experience. " While confessing that some of the devices employed are
"ingenuous" rather than "ingenious, " Corday affirms that "their inter-
est resides precisely in the diversity of experiments and discoveries. "
Even if far from perfected, technological strategms such as those seen
at the exposition constitute an "extraordinary movement of vulgariza-
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tion, the enormous scientific toy put in the hands of the masses.
"
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The question of truthfulness, Talmeyr's primary concern,
becomes transformed to a question of mechamcal ingenuity
.n Corday's
mmd. For Talmeyr the matter of veracity involves the resemblance
between the illusion of a foreign place as suggested by a commercial
attraction and the economic and social reality of that place. Corday
too speaks of the truthfulness of the exhibits as he invites his reader
to tour the exhibits with him: "Thus shall we go to attend a veritable
concourse of evocations, a sort of agreeable race where each one
exerts himself to press closer to the Truth. " Truth, in his usage,
refers to a mechanically faitMul rendering of exterior sensations -
-the
sights, smells, and sounds of travel or of a place. Corday is so
intrigued by attempts to reproduce a mechanical, exterior fidelity that
he never stops to ask, as Talmeyr does, whether the mechanical
illusion is faithful to the total social reality or only to selected external
appearances. According to Talmeyr, education cannot be made into an
amusement without being falsified; Corday sees no necessary conflict
in these aims. It is not fair to say that Corday's fascination with
mechanical means blinds him to any awareness of the ends served, for
he does express forcefully his belief in the benefits of teaching people
about distant places. What he fails to question is the reliability of
what is being taught. Corday is clearly an intelligent and thoughtful
observer, but his interest in gadgetry tends to make him neglect
deeper questions of verisimiltude. The "official facades" of the
Trocad^ro which Talmeyr finds so eloquent in their mendacious
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illusionism are dismissed by Corday as lacking in technical ingenuity,
and therefore in power to attract: "Certainly, these facades speak to
the eyes, teach them about distant architectural styles, but do not
really constitute attractions, which is to say efforts combined for an
58illusion. " The young engineer and the older moralist come to the
exposition with mutually exclusive sets of concerns so that their
conclusions are largely incommensurate.
Using his leading criterion of technical ingenuity, Corday
classifies the exhibits by the types of mechanical devices used to simu-
late movement: "ensembles in relief, " panoramas where the visitor
moves, those where the panorama itself moves, those where both
move, and moving photographs. In other words, he begins with the
mechanically more primitive and ends with the most sophisticated.
One of the more primitive exhibits is the World Tour, an enormous
circular canvas representing "without solution of continuity, Spain,
Athens, Constantinople, Suez, India, China, and Japan, " as natives
of these places dance or charm serpents or serve tea before a painted
picture of their homeland. As the visitor walks around in the room in
which the canvas hangs he is supposed to have the illusion of touring
the world, although Corday hardly finds it convincing to have "the
Acropolis next door neighbor to the Golden Horn and the Suez Canal
almost bathing the Hindu forests. " This is the chaotic -exotic style on
canvas. ^'^ The Stereorama is no more coherent but is technically
more sophisticated. In this exhibit two canvases representing the
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foreground and background of remote places are unrolled before the
stationary spectator. On a somewhat more elaborate scale, the
Ti^ns-siberian Panorama places the spectator in a real railroad car
which moves eighty meters from the Russian to the Chinese exhibits
while a canvas is unrolled outside the window giving the impression of
a journey across all Siberia. "The most ingenious precautions seemed
to be taken to give the spectator the illusion that the train moved and
not the canvas. " Three separate machines operate at three different
speeds so their relative motion will give a faithful impression of
gazing out a train window. Originally it was planned to add a slight
rocking motion to the car, but the sponsoring railway company vetoed
that idea because it advertised that its trains did not rock.
Clever as this exhibit may be, Corday is even more fascinated by
ones where not canvases but photographs move:
This is the Cineorama, the application-
-which suprisingly did
not appear sooner- -of cinematography to the panorama. This
ingenious apparatus replaces the artist. Like him, it is placed
in the center of the spectacle to be reproduced. Only it has
eyes all around its head. In fact the projector is composed of
ten cinematographs which work together and divide the horizon
into ten sections, like ten parts of a cake. If one places the
apparatus in a bull ring, it later reproduces on a circular
screen the periphery of the course and the view of the crowd
in all directions. ^1
The Cineorama could even convey the impression of ascending from the
earth in a balloon through a series of photographs showing things
getting smaller and smaller down below. To make this illusion even
more convincing, spectators would stand in a basket of a balloon to
see the show. Finally, Corday describes some exhibits which appeal
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to many senses at the same time. At the Animated Voyages and the
Phonorama, sounds recorded on a phonograph are played back at the
same time as corresponding movements from life. The Mareorama
reproduces a sea voyage from France to Constantinople complete with
canvas panorama, the smell of salt air, a gentle swaying motion
(unlike trains, boats are expected to rock), and "music which takes on
the color of the country which the ship touches: melancholy at the
departure, it.
.
.becomes Arabic in Africa, and ends up Turkish after
having been Venetian. "^^
Even sailing to Byzantixim is not enough: the surface of the earth
is too small to contain the human imagination armed with such gadgetry.
Corday marvels that new devices allow the masses to realize the
"extraordinary voyages" of Jules Verne, to travel not only where few
have ventured but where none have, far below or far above the earth.
The Cineoramatic balloon trip already described is just the first step
in flight from earthbound reality. At another exhibit a diorama takes
the visitor far beneath the earth to dramatize its formation by showing
vast subterranean and prehistoric landscapes violently lit by electricity.
Elsewhere a small aquarium is rigged up with mirrors and lights so
that it appears infinitely large. Its organizers boast, "If each visitor
in the room wore a diving- suit, he would have the complete illusion of
64being on the bottom of the sea. " Finally, in the Optical Palace the
visitor is greeted by photographic plates from a large telescope pieced
together to give the impression he is viewing the moon from a distance
of only four kilometers. Then, according to Corday,
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the diorama makes its appearance; at first prudent, it repro-duces with exactitude the lunar landscape: then, fantastically,
It paints an imaginary voyage to a star; finally, leaping acrosscenturies as easily as space, it narrates the genesis of theearth m twenty tableaux. 65
Corday concludes his article with a defense of all these exhibits
against small-minded detractors by praising "the sum of ingenuity, of
research and invention, spent there to amuse the masses usefully, to
enrich them with new visions in all directions of the universe. "^^ The
standards of ingenuity, research, and invention by which he judges the
success of the "distant visions" exhibits resembles the criterion of
success which Talmeyr detects behind the exotic exhibits of the
Trocad^ro--that of attracting and holding the attention of the crowd.
That end may be achieved by an accumulation of romantic visual
themes, by the repetition of one theme, or by ingenious gadgetry: in
all cases the goal remains the same, that of using cleverness to arouse
surprise, then awe, and finally a sort of stupefied intoxication. In
Corday's own words,
Thanks to [j:hese inventions]]
,
one can live for much time in a
few hours; travel through much space in a few steps; they are
like liquors sparkling for the eyes, pleasing to the palate,
which concentrate power and life in a small volume.
Intoxication is a drug-induced form of dreaming which brings a pleasant
escape from reality. When intoxicated by clever means, the spectator
may hardly be aware of crossing the line between reality and fantasy,
of moving, for example, from a painstaking reproduction of the moon's
surface to a wholly imaginary simulation of a journey to the stars.
Real and fantastic voyages, present and future and prehistoric ones,
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earthbound and cosn^ic ones become indistinguishable when viewed in
the same context as triumphs of technical ingenuity.
Corday is well aware of this confusion which takes the visitor
"leaping across centuries as easily as space, " but to him the leaps
are harmless and even educational. What harm can there be in mixing
the reality and fantasy into a brew so intoxicating it gives the masses
a taste of "power and life? " However, Corday himself hints at some
dangers in his concluding paragraph which immediately follows his
praise of the potent liquors. He suggests that
without injuring the interests involved, without transgressing
on past contracts, the doors of these attractions might belargely opened to the masses. In one month, during twohundred days, from all points of the continent, trains are
going to converge towards one center only: Paris. They are
like so many miniature societies in motion, which money has
brutally and frankly divided into three classes. Well, one
must wish that this harsh hierarchy might disappear at thedoorway of the Exposition: that those who suffer from it find
precisely in this promised land a short and charming respitefrom life, do
Has Corday himself become unable to distinguish reality and dream?
The real world of real train rides is one of first, second, and third
classes, corresponding to high, middling, and low incomes. The same
business world which runs actual trains has invested large amounts of
capital in the exposition to sell imaginary train rides there at a profit.
But Corday seems to imagine that because the voyages there are
illusory, the whole exposition might become an illusion, a "promised
land" of dreams set apart from waking reality. In confusion he wishes
that the exposition would not only sell fantasies but become a fantasy.
Talmeyr would not fall for this deception. He sees even the most
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extravagant fancies of exotica as very real business products. Corday,
on the other hand, unwittingly testifies to the dangers of the intoxica-
tion he has just praised when his delight in this dream world blinds
him to its origins in the social world of classes, profits, and capital.
Cinematic Voyages
The down-to-earth business of selling fantasy continued after the
"promised land" of the exposition vanished. Despite the large amounts
of capital required, its exhibits of "distant visions" had been a com-
mercial success. We have already discussed how exotic associations
may serve to elevate otherwise banal products; in the case of these
exhibits, the exotic could stand as a product in its own right when
marketed as entertainment. Motion pictures are the commercial and
technological successor to the exhibits described by Corday. Between
the close of the 1900 exposition and the outbreak of World War I, films
became a popular attraction in urban France. In 1907 there were two
cinemas in Paris, and six years later there were one hundred sixty.
Large, well-financed organizations were created to prepare the sets,
costumes, and special effects, to devise scripts and hire actors, to
shoot the film and edit it, to publicize and distribute the final product.
"It is a new, and important, and very modern branch of business, "
wrote Loms Haugmard in 1913. "This development, extraordinary in
its rapidity and extent, this swarming, this 'invasion' of cinematography
is a fact which deserves to attract the attention of the casual observer
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who likes to meditate on things. , . "
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Haugmard's own thoughts on this subject, in the form of
article titled "L' 'Esthaique' du cinrmatographxe" frhe "aesthetic-
of cinematography]
,
also deserve the attention of meditative
observers. The author appears to have been one of the many young
men in literary circles around the turn of the century who published a
considerable body of creative and critical writings without achieving
particular fame. He had some vague associations with the Abbaye, a
group of writers and artists who formed a commune in 1906-1907 and
of whom the most illustrious member is Jules Remains. One of
Haugmard's books was published by the Abbaye press, and although
this fact in itself does not indicate membership in the group, the
literary historian Florian-Parmentier does include Haugmard in a list
of those associated with the Abbaye. The 1913 article on cinematog-
raphy, on the other hand, is published in Le Correspondant
, the
Catholic journal where Talmeyr published, whereas the Abbaye group
was distinctly secular. Whether Haugmard's religious opinions changed
dramatically between 1906 and 1913, or whether he had always been a
believer, obviously he is not immediately classifiable by terms like
right or left, conservative or radical.
A character of maverick independence is also suggested by the
article itself. As he explains at the outset, Haugmard is not interested
in describing the commercial aspects of the cinema but instead offers
a highly personal meditation on
the value of cinematographic spectacles, on their role, on their
consequences, and.
. . since it serves nothing to revolt against it,
[[onQ the good part that can be extracted from this phenomenon,
as immense as it is disquieting. . . 72
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His words echo uncannily the tone of the remarks made years before
by Nautet, Mirbeau, and de Vogii^, who also felt they were witnessing
a phenomenon at once "disquieting" and too "immense" to "revolt
against. " In 1913, however, Haugmard is much more clearly aware
that he is seeing the marketing of dreams, a form of marketing that
was only taking shape at the 1889 and 1900 expositions. By 1913 the
"invasion" of Paris by the selling of illusion in the form of cinema-
photography is decisive; it is clearly not a temporary phenomenon
confined to temporary fairgrounds.
In another way Haugmard' s observations on the cinema directly
recall earlier ones regarding the expositions, for he too is particularly
struck by the jumbled, chaotic nature of what he sees. In both cases
anything real or imaginary is considered fair game, as long as it can
be made entertaining. For the cinema, Haugmard begins by observing,
everything in space and in time provides material. "History, legend,
fantasy, all forms of actuality and current life, the sea and the various
continents, jjthere is] nothing which cannot be used, with sincerity or
7 3
artifice, for the confection of a film, ..." As a "hybrid or
homogenous" medium, film provides the means to record all sorts of
imaginings - -fantastic
,
sentimental, comic or dramatic, scientific,
historical, moralizing- -and on a cinema program all these types are
dumped into one performance, so that a western is juxtaposed with a
sentimental comedy, a social documentary with a picturesque walk, a
comic chase sequence with the Fall of Troy. Arranged in a series of
short unrelated features, cinema programs give people concentrated
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doses of action in rapid succession, a sort of dynamic equivalent to the
piling up of visual themes characteristic of the exotic-chaotic decora-
tive style. Haugmard himself draws an analogy to cinema programs
by noting that weekly newspapers contain a similar potpourri of news,
melodrama, detective stories, "heavily adulterated" literature, sports
news, and articles about dogs. As the movie house has replaced the
theater, "so the newspaper has killed the book. ""^^ ^^^^^ cases,
distinctions of significance or even of reality are obliterated because
a wide variety of experience is reduced to the same level. ( The exampl
of the cinema in particular is comparable to that of the "distant visions
exhibits described by Corday: all sorts of experiences are reduced to
the common level of technical ingenuity.) Haugmard further suggests
that there is a commercial basis for cinematic syncretism. Theater
owners want to expand sales by catering to all tastes. "In fact, the
public of cinematographic spectacles is not coherent. Many 'milieux'
are represented there, and all sorts of minds. ""^^ Because the
audience includes many publics rather than one shared culture, film
programs try to include something for everyone, just as newspapers
and tourist attractions try to do.
In defining the cinema as a phenomenon of "the people, in the
largest meaning of this term, " Haugmard agrees with Corday that
modern technology widens the horizons of the masses who could never
afford the expensive tickets or elegant clothes required of the theater-
goer. Not only does film take people to far-off places, "reproduced
in their photographic truth, luminous and trembling, " it also lets them
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enter hitherto inacessible reaches of society through "elegant and
worldly dramas which initiate them to milieux where they cannot pene-
trate. " Whether the distance travelled is geographic or social, film
allows a pleasing illusion of wealth. Haugmard is, however, much
more dubious than Corday about the educational benefits of this
democratizing of culture. He is much closer to Talmeyr in his con-
clusion that these imaginary excursions appeal only to childish, lazy
fantasies of escape. Haugmard quotes a film advertisement which
promises "an hour of intense emotion" to the movie-goer. Who could
resist this appeal, he asks? People want concentrated doses of intense
emotion-
-draughts of highly distilled liqueur, to refer back to Corday 's
image- -to lift them from "their sorry and monotonous existence, from
which they love to emerge. " Haugmard notes that movie- goers show
very little enthusiasm for reproductions of scenes from their own
lives. Their preference for the world of fantasy, Haugmard feels, is
essentially juvenile:
"The masses" are still like a big child who, in order to make
him forget his miseries, demands a picture album to leaf
through.
.
.the "cinema, " which is a "circus" for grown-ups,
offers to the popular imagination and sensibility, deprived and
fatigued, the "beau voyage. "76
In offering this escape from reality, the cinema does all the work for
the viewer, demanding only minimiim intellectual effort. "The mental
tension required is feeble; fatigue, if there be fatigue at the end of the
spectacle, will be purely nervous and wholly passive. " Because all the
details of the film are explained by a program or a narrator, "mental
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work is already accomplished in advance to suppress the active effort
of the spectators. " Passivity also implies isolation. The spectator
has no need to make a judgment or response which may be communicated
to others. In the movie theater "everything takes place in the domain
of silence.
. .
""^"^ One dreams alone.
Thus Haugmard rejects "the formula: Instruct through enter-
tainment" which so appeals to Corday. People want to escape from
reality, not learn about it. Even more troubling to Haugmard is the
possibility that in cases where the cinema is used for education it may
inculcate political ideas as readily as scientific ones, for
if the field of scientific applications for fpopular education^ is
indefinite, that of social applications is no less so. Cinema-
tography allows emotions and feelings to be determined at will.
It is probable that the sight of military scenes, of manoeuvres,
of imposing reviews would be appropriate to uphold the patriotic
instinct in a nation. Through film, political biography will
become a banality. 78
Haugmard cites examples. Romania has already "re-edited by film the
history of Romanian independence, " by demolishing here and recon-
structing there to simulate great battles of the past. The city of Paris
is accumulating a film library to commemorate important public
solemnities, and lately the lives of outgoing and incoming presidents
of the French Republic have been presented on film "like an album of
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'real' pictures. "
Haugmard' s suspicion of these "real'pictures recalls Talmeyr's
equally ironic references to exhibits of the "real" China or the "real"
South Seas at the Trocad^ro. In both cases there is no question that
technical dexterity permits a convincing reproduction of visual reality,
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or. in Haugmard's words already cited, the presentation of distant
places "in their photographic truth, luminous and trembling. " The
issue is the distinction between "photographic truth" and truth. Film
may be able to give "the exact reproduction of natural reality" while
still being
a factor of artifice and of falsification If it is the realm offraud, of counterfeit, of trickery, how will a naive public knowhow to make the indispensable distinctions and the necessary
selection, under pain of inevitable misunderstandings and
multiple errors? 80
Just because of its photographic realism, film offers a nearly irresis-
tible temptation not only to inculcate political propaganda but also "to
vulgarize, which is to say to deform" the most noble novels, plays, and
poems; " 'to romanticize, ' or falsify" history by giving a partial view;
and, regarding current subjects, "to nourish all vanities and launch
imitations, for the image excites naive souls. "^•'
Film speaks in the language of imagery. This is why the medium
is at once so emotionally exciting and so intellectually deceptive. The
rapid succession of "realistic" images captivates the imagination of the
passive viewer. Haugmard cites as an example the way a robbery is
portrayed on the screen in a series of concrete images, beginning with
the hold-up of a delivery van,
"
even the mark of the bullet on the wheel; then the judge.
. .inter-
rogating the policemen. Imagine, for example, the influence on
the minds of children of the burglary scenes and the setting in
motion of the ingenious methods used to throw the pursuers off
the track. The prefect of police in Berlin thought it fit to forbid
entrance into movie houses to children under fifteen. ^2
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The cinema is exciting because it communicates through such concrete,
powerful, "realistic" images. It lies because it communicates only
through images:
Why does an evening at the movies, however crammed with themost diverse films, despite everything leave in the mind animpression of emptiness, of nothingness?
... Hardly is the
spectacle over that one thinks no more about it.
It is because one "cinematographs" only facts. All the rest
IS sacrificed, all that which is intellectual life and interior life-
and m the human order, intelligence and soul alone truly count'This exclusive capacity to reproduce only the fact carries along
Its consequences. Action, only action, which is rapid and
brutal. From whence the suppression, almost absolute, of allpsychology. Cinematography is a notation by image, as arithmetic
and algebra are notations by figures and by letters; now, it is
convenient to limit as much as possible in the statement or the
exposition all that which is not the sign itself. It is the triumph
of simplication. 83
Obviously Haugmard's comments apply most pertinently to the silent
films of his own era, but even when the image is accompanied by a
soundtrack its dominance is maintained. The cinema remains a sort
of positivistic medium, excluding all that is not fact, visually speaking;
and by excluding so much, by passing off over-simplification as total
reality, the cinema is, to borrow Talmeyr's description of the Indian
exhibit at the Trocadero, true only partially, and so partially as to be
false.
The language of imagery is the language of the dream world.
Haugmard's comments clarify not only our response to photographic
illusions seen in movie theater, but also to the whole realm of fantasy
which business exploits. "We have already concluded that the goal of
exotic decoration, non-art masquerading as art, is to excite the
spectator through images of romantic places. As with the cinema,
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excitement is attained because the language of imagery reduces, con-
centrates, and distills. Early in his article Haugmard points out that
movie actors quickly become " 'types, ' " which is to say that they
convey a whole constellation of values and feelings in their immediately
recognizable personal image, down to the child actor who incarnates
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" 'Baby. ' " In the same way, the image of the exotic is a type which
conveys a whole cluster of values, erotic and romantic, adventurous
and luxurious. The concrete images of the Orient, for example-
-the
colorful rug, the dancing girl, the domed palace-
-convey a notion of
the Orient so enticing, so exciting that it may encourage customers to
buy products associated with it. At the same time those images, no
matter what their "photographic truth, " bear little resemblance to the
overall truth of the place they purport to evoke. At once enticing and
deceptive, encouraging both passivity and solitude-
-this is the language
of imagery, of the dream world of consumption.
Like Mirbeau, Haugmard reserves his most biting and pessimistic
remarks for the mouth of a "philosopher friend, " in Haugmard's case a
frankly imaginary "man of taste, of a scepticism sometimes morose,
sometimes indulgent. " It is almost as if his conclusions are too
depressing to be enunciated in his own voice. The "man of taste"
muses that the movies "using every real or imaginary given, take,
like Proteus, a thousand forms, " of which some are tolerable or
even pleasant, such as the view of lovely landscapes, or strange lands,
or even fairylands,
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for cinematography can realize any dream. What good areHoffmann, Andersen, and the creators of fantasy, that goodare poets who invent, when cinematography is there which
scientifically records, for the incredulous masses, the
wildest phantasmagorias of ancentral myths.
. .
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Illusions of reality, illusions of illusions, all appear together on the
movie screen and provide some delightful moments. But in the real
world, the world from which the movies provide an escape, here the
"man of taste" foresees that reality will become distorted by cinema-
photography. Because movies provide the miracle of "an unlimited
posthumous life, there will be no more written archives, only films,
catalogued and classified, and the 'pressings ' of public life, the
'preserves' of the past, often not exempt from falsification. " Not only
will our view of the past be altered, but action in the present will chang
with an eye to what it will look like on film. "Alas ! in the future,
notorious personalities will instinctively 'pose' for cinematographic
popularity, and historical events will tend to be cooked for its
sake. ..." Thus even emotional life will become falsified because it
will become "an ethnic habit" to become moved not by events as they
happen, but by vanished events which have already happened. "Our
emotions, lagging behind the fact which causes them, are factitious
and vain.
. .
" But already churches are turning into movie theaters,
as film becomes the "religion of the masses" or rather (borrowing the
well-known title of a book by Jean-Marie Guyau) "the irreligion of the
future
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Jo^!°^^V'n'^^
charmed masses will learn not to think anymoret resist all desire to reason and to construct which willatrophy little by little; they will know only to op^n ttiT^ ar.eand empty eyes, only to look, look, look. Will cinemaphotog-raphy comprise, perhaps, the elegant solution of the social
^
question, if the modern cry is formulated: 'Bread and
cinemas '? ...
And we shall progressively attain those menacing days whenuniversal illusion in universal mummery would reign.
.
.
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Towards the beginning of this chapter, it was explained that
descriptions of the dream world of consumption would be pieced
together from a number of writers none of whom is prolific enough to
be considered a major intellectual figure. Of this group Louis
Haugmard is by far the most intriguing. Much more needs to be
learned about his life and works to assess whether his article on the
cinema is an isolated accomplishment, or whether it is part of a larger
output of equally masterfiil- cvdtural criticism. Certainly "L' 'Esthe-
tique' du cinematographie " beautifully illustrates a type of c\il-
tural criticism which this dissertation seeks to rehabilitate, that which
originates in aesthetic thought but extends to far broader social and
moral issues. When Haugmard places "aesthetic" in quotations in his
title, he indicates his awareness that this term is only approximate.
Throughout the article he experiments with a variety of vocabularies
--aesthetic, moral, sociological, psychological- -in his attempt to
understand the phenomenon of the cinema, "as immense as it is dis-
quieting. " In this respect, although his success is singular,
Haugmard 's goal is similar to that of Talmeyr, Corday, de Vogiie',
Mirbeau, and Nautet. They all try to devise a terminology appropriate
for experiences which are at once significant and difficult to discuss
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in traditional intellectual categories. Like the phenomena they treat,
their language tends to be hybrid and homogenous. New forms of
consumption demand new modes of criticism.
The Electric Fairyland
There is no firm boundary between realism and fantasy in the
eclecticism of the "distant visions" exhibits or of the cinema. Visions
of remote places and of imaginary ones exist side by side without any
break in continuity; all of them are presented as concrete images,
thanks to modern technology. Nor is there any significant distinction
in the way business exploits these two t>pes of illusion, for both
suggest pleasing and enticing escapes from reality. This section about
fairyland images therefore follows naturally after the previous one.
Although shorter, its general organization will follow a similar pattern.
We shall first see how illusory images of a fairyland were represented
at the expositions of 1889 and 1900, and then similar images will be
described as they appeared in commercial settings outside the
expositions, specifically at the Automobile Salons.
Just as the creation of "distant visions" depended on new technol-
ogies culminating in the cinema, the creation of fairyland images
required the advent of v/idespread electrical lighting. In the 1890's
the lighting of cities at night was not novel, for gas had been used for
this purpose for decades, but it gave only pale and flickering illumina-
tion. The incandescent light bulb was more recent, but only in the last
decade of the century were incandescent and arc lights both powerful
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and ubiquitous enough to illuminate the night sky in brilliant display.
In the 1890's nocturnal Paris began to be transformed from somber
semi-darkness to celestial landscape, and the expositions again pro-
vided a sort of preview of coming attractions. It will be recalled that
in his articles on the 1889 fair, de VogUe describes how crowds of
Parisians are hypnotized by the "charming sorcery" of the lighted
fountains, and how he is himself mesmerized by the city lights seen
from the top of the Eiffel Tower. By 1900 lighting techniques at the
exposition were even more spectacular. In one of his articles for the
Revue de Paris
,
Corday describes the nightly performance:
A simple touch of the finger on a lever, and a wire as thick as
a pencil throws upon the monumental gateway of the Concorde
the brilliance of three thousand incandescent lights which,
under the uncut gems of colored glass, become the sparlcling
soul of enormous jewels.
Another touch of the finger: the banks of the Seine and the
bridges are lighted with fires whose reflection prolongs the
splendor.
. . .Next it is the hall of festivals, where the incan-
descent chandeliers resemble bouquets of flowers with pistils
of fire. The facade of the Palace of Electricity is embraced,
a stained glass window of light, where all these diverse
splendors are assembled in apotheosis. . .the whole festival
city is illuminated and, knowing that it has only two hundred
days to live, prolongs its duration a little for two hundred
nights. 88
Other descriptions of electrical illumination at the expositions also
keep returning to the analogy of a fairyland to describe the spectacle.
If during the day the expositions were dominated by images of exotic
places, at night they turned into fairytale places. The same analogy
is repeatedly used to describe Paris at night. Although the city was
not illuminated according to a predetermined program as were the
88
exposition grounds, the cumulative effect of brightly-lit streets,
gardens, stores, homes, and vehicles was equally breathtaking. The
advent of electrical lighting gave visual reality to antique fantasies of
fairyland.
It is not difficult to imagine how business could exploit this
illusion. In 1873, long before the expositions, indeed just after the
introduction of electrical lighting, Villiers de I'Isle-Adam (1838-1889)
published a short story, "L'Affichage celeste" [which could be trans-
lated loosely as "The Heavenly Billboard"] telling of
A thing strange and capable of arousing a smile from a financier:
it concerns Heaven! But let us understand: heaven considered
froni an industrial and serious point of view. 89
Villiers explains that the wise inventor, M. Grave, through his
scientific understanding of refraction and mirages (which would
explain, among other seeming miracles, the labarum of Constantine)
has devised a method to convert the night sky, "these sterile spaces,
into truly and fruitfully instructive spectacles.
. . . It is not a question
here of feelings. Business is business. " What matters are "the
pecuniary results of the unhoped for discovery of which we speak, "
which at first seems impossible if not insane. But M. Grave, over-
coming all difficulties, devises a system of enormous lenses and giant
reflectors which will secure for large industry and small merchants
alike "an absolute Publicity. " Villiers muses that at sunset, in large
cities like Lyon or Bordeaux, "Suddenly, powerful jets of magnesium
or of electric light, magnified a hundred thousand times, would
flash forth from the summit of some flowered hillside" to send an
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advertising message between Sirius and Aldeberan. Imagine the effect
on the crowd:
After the first movement of surprise, certainly understandable,
old enemies embrace, the bitterest domestic resentments are
forgotten;.
. .
Would it not be something to surprise the Great
Bear himself if, suddenly, between his sublime paws, this
disturbing message were to appear: Are corsets necessary
,
yes or no?
. . .
What emotion if, concerning these dessert
liqueurs.,, one were to perceive, in the south of Regulus, this
heart of the Lion, on the very tip of the ear of corn of the
Virgin, an Angel holding a flask in hand, while from his
mouth comes a small paper on which one would read these
words: My, it's good !
Lighting could be used to broadcast the photographs of escaped
criminals, or to advertise politicians running for office by projecting
a dignified and, as it were, an exalted image. "That would be their
place up there, one must agree !. . . One might even add that, without
M. Grave's discovery, universal suffrage is a sort of joke. " Villiers
concludes, "Thanks to Qvl. Grave^ , Heaven will end up being some-
90thing and acquiring, finally, an intrinsic value. "
The prophetic value of Villiers' short story lies not so much in
its prediction of the physical details of a nocturnal neon landscape, but
in its moral content which foresees that commerce can seize on all
visions, even that of heaven, to publicize its products. Villiers'
prophecy proved more valid than that made later by de Vogue' (a
Catholic and aristocrat like Villiers, although a much more respectable
one) when he gazes at Paris at twilight from the top of the Eiffel Tower
and dares to hope that the old stars of faith will live in harmony with
the new artificial ones of science, that the spotlight shining from the
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Tower to Notre Dame heralds an era of reconciliation between the
Church and modern life. De Vogue's vision is much more optimistic
than that of Villiers, who prophesies that the old stars of faith will
simply be obliterated by modern ones, and that spotlights will proclaim
messages not of spiritual reconciliation but of publicity. It should be
recalled that de Vogue himself glimpses a less exalted future for
electrical lighting when in 1889 he sees exposition crowds gradually
hypnotized by the display of lighted fountains. Even if lights are not
used to spell out trade names, they can by their glow alone attract
attention and induce a state of stupefied awe. By 1900 de Voglie is
aware that the use of electrical lighting to awe the spectator has
triumphed over its more spiritual possibilities. In his description of
the 1900 exposition, he mentions electrical lighting only to tell how
female spectators are transfixed by the sight of wax figurines modelling
the latest fashions in glass cages under the glare of artificial lights.
In order to demonstrate how the fairyland imagery of electrical
lighting could be exploited for commercial pruposes, let us return to
the Automobile Salons held in the Grand Palais beginning in 1901. As
with the expositions, the Salons led a double life: in broad daylight the
dominant impression was one of chaotic-exotic decoration, but when
its two hundred thousand lights were turned on at dusk the Palais
9
1
became a "radiant jewel" set in the Parisian night, a "colossal
industrial fairyland, "'^^ a "fairyland spectacle. "'^^ The lighting of the
Grand Palais was especially dramatic because when seen from the
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outside its glass dome glowed in the darkness like an enormous
lantern. This is how another observer describes the scene:
One must come at^ nightfall. Coming out into the world by tlie
entrance to the Metro, one stands stupefied by so much noise
movement, and light. A rotating spotlight, with its quadruple
blue ray, sweeps the sky and dazzles you; two hundred auto-
mobiles in battle formation look at you with their large fiery
eyes, ... A double cordon of lights hung on towers and poles
leads you,
. . .
[Seen from the balconyj The spectacle is rare
and of an undeniable beauty. The large nave has become a
prodigious temple of Fire; each of its iron arches is outlined
with orange flames; its coupola is carpeted with white flames,
with those fixed and as it were solid flames of incandescent
lamps: fire is made matter, and they have built from it.
The air is charged with a golden haze, which the moving rays
of the projectors cross with their iridescent pencils.
. .And all
brightness is multiplied again by the windows and varnish of
the vehicles
, ...
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How could the hypnotic effect of mass lighting be described more
vividly? There is no need here to spell out a message with lights. The
sheer scale of illumination draws Parisians to the spectacle in a way
which makes it difficult to avoid the analogy of moths and flames. Not
only does the lighting entice people to view the automobiles in the first
place, but once there they see the automobiles as glittering, fiery
chariots, as merchandise invested with an enchanted quality which lifts
it to a far more exciting level than everyday considerations of
transportation.
It is hardly necessary to point out analogies between the visual
traits of exotic fantasies and of fairyland ones. They rely on the
exaggerated, the overdone, in order to attract attention; simple but
powerful imagery is employed to arouse the emotions; either endless
variation or endless repetition (what could be more repetitious than
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two hundred thousand lights in one dome?) is used to overwhelm the
viewer. In both cases the purpose behind such displays is the same,
to attract attention and to associate merchandise with pleasing
fantasies by giving the illusion of being transported from an ordinary
plane of existence to that of dream. But what about the deceptiveness
characteristic of exotic dreams? How can a fairyland, which does not
pretend to duplicate a real place, be accused of falsity--or, to put it
another way, how can we say that the line between reality and dream
becomes blurred in the case of illusions which are frankly fantastic?
A number of visitors to the Automobile Salon detect the falsity of its
fairyland guise when they note how the splendor of the lights covers up
a multitude of aesthetic sins. The visitor quoted at some length above
is not so hypnotized by the lights that he fails to notice the poles
supporting them are ridiculously ornamented with nautical motifs and
garlands whose stuffing is unravelling. The illuminated fairyland is
deceptive because of what it covers up:
The Grand Palais itself is almost beautiful because you hardly
see it anymore: the confused scrap-iron or copperworks.
. .
[^is3lost in the shadow; the luminous scallop decorations and
chandeliers and. . . allegories, drowned in the irradiation,
. . .
The roof itself, that monstrous skin of a leviathan washed up
there, on the bank of the river, borrows a sort of beauty from
the light which emanates from it. 95
The transforming blaze of electricity conceals the junky reality which
remains when the lights go off.
Robert de La Sizeranne (1866-1932), well-known art critic for the
Revue des deux mondes, compares the nocturnal transformation of the
Automobile Salon to fairy tales where lovely damsels are caught
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"between perverse and benevolent powers. .. frightfully ugly all day
long [and] at night become beauties adorned with dazzling jewels. "
Furthermore, comments La Sizeranne, this diurnal schizophrenia is
characteristic of all Paris. During the day, the city displays super-
fluous, ignoble, lamentable ornaments, while at nightfall "these
trifling or irritating profiles are melted in a conflagration of
apotheosis Everything takes on another appearance. " The ugly
details can no longer be distinguished, and instead diamonds, rubies,
and sapphires spill over the city. The deception. La Sizeranne re-
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marks, is complete. This is the same enchantment which leads
Corday to hope the real world of classes will somehow melt away at
the entrance to "distant voyages" exhibitions, and which makes
Talmeyr criticize the cloak of merchandise and dancing girls thrown
over the realities of Indian colonialism. All these exotic and fairyland
illusions serve both a positive function of attracting attention and there-
fore business, and a negative one of hiding certain unpleasant realities
such as colonialism, class structure, and ugly surroundings. To put
it another way, illusions divert attention away from certain things
(like starving Indians) and towards certain other things (like auto-
mobiles). Through fantasy, business provides alternatives to itself.
If the world of work provides a meag-er and d\ill existence, then
exoticism furnishes a temporary alternative; if exoticism results in
heavy and ugly decoration, then another alternative is provided in a
nightly fairyland spectacle.
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The Aesthetic of Neo-Barbarism
Up to this pomt the discussion of fairyland illusions has reiterated
concepts familiar from earlier discussion of exoticism. The spectacle
of the lighted Automobile Salon, however, inspired Camille Mauclair
(1872-1945) to analyze it in other terms not yet mentioned that help us
arrive at a better understanding not only of the electric fairyland but
also of the entire symbiosis of commerce and fantasy. Like
La Sizeranne, Mauclair was a well-loiown art critic. Both of them
are figures of considerable intellectual importance for their persistent
and on the whole successful efforts to unite aesthetic and social
criticism, and they will therefore be discussed at more length in Part
Two. Mauclair particularly exemplifies the talented young generation
of the 1890's for whom literature, art, politics, and social thought are
not separate categories but points on a continuum. Even among this
generation Mauclair stands out as extraordinarily productive. He
came from a Parisian worldng-class family and earned his living with
his pen, producing a steady flow of novels, poems, critical works,
and journal articles from the time he made his debut in symbolist
circles at the age of eighteen. His article on the lighting of the 1907
Automobile Salon, "La Decoration lumineuse" [^Luminous decoration"]
,
appeared at a time when he was trying to define "social art, " an art
sympathetic to socialist aspirations but not so trapped by political
dogma that genuine artistic standards are subverted. Like many of
his articles from this period, it was published in the Revue bleue, a
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weekly political and literary journal which included a wide variety of
topics and viewpoints in a flexible eclecticism which Mauclair found
compatible.
Mauclair opens "La Decoration lumineuse" by paying tribute to
the "extraordinary spectacle" at the Grand Palais which justifiably
impresses the crowd. "There is there a sort of eruption of forces
which creates a special lyricism. " But that lyricism is permeated by
a disturbing quality:
Just as autolocomotion is based on intermittent and disciplined
explosion, it seems the beauty of this place is that of a disci-
plined fire. Something is borrowed from the sinister to make
something splendid.
Each day at sunset a cooking fire lights up in the middle of
the Champs Elys^es; the power of the fire fascinates creatures,
and irresistibly the feeling of a return to primitive times
.
imposes itself. 97
Mauclair's response recalls the "structure of feeling" shared by Nautet,
Mirbeau, and de Vogue before the exposition crowds
--a highly ambiv-
alent mixture of awe at the splendid spectacle and of uneasiness at its
sinister overtones--as well as by Haugmard when he considers the
cinema as something "as immense as it is disquieting. " When
Mauclair goes on to mention "a return to primitive times, " however,
he seizes upon a concept which clarifies intellectually this common
emotional response. De Vogue had suggested that lighting appeals to
primitive instincts in his description of a Parisian shopkeeper being
"melted down into.
. . the placid soul of the perfect fakir" before the
lighted fountains of the 1889 exposition; Haugmard had wondered if the
cinema would not become a modern equivalent of ancient bread and
circuses. Mauclair is more specific in stating the comparison: "The
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dominant sensation one feels in this colossal industrial fairyland is
that of the unexpected return of ultra-modernism to barbarian
pageantry. " And, even more important, he is more thorough in de-
lineating the implications of this neo-barbarism.
The dominant characteristic of aesthetic primitivism, according
to Mauclair, involves an impression of power. The luminous decora-
tion of the Grand Palais "is powerful, it is not exactly beautiful. "^^ In
its affirmation of power over beauty, the Automobile Salon becomes a
"symbolic affirmation of a spiritual current" noticeable throughout
Paris--in the way "war chariots, which are called automobiles" run
down more and more pedestrians; in the brilliance of electric lighting
which chases away shadows at night "as the spotlight of a battleship
searches the nocturnal waves to find its enemy there;" in the way the
night sky is blasted by advertisements for toothpaste, liqueurs, and
egg noodles (Mauclair cites the prophecy of Villiers de I'lsle-Adam);
in the spectacle of entire houses and shop windows lit up in a "fixed,
impartial glare. " Mauclair sees no end to displays of power through
electrical illumination. The violence of commerce, which multiplies
its advertisements and automobiles and displays, will always impose
itself more and more:
One cannot affirm that the spectacle offered by the Automobile
Salon presents the maximum of Ixxminous industrialised force.
Obviously they will go further in brutal power. The newspapers
tell us with complaisant admiration that there are two hundred
thousand Paz and Silva lamps there. The automobile industry
triumphs: it will require four hundred, six hundred thousand
l^.mps in two years. It will ignite from the Louvre to the
Etoile, and from the Invalides to Montmartre, if it wishes. '^^
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The lighting display at the Automobile Salon may be ultra-modern
its technology, but its atavistic purpose is to impress the masses with
a display of "brutal power. " Mauclair's most disturbing comparison
of barbaric and modern times comes in his final paragraph, where he
describes how "Nero lighted his gardens with Christians smeared with
pitch, luminous decoration far too symbolic, sinister, and nauseating."
We are not too far removed from such horrors, he suggests, for
"modern warfare, with the mine, the shell, and the bomb has known
how to invest death with a completely Neronian sadism. "^*^° If Nero
represents the ultimate example of barbaric power, then industrialized
warfare represents the most extreme example of sinister ultra-
modernism which blends technological sophistication with primitive
sadism.
"What are the aesthetic results when the controlling motivation is
the will to display power rather than to create beauty? At the Auto-
mobile Salon Mauclair notices that the lighting is all fixed, multiplied
over and over with no consideration for the reflections and shadows
which are the complements of light. Similarly in shop windows,
"electricity is only a dead, frozen, inert clarity, " without surprises
or movement:
The nocturnal life of our cities is composed like a tableau where
the values are too equal. Everything is brightness on brightness,
without shadows. . . . With this impartial and fixed electricity,
everything comes to our retina without gradations. And, by dint
of flat glare, we see less well. Our eyes are veiled, our optic
is, if I can say so, muffled and blunted.
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Mauclair contrasts this monotonous repetition with lighting of the era
of Louis XIV, when candles cast a warm, moving glow, and when
shadows and zones of obscurity were played off against zones of
brilliance. The technological means may have been more primitive,
but they were employed with a sense of order and form. Today lighting
demonstrates only a "contrast between the power of the means and the
poverty of the arrangement. " Force is employed without a sense of
form; the means are ingenious, but the only end to which they are
related is that of scale. Mauclair compares the situation to that in
modern jewelry-making, which "also thinks only of sparkling, of
multiplying the fires. It has lost all style and imitates anything, a
knot of ribbons, a basket of flowers. " Electrical lighting could be
developed into an admirable decorative art by varying colors and bulb
shapes and types of lighting, if only the criterion of order rather than
of multiplication were applied. ". . . the search for maximum effect
has never been the criterion of an art, and so far we see only that in
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this enormous illumination of the Automobile Salon. "
The aesthetic results of a primitive mentality, in which powerful
means are unformed by a sense of order, have been noted in de Vogue's
comments on the 1900 exposition ("order is more and more absent"),
in Haugmard's criticism of the cinema as reducing all experiences to
the same technological level, in all the horrified descriptions of
decorative chaos at the expositions and at the Automobile Salon itself.
Mauclair is well aware of analogies between the lighting display at the
Salon and other ultra-modern phenomena. In "La Decoration
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lumineuse" he mentions an earlier article of his, also published in the
Revue bleue, which applied the concept of primitivism to iron archi-
tecture. The "brutal and terrible decoration" of fire, he suggests,
goes well with the "Assyrian character" of iron buildings. In the
earlier article Mauclair had particularly remarked upon the primitivism
of the Eiffel Tower, the icon of the 1889 exposition, which he described
as "barbarous, and in the true sense of the word; structures such as
the Eiffel Tower seem familiar because they remind us of the caprices
of the barbarous kings, of Babylonian festivities. "^"^^ Indeed they
suggest an even more remote past of "fossil skeletons of giant extinct
monsters" which are probably the prehistoric prototype of all monu-
mental buildings. That is why the Eiffel Tower seems at once very
new and very familiar:
In its frank and brutal novelty it retains a prehistoric aspect.
Its armatures rise up from the ground.
. .like skeletons of
monsters, and in looking at them we return to the confused
stupor of our childhood before the bones of whales in the
museum. It is something primitive, unfinished, and huge
which repulses us, disturbs us, and attracts us.
Once again, facing an impressive spectacle of ultra-modernism,
Mauclair responds with an ambiguous mixture of repulsion, disturbance,
and attraction. Once again he theorizes that the spectacle is designed
to be overwhelming because of an atavistic desire to display power.
The scale of iron structures takes us back to days when primitive
people
had to resolve terrible problems with imperfect knowledge and
clumsy tools, and they nontheless wanted to build large. The
enormity of the construction was the first sign by which despots
wished to demonstrate their power.
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So the concept of the neo -barbaric invites us to consider a whole
range of modern constructions. The neo-barbaric is an aesthetic which
relies on magnitude, whether in the size of a building, the number of
lights, or the elaboration of ornamentation. No matter how large the
dimensions, the result is still one-dimensional. It is not that magni-
tude is incompatible with beauty, for the history of art presents many
examples of their coexistence, and Mauclair himself praises the "nude
and severe beauty" of primitive buildings. But by itself, he states,
"the search for mctximum effect has never been the criterion of an
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art. " Alone, that search can only create what is "powerful" with-
out its being "exactly beautiful. " Mauclair does not avoid the
political implications of his suggestion that the aesthetic of magnitude
is created by "despots" who wish "to demonstrate their power. " Who
are the modern equivalents of ancient barbarian rulers? One would
like to believe that the luminous fairyland is created by a good fairy
waving her magic wand, but perhaps it arises like the fairyland of a
thousand and one nights, where a cruel Oriental potentate commands
genies, slaves, eunuchs, harems, and story-tellers to do his bidding.
Mauclair thinks he knows the force behind the electric display. He
refers to the Automobile Salon as a creation of "the maximum of
luminous industrialized force, " specifically the force of the automobile
industry which could light up the whole city of Paris if it wishes.
The connection between industrial power and aesthetic results
had been stated even more clearly by Mauclair a dozen years earlier
in his observations on the 1889 exposition. Although only a teenager
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in 1889, he too was aware of the exposition's character as a mirror of
the future and was naade uncomfortable by what was reflected there.
In 1896 he wrote an article opposing plans for another exposition in
1900 as part of the current debate regarding those plans. ^^"^ Mauclair
scoffs at claims that an exposition is a patriotic celebration. It is
rather an "industrial celebration, " he contends, and the benefit of
industry is the "central reason" for the project. The aesthetics of
such an exposition are bound to be disappointing because true beauty
cannot be created under commercial conditions:
Beauty needs calm, grand lines, study, discretion of colors,
harmony; it does not know how to enter these noisy accximu-
lations of bazaars open to the cosmopolitan crowd, to the
idle, to fools, to the ignorant. It cannot be in accord with
this enormous fair.
. .
lH
The only constructions that can be created there are "the bizarre, the
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exagge rated, and the artificial. "
The concept of an aesthetic of the primitive is no more limited to
matters of art than is Haugmard's "aesthetic" of the cinema. Both
critics are trying to show that what is artistically sterile is also
socially pernicious. Both of them are painfully conscious of the results
when the motive is to overwhelm the spectator with a display that puts
him into a passive, confused stupor "only to look, look, look. . . " Re-
gression to a state of savage awe, similar to regression to childhood,
constitutes the dominant emotional response evoked by violent displays
of industrialized force. Barbarism, childhood, and dreams all involve
cruder and stronger emotions than those of waking civilized adulthood.
They are at once fascinating and disturbing. The sinister and
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splendid dream world of consumption may be ultra-modern in its
details, but it conveys what is fundamentally a primitive experience.
Dreams of Love and Wealth
It is neither necessary nor possible to catalog all the dreams
which business exploits. While their range is as boundless as the
human imagination, the concepts already discussed should apply to
them also in a general way. One fantasy, however
, is so powerful and
pervasive that it deserves special mention in passing-
-that of sexual
fulfillment. If illusions of distant places are captured visually in
exotic imagery, if fairyland fantasies are conveyed by dazzling dis-
plays of electric lights, erotic dreams are embodied in the female
image. In the commercial exploitation of that image, once again the
expositions of 1889 and 1900 furnish a sort of preview. Mirbeau's
description of his philosopher friend captivated by the belly dancer in
the Rue du Caire, or de Vogue's of women clustered around elegant
mannequins, are both striking examples of the mesmerizing effect of
the female image. The 1900 exposition also furnishes a sort of
penultimate female symbol in "La Parisienne" which stood at the apex
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of its monumental central gateway.
But just what is "La Parisienne" supposed to represent? The
image is simultaneously aloof and seductive, a goddess and a slut. A
second look at female images in the expositions reveals the same
ambiguity. The sinuous Oriental dancer and the costumed model are
both enticing, but in very different ways. A male audience is attracted
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by the frank sexual appeal of the shapely, scantily clad dancer who
emerges from the shadows of the cabaret, while a female audience is
held spellbound by the thin, elegantly clothed mannequin transfixed in
the glare of lights. The charms of the dancer are closely related to
those of the exotic, for both fantasies imply liberation from ordinary
conventions in a more romantic and exciting existence. The appeal of
the mannequin, on the other hand, is that of a fairytale princess, dis-
tant and haughty. These images imply a startling contrast between
male and female fantasies, between what men want women to be like
and what women want to be like. Could there ever be a reconciliation
of these two images in that of a woman at once exotic and fairylike, at
once sensual and remote, at once harem slave and princess? "La
Parisienne" suggests that there could be. An icon both sexy and
haughty, she resembles the women portrayed on advertising posters in
that era when the poster became a significant art form in France.
Indeed the triumph of French poster art, according to Georges d'Avenel
(of whom much more will be said shortly), is its mating of these con-
trary images in its ceaseless repetition of "the representation of a
female being with teasing features, half fairy princess and half
'streetwalker. ' " The preferred model of the Ch^rets, masters of
poster art, is "this Parisienne, of a desirable length, with a hierartic
smile, pagan goddess intoxicated with her own apotheosis. " This
"illusory type" always wears the same expression whether she is
represented on horseback, at the beach, smoking, writing to advertise
an ink or carrying a lamp to advertise a mineral oil, always "lending
,,114
the charm of her petite person to all the offerings of busmess. . .
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U her image constitutes a triumph of poster art, it is also a
triumph of business to create an "illusory type" which appeals to
fantasies of both sexes. It is more efficient for business to deploy
images which appeal to as many customers as possible, just as cinema
programs try to including something for everyone. Some fantasies may
be nearly universal but others may vary according to sex, age, social
class, or other factors, so that the contours of the dream world of
consumption are not identical for all. The interest of business, how-
ever, is to make that world as uniform as possible. Individual quirks
of imagination may be taken into account to some extent, but the goal
of mass publicity is to appeal to as many people as possible at once.
The creation of hybrid streetwalker-princess image is one way to
achieve this goal.
A second way is to reduce fantasies to their lowest common
denominator. This is why the dream of wealth is of crucial importance
in the symbiosis of commerce and fantasy. This dream is at once
nearly universal and infinitely flexible: people have the most diverse
ideas about how they would spend their money if they were rich, but all
their daydreams depend on the fundamental fantasy of being rich in the
first place. With wealth nearly all other dreams could come true, so
in appealing to this dream business achieves a feat of reductionism
which secures the broadest possible audience.
From start to finish the universal expositions of 1889 and 1900
appealed to reveries of wealth. For the relatively low price of
admission, a visitor coxild enjoy palaces and dancing girls, surround
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subsequently in book form. The title is intriguing. The term
"mechanism, " generally associated with means of production, is
applied by d'Avenel to means of consumption. Each of his articles
discusses one form of modern consumption-
-institutions like depart-
ment stores and supermarkets; the manufacture (but this is of rela-
tively minor importance) and retailing of items like paper, silk,
porcelain, clothing, and alcoholic beverages; systems of credit,
advertising, and insurance; methods of transportation like steamships,
buses, the Metro; entertainments such as the racetrack and theater;
domestic consumption in the form of lighting, heating, building, and
home decoration- -all these examples and others are treated by
d'Avenel according to his exceptionally broad understanding of what
modern consumption includes. His is an impressive achievement.
In the words of one reviewer, d'Avenel "finds statistics like an
engineer, caprices like a caricaturist, motives like a sociologist, and
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recollections like an historian. "
It is indeed this blend of perspectives which makes d'Avenel 's
comments so interesting and informative. His career demonstrates a
fertile interaction between his roles as historian and as social critic.
The significance of the "Mecanisme de la vie moderne" series may be
appreciated best when it is seen in the context of d'Avenel 's prior
research on the history of consumption patterns. This topic is an
unconventional one for a late nineteenth- century historian, to say the
least, and d'Avenel came to do research in the history of consumption
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patterns by a meandering route. His initial historical works were
much more traditional in choice of subject. His first book, published
in his early twenties after he left administrative work in the Ministry
of the Interior to devote himself to scholarship, is a history of the
bishops and archbishops of Paris (1878). His next major work, which
won the distinguished Prix Gobert from the Academie Francaise in
1889, was a four -volume study of Richelieu and the absolute monarchy
(1884-1890). Subsequent works treated nobles
,
priests, soldiers, and
judges at the time of Richelieu. While these subjects bear witness to
d'Avenel's own aristocratic heritage and his sincere Catholicism, in
writing them he became increasingly convinced that such eminent
political and ecclesiastical figures bear little relevance to the lives of
most people. "The public life of a people is a very small thing in
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comparison to its private life. " No doubt this conclusion also
reflects d'Avenel's disdain for contemporary public life in the Third
Republic of Boulanger and the Panama scandal. Looking at French
society of his day, he concluded there were really two Frances - -public
and private, visible and invisible, on the one hand the talkative,
divisive, non-productive France of Parliament and press, on the other
hand the silent, unified, productive France of laboratories and
factories. His contempt for contemporary public life was by no
means unique or totally unjustified, and as a wealthy aristocrat with
the title of "viscoxmt" d'Avenel was not predisposed to favor the
politics of the Third Republic. But he was by no means a reactionary
either. In the words of one admirer, he remained
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an independent spirit, sincerely liberal in religion and inpolitics, a modernizing and Americanizing Catholic dis-
engaged from the anti Semitic and legitimist fanaticism ofhis friends of the Faubourg [Saint- Germain, the quarter
of Pans where rich aristocrats kept their town housesj
.
However, this admirer adds, d'Avenel had not
entirely liberated himself from the prejudices of his class
nor reconciled himself with existing institutions, and hisdisdain for the politics of the Third Republic is such that
he ends up relegating politics in general to the rank of
indifferent matters. M. d'Avenel seems to affirm at the
same time that the French of his day possess a destestable
government and that it does not matter at all that this regime
is destestable. 120 ^
While d'Avenel 's conclusion about the relative significance of
public and private life may have been a somewhat inconsistent analysis
of the contemporary political scene, it was extraordinarily fruitful
when applied to historical research. He became interested in a whole
area of history which had been largely ignored. Instead of continuing
to study the public history of Richelieu, the monarchy, and the
ecclesiastical hierarchy, d'Avenel began to study slow changes in
material life- -in food, clothing, furnishing, lodging, and lighting, to
name only a few examples. This historical path led eventually to his
monumental four -volume Histoire ^conomique de la propriete, des
salaires, des denrees, et de tous les prix en generale, depuis I'an
1200 jusqu'en I'an 1800 [Economic history of property, salaries,
commodities, and prices from 1200 to 18003 (18 94-8), later condensed
for a more general audience in La Fortxine privee a travers sept
siecles [Private fortunes across seven centurie sj (1895), Paysans
et ouvriers depuis sept cents ans [[Peasants and workers for seven
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hundred years] (1889), and Les Riches depuis sevt cents ans fXhe
Rich over seven hundred yearsj (1909).
The bedrock of all these works is a statistical compilation of
private incomes and expenditures involving staggering labor (d'Avenel
claims he examined on the order of seventy-five thousand prices alone).
He is convinced that household budgets are the crucial data which allow
the historian to penetrate lost worlds of consumption. From these data
he concludes that material life has radically changed, has been "trans-
formed from top to bottom"^22 ^^^^ ^-^^ centuries, and that this
transformation has progressed independently of political or legal events,
even so-called revolutionary ones. Furthermore, d'Avenel concludes,
there is no correlation between the abstract prosperity of a coimtry
and the living conditions of its working classes, nor between the price
of labor and living costs. Changes in private consumption patterns are
striking both in their extent and in their independence of public factors.
But the statistics are only the means to d'Avenel's ultimate goal, which
is
to penetrate into the intimacy of humble homes of yesteryear, to
scrutinize the relations formerly established between rich and
poor, finally, to discover, buried beneath the heap of dead
statistics, a thousand secret emotions of our fathers.
. .
The dry figures of prices and incomes provide the key to the mental life
of people in the past: "the history of figures has become the history of
1 24
men. " The history of expenditures is not at all a "prosaic and
vulgar subject, " because patterns of expenditure are based not on a
logical and sober assessment of material well-being, but on mental
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pleasures ranging from the thriU of success in doubling one's income
to the "vaporous reveries of inebriation. " D'Avenel concludes that
"for the poor as for the rich, this question of income and of expenses
is above all a matter of imagination. "-^^^
D'Avenel is well aware of his pioneering role when he turns to
study the history of consumption. Writing in 1913, he notes that not
many years before the study of household expenses had been refused
the title of history altogether and had been treated, if at all, in
cursory and anecdotal fashion. Now, he feels, the history of household
budgets
corresponds well enough with contemporary preoccupations to
claim equal footing with the recitation of the battles, con-
spiracies, negotiations, murders, and loves of the twenty- five
kings who have occupied the throne of France since Philippe
Augustus down to Louis XVI. 126
But d'Avenel is by no means confident that this new kind of history he
practices will replace the more conventional variety. Because tracing
the adventures of a single individual might be more exciting than
studying "the silent vicissitudes of a people, " he doubts if many future
historians will give up the traditional dramatic narrative which is
relatively easy to write and enjoyable to read. Still, d'Avenel feels
the untraditional history of consumption is more stimulating intellectu-
ally, more "fecund in conclusions, " so some readers might brave
"the aridity of this portion of history to follow us into the shadows of
the evolution of private expenditures. "^^"^ In this judgment he under-
estimates both the human interest of his own work and the interest
which future historians would take in seeking alternatives to the
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traditional political narrative. In his thorough statistical research
combined with an appreciation of popular mentalities, in his pre-
ference for tracing a slow evolution over long periods of time, in
proclaiming the primacy of economic and social history, d'Avenel is
a precursor of the French Annales school which developed decades
later and which has since risen to a position of dominance in the
French historical profession.
However--and this may be the reason why d'Avenel's precursor-
ship is largely unacknowledged-
-he differs from most Annales historians
in that Marxism has little influence in his redefinition of historical
research. When d'Avenel refers to socialists, it is to disapprove of
their thought and practice. He is convinced his historical work shows
that socialist efforts to create equality in living standards through
political means, whether revolutionary or reformist ones, are futile.
A slow improvement in living standards has taken place over the
centuries regardless of political events or changes in legal status.
Socialist remedies for inequalities are now more unnecessary than
ever because
economic progress, which does not equalize "incomes" at all,
on the contrary equalizes "enjoyments" and thus realizes
without violence and without noise this leveling of the com-
fortable which beneficent legislators flatter themselves to
obtain by coups de baton . 128
The equalization of enjoyments is what really counts. "For what does
an inequality of money matter which no longer gives rise to an
1 29inequality of actual enjoyments? " The rich may have improved
their living standard in the nineteenth century, but the masses have
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gained so much more that differences among classes have become
relatively unimportant. D'Avenel specifically rebukes socialist
"egalophiles" m the last chapter of his book Le Nivellement des
jouissances [The leveling of enjoyments] ( 19 1 3) when he reprimands
-Lassalle and his disciples" for claiming that the absolute situation of
the working class is of no consequence, only its relative standing vis
^ vis other classes at the present. D'Avenel admits that inequality of
fortunes has increased in the previous century, that the bourgeoisie
probably has three or four times more to spend, and the very rich six
to eight times more, while the masses have only twice more. But this
increase of wealth means little to the rich man, for his money buys few
real improvements but only "artificial" luxuries or rareties.
"Leveling consists of this: that the people have acqmred more real
well-being, more useful luxury than the rich. " He cites examples:
There is less difference between a man who eats truffles or
grapes at five francs a livre and a man who eats cold cuts
and an orange at two sous, then between the latter and a man
who eats dry bread; there is less still between these than
between the man who eats till he is full and he who siiffers
hunger. There is more difference between the peasant lighted
by a resin candle and the lord lighted by wax tapers than there
is between a worker lighted by oil and a bourgeois lighted by
electricity. 130
This improvement in the lot of the masses has not been brought about
by socialists- -or by Christian charity, for that matter, or by any
altruistic attempt to help others --but by speculators who build
factories, send out ships, invent machines, and risk experiments in
order to make money. Giving rather than receiving may be important
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to instill virtue in the individual, but
-from the economic point of view,
the effective benefactors of humanity are not the organizers of goodness
but the pace-makers of work. "131 ^bove all it is invention which has
diminished the differences among the classes. The bicycle is one
example: it is much more useful to the poor than the automobile is to
.
the bourgeoisie, and soon the Paris Mfco will give all urban workers
the dream come true of a vehicle always at their service. Thanks to
the inventiveness of modern industry, of the invisible France, the
illusion of wealth is so complete that real differences in income no
longer matter. The traditional relationship of objects and their values
has been overturned, now that people can enjoy things without having to
pay a lot of money for them.
Once more we see how d'Avenel's role as an historian is inter-
twined with his social criticism. Because of his thorough historical
research into consumption patterns beginning in the thirteenth century,
recent changes in them stand out for d'Avenel in bold relief as novel
and unprecedented transformations. In "Le Mecanisme de la vie
moderne" d'Avenel demonstrates over and over how ordinary citizens
of his own day can for the first time enjoy the feeling of wealth: the
backdrop, stated or implied, is the preceding seven centuries and
more when ordinary citizens could never forget the great unpassable
gulf separating their way of life from that of the rich. In his article
on porcelain and earthenware, d'Avenel describes how the rich used
to eat off porcelain and the poor off clay or wood, whereas now
Frenchmen from millionaire to peasant eat "out of the same dish, " so
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to speak. Industrial changes which make possible large-scale pro-
duction of tableware have also revolutionized interior decoration, so
that the working classes can afford factory-made rugs and wallpapers
which offer "some appearance of wealth in place of the reality. " The
illusion of wealth may also be enjoyed in clothing, especially in "the
democratization of the 'silk dress, ' that ancient symbol of opulence,
["which] procures the illusion of similarity in dress,
--great comfort
for the feminine half of the human race. " While the mass-produced
silks selling for a franc and a half a meter are less beautiful than the
fine Lyon ones costing six hundred francs a meter, "they make more
people happy. " Technological advances have also transformed the
feather industry, so that cheap and convincing facsimiles of the rarest
varieties, or even of totally imaginary ones, can now be purchased by
any shopgirl. Rabbit pelts can be turned into exotic furs like
"monogolian chinchilla, " and artificial flowers with brilliant colors,
flexible rubber stems, and papyrus corollas are produced for the mass
market. The poor also enjoy the pleasures of novelty for the first
time. The privilege of following changes in fashion has spread to
social classes, male and female alike, whose grandparents probably
purchased only a few new outfits in a lifetime.
D'Avenel feels this mass of cheap imitations flooding the market
should be welcomed wholeheartedly. In the past striking differences
in appearance and possessions placed a "brutal barrier" between the
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classes; now, in the place of continual frustration, the humbl
derive great pleasure from pretending to be rich too:
Each time [industries] extend their reach, the life of a great
H '"^'^r^'
^ satisfaction; they allow thepale and Illusory but sweet reflection of opulence to penetrateeven to the humble. These vulgarizations are the work of ourcentury: they honor it greatly. 134
uxi^ ui
To those who protest that the pleasure derived from these vulgariza-
tions is banal, d'Avenel responds.
The character of the new luxury is to be banal. Let us not
complain too much, if you please: before there was nothingbanal but misery. Let us now fall into this childish but
nevertheless common contradiction which consists of wel-
coming the development of industry while deploring the results
of industrialism. ^->^
He is determined not to look down snobbishly on the new pleasures of
the masses while forgetting what miseries they replace. His historical
work gives him a clear-eyed recognition of what industrialism means
to the vast majority of people. Many other social critics, in con-
trasting past and present, look only at differences in methods of pro-
duction and present a contrast between an earlier utopia of craftsman-
ship, small shops, and good will and a present degrading system of
factories, strife, and boring labor. D'Avenel looks at the level of
consumption each productive system is capable of supporting. He
emphasizes the contrast between the physical and psychological
miseries of ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-lodged masses who never tasted
any of the pleasures of wealth, and the contemporary standard of
living which is far more comfortable and uniform.
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D'Avenel is aware of arguments that modern consumption entails
a degradation of craftsmanship, but they do not detain him for long.
Unlike many of his contemporaries, he u:.derstands that the reason for
this decline is not just technological- the replacement of handwork by
machinery-but also social and psychological-
-the desire to imagine
oneself rich. For example, silk may have been coveted in the first
place because of its intrinsic beauty, but in modern times the masses
desire it more for its association with wealth. Thus a shopgirl prefers
shoddy mass-produced silk to sturdy, handsome cotton. Silk conveys
an illusion of wealth which cotton does not, and the illusion, not the
fabric, is the source of the consumer's pleasure. We have already
discussed the psychological roots of "bad taste" in connection with
exotic ornamentation, where the motive to make a display takes pre-
cedence over aesthetic considerations such as harmony, logic, or the
integrity of the material. The situation is similar with the silk dress,
although in this case the motive is not only to display an illusion to
others but to gain the internal satisfaction of the illusion of wealth.
D'Avenel defends this satisfaction as legitimate even if it means the
article is unattractive or ill-made. When a silk manufacturer admits
to him that the lovely tints of mass-produced fabrics will not last long,
d'Avenel remarks,
I do not plead here the cause of the "shoddy;" it does not need a
lawyer, and if it needed a poet the dyers could say: " 'Qu'
importe le flacon pourvu qu'on ait I'ivresse?
. . .
" [What does it
matter what is in the bottle as long as it gets you drunk?]) ^36
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While defending considerations of imagination, however, d'Avenel
does not confuse them with aesthetic ones. He does not try to argue
that machine-made goods are the equal of older handmade ones, but
only reminds his readers that the productions of our forefathers could
be enjoyed by only a few. Furthermore, the flood of mass-produced
goods does not have to mean the disappearance of artistic inventive-
ness, but should rather inspire the truly rich to subsidize genuinely
unique works of art. example, in an age when anyone can buy
an imitation Oriental rug, the handmade tapestry "grows in its proud
solitude as a unique fabric unconquerable by industry, because it
remains inaccessible to the blind looms of the factory. "^^^ In other
words, d'Avenel makes a clear distinction between art and consumer
goods- -a distinction which, as we shall see in the next part, was by
no means universally accepted.
Critical Remarks: The Democratization of Luxury
Certainly d'Avenel 's appreciation of the pleasures of cheap imita-
tions stands in refreshing contrast to their easy dismissal by those
who forget that the realistic alternative is not fine handmade goods for
the masses but misery for them. Still, his remarks bear a patronizing
note which deserves some consideration. His emphasis on recent
improvements in consumption provides a much-needed corrective for
those who concern themselves only with transformations in production;
but this focus on consumption means d'Avenel is insufficiently
appreciative of the social cost in physically taxing and psychologically
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unrewarding work often required to produce modern consumer goods.
After all, arguments about the decline in craftsmanship are not simply
aesthetic ones. Lamenting its decline is also to lament the absence of
rewarding work under modern systems of production, and to this issue
d'Avenel does not really address himself. No doubt he would say that
any degradation of work is more than compensated for by the new
pleasures of consumption. That response should receive careful
consideration by anyone suggesting an impossible marriage of old
methods of production with present levels of consumption. But the new
pleasures of consumption should not be used as an excuse for the con-
tinuation of unsatisfactory working conditions, since the correction of
those conditions does not necessarily entail a return to primitive
methods. D'Avenel himself cannot be accused of using this excuse
directly, and to faxilt him for not mentioning production is to blame
him for not covering a topic he never intends to cover. The point is
that his emphasis on the new pleasures of consumption is an argument
which can readily develop into an evasion of or excuse for problems of
production. Those pleasures may be genuine, but they may too easily
be regarded as an opiate to lull workers into forgetfulness of social
inequalities or of dissatisfactions with their work.
In one passage d'Avenel indicates that he is aware that many
workers are indeed unhappy despite the "leveling of enjoyments. "
The passage appears in his article on alcoholic beverages in "Le
M^canisme de la vie moderne. " After some amusing comments on
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Scotch and Benedictine, d'Avenel remarks that for some reason
enormous number of workers do not use their high wages to gather a
nest-egg or to enjoy a more comfortable life, but only to fill their
goblet and empty their heads with the same drink as some "fetishist
negro" in the Sudan. Why do the most cultivated and proud workers
in the world behave in this manner, drinking not in jolly festivals but
rapidly, silently, grimly?
You would have to understand their interior, probably more
than they understand it Cthe worker] prefers to see what
he desires than to desire what he isn't aware of himself.
C only in drink] are promises never eluded.
. . The more'his
reason takes flight and his head strays, the alcoholic, in
stupefying himself, loses himself and, however crude be his
dream, he dreams !l39
'Qu' importe le flacon pourvu qu'on ait I'ivresse.
. .
? " This is an
extremely disconcerting passage, for in describing the inebriated
worker d'Avenel unvnttingly comes very close to describing the
pleasures of illusion in consumption which he has been defending with
such vigor, and which have been described so many times before in
this chapter. Why this flight from reality to illusion, from sobriety
to drunkenness, from reason to stupor, from waking to dream? Is
there any great difference between drinking in solitude or going to the
movie theater to lose oneself in solitary dreams there? Does not
Corday describe the "distant voyages" exhibits as draughts of highly
distilled liquor which give the masses a taste of power and life?
D'Avenel isn't sure just what the cultivated and proud French worker
desires, and perhaps he is right that the worker himself does not
know. But clearly something is desired which is not found in the
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"leveling of enjoyments. " The illusion of wealth is not sufficient.
Perhaps its pleasures do not compensate for the kind of work the
solitary drinker does all day long. Perhaps an awareness of inequali-
ties in income remains despite the flood of cheap imitations: d'Avenel
may be ready to settle for an illusion of equality rather than the
reality, but the masses may not be willing to do so. Or perhaps the
reasons have nothing to do with socio-economic factors, but involve
rather some inherent restlessness in humanity aggravated by the loss
of religious faith. Whatever the cause, d'Avenel fails to inquire why
the worker wants to intoxicate himself so thoroughly, by whatever
method, why he seeks a dream world not of joy and liberation but of
numbness and evasion.
There are other passages in which d'Avenel suggests, but does
not explore, objections to his own thesis that the illusion of wealth
brings happiness to the masses and harmony to society. He is aware
that this happiness and harmony are based on deception-
-a term
d'Avenel avoids, but which is certainly implied in the idea that a
shoddy silk dress or a "Mongolian chinchilla" can give the same
feeling of wealth as a hand- made Lyon silk or a mink coat. He under-
stands the difference in quality, but assumes the masses won't notice
or won't care. But if the rich seek the unique and the genuine article,
the work of art rather than the mass-produced, why shouldn't the
people want it too? The issue here is not just a matter of taste or of
recognizing the difference in quality between a cheap imitation and an
expensive original. In the "M^canisme" series d'Avenel often reminds
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his readers that wealth consists of the ability to possess rare objects
--not beautiful or comfortable ones, but rareties. However, he adds,
an object cannot be at once rare and owned by the masses. No matter
what the item, no matter what its former associations with wealth, as
soon as it becomes cheap enough to find a mass market it is no longer
rare and therefore no longer desirable. D'Avenel cites department
store items as exemplifying the ever-receding nature of the illusion of
wealth. Department stores ceaselessly try to offer the masses objects
whose great attraction has been the difficulty of obtaining them because
of their price (for example, the Oriental rugs Mouret offers at cut
rates). Then, when the object becomes common in such stores, it
loses its attraction. The result is good business but repeated frustra-
tion for the masses who are always being disillusioned. Since the
pleasure of cheap imitations is less in the goods themselves but in
their imaginative dimension which allows the owner to feel rich, their
pleasure is always vanishing as the mass market keeps encroaching to
turn rareties into banalities. Once everyone can afford an imitation
Oriental rug, people want a hand-made tapestry, the genuine article
rather than the facsimile. The genuine continues to signify wealth,
and common people continue to sviffer frustration at not being able to
afford what the rich can afford. The impasse is inescapable. If
wealth is defined by the possession of that which is limited in
availability (the "rare"), then by definition the masses can never
enjoy a convincing illusion of wealth. Dreams may be solitary
experiences, but the results are collective when many people act on
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the same dream. When a shopgirl gets a silk dress to fulfill a per-
sonal fantasy, she steps out on the street and discovers that thousands
of other women have had the same dream and bought the same dress.
For all of them the dream is over. And it is not just on a psychological
level that the pleasures of possession may be destroyed when many
others seek the same pleasures. There are certain goods, d'Avenel
concedes, which cannot be used by the masses without losing much of
their charm. Some luxuries are inherently incapable of democratiza-
tion. Everyone can possess a dress without physically (if not
psychologically) encumbering anyone else, whereas
it would doubtless be more pleasant for each Parisian to own
the Bois de Boulogne all by himself, or with a small number
of friends, rather than share its enjoyment on holidays with
five hundred thousand other proprietors. But it is precisely
the glory of Progress to have created this congestion in
making accessible to all an outing hitherto very distant. 140
In the imaginary voyages of the expositions many people can pretend to
visit a distant place without getting in each other's way, but when many
people make an expedition in reality, the pleasure of the outing is to
some extent spoiled by the presence of others seeking the same plea-
sure. Once again, illusion is solitary but reality is collective.
The f\indamental weakness of d'Avenel 's theory of the "leveling
of enjoyments" is precisely its attempt to base social harmony on
illusion rather than reality. D'Avenel contends that the value of a
consumer item is not intrinsic but purely symbolic; its value is
measured by its power to create illusions rather than by its beauty
or utility. But who is measuring that power? D'Avenel may say that
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pleasures have been leveled, that the pleasure of owning a cheap silk
equals that of owning a fine one, but it is impossible to compare such
intangible feelings. Differences in goods are visible, measurable;
differences in enjoyment may be claimed but cannot be demonstrated.
And because people insist on comparing themselves with each other,
they may be more aware of the tangible differences among the classes
than the illusory similarities. D'Avenel himself admits this:
If the mass of citizens does not appear to feel the.
. . new enjoy-
ments with which the nineteenth century has endowed it it is
that the "money question" is not a question of enjoyment, but aquestion of equality; a matter of self-respect and not at all one
of pleasure. "To have money, " isn't it basically, "to have
more money than others, " and how to arrange it that eachFrenchman has more money than the others? 141
D'Avenel makes a crucial admission here that people seek realities of
income rather than illusions of pleasure, an admission which essentially
undercuts the theory of the "leveling of enjoyments. " An obvious con-
clusion is that people should enjoy a real equality of income and seek
whatever illusory pleasures they desire on their own. But d'Avenel
immediately jumps to another conclusion, that people will not be
satisfied with equality but will instead demand superiority of income.
It is as if the moment he approaches the matter of equalizing incomes
rather than enjoyments, equalizing realities rather than illusions, he
takes refuge in the despairing conclusion that people will never be
happy no matter what, a conclusion which is not self-evident.
Even if he avoids facing the alternatives, d'Avenel is correct in
admitting that the "money question" involves more than enjoyments.
The illusion of wealth based on a leveling of enjoyments will fail
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because any item owned by the masses lacks the rarity necessary for
conveying that illusion; because differences of quality between mass-
produced and luxury items remain; because people seek self-respect,
status, prestige, as well as pleasure; because the pains of work are
not necessarily compensated for by the pleasures of consumption;
because some luxuries are inherently incapable of democratization;
because people are more aware of tangible differences in income than
of intangible similarities in enjoyments; and, most of all, because the
differences between rich and poor involves differences in people rather
than in possessions. D'Avenel looks too much at the objects which
distinguish people and not enough at the human beings themselves. The
significant distinctions remain even as consumer goods become more
similar- -distinctions in mortality, education, health, manners, taste,
social contacts, social and political power. Wealth involves how a
person spends his time as well as what he owns. When d'Avenel
suggests that in the future the elite will patronize truly unique art, he
suggests that the elite have personal qualities which the masses do not
possess no matter how many imitation rugs may fill their modest
homes. The real differences among people cannot be obliterated by
illusions of wealth.
At the beginning of this section it was suggested that the dream
of wealth is the most pervasive one of all. Therefore the consequences
of its deceptiveness are also singularly pervasive, involving nothing
less than the masking of human injustice by material show. The
principle of deception involved, however, is the same as that
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responsxble for the seemingly silly Ues of the Trocad^ro exhibits, or
for the lovely deceit of brilliant electric lights. D'Avenel is a per-
ceptive and intelligent writer who too readily approves of the vast
delusion he describes. In this he .s by no means alone. The concept
of the leveling of enjoyments will appear again and again in this
dissertation, most often under the rubric of "the democratization of
luxury,
- the concept that in the modern age luxury is no longer
reserved for an elite but is available to the masses. The appeal of
this idea as a pseudo-solution for contemporary social problems is
extraordinary. D'Avenel must be recognized as an early and eloquent
advocate of it, and certainly he thinks through its implications more
than most. But the theory of the leveling of. enjoyments is not his most
important contribution to thought about consumption. As a theoretical
framework it is clever but too crude and restricted to encompass the
wealth of information and insight recorded in "Le M^canisme de la vie
moderne. " The lasting contribution of this series lies not in socio-
logical theory but in the very discovery of the phenomenon of mass
consumption. This is a discovery participated in by all the writers
discussed in this chapter, but d'Avenel is the most explicit of all in
describing the nature of the new world of consumption he has found.
He raises familiar activities from the level of unconscious unrecorded
routine to the level of consciousness, perceiving their significance and
their relationship as activities of consumption, thereby opening them
126
up to thoughtful consideration. He does this both for his own day and
for the past; indeed, it is the continual comparison of past and pre-
sent that makes d'Avenel's vision so lucid, that enables him to see a
whole area of life hitherto ignored. He views contemporary events in
the light of history, and history in the light of contemporary events.
Both for the past and for the present, d'Avenel defines consumption
as an area for intellectual inquiry.
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CHAPTER II
DECADENTISM AND CONSUMPTION
Problems of Interpretation
In describing an emergent culture in which fantasy and commerce
are interwoven, there can be no firm line between the evidence offered
by writers of non-fiction and those of fiction. Even d'Avenel, whose
opus magnum presents tens of thousands of factual statistics, contends
that first and foremost consumption is "a matter of imagination. "
Other writers cited describe the expositions and other experiences of
mass consumption in highly metaphorical language; their reportage has
a vivid imaginative component that is not far removed from the lan-
guage of fiction. Indeed, we should expect to find similar themes in
frankly imaginative works, since writers of fiction could be expected
to discern, no matter how tentatively, the same developments as
thinkers publishing journalism or criticism. The same individual
might even function in both capacities. J. -K. Huysmans, whose novel
A Rebours [Against the grain] will be discussed here at length for its
insight into mass consumption, also published his impressions of the
1889 exposition in a journal article which substantiates Mauclair's
analysis of an aesthetic of neo-barbarism. ^
So the transition in this chapter to imaginative literature needs
no apology as long as there is acceptance of the general validity of
broadly humanistic as opposed to narrowly objective (or rather
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pseudo-objective) scholarship. The
..ore i:.portant quesUon
.s which
of the works from the 1880-1914 era to discuss, considering the out-
pouring of outstanding contributions in all genres in what was certainly
a golden age of French literature. The relevance of works of literary
realism has already been illustrated by references to Au Bonheur des
Dames of Zola, the master of the realistic school in that period.
Repeated references to illusions and dreams have suggested that the
writings of the symbolists, for whom these terms are also key ones,
would bear fruitful analogies; the symbolist exaltation of a dream world
over daylight reality provides a starting point for such an analysis.
But in this limited space attention will be directed towards the
decadents, who occupy a sort of buffer zone between the longer-lived,
farther-reaching schools of realism and symbolism. Not only does
decadent literature provide a direct and useful commentary on Ihe
dream world of consumption, but also concepts already discussed in
relation to that dream world provide a helpful analysis of a literary
movement which has proved troublesome to interpret.
Even in its own day, decadentism was something of an embarrass-
ment. The term "decadent" was thought ridiculous then and was not
adopted by many of those commonly associated with it, such as
Jules Laforgue, Stephen Mallarm^, Paul Verlaine, Gustave Kahn,
Henri de Regnier, Villiers de I'Isle Adam, and Huysmans. ^ The term
was popularized by the journal Le Decadent litteraire et artistique
[] The literary and artistic decadent] , founded in 1886 and edited by
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Anatole Baju. who proclaimed in the manifesto heading the first issue:
To conceal from ourselves thp citato r^f j
have arr.ved would be the h:?ght^ofnn;efsiMSy^^"
"'^^^
Religion, customs, justice, everything decays, or rathereverything undergoes an ineluctable transformationTo new needs correspond new ideas, infinitely subtle andnuanced. From there the necessity of creating 4heard ofwords to express such a complexity of sentiments and ofphysiological sensations. ... 3 ui
The origins of decadentism long predate Baju's manifesto and may be
traced back to French romanticism of the 1830's. Its themes were
first enunciated clearly by Charles Baudelaire, especially in Les
Fleurs du mal [Flowers of evil] (1857) for which Thg-ophile Gautier's
preface to the first posthumous edition (1868) served as a sort of pre-
manifesto. Its termination is as indefinite as its origins. The
symbolist manifesto of Jean Mor^as was published in the same year as
Baju'
s
and, as a literary school, decadentism was always engaged in a
sort of cross-fire with symbolism and finally merged with it towards
1889, when Baju's journal ceased to publish. 4 Although relatively
short-lived as a discernable literary movement, as a cultural pose
decadentism was flamboyant, widespread, and tenacious. To quote
further from Baju's manifesto, decadents flaunted a life style of
"Refinement of appetites, of sensations, of taste, of luxury, of enjoy-
ments: neurosis, hypnotism, morphinomanie, scientific charlatanism,
extreme Schopenhauerism.
. .
A phenomenon both literary and cultural, both extremist and
popular, is an indication of what H. Stuart Hughes has called as a
"profound psychological change" which "nearly all students of the last
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years of the nineteenth century have sensed in some form or other.
.
.
"6
The difficulty is in deciphering the relationship between decadentism
and that change. Its adherents often seem too ridiculous to be regarded
as something other than a curiosity-
-an attitude present in A.E.
Carter's book"^ in which he recounts ad nauseum the admittedly
ludicrous plots of second-rate decadent novels. The decadents are too
noisy to ignore but too silly to take altogether seriously. Hughes him-
self rejects "older, more aesthetically oriented interpretations (we may
think of Henry Adams)" in which the 1890's "figured as the fin de si^cle :
it was a period of overripeness
,
of perverse and mannered decadence
--the end of an era. " Instead, Hughes concludes, decadentism was
"irrelevant.
. .
a backdrop, nothing more, " while the important cultural
and intellectual changes were going on elsewhere. ^ This section will
attempt to demonstrate that the decadents should not be dismissed so
readily, that even their more embarrassing aspects provide a serious
comment on dreams of consumption, which in turn illuminate our
understanding of the literary school.
To support this contention, our starting point can be the simple
observation that writers already cited refer to decadent writing to
articiilate their response to what they observe. When Mirbeau's
philosopher friend feels himself swept away by the sensuous atmosphere
of the 1889 exposition, he cries "O Verlaine! O Swinburne [an English
decadent^ ! Who would ever have thought that I would someday
experience the execrable passions about which you have sung!" Nautet
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wrote essays on Baudelaire and "decadent psychology- which are echoe
in his description of the exposition as a "city of pleasure. ""^ After
describing the spectacle of the lighted fountains at the 1889 exposition
as a triumphant marriage of science and art, de Vogii^ comments that
lovers of science should read no further because "I want to add some-
thing to console the young decadents.
. . .fairness constrains me to
admit that M. J.-K. Huysmans was a prophet in certain chapters of his
book: A Rebours. " The lighted fountains, he explains, confirm
decadent theories that the means of one art can be transposed to
another and that impressions received by different senses can be
equivalent:
While we are dreaming, let us flatter decadent desires as much
as possible. Arts bearing affinities with each other will join in
concert in this total music of the future.
. . choirs will chant the
classic writings of M. Stephen Mallarme, and the harmonious
sheaves will be perfumed with rare essences. 10
In fact the expositions as a whole furnish a showcase for decadent
themes--evasion, exoticism, sensation, Ivixury, eroticism, the
fabulous --and we shall see that Huysmans' hero constructs a sort of
one-man exposition complete with "distant voyages" in his home.
Furthermore, Mauclair and La Sizeranne describe the Automobile
Salon as a glass -domed pleasure palace, and Mauclair and others
cite Villiers de 1 'Isle -Adam, usually classified as a decadent, as a
prophet of "heavenly billboards. ""^^ Admittedly, scattered references
do not prove anything, suggestive as they may be. More significant is
the general congruence of imagery and tone in decadent literature and
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in numerous non-fictional accounts of the expositions, commercial
displays, advertisements, and amusements of modern business.
The theoretical problems of positing a causal, as opposed to a
casual, relationship between literary events and social-economic ones
are extremely tangled. At the very least, noticing the congruence in
language and tone between literary decadents and writers describing
experiences of mass consumption does cast some doubt on theories
which place the decadents and bourgeois society in more or less com-
plete opposition-
-theories such as those of Cesar Grana in Bohemian
and Bourgeois (1964)^^. or, more recently, of Daniel Bell in The
Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (1976k Both Grana and Bell
treat the decadents as one example of a more general "bohemian"
culture (Grana's term) or "counterculture" (Bell's term) which exists
in a state of "disjuncture" (to borrow one of Bell's favorite expressions)
vis a vis bourgeois society. Both writers define these opposing camps
with grand sweeps of the historical pen. Grana finds the origins of the
mutual emnity of bohemian and bourgeois in the 1830 's and traces it
down to the rebellion of the "beats" of the 1950's. In The Cultural Con-
tradictions of Capitalism Bell classifies both the decadents of the
1890's and the counterculture of the 1960's as examples of modernism,
the origins of which are set at some vague time in the early nineteenth
century. Bell cites Grana in support of his thesis, but Bell's
theoretical ambitions are greater and so he tries to be at once more
general and more precise in defining the antagonists:
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The argument elaborated in this book is that the three realms
--the economy, the polity, and the culture--are ruled con-trary axial principles: for the economy, efficiency; for'iheponty, equality and for the culture, self-realization (or self-gratif.cation). The resulting disjunctions have framed the
iTo'years""
5'°' °' "^"''""^ P^^^
Most of Bell's book involves the opposition of "culture" and "economy"
which, despite the author's more imposing theoretical apparatus, seems
indistinguishable from GraSa's opposition of "bohemian" and
"bourgeois. "
Both Grarla and Bell realize that the basic dichotomy they de-
scribe does not fit some important evidence. GraKa cannot understand
the decadents' appreciation of the city and of technological artifice,
which supposedly belong to the bourgeois realm of urbanization and
industrialization they so thoroughly despise. As for Bell, his evidence
keeps spilling out of his tidy tripartite framework. He expends much
energy sourly blaming the realm of ciolture for promoting self-
destructive, pleasure-seeking values, and yet at other points he admits
that developments within the economic system itself, such as the
advent of the automobile and of widespread consumer credit, also
greatly encourage this lamentable hedonistic self- gratification.
Statements like "... the Protestant ethic was undermined not by
modernism but by capitalism itself"^^ are not examined thoroughly for
their implication that perhaps culture and economy are not so opposed
after all. In particular. Bell's static model does not allow for any
significant mutation within the "axial values" of the "techno-economic
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system. " It serves to let Bell vent his rage against certain cultural
manifestations without accounting for historical change. And neither
Grar^a's nor Bell's assumptions of a fundamental opposition between
bohemian and bourgeois can account for any congruence between
decadent literature and manifestations of the economic system as seen
in expositions, the automobile salon, the cinema, or department stores
Their theories assume there can be no congruencies and so deter us
from noticing them in the first place.
All this suggests the obvious alternative, a Marxist perspective
which assumes that literary productions are indeed related to economic
developments, a relationship commonly if clumsily referred to as that
of a literary superstructure resting on the economic substructure.
Bell explicitly offers his theory of disjuncture as a response to Marxist
and functionalist theories which, he says, share the "common premise-
that "society is a structurally interrelated system and that one can
understand any social action only in relation to that unified system. "^^
Although the logical flaws in Bell's theory are serious, what matters
more for us is the pragmatic question of whether the Marxist alterna-
tive might prove useful in illuminating a congruence between decadent
literature and the emergent culture of consumption. One intriguing
interpretation from an implicitly but not explicitly Marxist viewpoint
is Wylie Sypher's Literature and Technology (1968) especially in the
chapter titled "The Pathos of Consuming. "20 The distance between
Sypher and Grana is demonstrated by the former's interpretation of
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Flauberfs Madame Bovary not as a diatribe against bourgeois values,
as GraSa reads it, but as a portrait of Emma the "victim of uncon-
trollable middle-class cravings" whose romantic dreams, which
originally have a certain nobility, become debased to the level of
vulgar appetite for ornate consumer goods. The only difference
between Emma and later aesthetes (a term Sypher uses to refer to the
decadents) is that their pleasures are more recherchgs
. They too are
easily debased to crass Philistinism, for while they scorn the bourgeois
world, their scramble for pleasures and sensations unconsciously
reflects it.
This interpretation has the great virtue of seeing through the
usual cliches of bourgeois culture as wholly efficient, rational, and
utilitarian-
-cliches which Bell and Grana accept far too carelessly.
Sypher understands that the so-called respectable society involves
illusions and cravings just as the unrespectable bohemian culture does.
This redefinition of bourgeois society goes far towards explaining why
descriptions of fantasies of evasion, luxury, or fairytale kindoms
would prevail in the non-fiction essays we have read. The danger
of this kind or reading, though, is that it may become reductionist and
explain everything as a direct reflection of economic phenomena.
Sypher goes too far when he describes Baudelaire's dandy or
Huysmans' hero des Esseintes as paradigmatic consiamers whose
pleasures are those of the middle class, only more exotic. They do
display affinities with the bourgeois consumer, but they are not only
that. Their devastating scorn for the bourgeoisie is not just an
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example of bad faith, of self-deception, of refusal to recognize that
they too are greedy for middle-class pleasures. Similarities of
themes may be enlightening but they may also be deceivingly super-
ficial. Mimickry does not necessarily demonstrate identity or
approval.
Therefore we shall eschew further theoretical generalizations
about literature and society for a closer reading of the decadent work
par excellence, the most famous novel of the movement, the "breviary
of the Decadents, "^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^ popularity, or notoriety, suggests
that whether adored or detested it struck a responsive emotional chord
in many readers--Huysmans ' X Rebours
. The advantage of focusing
on an important work like this, in all its complexity, is that we are
forced to recognize that the relationship of literature and what Sypher
calls the "techno-economic system" is much more ambivalent then
theories either of opposition or of reflection admit. Certainly some
decadent writers could be cited who are only opponents or only mimics
of bourgeois life, but it seems only fair to both sides to examine a
significant novel by a significant writer rather than one of a flood of
derivative and pedestrian works. And fairness is important. The
theories already mentioned tend to blame rather than to understand, to
reprimand modernist writers for attacking the puritan values of the
bourgeois economic system (as Bell does) or to lament the way
bourgeois philistinism has infected literature (as Sypher suggests).
The interplay of literary and economic phenomena which emerges
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from a reading of ARebour_s is a good deal more subtle than the alter-
natives of superstructure or disjuncture suggest. In this interplay,
culture must be viewed as a totality in which different types of events
reflect and influence each other in a mutually responsive manner
rather than in a simple mechanical scheme where a block called "the
economy" hits against or pushes a block called "literature" or vice
versa. Finally, interpreting a work of literature as the result of some
tug-of-war between economic and literary entities ignores the fact that
it is also the result of an individual mind dealing with a problem and
expressing a vision. In the case of A Rebours
, the novel originates in
an agonized and lonely attempt by Huysmans to retain some personal
integrity in the age of mass consumption.
The Indictment of Mass Consumption
Des Esseintes, hero of A Rebours, is probably the most famous
consumer in literature. He is the last scion of an aristocratic house.
and, after enduring a bleak youth in an unloving family and a Jesuit
school, he is able and quite willing to afford himself the pleasures of
women, wine, and revelry. Eventually he is worn out by youthful
excesses and the tedium of having to interact with the general run of
coarse, disgusting h\imanity. He repairs to a house at Fontenay, near
Paris, "a hermitage combined with modern comfort, an ark on dry
land and nicely warmed, whither he could fly for refuge from the
24incessant deluge of hiiman folly. " Des Esseintes decorates the house
with exquisite taste- -even a bedroom outwardly resembling an austere
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monastic cell is outfitted with the finest materials- and fills it with
his favorite books, liquors (stored in an organ-like gadget on which he
composes symphonies of tastes) and paintings (mostly macabre). At
the outset des Esseintes amuses himself with all these things and
simultaneously begins to meditate on his boyhood, his past love affairs
his religious training, and other experiences. As memories and
thoughts accumulate, he feels increasingly tense and distracted in his
complete solitude. He tries to calm his nerves by ordering a truck-
load of flowers so exotic they seem artificial; by immersing himself in
harmonies of perfumes; by planning a trip to London from which he
turns back at the last moment, preferring to travel in imagination
instead; and by reading religious literature. All these strategms fail
to halt his nervous deterioration in hallucinations, delusions, coughs,
fever, and vomiting. Finally his doctor is summoned. The physician
orders him to leave the hermetic existence of Fontenay and "to return
to Paris and take part again in the common life of men; in a word, to
endeavor to find diversions the same as other people. "^^ Only fear of
an agonizing death makes des Esseintes follow these orders. As he
sits listening to the movers packing his belongings, he ponders the
world he will re-enter. He knows no compatible person with whom he
can socialize; the religious faith he craves is always aborted by doubts
of logic and common sense; the bourgeoisie is triumphant and dis-
gusting, the aristocracy a rotten corpse; and the consoling arguments
of Schopenhauerian pessimism which might make him accept all this
peacefully are powerless to comfort him:
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Des Esseintes dropped into a chair, in despair "t , ,mo.e I shall be in Par.s, " he exclaWd; Cli; al .s ove;"'like a flowing tide, the waves of human medioc^ityVise lo theheavens and they will engulf my last refuge; I am opening thesluxce-gates myself, m spite of myself. Ah; but my couragefails me, and my heart is sick within me !
-Lord, take pitv on
on'the n""T ^"P^- wouid fain benevegalley-slave of life who puts out to sea alone, in the 'darkness of night, beneath a firmament illumined no longer bythe consoling beacon-fires of the ancient hope. "26 ^ ^
As in the case of any book of merit, a plot outline does not begin
to do justice to the richness of the work--for example, to its texture in
which comedy and irony are interwoven in a tone of immense pathos
reaching its climax in the final paragraph quoted above. What comes
across most powerfully are not events, of which the novel is largely
bare, but the vision of des Esseintes' silk-lined prison at Fontenay
and the hero's anguished inability to stay there or to leave. For
des Esseintes is not only a consumer, but a tragic hero. For all his
perversities and eccentricities, in the final scene where he abandons
Fontenay he is an immensely moving figure because of the determination
he has previously shown in his singlehanded effort to fight off an
inauthentic market and to create his own authentic mode of consumption.
Like a tragic hero, he fails but goes down struggling against his fate.
fully aware of his defeat but still not accepting it.
The inauthentic consumption which des Esseintes resists so
valiantly is that of the stupid, crude bourgeois, boastful show-offs
devoid of taste or manners. They take false pride in owning a luxury
item- -a diamond, an Oriental rug, a fancy reception room- -and the
only pleasures they derive from ownership, besides the transient and
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shallow ones of amusement at the most trivial follies, are the purely
exterior ones of indicating a certain social status. But status is never
secure, and amusement does not last: the bourgeois are thus caught up
in a ridiculous scramble for goods which they cannot afford. Des
Esseintes continually rails against their futile chase after amusement
and status, but his most biting attacks are put in the form of two
anecdotes recounted in the sixth chapter. In the first anecdote he
recalls his friend d'Argunande, whom des Esseintes sadistically urged
to marry after learning that the friend's fiancee wanted to move into a
chic new apartment house in Paris built on a circular floor plan. The
newlyweds proceeded to have an entire suite of round furniture made to
order to fit their new home, although they could ill afford the expense.
The wife, finding herself short of dress money, finally prevailed upon
her husband to move to a cheaper apartment built in the ordinary
fashion. There the round furniture refused to touch the walls and the
shoddily-made drawers began to warp, but there was no money to
replace or repair it. The couple quarreled ever more bitterly over
these petty irritations, and the maid took advantage of their distraction
to raid the cashbox. The marriage soon broke up, to des Esseintes'
immense satisfaction.
The anecdote- -it might even be termed a parable- -which immedi-
ately follows this tale of bourgeois woe also recounts the miseries
caused by an excess of desires over income, this time among the
popular classes. Somewhat earlier des Esseintes had remarked that
the bourgeois style of consxamption was rapidly spreading throughout
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the masses like some loathsome infection. With horror he noted that
the trains running to Fontenay from Paris were hauling hordes of
Sunday tourists each week; that Oriental rugs were being sold at dis-
count prices so any tradesman could purchase them; that even jewels
and flowers, at least the cheaper varieties, were being indulged in by
the common throng. This same theme--that the common people are
being seduced by the relentless desire to consume which will lead them
to the same vexations the bourgeoisie now experiences -
-is the subject
of the second anecdote des Esseintes recalls in Chapter Six. He
remembers how he happened upon a sixteen-year-old street urchin,
Auguste Langlois, whom he took to a brothel to let Auguste have his
choice of the women. There des Esseintes explained to the madam,
I am simply trying to train a murderer. Now just follow my
argument. This boy is virgin and has reached the age when
the blood begins to boil; he might, of course, run after the
little girls of his neighborhood, and still remain an honest
lad while enjoying his bit of amusement; in fact, have his
little share of the monotonous happiness open to the poor.
On the contrary, by bringing him here and plunging him in a
luxury he had never even suspected the existence of and which
will make a lasting impression on his memory; by offering
him every fortnight a treat like this, I shall make him acquire
the habit of these pleasures which his means forbid his
enjoying;.
. .
well, at the end of the three months, I stop the
little allowance I am going to pay you in advance for the
benevolence you show him. Then he will take to thieving to
pay for his visits here; he will stop at nothing that he may
take his usual diversions on this divan in this fine gas -lit
apartment.
If the worst comes to the worst, he will, I hope, one fine
day kill the gentleman who turns up just at the wrong moment
as he is breaking open his desk; then my object will be
attained, I shall have contributed, so far as in me lay, to
create a scoundrel, an enemy the more for the odious society
that wrings so heavy a ransom from us all. ^"^
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In recalling this episode later, des Esseintes is annoyed that he has
never read in the newspapers about the boy getting into trouble with the
police. "It would be a thousand pities, " he muses,
for, by acting in this way, I had really been putting in practice
the parable of lay instruction, the allegory of popular educa-
tion, which, while tending to nothing else than to turn every-body into Langlois, instead of definitely and mercifully putting
out the wretched creatures' eyes, tries its hardest to forcethem wide open that they may see all about them other lots
unearned by any merit yet more benign, pleasures keener and
more brightly gilded, and therefore more desirable and harder
to come at.
... the more we endeavour to polish the intelligence and
refine the nervous system of the poor and unfortunate, the
more we shall be developing the germs, always so fiercely
ready to sprout, of moral suffering and social hatred. 28
To appreciate the power of des Esseintes' denunciation of popular
consumption, one need only compare it with the analysis of d'Avenel.
They both observe the same phenomenon, the ability of the bourgeoisie
and, increasingly, of the lower classes, to purchase enjoyments.
D'Avenel praises this development as the glory of the nineteenth
century, although he is not unaware of the inevitable frustrations in
store for the consiiming masses as the illusion of wealth ever recedes
before the advancing tide of mass consumption. These reservations
do not prevent d'Avenel from anticipating that the spread of material
enjoyments will lead to more personal happiness and social harmony.
But des Esseintes' conclusions are uncompromisingly grim.
Bourgeois enjoyments are silly and stupid; the masses are being
seduced into a way of life they cannot afford; the results are inevitably
personal misery and social discord. As important as the difference in
opinion is the difference in tone. D'Avenel gracefully reflects upon
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moral issues in the guise of an historian and social critic, while
Huysmans, in the voice of des Esseintes, thunders like an Old
Testament prophet.
Consider, for example, their respective responses to the exploi-
tation of the Catholic Church in the peddling of products to the masses.
D'Avenel tells how a small-town merchant in Normandy made a fortune
selling Benedictine liqueur after his well-publicized but dubiously
authentic discovery of a medieval recipe in a monastery there, and how
the shopkeeper subsequently used the monastic name to endow the pro-
duct with religious and historical associations. D'Avenel recounts all
this with great flair and an air of detached amusement. When des
Esseintes describes similar merchandising practices, he is outraged
that the Church, which in the past preserved art and beauty for their
own sakes, is being invaded by the market just like the rest of society.
In his opinion the Benedictine bottle is a lie, for its dark green form,
so medieval and liturgical in appearance, deceitfully disguises a liqueur
"startlingly modern and feminine. "^'^ Now monasteries are producing
not only liqueurs but chocolates and medicines too. Magnificant plain-
songs are being discarded for modern, pretentious works borrowed
from Italian operas, "due partly to the greed for offertories, partly to
a supposed attraction the music exercised on the faithful.
.
.
" The
Church had become just another place for amusement where "women
fought a pitched battle of fine clothes with one another and quivered
with soft emotion to hear the heroes of the opera whose wanton tones
defiled the sacred notes of the organ. " Because des Esseintes
es
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regards the Church as the last outpost against the rage to consuxne
wMch devours society, his awareness that this last bulwark has fallen
is bitter and despairing. The substitution of mass-produced goods for
quality ones, that spreading flood of mediocrity, is lapping at the very
communion rails. Shameless dealers now manufacture communion
hosts from potato flour rather than from fine wheat flour. No wonder
the faith is tottering, des Esseintes mutters, when one constantly faces
the prospect of being duped, even at the communion table. Absolutely
nothing, not the Church, not the Eucharist, nothing is sacred anymore.
Commerce has profaned everything. This meditation comes just befor
des Esseintes - final agonized prayer to a God whose existence he doubt
as he is submerged by the foul flood which rises to the dark and silent
heavens, sweeping away the last debris of civilization.
Devising an Alternative
As an indictment of mass consumption-
-its all-pervasive duplicity,
greed, shamelessness, folly--A Rebours is without equal in imaginative
literature. That fact alone accounts for a good deal of its popularity,
for it articiilates so powerfully the disgust for the bourgeoisie prevalent
in French literary circles, as Bell and Grana continually remind us.
But the novel is more than a negative indictment. It also shows how
des Esseintes attempts to create his own authentic style of consumption,
uncontaminated by the mass market and yet not just negatively ascetic.
This aspect of the novel must also have contributed to its popularity,
considering the number of literati so smitten by des Esseintes' example
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that they went to great lengths to imitate his fictional lifestyle. In this
effort to devise an alternative mode of consumption, the ambiguity of
the relationship between bohemian and bourgeois -
-that is, the way
bohemian culture simultaneously reflects and rejects the bourgeois
one--becomes more apparent than if only des Esseintes' diatribes
against the bourgeoisie and the masses are considered.
The starting point of des Esseintes' experiment is total isolation
from the mass market. Like an experimental laboratory, Fontenay is
sealed off from external influences which might disturb what goes on
there. The extent of his isolation is another sign of des Esseintes'
uncompromising stance. There can be no coming to terms with the
flood of mass consumption, no dabbling a toe in its waters; the only
choice is to seek shelter in an "ark" which rides over its waters as the
wicked are drowned. His withdrawal is so radical that he intends to cut
himself off from nature as well as from society. Consumption is both
an organic and a social act, serving both needs related to physical
survival and those related to social status. To escape mass consump-
tion des Esseintes wants to leave behind the demands of the body as
well as those of society. He cannot totally evade organic demands and
survive, but he can do so approximately. As a result, his life at
Fontenay exhibits a curious blend of the ascetic and the liaxurious.
Demands of a strictly physical nature are kept to a minimum (for
example, his meals), but he allows himself the wildest extravagance
when it comes to the satisfaction of spiritual and intellectual needs.
To put it another way, consumption to satisfy organic and social needs
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alike is minimized to allow more freedom to consume in order to
satisfy cravings for the ideal.
Having shut out inauthentic and base needs as much as possible,
des Esseintes proceeds to surround himself with objects that serve
authentic and idealistic ones. Each object at Fontenay is chosen with
great care and thought so it relates to his memories, whims, and
beliefs. Instead of possessing items to impress others, des Esseintes
insists that they stimulate his personal vision. And ultimately the
vision, not the item, is what counts. Des Esseintes actively interacts
with his possessions because only object and imagination together make
possible a vision of the ideal. The fullest explanation of the way mind
and matter interact for des Esseintes comes fairly early in the novel
when he is meditating in his dining room. He has constructed it to
resemble a ship's cabin, complete with beamed ceiling, portholes,
bulkheads, plank floors, steamship schedules on the walls, nautical
instruments and charts on the tables, chairs and anchors heaped in a
corner, even a tarry odor throughout. Between the wall of this cabin
and the original wall of the house he has placed a huge aquarium filled
with schools of mechanical fish which can be seen "swimming" behind
the portholes. Des Esseintes delights in the thought that with the help
of this carefully constructed environment his mind is freed from sordid
reality to rise to a realm of perfect self-sufficiency:
The whole secret is to know how to set about it, to be able to
concentrate the mind on a single point, to attain to a sufficient
degree of self-abstraction to produce the neces sary hallucination
and so substitute the vision of the reality for the reality itself.
To tell the truth, artifice was in des Esseintes' philosophy the
distinctive mark of human genius.
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Since what matters is the glimpse of the ideal, rather than the material
means through which that glimpse is attained, des Esseintes remains
remarkably unattached to specific objects. When his exotic flowers
wilt or his jewel-encrusted tortoise dies, he has no regrets for the
investment in time and money they represent. They have served their
purpose in stimulating his imagination, and he can let them go the same
way he redecorates rooms or discards books which cease to excite his
imagination. For him objects are not valued for their durability: he
consumes them the same way others might consume drugs or alcohol.
Des Esseintes admits
he had resorted to opium and haschisch in order to see visions
but the only result had been to bring on vomiting and intense
nervous disturbances; he had been obliged forthwith to give up
their use and without the help of these coarse excitants to ask
his brain of itself alone to bear him far away from everyday
life into the region of dreams.
In a peculiar way, then, he demonstrates a sort of Puritan self-reliance,
attaining his fantasies through imagination alone rather than relying on
"coarse excitants" which require no active participation.
In this way and others, des Esseintes' mode of consumption does
suggest an ethical alternative to that of the masses. He interacts
imaginatively with things rather than passively surrounding himself
with objects; he choses each item to answer personal spiritual needs
rather than those of social status or of organic maintenance; he remains
unattached to particiolar items rather than allowing himself to become
weighed down by them. Above all, des Esseintes rises above crabbed
notions of thrift and utility to put matter at the service of an ideal, or,
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to state it another way, he rejects trivial notions of utility for a much
grander defintion of xt. Things are indeed valued for the purpose they
serve, the purpose being a spiritual one involving vision rather than
ones of petty amusements, creature comforts, or social status.
The Deception of the Alternative
But does des Esseintes really discover a genuine alternative to
mass consumption? The social and natural worlds which he tries so
desperately to exclude from Fontenay may be banished but remain potent
nonetheless. Like invisible magnetic poles, they cast a field of force
over des Esseintes' life, relentlessly pulling and distorting out of shape
all his feelings and encounters. The emotional energy he expends in
resisting them are testimony to their power. Rather than presenting a
simple opposition between bohemian and bourgeois, A Rebours
demonstrates how des Esseintes' very attempts to resist the market,
heroic as they may be, are themselves shaped by it. This is not to
conclude with Sypher that the decadents imitated bourgeois patterns
only on a more exotic level. Des Esseintes' repudiation of them is
genuine, and so is his effort to create an alternative; but when mass
consumption is a phenomenon so pervasive that his own experiment
must to a great extent be defined in opposition to it. a relationship is
created in which opposition and imitation are both entangled.
An excellent example of this complex relationship involves the
criteria used by des Esseintes in deciding how to furnish his "ark. "
As already noted, he insists that each book, each curtain, each detail
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be selected for qualities which stimulate his imagination. Along with
this positive criterion, however, functions a negative one, the refusal
to accept any object which has become an item of mass consumption.
And the second standard ultimately takes precedence over the first.
Des Esseintes admires the "sacerdotal character" of the amethyst, for
example, but declines to own one because it is "spoilt by its frequent
use to ornament the red ears and bulbous hands of butchers' wives who
are fain at a modest cost to bedeck their persons with genuine and
34heavy jewels. " Even worse, des Esseintes has to become a closet
admirer of Rembrandt, surveying his collection of the painter's works
only on the sly now that the artist has become so popular, because
just as the finest air in the world is vulgarized beyond all bearing
once the public has taken to hum it and the street organs to play it,
so the work of art that has appealed to the sham connoisseurs, that
is admired by the uncritical, that is not content to rouse the
enthusiasm of only a chosen few, becomes for this very reason, in
the eyes of the elect, a thing polluted, commonplace, almost
repulsive.
This diffusion of appreciation among the common herd was in
fact one of the sorest trials of his life; unaccountable triumphs
had for ever spoilt his enjoyment in pictures and books he had
once held dear. 35
In the final analysis, des Esseintes is unable to evaluate objects
independently of their market value. In a negative way his consumption
is just as dependent on the mass market, just as empty of personal
integrity as that of the butchers' wives, for as soon as an item becomes
cheap enough to be widely purchased he feels he must give it up no
matter what its intrinstic merits. The market he tries to banish from
Fontenay invades even that sanctuary, forcing him to reject amethysts
and even Rembrandts and a host of other objects.
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The frightening possibility is that the "diffusion of appreciation"
which des Esseintes laments and d'Avenel lauds has made authentic
consumption impossible. Each object, from jewels to Rembrandts, is
tainted by its association with the market. Whether one buys from a
herd-like instinct to own what is popular, or from an elitist instinct to
own what is unique, the choice is still dictated by market value rather
than personal assessment-
-or, to be more precise, personal assess-
ment is inextricably tied to market assessment. The consumer can
never be entirely sure whether he genuinely wants something or whether
he really wants the status it confers. Even in his ivory tower des
Esseintes automatically associates all objects with their position on the
market, and so he only confirms the tentacular grip of commerce. The
debasement of objects is not physical, for the paintings of Rembrandt
remain unscathed in a material sense, just as a melody is made up of
the same notes whether it is played by a symphony or whistled in the
streets. The debasement is instead a spiritual one on the part of the
consumer. Des Esseintes can no longer admire such paintings or
tunes without feeling himself classed with the boors who admire them
only to show an appearance of culture. Therefore the concept of class,
usually associated with one's relationship to the means of production,
invades the realm of cons\imption in A Rebours. Des Esseintes' world
is rigidly class-structured, only he classifies people, including himself,
by what they consume rather than by what they produce. He frantically
resists being declassed from his elite status as a consumer of superior
taste, which is what he feels would happen were he to use objects also
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used by the masses. His sensitivity on this score is so extreme it
could be termed a taboo. Even touching objects of popular consump-
tion would mark him as one of the unclean. For des Esseintes the mass
market endows its objects with a power to defile which borders on the
magical.
Huysmans' fictional hero confirms d'Avenel's analysis that in
modern times the wealthy are engaged in a "furious search for the
'unique' " because
This extreme superiority of money no longer gives either "com-
forts" nor even "beauties" but only rarities. It does not give
the most beautiful things, but only the most expensive.
. . the very
great modern luxury has "rarity" for its objective, because it
cannot have any others . 36
The rich, although not forced to purchase in the mass market, are still
circumscribed by it in spending their money. Wealth no longer buys
anything usefiil or desirable in a positive sense, only what is non-
reproduction, non-imitation, un-common, or unusual. Just as
objects can no longer be judged according to intrinsic qualities
divorced from symbolic market ones, money has lost any necessary
connection with inherent usefialness or comfort or beauty. The way
objects and money alike lack integrity and independence presents
practical problems as well as philosophical ones. Des Esseintes finds
it impossible to keep ahead of the ever-encroaching mass market which
keeps turning rarities into commonplaces. As the bourgeoisie ran-
sacks the world for status symbols, everything in its turn is defiled by
its touch. First amethysts become popular, then diamonds; des
Esseintes can still allow himself to admire sapphires, but they might
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be the next gem to become a fad. K Rembrandt is out of the question,
des Esseintes can retreat to an admiration of avant-garde painters like
Redon, but the day would soon arrive when the bourgeoisie would begin
to snap up avant-garde works ! Like a military general being pushed
back from one position to another, des Esseintes retreats from one
luxury item to another until he will be left with nothing that the masses
have not yet discovered. Once again, his experience confirms the
analysis of d'Avenel, who describes how the illusion of wealth is
always retreating as once rare objects become widely consumed and
therefore no longer give that illusion. Again we return to the concept
of class in matters of consumption, this time in the sense that objects
are continually being declassed (this is. a term d'Avenel employs)^
from elite to common status. The consumer never finds a resting
place, a point of equilibrium, but must keep buying and discarding,
picking up and then giving up items, perpetually on the move to keep
one jump ahead of the market. The process is no different for des
Esseintes even if he enjoys the reality of wealth rather than its
illusion. In his search for unique items, he too is on the run to keep
ahead of the common herd in order to demonstrate to himself that his
sensibilities are infinitely more refined; just as much as for the
masses, his image of himself is tied to the objects he possesses.
It is in such ways that A Rebours illuminates as well as condemns
mass consumption. If des Esseintes' life at Fontenay reflects patterns
of the larger society, it is like a distorting mirror which throws back
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images which are at once recognizable and distorted, so that certain
angles and contours are exaggerated and therefore more obvious.
Fontenay therefore bears a similar relation to bourgeois culture as do
the expositions. It has already been remarked that des Esseintes con-
structs a sort of private exposition at his house. Dreams of the Middle
Ages, of monastic life, of voyages to far-off places, of erotic
pleasures-
-these fantasies make up the "exhibits" of his life at Fontenay,
and he desperately creates and tours them in order to fend off sordid
daylight reality. The methods he uses are also familiar to us from the
expositions. Des Esseintes gazes not at a live dancing girl reminiscent
of Salome (for that would necessitate mingling with a crowd) but at a
picture of Salome which similarly inspires his erotic imagination. He
outfits his dining room like the Mareorama described by Corday,' where
all the senses are stimulated to give the impression of a sea voyage.
Des Esseintes is as fascinated by gadgetry as Corday, tinkering not
only with mechanical fish but also with a liqueur organ and perfume
38devices; he decorates his house with a syncretic jumble of exotic
furnishings whose common denominator is distance from the ordinary;
he immerses himself in an ocean of material things so that his illusions
will be convincing, "genuine. " Both the fictional Fontenay and the
actual expositions thus force us to redefine bourgeois culture. Grana
and Bell are hardly unique in their assumption that this culture may be
described by terms like utilitarian, rationalistic, work-oriented,
thrifty. What is being argued here, and what Fontenay and the
expositions suggest in their roles as distorting mirrors, is that if
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these terms are true, they are so only partially, and so partially as to
be false. The French bourgeoisie, and to a large extent the popular
classes too, appear to have been engaged as well in the pursuit of a
dream world of fantasy and evasion achieved through consumption.
When des Esseintes describes his aim as substituting "the vision of the
reality for the reality itself, " or as carrying himself "far away from
everyday life into the region of dreams, " he might be defining with
equal accuracy a significant aspect of the mainstream culture, that
aspect we have termed the dream world of consumption.
Similarities of Decadent and Mass Consumption
Des Esseintes is himself aware of the similarities between his
thirst for vision through consumption and that of the masses. This
awareness of his identity with what he despises makes him far more
interesting than if he were a one
-dimensional mouthpiece for bohemian
diatribes against the bourgeoisie. In one of his "mental excursions, "^^
he recalls how he visited vrdgar Left Bank cafes, and as he continues to
meditate on this experience in his solitude at Fontenay
He realized the meaning of these cafes, saw that they corres-
ponded to the state of mind and imagination of a whole genera-
tion; he gathered from them materiad for a synthesis of the
period.
Indeed, the symptorns were plain and unmistakable; the
legalized brothel was disappearing, and each time one of these
closed its doors, a beer-tavern opened.
This diminution of official prostitution, organized for the
satisfaction of clandestine amours, was evidently to be accounted
for by the incomprehensible illusions men indulge in from the
carnal standpoint.
Monstrous as this might seem, the fact was, the beer-tavern
satisfied an ideal. 40
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Despite all modern "utilitarian tendencies, - des Esseintes concludes,
youth today "reserved, deep down in its heart, an old-fashioned flower
of sentiment, a vague, half decayed ideal of love. "41 Therefore, the
young men would not march into a legal brothel to strike an honest
bargain there, but insisted on courting tavern waitresses, although
they were less attractive than most prostitutes and made their suitors
spend time and money before finally submitting.
Great God! Des Esseintes could not help exclaiming, whatsimpletons these fools must be who flutter round beer-hallsfor, to say nothing of their ridiculous self-deception thev
'
have positively brought themselves to ignore the danger thev
run from the low-class, highly suspicious quality of the goods
supplied, to think nothing of the money spent in drinks, Alpriced beforehand by the landlady, to forget the time wastedm waiting for delivery of the commodity,
--a delivery put off
and put off continually in order to raise the price, frittered
away m delays and postponements endlessly repeated, all toquicken and stimulate the liberality of the client. 42
This may be "ridiculous self-deception" or "imbecile sentimentalism. "
but it still represents a striving towards an ideal of love. In their own
way these youths too are taking a mental excursion, and the route they
choose to achieve a "semblance of victory" in love is probably no more
ridiculous than that of des Esseintes himself, who increases his
pleasure in love-making by taking to bed a female ventriloquist who
pretends that another of her lovers is shouting furiously outside the
bedroom door.
The identity between des Esseintes and the world of working-
class cafes becomes even plainer if we consider further how in both
cases such pleasurable illusions depend on deception. Des Esseintes
prides himself on achieving his visions through self-deception, or, as
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he puts it, through a
-clever system of adulteration" transferred
-into
the world of the intellect- so that he n.ay
-enjoy false, fictitious plea-
sures every whit as good as the true.
. .
-^4
^.th a little imagination,
he can pretend he is on a trip to London or sailing on the high seas
rather than ensconced at Fontenay. He can imagine he is in another
time as well and take a mental excursion to antiquity or to the Middle
Ages. What is more, he recognizes that the delusions he enjoys are
part of a much broader social pattern. One November day, as he
lounges in an apartment at Pantin, enjoying the smell of fresh flowers
and the heat of the stove, he imagines he is on the Riviera in the
springtime and thinks
-Now seeing that, in these times of ours, there is no single
thing really genuine to be found; seeing that the wine we drink
and the liberty we acclaim are equally adulterate and derisory-
considering how remarkable a dose of credulity it takes to
suppose the governing classes to deserve respect and the lower
to be worthy either of relief or commiseration, it appears to
me, - concluded des Esseintes,
-neither more absurd nor moreinsane to demand of my neighbour a sum total of illusion barely
equal to that he expends every day in his life for quite idiotic
objects, that he may successfully persuade himself that the
town of Pantin is an artificial Nice, a factitious Menton. -45
Here his tone is one of mildly amused cynicism, as he concludes that
since everyone fools himself, he might as well do it to good purpose.
But as his stay in Fontenay lengthens, des Esseintes' vision darkens
progressively, so that by the time he considers the replacement of
brothels by cafes he views the relationship of young men with tavern
maids as just one link in a disgusting chain of deceit:
This imbecile sentimentalism combined with ferocity in practice
seemed to represent the dominant feeling of the age;.
. . Workmen
toiled, families cheated one another in the name of trade, all to
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let themselves be swindled out of money by their sons, who intheir turn allowed themselves to be plundered by these women
who m the last resort were drained dry by their fancy loversFrom end to end of Paris, East to West and North to South
It was one unbroken chain of petty trickeries, a series of
organized thefts repeated continually from one to another,
. . .
To what extent is des Esseintes a part of that "unbroken chain"? He
would no doubt argue that the illusion of being on the Riviera is worth-
while, not "idiotic" like that of amorous conquest in courting tavern
maids. Such assertions are hard to justify. In connection with
d'Avenel we have already mentioned the impossibility of comparing the
enjoyment two different people claim they obtain from their private
dreams. There is, however, another distinction between des Esseintes
'
practice of deception and that of the masses which may be treated on a
more objective basis. Des Esseintes is out to deceive himself, not
others, and his adulterations are committed on his own mind, not on
products sold to others. Still, his exaltation of deceit in his own life
makes it difficult for him to condemn legitimately the deceits of the
market. His rage against the market is always being frustrated
because of his admission of the principle of deception which he clings
to in his own life but which disgusts him when it is practiced on the
market.
This dilemma becomes most painfully obvious when, in his last
hours at Fontenay, des Esseintes becomes infuriated as he considers
how the Church has been invaded by commerce which dilutes the wine
of the Eucharist with alcohol and replaces potato flour for wheat in the
hosts. The days were gone forever, he mourns.
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when, by the custom of Cluny, three priests or three deaconsfasting, clad m alb and amice, after washing face and fingers'
sorted out the wheat grain by grain, crushed it in the hand-millkneaded the dough with cold spring-water and baked it themselves
over a clear fire, singing psalms the while! 47
But mixed with this nostalgia is his recognition that the replacement of
fine handmade meal by cheap potato flour could not really interfere with
the holy mystery of Communion. Des Esseintes mocks theologians who
suggest that God might refuse to be made flesh in potato meal (the case
of rye meal, he notes sarcastically, is in doubt), for "how accept an
omnipotence that is hindered by a pinch of potato meal or a drop of
AO
alcohol? " ° The whole concept of the Eucharist is based on mental
adulteration, on ordinary goods being substituted for precious ones in
short supply, while the consumer willingly deceives himself into
accepting the imitation in place of the genuine article. Far from being
the last outpost against dupery, the holiest sacrament of the Church
may be said to depend on an exalted form of it. In mocking the worried
theologians, des Esseintes is acknowledging that the validity of the
Eucharist depends on the quality of faith in the believer, not on the
quality of the product used to stimulate the divine vision. If the devout
imagination of the believer can transform wheat flour into the body of
Christ, it can similarly transform potato flour. Yet des Esseintes
remains instinctively disgusted by the commercial deception involved.
What can he say when the highest mysteries of faith and the sleaziest
business practices seem to be based on the same principle of duplicity?
Des Esseintes is in a bind. He is appalled by the adulterations of the
market, yet indulges in his own mental ones; he insists on the finest
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quality for his possessions, yet if the imagination be omnipotent it can
be stimulated by cheap products as well as by rare ones; he indulges in
a private unbroken chain of petty trickeries to evade the unbroken chain
of petty trickeries running through an intolerable society. He cannot
effectively use his dream world to criticize another dream world.
The Collapse of the Dream World
By now it should be plain that A Rebours simultaneously makes a
strong case for the seductiveness of a dream world-
-the fascination of
artifice, the beauties of imagination, the pleasures of self-deception,
the sense of initiation into mysteries, the thrill of questing for an
ideal- -while providing an even stronger case that the way of illusion is
ultimately self-destructive. The dream is lovely, but the dreamer must
awaken. The reasons for the eventual failure of des Esseintes' experi-
ment involve more than his personal eccentricities or his weak digestive
system, for they are inherent in his attempt to satisfy the cravings of
the spirit through matter. Just as his self-deceptions reflect a larger
pattern of deception pervading society, so does the failure of his dream
world suggest intrinsic weaknesses in the larger universe of fantasy
which will eventually cause its collapse too. We have already mentioned
how unstable is des Esseintes' existence because of his need for
perpetual motion to keep ahead of the mass market, as well as his
inability to reconcile his disgust for the mass of consumers with his
awareness that they too engage in mental adule ration. These maladies
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on
alone weaken his dream world but do not destroy it.
.^at are the
causes which do finally cause its collapse, and. by implication, wxll
cause the collapse of that of the masses?
In the first place, des Esseintes' dream world is more secure
than most: he has money. All the illusions of Fontenay are based
the premise of an unlimited income from unspecified sources, which
makes it possible for des Esseintes to buy sapphires rather than
diamonds and exotic plants rather than lowly geraniums, and to buy
expensive labor which turns out unique objects rather than cheap
machine-made items. He buys the time of servants, physicians,
horticulturists, jewelers, book-makers, of a whole unseen army of
labor ready to satisfy his wishes. He escapes the mass market, based
on the machine-made, by having enough money to command labor
directly. Indeed, rather than excoriating the common herd for their
sordid pleasures, he might rather praise their imaginative capacity
which allows them to tailor dreams from the unpromising fabric of
mass-produced goods and limited budgets and endless bills. Their
dreams are to evade this cramped reality; all of des Esseintes' reveries,
on the contrary, are supported by another, the reverie of limitless
income, which has already been mentioned as the most pervasive and
enticing one of all. The reality of money does not enter his world. The
flow of income is magical in its inexhaustibility and reliability, and on
that flood ride all the subsidiary dreams. '^'^
But since the collapse of des Esseintes' dream world does not
come about from any external cause, but rather internal ones, let us
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accept the fantasy of wealth and ask why his existence crumbles even
when money is no barrier. The most obvious cause is des Esseintes'
own mortality, the deterioration of his body which eventually forces
him to return to Paris. He wants to escape both society and nature,
but the latter at least proves inescapable. In a sense, his own
materiality marks the point at which deception must stop, where pre-
tense must halt and reality asserts itself. His situation has obvious
parallels with the tortoise whose back he studs with jewels and the
artificial-looking plants he imports from the hothouse. They all die,
unable to survive as organisms when nature finally rebels against des
Esseintes' attempts to treat it as artifice. In the same way he treats
himself as a work of art, with the same results that nature reasserts
herself against outrages he commits against her.
Is his attempt to slip the bonds of society any more successful? ^0
If his health had been better, there would have been no reason why he
could not have stayed at Fontenay indefinitely, exept that the inherent
weaknesses of the dream world are psychic as well as organic. The
fact of solitude is crucial in the novel, which Huysmans originally
titled Seul [AloneJ
. Des Esseintes himself directly links his failure
to establish satisfactory social contacts with his retreat to a solitary
world of objects. His loathing for the "half closed lids and. . .
magisterial air" of respectable bourgeoisie, for the "meagre brains of
. . .
tradesmen, " most of all his loathing for the "new types of self-made
men" is so extreme that he rushes home to his books and finally to
Fontenay. There he can surround himself with pleasing things only,
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whereas he has no such power to control people he encounters. In the
universe of matter, but not that of humanity, he can be king.
Occasionally des Esseintes expresses regret that he has no like-minded
soul with whom to communicate, so instead he searches out books which
will support him and help him "on his way.
. . as if supported by a
52friend's arm, ..." Immersion in material things like books which
stimulate his imagination compensates for his disappointments in human
contacts.
The attempt at compensation is unsuccessful, however, as the
pleasures of privacy mutate into the sufferings of solitude. The society
of matter, which des Esseintes has substituted for human society be-
cause it can be controlled more perfectly, gradually gets out of control
too. Things begin to function independently of his will. He samples
bonbons in order to call up dreamy, half- remembered amorous
encounters, but instead the sweets "tear the veils from before his eyes
and show him the bodily reality, in all its brutal force and urgency. "^"^
He experiments with perfumes in order to escape a hallucinatory odor
of frangipane, but it returns stronger than ever and causes him to
faint. He is seized by a morbid craving for a white pasty cheese and
onion on bread, and he begins to hear noises like running water, wasps
buzzing, and bells ringing. Illusion does not stay within its assigned
limits but spills over, spreading like another kind of foul flood,
engulfing his whole existence. The universe of objects closes in
oppressively so des Esseintes lives not in the independence he sought
but in a material prison. Having invested objects with great potency.
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he discovers they can generate frightful visions as well as pleasurable
ones. When he orders the exotic plants to stimulate his imagination,
they only induce a terrifying nightmare from which he awakens gasping,
"Thank God, thank God! it is only a dream. "^4 Because des Esseintes
cons\imes objects as others might consume drugs, like a drug user he
risks a "bad trip. " In his solitude distinctions among dream, night-
mare, and reality become increasingly confused, swirling around in his
brain until their separate identity disappears. By the time he finally
realizes he is going back to a normal life in Paris, he groans, "Ah! to
think that all this is not a dream! to think that I am about to go back into
the degraded and slavish mob of the century!" At this point he is
forced to wake up from his dream world, and he awakens not so much
to daylight but (to borrow Joseph Conrad's expression from Heart of
Darkness ) to a "choice of nightmares. " He is roused from a dream-
turned-nightmare in which objects take on a life of their own to a reality-
nightmare of a loathsome society. In either case he is utterly alone
with the horror as the solitude of dream is transmuted into the solitude
of nightmare. This psychic disintegration indicates that the mind has
its imperatives just as the body does, and that des Esseintes can no
more evade the need for social contact than he can the need to eat.
The psychological condition of des Esseintes may be better under-
stood by referring to the similarity of the realms of barbarism, child-
hood, and dreams discussed in the previous chapter in connection with
Mauclair's analysis of the aesthetic of neo-barbarism. When des
Esseintes regresses to an animistic universe in which objects overwhelm
174
and crush his senses, he too approaches these realms. Savages and
children alike may be envied for the fertility of their imaginations, but
the reverse side of this capacity is that savages live in terror of angry
gods and that children are susceptible to nightmares. The sinister
accompanies the splendid in an animistic universe of unpredictable
objects where both wishes and fears take sfepein vivid forms. Another
psychological term, this one not yet mentioned, also aids in clarifying
the nature of des Esseintes' psychic state. What is living alone with
one's illusions, whether terrifying or pleasant, but madness? While
we have often noted a blurring of the distinction between fantasy and
reality in the dream world of consumption, the obvious conclusion that
this blurring is characteristic of insanity has seemed too extreme for
seemingly benign examples. But in the case of des Esseintes the evolu-
tion from harmless deceptions to psychic disintegration forces us to
recognize that madness is indeed the ultimate result of the confusion of
dream and reality.
Reification in A Rebours
Of all the terms that may be applied to des Esseintes' condition,
probably the most helpful comes from the Marxist tradition, in which
the psychology of the individual is never considered in isolation from
social and economic phenomena. What we have called the increasingly
animistic universe of des Esseintes may be described in Marxist
terminology as an example of commodity fetishism, the displacement
of life from people to objects which is discussed by Marx in the first
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Chapter of CapUal.
-to use the te.. nea.Iy unanimously adopted
.n
Marxist literature since the writings of Lukacs.
. . rexf.cation. "^T
Although
.t would be a reductionist fallacy to read ARebour_s only as a
novel illustrating the process of reificat.on. it would also be a loss to
ignore a concept which suggests a link between des Esseintes' private
hell and the social world he tries so hard to escape. To refer to
reification is to expand upon but not to contradict other interpretations
already mentioned. The term
-fetishism" suggests the primitivist
nature of the culture of mass consumption. In its description of how
objects take on a life of their own. the concept of reification posits a
kind of social, as opposed to purely individual, insanity. The roots of
that shared madness lie in the potency and mystery which objects
assume once they are placed on the market, qualities which have nothing
to do with their real function or value. ^8 xhe transfer of vitality is
plainly evident in A Rebours as des Esseintes becomes progressively
unstable and passive while the objects at Fontenay becomes ever more
active and potent. The transfer comes about because des Esseintes
replaces relationships with nature or with people by relationships with
things
--specifically with market items, for we have seen that in fleeing
to Fontenay he does not escape the grip of the market which continues
to dictate its values to him. The transfer of value-making from the
human personality to objects, the transformation of values into qualities
of things rather than human choices, is the ultimate fantasy, "this
phantasmagoric illusion, "^"^ in the words of Lucien Goldmann (1913-
1970), the French scholar who traces the process of reification in
nineteenth- and twentieth-century novels.
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Goldmann does not himself venture an interpretation of X Rebours
but the terms with which he analyzes the "problematic heroes" of
Stendahl and Flaubert may readily be applied to Huysmans' work too-
or, it might be noted, to Zola's Au Bonheur des Dame, where the
department store possesses a vitality and personality lacking in the
nominal hero and heroine. According to Goldmann, problematic
heroes are passive and isolated. These characteristics are intertwined
since the passivity involves a total refusal to participate in society,
"a phenomenon, " in Goldmann's words, "much more fundamental [than
that of depoliticization alone] which can be designated, in a progressive
gradation, by terms such as: depoliticization. desacralization. de-
humanization, reification. "^^ In the case of des Esseintes. his initial
activity as a consumer, his care and attention in choosing and arranging
objects for Fontenay, compensates for his utter passivity vis a vis
society. As he lives in isolation he becomes increasingly passive even
as a consumer, for he is reduced to defending himself against the ever
more violent assaults of perfumes, foods, humidity, objects. In isola-
tion he loses his ability to choose and function, and so he loses his
humanity-
-for Goldmann contends that a person cannot remain human
while accepting the absence of concrete contacts with other people.
Goldmann says further that problematic heroes of nineteenth- century
novels like those of Flaubert and Stendahl try to break out of their
isolation, but that in the twentieth century the hero disappears entirely
and the autonomous universe of objects takes over the scene, acting
according to its own structure and laws as in novels by Joyce, Sartre,
and Robbe-Grillet.
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According to this analysis, A Rebours marks a critical moment
where the nineteenth- and twentieth-century traditions dovetail. The
novel commences by describing the upbringing of a typical problematic
hero. As the novel progresses the hero is more and more crushed and
is finally almost destroyed by a universe of things he himself creates.
In the last pages of the book the autonomous universe is dismantled and
packed up, as it were, although the imaginative vision of its terrible
power remains--and des Esseintes returns to another world of things,
that of the foul flood of mass consumption, which he expects will sub-
merge himalso. As a problematic hero he does not disappear entirely,
but he exists only at the outermost limits of solitude. In later novels
only a slight shift in emphasis would be necessary to retain the indepen-
dent universe of objects while discarding the hero altogether, for, if we
take des Esseintes at the conclusion of A Rebours as any example, he
has had nearly all the life drained from him anyway.
The Significance of Decadentism
Having examined Huysmans' novel in some detail, it is time to
return to the general problem of the significance of decadent literature.
Like A Rebours in particular, that literature in general represents a
point of transition rather than a culmination, a problem posed, but not
resolved. One could say that in decadentism new wine is being poured
into old bottles which are not quite appropriate for the brew but which
serve to contain it nonetheless. Even at the time decadentism was
appreciated as a transient literary movement which itself offered no
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resolution, a sort of literary crossroads between realism and syn^bolis
Theoreticians of decadentism were aware of its historical role in re-
working old language to express new needs. In his preface to Les
Fleurs du mal, Gautier states that decadentism represents the
"necessary and inevitable idiom of peoples and civilizations in which
factitious life has replaced natural life, and developed unknown wants
63in men. " Baju expresses a similar idea in his manifesto of 1886:
everything is undergoing "an ineluctable transformation.
... To new
needs correspond new ideas,
. . . Therefore the necessity of creating
unheard of words.
. .
" The emphasis on "new needs" and on a general
transformation towards a "factitious life" suggests that the decadents
are attempting to respond to the emergent culture of consumption which
has been our theme. Their great contribution is to provide a language
appropriate for the new culture of consumption. At the same time,
however, the literary conventions, images, and vocabulary used by the
decadents are not entirely appropriate for this purpose. They are
inherited from the Romantic tradition dating back to the 1830's, and a
more thorough analysis of A Rebours
, or of any decadent work for that
matter, would demonstrate how it represents the internal development
of this literary tradition as well as a response to contemporary cultural
changes. But decadent themes in the 1880 's are not the same creatures
as those of the 1830 's, and the two eras should not be carelessly thrown
together into one stew, any more than titles like "modernism" or
"bohemianism" should serve to signify huge chunks of "culture" as if it
were a static entity rather than a dynamic process.
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As decadentism merged into symbolism, the sense that literature
had reached an impasse became even more acute. Even more explicitly
than the decadents, the symbolists embraced a dream world, and the
frustrations arising from that embrace and the attempts to resolve them
are the subject of Michel Dgcaudin's fine book La Crise des valeurs
symbolistes [The crisis of symbolist values]
.
^4 These are also the
themes of the final section of Edmund Wilson's Axel's Castle . ^5 written
decades before D^caudin's book to introduce English-speaking readers
to French decadents and symbolists. Wilson concludes that in their
search for the ideal, symbolists could choose evasion either to a fantasy
realm (as represented by Villiers de 1 'Isle-Adam's Axel ) or to exotic
places (as represented by Arthur Rimbaud's personal odyssey in the
Near East), and that neither flight would prove satisfactory. In
reviewing the evolution of French literature, we see that the dream
world of the decadents (and of their symbolist successors) was hardly
constructed when it was stormed and pulled down by other writers,
many of them calling themselves naturistes
, who reacted against
illusions in the names of life, social reality, nature. They declared
that the alternative to dreams did not have to be a nightmare of
bourgeois materialism. We shall see in Part Two how other artists
like Mauclair who grew up with symbolism but later grew out of it
attempted to arrive at a concept of art which is not an artificial
paradise but which accords with real life so that "aesthetic and ethic
tend to merge in the fecund unity of a superior form of action. "^^
One consequence of this reconceptualization of art is to suggest how
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consumption could be related to utility without becoming utilitarian, how
it could be socially responsive without being conformist, natural with-
out being naturalistic, practical without being Philistine. In sum, post-
decadent artists seek to divorce consumption from dreams but not from
ideals
.
This artistic response is significant because the impasse of
decadentism in art prophesies an impasse in the broader culture. When
the dream world of consumption was just beginning to take shape in
French society at large, imaginative writers had already explored it,
surveyed its pleasures and pains, felt out its limits, and prophesied
its final failure. The decadent movement was folding its tents just as
the exposition of 1889 was erecting its own, and, as we have seen,
those who describe the spectacle of the actual events appropriately
borrow decadent vocabulary to articulate what they see. This
coincidence of timing should not lead to the conclusion that the decadents
caused the emergence of the new type of consumption revealed at the
expositions, in the way Bell sometimes seems to blame "culture" for
advocating a chase after pleasure which then spreads to society at
large. The relationship here is not of causality, but of social prophecy
as defined near the beginning of the previous chapter as a precocious
awareness of emerging social changes. This consciousness of change
is not necessarily promotion of it. Huysmans is hardly the promoter
of the type of consumption which wrecks des Esseintes. In the same
way Nautet, Mirbeau, de Vogue, Corday, and Talmeyr are all
conscious that the expositions portend a cultural transformation without
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being advocates of it. any more than Haugmard is an apologist for the
cinema or Mauclair is for luminous fairylands. The prophetic aware-
ness of cultural change is valid and significant even when that change
is dreaded, and even when the means to conceptualize it are unformed.
Both Fontenay and the expositions afford a glimpse of the future,
but in this case the novel is richer than the historical event because its
writer senses not only the shape of the emergent culture but its ultimate
futility. For all his efforts to define a new ethic of consumption neither
Philistine nor ascetic, an ethic according to which matter serves the
ideal, des Esseintes ends up with two equally disastrous alternatives,
an intolerable dream world and an intolerable social world, both
become nightmare and both permeated by deception. For him to
survive some fresh response, cast in entirely new terms, is required.
As the Catholic apologist Barbey d'Auryville writes in his 1884 review
of A Rebours
,
"After such a book it only remains for the author to
choose between the muzzle of a pistol or the foot of the cross. " In
retrospect Huysmans agreed that this assessment was accurate. For
him decadentism was not only a literary way- station but a personal one
on a journey which ended in conversion to Catholicism. The novel
itself suggests at points that religious faith might be Huysmans' per-
sonal resolution for the collapse of a dream world; the power of the
novel, however, resides not in any hints about a particular alternative
but rather its dramatization of the warning that some alternative must
be found.
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For a dream world, no matter how enticing, always implies the
question-
-what will happen when the dreamer wakens? Will he only
repeat des Esseintes' anguished cry, "Ah! to think that all this is not a
dream! to think that I am about to go back into the degraded and slavish
mob of the century! "? What happens to Nautet or to Mirbeau's
philosopher friend when Salome's dance ends, the image of the Orient
fades, and the dream disappears? This is the same question de Vogue
asked himself in the dreary November of 1889, when he wandered around
the empty exposition grounds and wondered, "Was it then a dream, the
departed vision? " At that time he reassured himself that while the
image may have disappeared, its useful effects have lasted and the
French people have gained "a surge of national energy, pride, and
unity. " In surveying "the defunct exposition" of 1900, however,
de Vogue is much more apprehensive about the realities to which the
French will awaken afterwards. Only "sleepwalkers" think it is an
unparalleled glory to entertain the universe in a hall stuffed with
merchandise. In the real world, the Germans are overtaking France
at a breath-taking pace, so that unless the French are awakened by a
salutary jolt they will find themselves sunk in decadence. This same
fear, that people cannot be awakened from their fantasies in time to
confront reality, is the one haunting Haugmard a dozen years later,
when the spectre of German power which de Vogue discerned was even
more menacing. The universe of the cinema described by Haugmard-
-
its solitude, its passive reception of pleasure in which reality and
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illusion, time and space, become jumbled, where animate objects on
the screen overwhelm and numb the senses
--this is a sort of Fontenay
for the masses. The refusal of the audience to wake up, to do anything
but "look, look, look" is to Haugmard "an incontestable index of deca-
dence. " What will happen when everyone leaves the movie theater?
What will happen to the French people of 1913 if they are mesmerized
by fantasy into an evasion of actuality? These are the disturbing
questions which in time emerge from the question a reader of 1884
might ask, "What will happen to des Esseintes when he returns to
Paris? " Are suicide or Catholicism the only choices, or is there a
realistic alternative to the dream world of consumption which is not
itself a nightmare?
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Another significant work which might be discussed, if space
only permitted, is Villiers de I'lsle-Adam's L'Eve future (Paris:
Jean-Jacques Pauvert, I960), originally published in 1886. Villiers'
short story "L'Affichage cSleste" has already been mentioned, and
other stories in the collection Contes cruels (such as "La Machine
k gloire" and"L' Appareil pour I'analyse chimique ^u dernier sou-
pire") are also appropriate to our subject; but L'Eve future is a far
longer and richer work.
The basic situation presented in this novel may be compared to
Huysmans' A Rebours, for L'Eve future also tells about an elaborate
attempt to realize one's dreams in material form, this time in a
literal rather than in a figurative laboratory. The young dandy Lord
Ewald comes to Thomas Edison's laboratory at Menlo Park where
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the inventor proceeds to construct "the future Eve" who will have thebody of the lovely Alicia Clary, whom Ewald had recently met with-out her bourgeois soul. Like des Esseintes, Lord Ewald attempts tocompensate for the disappointments of human society by taking refuse
xn a solitary place where he can surround himself with material ob-
i^^^^n "^T?""^,
perfect, more controllable, than living human beings AtMenlo Park, as at Fontenay, the hero attempts to realize an Ideal--m Lord Ewald' s case, an erotic ideal, a "dream creature" of theboundless regions of which Man can glimpse the pale frontiers onlybetween certain dreams and certain sleeps" (pp. 336-337). But
erotic dreams are shown to be just one form of dreams of consump-
tion, for the future Eve is a consumer product, designed and manu-
factured for pleasure just like any other. It is Edison's technical
expertise that makes possible the realization of Ewald' s dream in
material form, so that the result is a delicate, lifelike Eve rather
than a clumsy, primitive Frankenstein. "In this vision, " Edison says
of her, "I shall force the Ideal itself to be manifest, for the first time
to your senses, PALPABLE, AUDIBLE AND MATERIAL" (p. 112).He is the engineer of the sacred, a manufacturer of heaven, attaining
the Ideal through technical gadgetry.
Or almost attaining it.
. . for in the end both Alicia Clary and her
mechanical surrogate are consumed by fire. Lord Ewald goes into
mourning for the mechanical Eve only, while Edison is left alone in
the night, looking up at the cold stars, shivering in desolation (the
final scene is very similar in imagery and tone to that of Rebours).
As in the case of Huysmans' novel, the experiment is a failure. Mor-
tality intrudes (for consumer products, as well as the human body,
may be destroyed), and the dream ends. Throughout ^:ve, in a tone
of mingled comedy and irony (which again bears comparison with A
Rebours), Villiers seeks to demonstrate that the technological dream
world is a false one, that only the vision of faith is genuine and last-
ing. Lord Ewald is correct in choosing the "world of dreams" in-
stead of flat, daylight reality (p. 371). His mistake is being lured by
the deceptions of materiality and gadgetry into ignoring the divine
vision. Like des Esseintes, Lord Ewald ends in confusion. He con-
fuses the manufactured and the living, and the pseudo - sacred of tech-
nical expertise with the truly sacred. All this was well understood
by the Catholic apologist L^on Bloy in his 1906 review of Villiers'
book titled "La Resurrection de Villiers de 1' Isle -Adam, " in his
Oeuvres, ed. J. BoUery and J. Petit, 15 vols. (Paris: Mercure de
France, 1965), pp. 315-328. Villiers himself was a believer, but
an eccentric one.
The opening sections of L'Eve future give a delightful account
of Edison's supposed meditation on all the sights and sounds of the
past of which the "reality" was, alas, lost forever before his inven-
tion of the phonograph and photograph- -sounds such as the trumpets
of Jericho, the sigh of Memnon at dawn, the Sermon on the Mount,
the cry "Ecce homo". . . As usual, comedy and irony are mingled, as
Edison further considers that what has really been lost are not the
sounds but rather "the impressive character with which they were
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endowed through and by the hearing of the ancients -
-and which aloneanimated their intrinsic insignificance. Therefore, neither then nornow would It be possible for me to record exactly sounds whose realitydepends on the listener- (pp. 25-26). Now that the capacity to hearthe supernatural is gone, Edison sighs, he will have to content him-
self with recording noises like avalanches, the Niagara Falls orbattles. The means of conserving speech seems to have been invented
at the very moment when man no longer says anything worthy of being
recorded. Edison has similar thoughts regarding photography, wish-ing mankind had several views of Eden, or snapshots of the Deluge --
and if God would only deign to give us the smallest, humblest photo-graph of Himself there would be no atheists left on earth tomorrowl
These parts of L' Eve future should be compared particularly with
Talmeyr on "the genuine" and Haugmard on "photographic truth."
24
J. -K. Huysmans, Against the Grain [a Rebours"], intro.
Havelock Ellis (New York: Illustrated Editions Co.
,
1931), p. 84.
This translation (no name given) is most unsatisfactory, but no
French edition was available at the time.
25
Ibid.
, p. 308.
^^Ibid.
, p. 339.
^^Ibid.
, pp. 162-163.
28
Ibid.
, p. 164.
29Georges d'Avenel, "Le M^canisme de la vie moderne: ralcool
et les liqueurs," Revue des deux mondes, 4th ser.
,
151 (January 1
1899):120-121.
30
Huysmans, Against the Grain, p. 271.
^^bid.
, p. 316.
^^Ibid.
, pp. 103-104.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 281.
^'^Ibid.
,
p. 128.
^^Ibid.
, p. 196.
3 6Georges d'Avenel, Le Nivellement des jouissances (Paris:
Ernest Flammarion, 1913), p. 313.
^"^Ibid.
,
p. 301.
188
3 8
.
Jules Lemaitre, Les Contemporains. gt..,rt ^. »^
ira;a\;e TssV I88 5I 1^3^r^^^" l^an,a.srd'.Cim:Heet ae iibraire, 1884-1885), 6:331-332, comments on des Esseintes'love for the artificial According to Lemattre, the artificial may be
"the CO t " IT"' "'^T'- ^"^^^^^ refinement of arT, or ascon rary of the natural understood in the ordinary sense " orsimply as "the illusion of reality produced by mechanical procedures
k;;*'^ IiJS u r""^^' '^.^
^^^ifidal is that which is most opposed toart. Although des Esseintes usually understands artifice in itsfirst two senses, he does show a leaning towards the third, as in thecase of his dining room with its mechanical fish. Comments Lema^-tre. Wouldn't you call that a fantasy of a delirious bourgeois"? There
IS something of P^cuchet in des Esseintes. P€cuchet and Bouvardthey too love the artificial: you may recall their garden. " (This last
reference is to Flaubert's story about two ridiculous gadgeteers. )
39Huysmans, Against the Grain
, p. 282.
4 0,, .
,Ibid.
, p. 283.
«ibid.
42,, .
,
Ibid.
, pp. 284-285.
^^ibid.
44
Ibid.
, pp. 102-103.
45„ .
,
Ibid.
, pp. 224-225.
"^^Ibid.
, p. 285.
47
Ibid.
, p. 336.
49The fate of a poor wretch who shares des Esseintes' sensibil-
ities (and ^oor digestion) but not his income is portrayed in Huysmans'
novelette A vau I'eau [bownstream"|, in Downstream and Other Works,
trans. Samuel Putnam (New York: Howard Fertig, 1975), pp. 115-185.
This is surely one of the most depressing stories by Huysmans, or by
anyone else for that matter, and it is not recommended for rainy day
reading. M. Folantin cannot afford to buy the labor of other people,
as des Esseintes can, and must take what he can find on the mass
market. He can't find good help, a decent meal, or even a nice place
to stroll in a "chicago -ized" Paris. He cannot escape petty trickeries
on every side much as he realizes people are out to chisel him. He
feels his dismal life would be saved if he could only find a decent
meal at a reasonable price, but he is continually disappointed in his
attempt to realize this ideal, such as it were. At the end, when no
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J-feon Bloy, "Sur la tombe de Huysmans," in his Oeuvres
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332, writes of his "bitter disenchantment" at the "abortion of Grace"
in Huysmans, whom Bloy had worked hard to convert. According to
Bloy, Huysmans' Catholicism was one "of knick-knacks and bric-'^-
brac" which other Catholics were foolish enough to take as "the effect
of a divine intimacy.
. .
" In response to anticipated criticism that he
is being too hard on Huysmans, who had died six years earlier, Bloy
quotes Jules Valines that "Death is no excuse. " (For Bloy on Villiers,
see note 23. )
PART II
AESTHETIC THOUGHT
CHAPTER III
THE USEFUL AND THE BEAUTIFUL
Another Alternative to the Dream World of Consumption
The preceding chapter has recounted the failure of J. -K. Huysmans
fictional hero to forge a viable alternative to the dream world of con-
sumption. In this part will be examined another heroic attempt to create
an alternative, this time carried out by actually existing human beings
who, like their fictional counterpart, are convinced that art is their
main ally in resisting the corruptions of the dream world. Their con-
cept of art, however, is very different from des Esseintes' solitary
ideal. Their aesthetic ideal is a social one. Their resistance is not
that of the isolated individual who surrounds himself with a personal
collection of objets d'art but involves a collective effort to reform the
design of objects of consumption for everyone. Like des Esseintes, the
decorative arts reformers to be studied in this part are disgusted by
the exotic, pretentious, and fanciful merchandise which is the bastard
offspring of the marriage of commerce and fantasy. Their response,
however, is not to retreat to a private world of fantasy aloof from the
market but to effect a legitimate union of commerce and art that will
produce objects at once useful and beautiful, rational and attractive.
Yet much more is involved here than matters of design. This critique
of the visual ugliness of the dream world of consumption is simultane-
ously a critique of its ethical and social implications; advocacy of a
new type of design means advocacy of another set of ethical and social
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principles. We are dealing ^^ath two opposing clusters of aesthetic,
ethical, economic, and political convictions which add up to radically
different conceptions of the role of consumption in human life.
In order to clarify these general remarks, let us look at a
particular expression of the cluster of values characteristic of decora-
tive arts reformers which came to be held in opposition to the values of
the dream world of consumption. This example comes from a lecture
made in 1910 by a well-known French socialist, Charles Andler (1866-
1933). His audience is a class meeting at the Socialist School in Paris.
The session is held in a dingy basement, and Andler begins by calling
attention to the ugliness which surrounds the group. Look at the
ordinary objects being furnished by contemporary industry, he laments.
They are hideous objects because they lie- -marble being replaced by
linoleum, bone by celluloid, and even wood being distorted by layers of
veneer. Andler prefers objects which represent an honest use of
materials, ones whose form arises naturally from their purpose.
Thanks to new machinery, he says, industry is capable of mass-
producing "without waste, loyally, everyday objects of a form that is
rationally beautiful. " From these considerations of design, "in
appearance wholly technological, " arise significant social and moral
res\xLts:
The everyday object, no matter how humble it may be, but
rationally constructed, encapsulates, through the satisfaction
which it gives us, the revelation of the feeling which we want
to carry over to all of social life. We rejoice in loyal materials
which are honestly worked: it is because at heart we want our-
selves to have the same loyalty, the same purity, the same
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inner necessity in our own character There is as it werp ^morality of the created thing f une n^orale d^la choL JIJl
back on Mm! °^
creator and which afterwards relets
In these remarks we awaken from the dream world of consumption to a
daylight universe which is logical, straightforward, sober. As this
part progresses it will be evident how well Andler's remarks provide
a summary of the aesthetic values which were formulated as an alterna-
tive to the dream world of consumption: honesty rather than deceit,
rationality rather than fantasy, loyalty to the familiar rather than
escape from it, necessity rather than liberty, purity rather than con-
fusion. The contrast between these aesthetic values and those of
exoticism, neo-primitivism, and fantasy is so obvious that it will not
be dwelt upon, although the reader is invited to make his own compari-
sons. But from the beginning Andler mixes his critique of visual
ugliness with a social and ethical critique. The reform of the design of
consumer objects implies a reform of personal and social life towards
purity and loyalty. Taken together a cluster, the values Andler
advocates add up to a new "morality of the created thing"-
-a most
pungent phrase, especially when the term "morality" [" morale l is
understood in its broad French sense as including social as well as
private behavior. This morale involves an entirely new relationship
between people and things, in which things at once express human
beings and teach them. Andler happens to identify that new morality
with socialist politics, but many others who urge a similar reform are
connected with other established political groups or, more often,
consider themselves politically independent.
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When Andler was speaking in 1911, the ideas he expressed had
become familiar. While their roots may be traced far back into the
nineteenth century, they acquired a new urgency later in the century
when reforming the design of consumer objects became a coherent
program with spokesmen, institutions, and doctrines which attracted
the attention of intellectuals, artists, art critics, and the general
public. The decorative arts movement, as this reform program was
generally known, crested during the 1890 's, the great decade of
experimentation, and reached its height at the Paris Exposition of
1900. After 1900 the wave broke and the movement attracted
increasing criticism, although the mentality behind it has by no means
disappeared yet. Because this is an essay in intellectual history, it
will concentrate not on the practical program but, in this chapter, on
the concepts which inspired it in the first place and, in the following
one, on the rethinking which res\ilted from the sense of its failure, a
sense which became increasingly prevalent after the turn of the century
and which was even more fertile intellectually than the preceding era
of hopefulness.
Even if the events of decorative arts movement are not the focal
point here, it is still important to note the general contrast between its
highly organized and conscious character and the relatively spontaneous
inarticulate efflorescence of the dream world of consumption described
in the last part. Of these two opposing clusters, both highly significant,
only one exhibits fairly well-defined spokesmen, institutions, programs
and doctrines. As a result later scholars have given more attention to
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the reform of the decorative arts, but in general their approach has
been that of art historians viewing this phenomenon as an artistic
movement expressed in a particular style which has come to be kno^
as Art Nouveau. That style, however, is only the surface foam of the
deep current to reform the design of everyday objects which originated
in the mid-nineteenth century and which carried along with it intellectual,
political, technological, and social motifs as distinctive as aesthetic
ones. A synthetic history would have to treat the practical experiments,
doctrines, and institutions which were products of that current and
would have to explore the interplay among visual representations, non-
visual arts, social ideologies, and aesthetic philosophy. If that pro-
gram were not ambitious enough, the movement in France would have
to be treated as part of an international effort to redesign consumer
objects. Various nations cooperated to learn from each other's
experiments and also competed to establish a claim to general cultural
and economic dominance.
No such history has been written. The territory may be familiar
in some of its localities, but it has not been surveyed as a region.
Anyone who leafs through French journals of general intellectual
interest from the 1890 's alone {like the Revue bleue. Revue des revues,
Grande revue or Nouvelle revue ) or those especially devoted to the arts
(like La Plume or Les Arts de la vie ) cannot help but conclude that they
contain a wealth of ideas and information which has not yet been sifted
through in the secondary literature. This essay will attempt to view
some of this intellectual territory from a particular vantage point, that
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of the way it embodies a significant concept of consumption. There is
no claim that this view is absolutely more valid than another, but it is
at the very least an extremely illuminating perspective which has been
neglected. This essay can only furnish such a perspective, not a
survey or a synthesis. The lack of secondary works means there is no
generally accepted canon of major and minor thinkers connected with
the decorative arts movement, and so the selection to be presented in
this section is necessarily impressionistic and incomplete. This
situation is regrettable but unavoidable due to the present state of
scholarship. Hopefully the choices made here may prove useful to
those who will attempt to provide a more satsifactory secondary
literature. The lack of synthesis at present is especially acute in the
case of aesthetic philosophy of late nineteenth-century France--that
is, regarding the important theoretical reconciliation of beauty and
utility which occurred simultaneously with the practical experiments of
the decorative arts movement. The most helpful study of the subject
has been done by a professor at the University of Bristol, H. A.
Needham, in his L.e D^\'^loppement de I'esthetique sociologique en
France et en Angleterre au XIX^ siecle [^The development of a socio-
logical aesthetic in France and in England in the nineteenth centuryU
(1962). Any initial surprise at finding that an Englishman provides
the best guide to late nineteenth-century aesthetic ideas in France
quickly subsides upon considering that in England this was the era of
William Morris and his disciples in the Arts and Crafts Momement,
with the giant shadow of John Ruskin still cast over them all. Needham
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seems to have asked himself, "Who are the equivalent figures in
France?, " and the question proves immensely fruitful. Still, besides
being fifty years old, this book concentrates on the middle part of the
nineteenth century and only begins to sort out the various strands of
aesthetic thought in France in the twenty-five years preceding World
War I. It is suggestive rather than exhaustive, and most suggestive of
all is its fine bibliography which, when combined with that of another
book of the same vintage, T. M. Mustoxidi's Histoire de I'esthetique
fran(;aise 1700-1900 |]History of French aesthetics 1700-1900^ (1920), ^
would provide the basis for years of productive and satisfying
scholarship.
The Two Traditions
One of the main purposes of Needham's book is to describe two
general traditions which wind through nineteenth-century French
aesthetics: the tradition commonly known as "art for art's sake, " and
that which Needham terms a "sociological aesthetic. " These two
aesthetic traditions are not precisely equivalent to the dream world of
consumption described in the previous part and the cluster of values
associated with the decorative arts movement to be described in this
one; but the two sets of opposing clusters are certainly congruent.
Here the opposition between the tradition of art for art's sake and a
sociological aesthetic will be discussed as it implies a confrontation
between two theories of design of consumer objects. In this respect
the contrast between the two aesthetic traditions involves above all
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their contrasting views on the relationship between beauty and utility.
In its most extreme position, the tradition of art for art's sake holds
that a useful object cannot be beautiful-
-agreeable, perhaps, but not
truly beautiful-
-and, conversely, that a beautiful object is necessarily
devoid of practical utility. The tradition of sociological aesthetics, on
the other hand, upholds the position that beauty and utility can be and
indeed should be reconciled in the same object. We shall first examine
the tradition of art for art's sake more fully before turning to the
reconciliation of beauty and utility made in the 1880's by Jean-Marie
Guyau--a crucial step in the development of a sociological aesthetic
in France.
While the conviction that beauty and utility are incommensurate is
of major importance in nineteenth-century French aesthetic thought, it
is far from being a native product. The theory originated in late
eighteenth- century Germany with Immanuel Kant and Friedrich von
Schiller and was transmitted to France through the mediation of the
English philosopher Herbert Spencer eighty years later-
-an unlikely
combination of German metaphysical idealism and English evolutionary
utilitiarianism. The influence of Kant, the father of modern aesthetics,
may hardly be overestimated. He made an important distinction be-
tween " free beauty" [^pulchritude vaga"]
,
which represents nothing and
serves only to please independently of all specific concepts or useful
ends, and "adherent beauty" ^pulchritude adhaerens ~j
,
which pre-
supposes the concept of an end to which it relates (or adheres) and
whose perfection may be evaluated only in relation to that end. Kant
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proclaimed the superiority of free beauty, which involves only taste and
not rationality, and which gives full liberty to the imagination. Since
the beauty of finality involves intelligence as well as taste, it cannot
please immediately and is therefore not truly aesthetic. Only free
beauty inspires a pleasure which is entirely disinterested, being
separated entirely from considerations of goodness or agreeableness
as well as of utility. ^ This is a theory of the psychology of beauty-
-the
response of an abstract individual to an abstract work of art- -but it
carries sociological consequences, even if Kant himself was not con-
cerned with spelling them out. Since art is divorced from necessity, it
is by definition a luxury to be enjoyed only by those who have time, free
time, to create or contemplate beauty unattached to any practical con-
siderations. In this case the philosophical notion of liberty implies the
practical need for economic liberty. Kant's aesthetics forbid the
democratization of art unless everyone can possess the leisure and
education to enjoy it, a possibility which no doubt seemed unlikely in
his day.
Kant's ideas were developed more fully by Schiller, who repeated
the contention that beauty must be disinterested and went on to propose
an "instinct of play" which is satisfied only when man combines his
impulse to life and his impulse to form in "living form, " or beauty.
The creation of art involves the disinterested, entirely formal imitation
of external phenomena which are considered apart from any interest or
purpose which might be attached to them in reality. Spencer later
broadened the theory of play to account for a whole series of biological,
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psychological, and sociological phenomena, while openly acknowledging
that he borrowed the basic idea from Schiller. Beginning with the play
of animals and children, Spencer traced its development to the highest
manifestations of art. He defined art as a form of play characterized
by its lack of any relationship with the vital functions of the organism.
With Spencer the identification of art with play and its divorce from
utility became dominant in European aesthetic philosophy, in large
measure because his evolutionism seemed to give the theory a
scientific, objective foundation. ^
If the origins of the doctrine are strangely varied, its acceptance
in Franee is even more so. The conviction that beauty and utility are
incompatible had an impact on French thought far beyond the relatively
confined circles of aesthetic philosophy. Decadents, Parnassians, and
symbolists all declared the complete dissociation of the beauty they
worshipped from the idols of money, success, and practicality which
supposedly ruled bourgeois society. We have already noted des
Esseintes' pathological revulsion against the utilitarian which even
leads him to try to repress bodily fvmctions like eating. The decadent
dissociation of art and utility represented by des Esseintes is expressed
most succinctly by Gautier in his introduction to Baudelaire's Les
Fleurs du mal : "There is nothing truly beautiful except what is useless;
everything usefxil is ugly, because it is the expression of some need,
and those of man are ignoble and disgusting like his poor, infirm
nature. This statement makes strikingly clear the implications for
consumption of the theory of art for art's sake. The needs of the body
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are ignoble and disgusting, and the objects which satisfy them are ugly
because the needs are so. Gautier (and Baudelaire himself, it might
be added), are quasi-medieval in their conviction of man's dual nature
--body and soul, physical needs and spiritual ones--and in their disdain
for the former. The aesthetic theory that exalts art as a spiritual
activity depends on a moral theory that consumption to satisfy physical
needs is shameful. The result is a "morality of the created thing" quite
opposite from Andler's. Everyday objects are not worthy of art because
their purpose is not worthy of man's higher nature. Furthermore, the
social implication remains that art is a luxury for an elite who can
devote themselves to it, although French artists in this tradition tended
to think in terms of a spiritual elite rather than an economic one.
The divorce of beauty and utility could cut two ways, however,
and it did. A tradition which at once apotheosizes art and proclaims
its irrelevance to ordinary pursuits is compatible with worshippers of
Mammon as well as of Beauty. It allows the former to carry out the
practical business of life with a fierce utilitarianism unchecked by any
aesthetic considerations. Art could be identified with luxury purchases,
parodies of elegance, while everyday acts and objects of consumption
were viewed with an eye to economy alone. If the bourgeoisie did not
disdain activities of consumption as much as Gautier, it might agree
that consumption has nothing to do with art, which is an elevated but
irrelevant realm of beauty. Consumption is simply business. Thus
the incompatibility of beauty and utility came to be accepted by many
sober businessmen as well as by artists like Gautier, Baudelaire, and
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Huysmans--an odd result leading the art critic Camille Mauclair to
conclude that "The principles of the bohemian are the principles of the
bourgeois upside down, but not opposite. What is worse, Mauclair
continues, socialists of his own day (he is writing in 1902) exhibit the
same kind of "fundamental bourgeoisism, " so that they make a "fearful
cult of fact and utility
,
" treating art as a dispensable luxury and con-
sumption simply as a serious business devoid of aesthetic values. ^
".
. .
the great mistake of Marxism and of utilitarian socialism is to
have thought in a bourgeois manner about the subject of artists and
Q
ideologists. "
It is a strange tradition which makes bedfellows of bohemians,
bourgeois, and socialists -
-but a most compelling one, and one which
would not be easily defeated. Still, Needham claims that the tradition
of art for art's sake was on the defensive in France from about 1860
and was in full retreat by 1870. He tries to show that all through the
century a sociological aesthetic had been gathering strength and would
prove triumphant in the end. Needham 's book must be consulted for a
full description of these developments. We are concerned here with the
reconciliation of beauty and utility in aesthetic thought which eventually
superseded the theory of art for art's sake just described, because that
reconciliation implies a wholly different concept of consumption.
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The Reconciliation of Beauty and Utility: Guvau
Because Jean-Marie Guyau (1854-1888) more than anyone else is
responsible for the rapprochement of beauty and utility in late nine-
teenth-century French thought, he will be discussed here at some
length as a spokesman for that cause. ^0 However, his overall impor-
tance as a thinker remains restricted by the fact that he died prematurely
at the age of thirty-four. It was a loss widely mourned at the time as a
tragedy for French thought and is still a personal tragedy in that his
intellectual promise remains eternally unfulfilled. Guyau roamed down
many more intellectual paths than he had time to explore thoroughly, so
that what remains most valuable in his legacy is its versatility and
suggestiveness. He wrote on education and heredity, and on concepts
of time; he outlined new reading methods; he studied and edited other
philosophers ranging from Epictetus to Pascal to contemporary English
utilitarians.-^^ Guyau discussed aesthetic, social, moral, and religious
topics with equal enthusiasm and ease, and his major contribution was
to try to harmonize these categories, which had become compartmen-
talized, in a way appropriate to the modern age. His effort to reconcile
beauty and utility should be seen as one example of his dominant intel-
lectual passion, which was to restore broken connections
--between
artistic and social understanding, between morality and art, between
aesthetic and ethical perspectives, between all these and science. His
ultimate goal was a synthesis of a new morality, a new art, and a new
sociology acceptable to a secular and scientific age. It is doubtful if
he could have attained this goal in a full lifetime, and in a short one
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failure was inevitable. What Guyau did leave is not an edifice but a
series of "sketches, " to borrow a term from the title of his major work
E squisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction fskPt.;.
of a morality without obligation or sanction] (1884), which vaguely
delineates such a future morality. It might be more appropriate to
consider Guyau as a social prophet rather than as a philosopher. He
certainly employed the language and traditions of philosophy, but in
general his work does not exhibit the logical cohesiveness of that
discipline. Critics have taken him to task for his lack of rigor, while
fully acknowledging that he more than compensated for this failing in
charm, versatility, eloquence, and originality. Evaluating him as a
social prophet rather than as a philosopher may do more justice to
these virtues and put his shortcomings in perspective.
Guyau's impact on aesthetic thought began with the publication of
Les Probl^mes de I'esth^tique contemporaine [The problems of con-
temporary aesthetics] (1884). -phe same year saw the appearance
of Huysmans' A Rebours
,
to which Guyau's book presents a complete
contrast in evaluating the dignity of ordinary h\iman needs. According
to Guyau, the human needs which drive men both to produce and to
consume are not shameful and animalistic but are extraordinarily
1
3
complex, exquisite, even noble, and entirely human. This moral
stance is a corollary of Guyau's profoundly vitalistic theory of art. He
defines beauty as "a perception or an action which stimulates life in
us, " so that in general terms "life. . . is the goal of art. "^^ Any
manifestation of human vitality, no matter how ordinary, may have an
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aesthetic quality. Guyau asserts there is beauty to be found in the
performance of daily tasks and finds aesthetic pleasure in the sight of
workers passing a heavy stone to one another up a ladder, or tugging
on a line to lift a heavy plank, rowing or cutting wood or working at a
forge. 15 Even more to the point of our topic, he affirms that aesthetic
pleasure may also be derived from the satisfaction of major human
needs "which correspond to the essential functions of being: breathing,
moving, being nourished, reproducing. "^^ Indeed, "the first manifesta-
tion of aesthetic feeling is need satisfied, life regaining its equilibrium,
the rebirth of inner harmony "l'^ The agreeable sensations which
come from such satisfaction take on an aesthetic character as long as
they possess "a certain degree of intensity, of reverberation in the
1
8
consciousness. " Guyau's most celebrated example of such an intense
aesthetic experience involves an ordinary act of consximption. In Les
Probl^mes de I'esthetique contemporaine he tells of the time he took a
walk in the Pyrenees on a summer day, when, fatigued and hot, he
came upon a shepherd who fetched him some milk which had been
chilled in a mountain stream next to the shepherd's hut. Guyau recalls
that while
drinking this fresh milk, into which the mountain had put its
perfume, and of which each tasty swallow revived me, I
certainly felt a series of sensations which the word "agree-
able" is insufficient to designate. It was like a pastoral
symphony grasped by taste instead of by hearing. 19
Guyau's identification of life and art is not altogether convincing
philosophically. One of his contemporary critics, a fellow aesthetic
philosopher named Gabriel Seailles (1852-1922), complains that Guyau
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"makes poetry out of a desire, and.
. . concludes that desire is poetry. "^O
While S^ailles is correct that Guyau's logic is sometimes weak, his
remark also suggests just what is most convincing about Guyau's
argument, his ability to "make poetry out of a desire, " to persuade the
reader by charm if not by reason that ordinary needs, ordinary sensa-
tions may be beautiful, that (in S^ailles own sarcastic words) "beauty
is everywhere, that it bestows itself to everything, in the useful, in
desire, in sensations, down to the bouquet of the wine and the aroma of
2
1
the trxiffle. " The discovery of beauty in useful activities is more a
matter of changed perception than of changed reasoning, of changed
values which render homage to human needs rather than disparaging
them as urges "which humiliate us, which make us slaves of things"
(again to quote Seailles).
Another criticism made by Seailles is less easy to dismiss. He
points with scorn to Guyau's tendency to treat beauty as a feeling rather
than as a quality of an object, and accuses Guyau of claiming that
"sensation is an element of aesthetic pleasure, therefore the sensation
is beautiful.
. .
"'^--* Seailles is an aesthetic traditionalist in his asser-
tion that "there are no beautiful feelings in themselves, " that they can
be expressed as beauty only by "enveloping themselves in a harmonious
and rich form, only by organizing themselves in a powerful and
beautiful body, which they animate and transfigure. "^"^ In what form
did beauty take shape when Guyau sipped milk in the mountains? Surely
not in the milk itself, contends Seailles, for
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It was not the freshness of the nriilk that was beautiful but theIdeas evoked by that sensation and the perceptions whichacconnpanied it, all those things of which he speaks to us- thecabin, the strean:^, the perfumed mountain. ^5
Because all these thoughts and feelings were not unified and rendered
concrete in an objective work of art, fliey remained locked in Guyau's
individual consciousness. Another person might not have found any
beauty in the experience: "If the shepherd had taken the cup after
M. Guyau, I don't think that he would have drunk a symphony of
Beethoven. In addition to being incommunicable, experiences not
shaped into an aesthetic form are by nature instantaneous. SeaiUes
agrees with Kant that the term "aesthetic" should be reserved for the
senses of sight and hearing, which are capable of receiving sensation
over an extended period of time, while the senses of taste, touch, and
smell register only momentary pleasure:
. . .
had the stream been made of milk, and had M. Guyau had the
capacity to drink from it without end, the monotonous flavor,
without nuances, without rhythm, could not have followed the
feelings which succeeded themselves in him, much less varied
them to renev^dng them. A beloved perfume, a springlike odor,
may arouse a whole world of memories, but, if the reverie is
prolonged, soon the perfume isn't even smelled anymore. '^'^
Guyau's response to these criticisms was published only after his
death in the posthumous volume L'Art au point de vue sociologique
^Art from the sociological point of view] (1889). Here Guyau sug-
gests that feelings, even if unembodied in an object, may be transmitted
to others both consciously and unconsciously. Because molecules pass
their motions to neighboring molecules, "it is as difficult to limit an
aesthetic, moral, or other feeling within a single living body as it is to
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confine heat or electricity. "29 The scientific basis for Guyau's sociol-
ogy of art is, needless to say, inadequate, but again he works from
weak logic to an intriguing sketch of the future. Aesthetic pleasure
could be the source of new social harmony. At the present, people
have widely different sensations and feelings, but in years to come the
role of art will be to lift individuals out of isolation to participation in
the universal life of society. Not similarity of possessions, not
rational arguments, but similarity of aesthetic experiences will bring
about a social solidarity whereby people share the same sympathetic
and generous feelings. Guyau contends that aesthetic experiences are
not necessarily locked up in the individual as long as they are the right
kind of experiences, possessing a character of sympathy and sincerity.
And just because they can be shared they are not necessarily transient,
for they may reverberate among individuals and thereby be prolonged.
All this is indeed unorthodox, as Seailles complains, but it offers
a far richer vision of the aesthetic possibilities of consumption than
one which is limited to objects. Guyau is arguing that not just every-
day objects but also everyday activities may assume the level of art.
For example, according to Si'ailles the aesthetic quality of a meal
would have to be sought in the visual design of the tableware or the
tablecloth, whereas Guyau could find it in the total experience of the
meal- -the food, conversation, lighting, and general ambience as well
as the concrete implements. Does not Seailles dismiss a whole realm
of pleasure and appreciation for which the term "aesthetic" is
appropriate in some way? His traditional understanding of beauty is
210
more appropriate for a society of producers manufacturing durable
objects; Guyau's extension of the term is prophetic of a society of
consumers who derive pleasurable experiences from consumable items
or from stimulation not embodied in items at all. To be more specific,
Guyau's concept of aesthetic pleasure could apply to the experience of
exposition visitors, for whom immersion in the Rue du Caire--its
noises, sights, smells, sounds, and flavors all taken together-
-add up
to a pleasure which could not be embodied in any one object there.
Guyau's insistence on the aesthetic validity of everyday experiences
and on the need to share those experiences is radically democratic,
much more so than proposals for the equal distribution of everyday
goods. It is far easier to hand out consumer objects equally than to
enable all members of society to have equal access to aesthetic feelings.
The latter presupposes that people enjoy similar opportunities for
education, leisure, and general social intercourse throughout their
lives. In a sense, then, Guyau responds to Seailles' sarcastic remark
that the sip of milk in the Pyrenees is a purely individual, unshared,
unsharable, and therefore unaesthetic sensation: "If the shepherd had
taken the cup after M. Guyau, I don't think that he would have drunk a
symphony of Beethoven. " Why not? Because the shepherd is
uneducated, unleisured, unable to hear performances of Beethoven,
unable to call up cultural associations to his mind, in brief, because
he lacks Guyau's wealth and advantages. There is no inherent reason
why that act of consumption could not have been shared, why two equals
could not have both heard a "pastoral symphony of the taste" in
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experiencing the pleasure of thirst satisfied. The aesthetic quality of
ordinary daily experiences of working and consuming may be appreciated
only if the people involved are similar: and the distribution of objects
alone cannot achieve that similarity. True social solidarity will be
achieved, states Guyau, when art becomes "mingled with the whole
moral or material existence of humanity.
.
.
"30 And once art is truly
democratized in this way, it will cease to be irrelevant: "One can
imagine that art, this luxury of the imagination, must end by becoming
a necessity for all, a sort of daily bread. "^1
After Guyau
It is appropriate to end on this visionary note, because Guyau's
reconciliation of utility and beauty involves much more than formal
theories of art. His is at once an aesthetic and a social vision, and its
inspirational effects extended far beyond artistic and philosophical
circles. After Guyau's untimely death other thinkers carried on his
search for a morale sans obligation ni sanction to the extent that this
quest became a dominant motif in late nineteenth-century French social
thought. In particular the concept of social solidarity which is so
central to Guyau's thought was extended and popularized. But this is
to anticipate. -^^ In the realm of aesthetic ideas with which we are now
concerned, an impressionistic survey of references to Guyau by
aesthetic thinkers during the late 1880's and 1890's suggests that he
had a major influence in that crucial period when experiments in the
decorative arts were getting underway. For example, citations of
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Guyau seem much more frequent than references to the English thinkers
John Ruskin or William Morris, whose ideas ran along similar lines
but who were relatively unknown in France until the mid- 1890 's.
Certainly the thinkers who will be discussed in the remainder of this
part were all well acquainted with Guyau 's work. Unfortunately it is not
possible to describe Guyau's intellectual legacy with any more precision,
either in the restricted field of aesthetic ideas or in the more general
one of social thought, for no thorough study of the subject has been
done. This is an urgent task, for more than any other person to be
discussed in this part, Guyau is a seminal figure. He is the kind of
thinker whose contribution cannot be measured only by what he himself
produced, but must also be evaluated by what he stimiilated others to
do.
While the tradition of art for art's sake outlived Guyau, its
vitality diminished steadily in the waning years of the nineteenth cen-
tury. As it did, an immense amount of energy liberated from defensive
proclamations about the purity of art was redirected to practical experi-
ments demonstrating that both consumption and art could be ennobled by
being merged, and that by being linked with human needs art could be
shared by all rather than being reserved for a few. As these practical
experiments (which will be discussed further in the next chapter) were
going on, philosophers and critics were wrestling with issues which
Guyau had raised but not resolved. Even if thinkers after Guyau were
increasingly willing to accept the compatibility of beauty and utility,
they still had to consider more thoroughly the nature of their
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relationship. It is one thing to say that beauty and utility are compatible,
meaning that a useful object could also be decorated in a beautiful
manner; it is a much bolder step to argue that beauty and utility are
identical, that the beauty of the object is derived from its utility.
Guyau suggests such an identification, but only in a most hesitant
manner. According to him, "everything useful, which is to say
adapted to a certain end, ordered for this end, carries by that a satis-
faction to the intellect and thereby acquires some degree of beauty.
.
.
"
This beauty of utility, however, is a "very primitive.
. . very inferior"
type, and furthermore
the agreeable and the beautiful can always subsist independently
of the useful.
. .
far be it from us to think that everything beauti-
ful must be justified with a practical utility to be admired, ... 34
In the decade after Guyau's death, the tendency was to drop these
hesitations and to claim more positively that the source of beauty is
the appropriateness of form to function. There is no necessary con-
nection between this particular definition of beauty and the general
contention that beauty and utility may be united in the same object, but
it is a connection which increasingly came to be taken for granted.
Those who advocated improved design of useful objects increasingly
had in mind a certain type of design, a lean, spare, logical design in
which decoration unrelated to the use of the object is suppressed. By
the turn of the century most of those supporting the beautification of
consumer objects advocated this partic\alar concept of beautification-
-
in Andler's words, the concept of "a form that is rationally beautiful"
and "loyal materials which are honestly worked. "
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This subject is familiar to art historians who trace the origins of
what has come to be known as functionalism, especially as applied to
architecture. No claim is being made that the thinkers discussed in
this chapter and the next are pioneers of the theory of functionalism in
this sense. After all, a well-known study of the origins of the theory
traces its roots back to classic times and cites eighteenth-century
French architects as advocating the derivation of form from function.
Moreover, because of the lack of secondary works discussed at the out-
set of this chapter, it is presently impossible to say how the issues
raised here fit in with the general development of that theory in France,
much less with its international development. What will be attempted
is to expand our understanding of functionalism, to see it as more than
a theory of architecture or even of design, to see it as embodying a
social ethic of consumption. While the effort to understand utility and
function may be raised in an aesthetic context, the refinement of these
concepts involves an analysis of human needs, which in turn involves
an analysis of the role of consumption in human life. In the design
typical of the dream world of consumption, ideas of Ixixury and beauty
are inseparable, and objects tend to be invested with ornamentation
that will impress the spectator. The moral view of consumption
implied by such design is that primary physical needs are irrelevant,
even shamefvd enough to be disguised. The social view implied is that
the most important purpose of consumer goods is to convey an
impression of wealth. The ethic of functionalism would on the contrary
divorce luxury and beauty on the premise that luxury taints art. Beauty
215
is to be found rather in simple and solid designs that serve human
needs in a straightforward manner. Thus the primary needs of the
consumer are brought out of hiding, so to speak, and are accorded a
place of central dignity. This is a social ethic as well as a personal
one. Functional theory confers dignity upon human needs common to
all, rather than to social pretensions available to a few. The best
design is what serves the ordinary needs of ordinary people. Thus the
concept of fitting form to function is by no means a purely visual one,
but involves a statement of moral and social purpose.
So far we have referred to the way functionalism rehabilitates the
primary needs of the consumer, such as the need to eat, to stay warm,
to move from place to place, and so forth. This is indeed the usual
understanding of needs inherent in the idea that the form of an object
should fit its function. The contribution of the thinkers to be discussed
in this chapter is that they are not satisfied with the usual understanding
They regard terms like utility and function as problematic rather than
self-evident. Just what does it mean for something to be useful, and
what are the various functions that an object might serve? They
wrestle with the term "useful" QitileJ that Guyau preferred as well as
with "utility" |~utilite^
,
being careful all the while to distinguish both
these expressions from "utilitarianism" || utilitarianisme "| , which is
disparaged as a philosophical cult limited to a cut-and-dried calcula-
tion of brute facts (and distinctively English besides). What is sought
is a definition of utility which is more inclusive and imaginative, and
perhaps for this reason the term "function" [^Jbnction~j is increasingly
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favored as a synonym for usage. But this word too is burdened with
inappropriate associations. Since its introduction into French in the
sixteenth century, fonction had been used primarily in reference to
living organisms, as was also true of the adjectival form fonctionnal
which came into usage in the mid-nineteenth century. (The word
fonctionnalisme came into usage in French only in the mid-twentieth
century. The biological associations of this terminology were
extremely influential for post-Darwin intellectuals for whom the theory
of evolution, in the words of a contemporary, "imposes itself.
. . on our
minds with all the weight that the Ptolemaic system weighed on those of
our ancestors,
. . .
"^^ Because these biological associations were so
powerful, human functions tend to be defined in terms of ones shared
with all other animals
--organic functions such as locomotion, repro-
duction, and nutrition.
We shall begin by examining the intellectual and aesthetic implica-
tions of this organic interpretation of functionality. Then we shall look
at attempts to supersede the biological concept of function, to arrive at
a more comprehensive and fruitful definition involving social and
spiritual purposes. In this chapter discussion will revolve around the
ideas of two aesthetic thinkers, Maurice Griveau (1851- ? ) and
Paul Souriau (1852-1926). In the following chapter the same themes
will emerge as we examine how these ideas were put into practice in
the decorative arts movement.
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The Organic Interpretation of Function
remain
Maurice Griveau is an obscure thinker and will probably
so. While he is cited favorably by better-known contemporaries like
Sully-Prudhomme,38 Emile Faguet. ^9 Robert de La Sizeranne,^°
Marius-Ary Leblond.^l Remy de Gourment, ^2 and less enthusiastically
by Paul Souriau, 43 they refer to him only in passing. Griveau is cer-
tainly not a decisive influence on contemporary thought as is Guyau. As
for intellectual historians, they seem to ignore Griveau completely
except for one sentence in Valentin Feldman's L'Esth^tigue frangaise
contemporaine [Contemporary French aesthetics] (1936). ^4 Because
published biographical information is non-existent, the list of Griveau's
publications in the Biblioth'^que Nationale of Paris must be relied upon
for clues about his background. The list suggests (and only suggests)
that Griveau lived in the provinces, probably in the south of France,
and that he lacked educational and financial advantages^, since he began
to publish only in his forties. Once commenced, however, his writing
is remarkable for its variety and quantity. Interspersed among the
publication of his first major work Les Elements du beau [The elements
of beaut^ in 1892, his opus magnum La Sphere du beaute" [The sphere
of beauty] in 1901, and his final book, the three-volume L'Histoire
esthetique de la nature [The aesthetic history of nature] in 1927-1930,45
he published, both privately and through established houses, fiction and
non-fiction, criticism of music (which he appears to have loved
passionately) as well as of the visual arts, topical articles (as on the
need to restore old buildings) as well as highly abstract ones, all in
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addition to editing the Revue moderne d'esth^tique beginning in 1893.
In his obsession with demonstrating lhat beauty follows the same rules
in nature as in art, he pursues analogies between the man-made world
and the organic in an uncompromising and tenacious way. His predilec-
tion for analogy and classification often leads him into a eccentric maze
of charts and scales, tables and graphs and lists, arrows upon arrows
and circles within circles, from which his illuminating observations
must be extracted much as Kepler's three laws must be gleaned from
heaps of the astronomer's now-forgotten speculations on universal
harmonies. Such eccentricities, as well as the way he jumbles
together scientific, poetic, and philosophical vocabiilaries so that no
coherent tone emerges, go far in explaining why his most compelling
ideas have been overlooked. Griveau's writings need too much sifting
through for him to be rated as anything but a secondary figure; but he
certainly does not deserve to be neglected so completely as he has
been, not only because he has such a lively and original mind, but also
because his role in formulating the aesthetic standards of the decora-
tive arts movement needs to be clarified. Griveau explicitly demon-
strates the intellectual origins of the standards of simplicity, honesty,
and logic which came to be advocated by Andler and so many others in
that era. How his work contributes to the development of those
standards, how he relates to other thinkers who came to similar con-
clusions, remain mysteries. Griveau sorely needs to be studied as
part of a survey of aesthetic thought in late nineteenth-century France.
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The starting point of Griveau's aesthetic philosophy is his fervent
conviction that all the beauties of nature, down to the smallest details
,
serve a useful purpose. The corolla of the flower and the stem of
moss which are vital reproductive organs are also spectacles of beauty;
the smoke which carries away products of combustion simultaneously
resembles sparkling gems or flowing tresses. Even the colorful
plumage of a bird constitutes a sexual attraction and therefore serves
to reproduce the species, for. like all other details of nature, color is
"born of a vital need, and tends towards a necessary end. "47 xhis
necessary relationship between natural form and natural function is the
great lesson of the theory of evolution, which to Griveau is "a certi-
! i48tude. " The process of natural selection eliminates forms which are
less efficient in fulfilling the functions of the organism, and this very
same process is the one which makes organisms more beautiful by
making them ever more elegant and perfect. There is nothing
accidental, nothing fortuitous about the relation of form to function in
nature. The beauty of nature is that of necessity.
According to Griveau, man should create useful objects using
exactly the same principles as nature. In matters of design, the
principle of adaptation of form to function provides an "infallible
touchstone. "^^ Even in "novel and doubtful cases, " the designer can
refer back to the "crucial law" of ascertaining the function of the
object: "The fate of the shape, and of lines still undecided, will depend
on the response to this question. "^^ In the world of m.an-made objects,
man plays the role of natural selector, choosing those forms most
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appropriate to his purpose and eliminating those which are inferior.
Human taste constitutes "a veritable artificial selection. " This might
be called a negative aesthetic, or. to put it another way, a positivistic
aesthetic of exclusion, because the elimination of the undesirable is
given primary emphasis. ^1 Griveau even claims that the French word
for "elegance" f l'elegance l is derived from an expression meaning
"choice" or "elimination" and is closely related to the English term
"selection." A sickle, for example, appears elegant "because it has
rejected from its form every surface which is useless and profitless
for its function.
.
.And there is the secret of all beauty. "^^ As a
general rule, then, beauty is to be equated with simplicity, as "all
ornamentation added on, which is not in more or less direct relation
with the function of the object, is generally a defect. "^^ Indeed, not
only is decoration to be suppressed, but even to some extent objects
themselves should be suppressed if they do not serve a function.
Griveau 's advice is, "Let everything serve and nothing remain unused
in your home. Otherwise it is only a pretentious museum, and your
life there a life of lies. "^'^
This last remark is significant in indicating how closely the
ethical emphasis on honesty is linked to the aesthetic emphasis on
simplicity. Again the creed is largely a negative one, for truthfulness
is defined as the elimination of the dishonest. Again the basis of the
creed is desire to have man operate as nature supposedly does. Nature
is incapable of falsehood. Its materials are honestly related to their
purpose, and in all its details of color and ornament "nowhere does
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one discover a lacuna, an artificial grazing area, a trompe d'oeil . "55
Excessive ornamentation is nnendacious because it suggests an attempt
to make an object appear more elaborate and expensive than it really is.
Similarly, it is deceptive to work with materials so they look like
something else--to polish marble, for example, so it looks like a
mirror instead of stone-
-because human integrity demands that man
respect the integrity of materials. 56 Griveau's emphasis on honesty
is reminiscent of Guyau's exaltation of sincerity as the supreme
aesthetic virtue for the same reason that man's greatest art is achieved
when he imitates life. In Guyau's words (and they might as well be
Griveau's too), "Life does not lie. "57
What are we to make of this reliance on organic analogies as a
guide to the design of useful objects? To begin with, Griveau's view
of how nature operates may be faulted on many points. Contemporary
critics of his point out that the link between form and function in nature
is much less necessary than Griveau assumes. Because nature can
fulfill the same function with a wide variety of forms, appeal to function
is an inadequate criterion of design. Certainly Griveau's absolute
assertion that all details of organic life may be accounted for by
functional utility is difficult to accept. Griveau himself repudiates his
own claim that beauty and utility are always synonymous in nature by
admitting that some organisms are ugly if not monstrous. In a
particularly intriguing section of La Sphere de beaute , he explains that
these repvilsive forms are characteristic of a transitional stage of
evolution and suggests that contemporary machinery is going through a
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similarly ugly transitory stage; but the damaging admission that
functionality and beauty do not always coexist still stands. ^9 This
section exemplifies Griveau's fundamental intellectual failure. Instead
of questioning the validity of comparing nature's realm with man's, he
only refines and extends that comparison even further. He habitually
views useful objects as a sort of man-made vegetation. The problem
with this mental habit is that Griveau fails to consider how man must
operate differently from nature and how man-made useful objects are
bound to differ from naturally created ones. As a result his theory of
design is flawed by two major limitations.
The first limitation involves Griveau's understanding of the term
"function. " As already mentioned, when applied to nature, this term
commonly is restricted to vital activities like nutrition, movement, or
reproduction necessary for the physical survival of the organism.
Griveau retains this bias even when dealing with man. He presents a
classification of useful objects according to the function they serve,
and with one exception (to be discussed later) his sixteen-item list is
restricted to physical functions such as closure, opening, support,
sheathing, and a large category of "mechanical" or self-moving func-
tions which is further sub-divided into those of traction, locomotion,
communication, measurement, projection, and fabricating other things.
This list provides a clear example of both the advantages and the
limitations of Griveau's reliance on biological analogies. The classifi-
cation of useful objects by their function marks a great improvement
over arrangement by other criteria such as historical period.
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geographical origin, or the materials or techniques of production. 60
Griveau rejects all these categories in favor of ones based on human
needs. As a result he is freed from a debilitating nostalgia for past
technologies of production because he recognizes that forms and
materials may evolve while the human functions they serve remain
stable. On the other hand, because he thinks in organic terms his list
of functions is too narrowly limited to ones involving physical survival,
as if "function" were synonymous with "vital function. "
A second major weakness of Griveau's approach involves his con-
tention that nature's forms are necessarily derived from organic func-
tion. Whether or not such necessity operates in nature, it certainly
does not apply to man's creations, especially in modern times when
technological prowess allows a wide range of choice of forms to fulfill
a function. Griveau himself cites an example: in old buildings the
distance spanned by a brick lintel was inherently limited by the weight
of bricks, but today a brick lintel can be supported internally by a
small iron column. No longer are there necessary limits to the length
of the lintel. The ancient relation of beauty and utility, the familiar
relation of visual proportion to structural soundness, has been snapped.
The modern lintel is eminently useful--" 'it holds, ' as the builders
say"- -but "our eye is troubled, our instinct of equilibrium remains in
defiance.
. .
" Griveau refers to such a practice as "industrial: it
consists of making use of very concise means or materials, deceiving
our eye, as it were. "^1 Here Griveau brings up a wholly different
kind of functionality than the organic kind. Industrial materials may
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"hold, " may work, may function in a way that has nothing to do with
nature's operations. Almost in passing Griveau has brought up a
central conflict between an organic and a mechanical interpretation of
function. In nature the concept of function (or of utility) refers to what
an organ does; in industry it is a matter of how something is built. To
state the distinction in slightly different terms, while in both cases the
logic is that of adapting means to ends, in the case of nature the end is
a life process and in the case of industry it is an inert product. If the
organic interpretation of function tends to suggest the life
-sustaining
activities of consumption, then the mechanical interpretation suggests
instead activities of production in which something is built or made.
The disparity between these two interpretations has led to a great deal
of intellectual confusion about the idea of functionality. One of the
major tasks facing historians of aesthetic thought is to trace the origins
and development of this conflict which Griveau presents so clearly here.
Griveau clearly prefers the organic to what he calls the industrial
understanding of utility. As far as he is concerned, industry plays
tricks while nature alone designs in honesty. His criticism of industry
for "deceiving our eye" recalls his praise of truthfulness in design, and
now we begin to appreciate how his ethic of honesty is born of a great
nostalgia for natural necessity. Nature does not choose truth: it is
what it is because it must be. How radically different is the human
condition, in which honesty and limitation must be attained through
conscious choice! As Griveau himself indicates, present technology
allows man to choose an industrial rather than a natural design, so that
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traditional limitations have no meaning. For example, whereas in
nature color is always related to a "vital need" or "necessary end, "
in human creations color may have no relation at all to structure
because "truly, man has this power to realize, by a voluntary effort,
many natural impossibilities.
. .
" Error in choice of color in the
aesthetic sphere, Griveau concludes, derives from free will just as
sin does in the moral sphere. ^ While Griveau is aware of man's
distinction from nature in his possession of free will, he still prefers
human design where man is relatively limited in his choices, where
man is forced to be honest, as it were, by external constraints.
In one memorable passage Griveau muses on the beauty of roofs
as an emblem of the beauty of necessity. The walls of a building may
be "dishonored" by pretentious and unnecessary plaster decorations,
by whitewashes or by false bricks, but the roof is left alone, designed
solely to serve its purpose of protection. The overlapping pattern in
which tiles or slates are placed imitates a "discovery of nature, "
being the same pattern found on pinecones, buds, or flower bulbs to
protect them from the elements. The streets of the modern city may
be painfully ugly, but when one looks upwards one enjoys
beautiful vistas. . . in contemplating a city from a bird's eye
view: in our Midi, the ruffling of red tiles, - -the majestic
and somber surge of blue roofs in the North. It is necessary,
in order for this part of the building to be saved from the
shipwreck, for an ineluctable necessity to intervene, to have
opposed its force of inertia. ... I find it admirable, this
spectacle of frivolous and fragile taste there ruianing up against
impassible and profound utility; I applaud the triumph of the
Immanent over the Transient; I enjoy seeing Nature. . . resist
man, in a domain where man believes himself master. 63
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How far we have come in a century from Kant's praise of beauty as the
realm of perfect liberty! Griveau, on the contrary, recoils from the
responsibility of choice and of self
-limitation which confronts his age.
He finds security in the concept of a beauty derived from an "impassible
and profound utility" by which form is necessarily derived from function.
Griveau's aesthetics hark back to an age when man's relation to nature
was one of subservience, rather than responding to his own time when
technological progress was freeing man from natural limits to an
unprecedented degree. The appeal of his aesthetic theory is emotional
rather than logical. Griveau looks back longingly to a time when, as
he himself suggests, man had a master more potent than himself. Even
if he is relatively free from nostalgia for specific models of design or
modes of production from the past, Griveau is encumbered by this more
general nostalgia for necessary limits, for necessary honesty. While
his appeal for an aesthetics based on an "impassible and profound
utility" may not furnish much of a practical guide to design in modern
times, it does testify to a troubled awareness that some guide must be
found. In order to understand why Griveau feels this need so acutely,
we must turn to another understanding of function, by which it is
defined in a social sense.
The Social Interpretation of Function
Griveau is not primarily a social critic. His goal is to analyze
the abstract elements of beauty, but in its pursuit he cannot ignore the
64fact that "we live our daily life in complete ugliness. " It is in
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diagnosing the cause of this ugliness that Griveau concludes that objects
have a social utility as well as utility based on biological needs. His
diagnosis begins by placing the manifestations of modern ugliness in
two major categories. The first type is the expression of a "ferocious
tive
utilitarianism-65 ^^^^^ degrades useful objects into dull, unattracti
items, no matter how respectable or even exalted their purpose.
Ecclesiastical censers are made as cheaply as kitchen utensils,
rosaries are sold in bargain basements, while the "noble sword of
gallant knights" has been trivalized into "our cabbage
-cutter (sabre-
bayonet)
. . .
" Griveau continues,
The list would be long of the partician, proud things which this
prosaic century has "banalized": there is. . .the parasol,
formeriy a portable canopy, still honorific among certain peoples,
reduced to the "umbrella"; there is the coach (egoist, in truth)
for which is substituted the "omnibus"; and finally there is the
funeral car
,
compared to today's "funeral bus. "66
The same refusal to spend any care on objects worthy of dignity is
responsible for clumsy, lugubrious clothing, tableware, and row
houses. On the other hand, modern ugliness is also manifested in just
the opposite manner, in the lavishing of decoration and expense on
objects in an attempt to inflate their importance. Country houses
"pose pretentiously as ch^teavix, " simple inns are built like palaces
and called "hotels, " and even rural churches are stuffed with "affected
and coquettish" statues. These two extremes of uglines s - -the
inappropriate degradation or equally inappropriate inflation of objects
--may both be seen simultaneously in any bourgeois or farm household:
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^^L^r ^^^S^^'^^ ^ P°^^^ty of contour, a decorativecarelessness bordering on cynicism,
--or, inversely bva pretentious vanity, an unhealthy appetite for falseluxury.
.
.
The plates, the chafing dishes, the salad bowls,the carafes, the glasses are miserable-
-or luxurious
I should say, rather, always miserable, for the surcharge
of ornaments which covers them is only ostentatious: it isnot rich, bo
Griveau concludes that the common source of modern ugliness is "bad
taste which degrades ordinary roles beneath themselves, or endeavors
to inflate them inordinately; which democratizes personal belongings,
or dishonors them with a parody of aristocratic elegance. "^"^
With this reference to "ordinary roles, " the transition from
aesthetic to social analysis is made as Griveau apprehends the social
roots of "bad taste. " Like d'Avenel, Griveau appreciates that the
nineteenth century has seen the democratization of luxury, or, as he
expresses it, "the luxury which hitherto distinguished the 'big shots'
is dispensed in this century to whomever can pay. ""^"^ Far from lauding
this trend as d'Avenel does, Griveau sees it as proliferating ostenta-
tious ugliness as more and more people attempt "a parody of aristo-
cratic elegance. " But Griveau recognizes that there is at the same
time an opposite result, one which d'Avenel had ignored- -the degrada-
tion of formerly dignified objects because the social roles they signify
are no longer held in esteem. "When Griveau cites the "patrician,
proud things which this prosaic century has 'banalized, ' " he is
referring to objects which used to be associated with an aristocracy
of faith, of courage, of leader ship- -the sword of the knight, the
censer of the priest, the coach of the nobleman. The design of objects
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used to reflect a generally accepted social hierarchy. Now aristocratic
elegance may be purchased by anyone, and a fortuitous hierarchy of
wealth has replaced that based on service to society. The resulting
confusion of social role (of social function, as it were) in turn results
in confusion about appropriate design. People are no longer sure which
objects signify social esteenn and which do not. Therefore modern
ugliness, whether of ostentation or of banality, may be reduced to a
single cause--the lack of understanding regarding social roles.
Because a meaningful social hierarchy is lacking, the design of objects
is subject to the rule of an indiscriminate market, which transforms
worthy items into shoddy mass merchandise and unworthy items into
ostentatious status symbols.
So Griveau amends his dictum that form must reflect function-
-
function being understood here in a biological sense- -by saying that
there is a need also to define a hierarchy of function-
-function under-
stood here in a social sense. "The law of adaptation is the scientific
basis of ' relative beauty
,
'--the law of subordination is the foundation
oi ' absolute beauty
.
'
""^^ The designer must ask which level of function
is involved for design to be appropriate to the relative merits of various
human activities. In discussing the function of support, for example,
Griveau reminds his reader that an object may serve the same physical
purpose but fulfill very different social roles:
Do you see the arresting transition from the bed to the coffin,
then to the reliquary? . . . that from the dining table --to the
Holy Table
. . .
?
Thus the function does not only particularize the object; it
ennobles it- -or degrades it. ^2
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Such an understanding of the relative dignity of various forms of con-
sumption is woefully lacking
.n modern society, he concludes. The
combination of powerful technological means which allow myriad
possibilities xn design, and confusion about social roles of people and
therefore the role of objects used by people, results in mendacious,
inappropriate designs. It is little wonder, then, that Griveau is so
nostalgic for the definition of functionality derived from nature, one
which involves only physical survival and not a social hierarchy. The
limits and necessities of nature might prove a stay against the confusior
and dishonesty of a society which is too free to design as it pleases.
However, the suppression of ornament which Griveau favors might not
be the best solution for the current confusions of design since orna-
mentation can serve to identify the relative merit of various objects.
Instead of eliminating ornamentation, the need is rather to restore its
appropriateness by restoring a hierarchy of merit. But as this involves
a social transformation out of the hands of the designer, Griveau
understandably prefers a solution which seems more likely to be
implemented.
There is one other solution, however. Motifs from nature coxild
be used as socially neutral ornamentation, so to speak. Writing in
1906, five years after Griveau published La Sphere de beaute
,
Camille Mauclair noted that jewelry, which used to be a hieratic
symbol of power and superiority, had become a frivolous slave to style
in "this epoch of false luxury.
. .which becomes more and more
democratic. " Now that the "human symbolism" was fast disappearing,
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natural symbolism was filling its place. Jewelers were deforming
plants in metal and using artificial stones to create baubles which were
only ornaments, not signs of caste. "^^ ^he French decorative arts
movement, a reliance on natural decoration, rather than the suppres-
sion of decoration altogether, was the preferred response to the
absence of a generally accepted social symbolism in design. How may
this predilection be explained?
The Spiritual Interpretation of Function
Of Griveau's list of sixteen functions served by useful objects,
only one is not primarily related to physical needs. After presenting
the first fifteen categories which are "useful--! did not say utilitarian,"
Griveau turns to the last one which comprises "decorative and
emblematic functions" to account for objects which "delight us--and
seem to have no other purpose in this world but to delight us. . . "'^^
These objects serve "an expressive role" as "emblems" of an ideal.
Griveau insists, however, that in every case this mysterious
emblematic charm is related to the "positive mission" which the object
originally served, citing as examples the emblems of the bee hive, the
vase, the sword, and the anchor whose "psychic functions" are linked,
no matter how remotely, to their "mechanical" ones. "^^
The concept of psychic functions, or, as he says elsewhere, of
"ideal functions"'''^ is not to be identified either with physical functions
or social ones. The hiiman needs being served here are ones of
imagination, of longing for an ideal- - spiritual needs, we shall call
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them, for lack of a better term. Griveau seems to include this last
function as an afterthought, but it deserves more attention than this.
The philosopher who does consider at some length how spiritual func-
tions might be fulfilled by everyday objects is Paul Souriau, a close
contemporary of Griveau and Guyau. His theory of the relationship of
beauty and utility is found in L 'Imagination de 1 'artiste [The imagina-
tion of the artist^ (1901) and La Beaut^ rationnelle [Rational beauty]
77
(1903), two in a long series of books written from 1893 to 1913 by
Souriau, a professor at the universities of Lille and Nancy. In his own
day Souriau was much better known than Griveau-
-indeed, he was one
7 8
of the best-known aesthetic philosophers of his time
--but today he is
of considerably less interest because he is a relatively dry, methodical,
academic writer. The irony is that this dull writer is pleading the
cause of the imagination which Griveau practices but does not preach.
To be sure, Souriau does not denigrate the satisfaction of physical
needs. An ordinary item which serves them is not vulgar, he says,
but is rather a "humble companion of existence" which deserves
ornamentation not to disguise it but because "Decoration is rather an
8 0homage which we render to things. " As this reference to decoration
suggests, Souriau does not advocate design by the elimination of every-
thing unrelated to material use. Utility must be defined in a larger
sense than this:
Any object made for utility, a piece of furniture for example,
seems quite poor to us if we sense in it a too strict economy
of matter or craftsmanship. Utility therefore will not always
be enough for us, if one understands by it that which responds
strictly to the necessities of life; what we desire for ourselves
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and wish for all to be animated, is life which is full and
generously opened up. For us beauty therefore commences
with the superfluous. 81
Basic needs must be met first because "All misery is ugliness, "^^ but
this is not enough. To support his argument that the concept of utility
must go beyond "gross, material needs" to "the superior needs of
8 3our soul, " Souriau turns to evolutionary theory, but in a very
different way from Griveau. According to Souriau, the lesson of
evolution is that physical survival, the satisfaction of vital needs, is
not its primary goal at all. The myriad complications of organic life
are inexplicable if the only end of life is physical survival and repro-
duction of the species. Especially in higher creatures, life is
immensely more complex than these basic requirements demand. The
only reasonable conclusion is that "physical life is a simple means,
84
and that the development of psychic faculties is the true end.
.
.
" "The
flowering of a conscious soul.
. . is truly the supreme goal of
evolution. "^^
Like Griveau, Souriau is convinced that the only way to establish
an authentic merging of beauty and utility is to establish a clear
hierarchy of merit by which certain ends are seen as inferior and others
as superior. He admits that "The difficulty, it is true, will be to
establish this hierarchy, " and ventures that "the highest end that we
o n
can conceive is the full expansion of conscious life. " This hierarchy,
then, does not involve an evaluation of various social roles but of
various human activities considered abstractly, with the development
of a rich, harmonious psychic life of intelligence and sensibility at the
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top. The two hierarchies are not incompatible, but they are not
identical either. What is most noteworthy is Griveau's and Souriau's
agreement that beautiful design of useful objects depends on the
development of a scale of merit outside the aesthetic sphere.
Souriau's particular contribution is to assert an independent
status to needs of the spirit which consumption must satisfy apart from
physical or social needs. In fact he singles out the decorative arts as
an area where more than any other imagination, fantasy, even the
bizarre should have full rein. When an artist decorates a useful
object, he should not think only of its usage in a material sense but
should create something for contemplation. Souriau specifically
criticizes the "rational decor" then being advocated by some which
would "permit only a very sober and very sincere ornamentation, which
would leave in evidence the purity of the form, the solidity of the struc-
ture, the quality of the materials employed. " Proponents of this ideal
remind him of the utilitarian schoolteacher in Dickens' Hard Times who
denounces fantasy and allows only "facts, facts, facts ! "^9 Decorative
artists should not hesitate to resort to charming "lies of form and
color, " to non-factual conventions and motifs, because they must
express their imagination, and this too is a legitimate human need.
".
. . these plays of plastic invention to which [the designerj surrenders
himself willingly are not only permitted; they are obligatory: they
comprise part of the very function {jDf decorative art^ . ""^^
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Sometimes, as Souriau discusses the "tendency of decorative art
to fantasy"92 lauds its character of play and luxury, he seems very
close to returning to the Kantian tradition in which beauty and utility are
divorced. Even more, he seems to draw near to the dream world of
consumption. The latter possibility is brought home most forcefully
when Souriau discusses the particular types of fantastic imagery to
which the decorative arts are prone-
-reductions and amplifications,
simplifications, metamorphoses and finally the creation of "composite
monsters" which seem the products of nightmares and where "We have
arrived at the farthest limit of plastic invention, at the critical point
where the imagination is going to lose contact with nature: the game
runs the risk of being spoiled. "93 So there is still a need for limits,
but how is the imagination going to limit itself and renounce the charm
of lies before they lead to madness? Do these dark possibilities make
the alternative of limiting design to physical function more appealing?
Evidently Souriau himself had second thoughts along these lines. Two
years after publishing L. 'Imagination de I'artiste
,
in which the above
remarks appear, he wrote La Beaute rationnelle to stress the ultimate
rule of reason rather than imagination in art, the decorative arts
included. Souriau seems to have felt the competing claims of fantasy
and reason between which, as we shall see, the decorative arts move-
ment as a whole was torn.
Therefore Souriau's tacit acknowledgment of this conflict furnishes
an appropriate conclusion to this discussion of the theoretical reconcilia-
tion of beauty and utility, and an appropriate introduction to the decorative
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arts movement which resulted from that reconciliation. The biological,
social, and spiritual definitions of utility would all have to be taken into
consideration in the design of consumer objects, for an adequate concept
of consumption should include all three aspects. The attempt to restrict
the criterion of design to functionality in a limited material sense
ignores the claims of the other human needs. People also look to
objects to signify a social order, a purpose which in modern times is
not being fulfilled because the democratization of luxury has snapped
the traditional links of object to social role. Useful objects also serve
needs of the spirit, and the predominance of natural symbols in the
decorative arts movement is a recognition of those needs. The problem
that Souriau raises is how this spiritual function may be served without
becoming mad fantasy or without being exploited by commerce. Indeed,
the one possibility that neither Souriau nor Griveau nor Guyau consider
is that all the legitimate definitions of function might be overridden by
the functioning of the marketplace. This possibility, however, came
to be very much on the minds of proponents of the decorative arts
movement.
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CHAPTER IV
THE DECORATIVE ARTS MOVEMENT AND ITS CRITICS
The Making of an Aesthetic Ideology
"We are.
. .
at the hour of one of those [krtistic] harvests K
optimism has a domain, it is in criticism and in art. This is the
buoyant conclusion of CamiUe Mauclair in his article heralding "La
R^forme de I'art dgcoratif en France" [The reform of decorative art in
Franee] published in the Nouvelle revue in 1896. The immediate
occasion for the article was the news that the French government had
agreed to let a group of decorative artists redesign the nation's coinage,
According to Mauclair, this decision should be interpreted not as an
isolated incident but as an initial step in an artistic revolution which
would beautify all ordinary objects, beginning with "the most universal
and most banal: a coin. "^ The coinage reform testifies that finally the
modern age is casting off the visual heritage of the past to find its own
distinctive style based on adaptation to contemporary needs. Mauclair
traces the origins of this decorative revolution back to the advent of
impressionism in painting, the French discovery of Japanese art, the
importation of furnishings from London in the style of William Morris,
and the diffusion of posters by Jules Cheret. According to him the
first major victory for the modern style came at the Salon du Champ
de Mars in 1891, when for the first time a section of industrial and
decorative art was added to an exhibition of painting and sculpture.
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Mauclair praises the efforts of pioneers of the cause, including S.
Bing, renowned collector of Japanese art, who had recently opened
a gallery, "L "Art nouveau, " to serve as combined shop and museum.
Mauclair also lists at length those whom he considers the artistic lead-
ers of decorative arts reform, including the sculptor Alexandre Char-
pentier and the glassmaker and cabinet-maker flmile Gall^. Thanks to
the combined efforts of such dedicated men, a modern style emerged
during the previous decade from a "fog" of indistinct and tentative
experiments, in a gradual process which
conforms to the intellectual history of generations From
this fog, slowly, is born a precise and rejuvenated conscious-
ness: a soul is revealed, an unknown lesson comes forth from
the epoch.
The arrival of a new generation of decorative artists is in fact only
one part of a general upheaval in which the generation of the 1890's
is casting off the burden of the past:
We are in a period which is especially attractive, for all the
arts correspond with each other. New literature and new music,
ornamentation and furnishings, impressionism and symbolism,
essays and dramas of Maeterlinck and glass-work by Galle,
novels of Paul Adam and frescoes of Bernard, jewelry of
Pierre Roche and poems of Henri de R^gnier, visions of Ver-
laine and dreams of Carriere, symphonies of Vincent d'Indy
and enamels of Henri Cros, pottery of Carries and canvases
of Henry de Groux, sociology of Roberty and modernist lyricism
of Gustave Charpentier, fairylands of M. Claude Monet and
nocturnes of M. Whistler, ideologies of Maurice Barres and
effigies of Rodin, all that, above negation and facile smiles,
becomes strengthened in harmonious relations, in deep or
subtle works, in slow and sure diffusions.
In the decorative arts, at least, all that remains to be done is to
coordinate the efforts of the new generation:
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the%Tan h/. h ^^^^ been made,
Isid. ^'''^u' prejudice have been put
all we ne!/''^''^''T ^"^.^^^^^^^ ^^t" is understood and admitted;
thL. S ''i^^ encouragement by the State ofese individual endeavors. ^
Mauclair's enthusiasm is in part that of youth: he was only
twenty-four when he wrote this article. Because he made his literary
debut in 1890, the year before the Salon du Champ du Mars, he be-
longs to the new generation ready to take command. This chapter will
tell the story of the decorative arts movement through Mauclair's
evolving relationship with it, because the transformation of his initial
enthusiasm into a much more critical and pessimistic attitude con-
stitutes at once a personal odyssey and a paradigm of the odyssey of
his generation. Other thinkers will be cited to clarify Mauclair's idea
or to substantiate his representative quality, but in general a biograph
ical framework will be used. Such a framework is appropriate to the
subject, for the ideas inspiring the decorative arts movement cannot
be understood without appreciating the fervent desire of young intel-
lectuals like Mauclair to break with worn-out traditions and to find
a new way to unite their aesthetic and social ambitions.
For Mauclair, as for so many others of his generation, the cause
of symbolism initially seemed to promise liberation from artistic
tradition. In his fascinating autobiography Servitude et grandeur
litteraires [Literary bondage and greatness]] (1922), Mauclair recounts
that when he entered the literary life of Paris in 1890 it was dominated
by symbolists who had hardly left behind their original label of
decadents. ^ By 1896, however, the ranks of symbolism had been
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scattered, in part through death and distraction, in part because the
battle to establish its claim to literary significance had largely been
won, and in part because of its inherent dead ends mentioned at the end
of the previous part. Although some young writers of Mauclair's
generation were never able to throw off the symbolist yoke, the more
ardent and creative spirits realized that the literary cause which had
launched their careers and had engaged their youthful enthusiasm would
have to be superseded. The publication of Mauclair's article on the
reform of the decorative arts represents a personal turning point at
which he tried to reach out beyond the symbolist circles in which he had
made his literary debut. The fact that this article was published in the
Nouvelle revue -
-a journal which his symbolist companions disdained
along with the Revue des deux mondes for its stuffy bourgeois respect-
ability- -in itself indicates that he was declaring his independence. The
main reason why Mauclair approached the Nouvelle revue was simply
that he was running short of money. Unlike many of the literary youths
in his circle he was of a "plebian clan,
. . .poor and of lowly birth, so
he had to mal<:e his living with his pen and published where he could. In
his autobiography he admits that he approached the offices of the
Nouvelle revue "as full of pride as of apprehension, determined to be
very polite but not to sacrifice any of my convictions to this universal
Philistinism which I assumed began beyond the confines of the symbolist
world. " Eventually he was happily surprised to develop a genuine
affection for the publisher and to see the journal publish some of his
literary heroes like the Rosny brothers.
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At the same time Mauclair was trying to move "beyond the con-
fines of the symbolist world" as a writer and critic, he was also in the
process of detaching himself from anarchist circles \vith which he had
become involved after the execution of the anarchist Vaillant in 1892.
Mauclair had attended the execution, which disgusted and angered him
as an act of sordid vengence by the hypocritical bourgeoisie. "And in
this I feel that I simply let the spirit of the hour pass through me, that
I let myself be moved along with many young people of my generation. "9
Afterwards he persuaded himself that he was a genuine anarchist and
became a romantic revolutionary, hating "pele-mele deputies, city
sergeants, judges, military officers, all the pillars of the social order
as much as the philistines.
. .
"^^ Mauclair's enthusiasm for the cause
was short-lived, to be sure. He observed too many anarchists who
were anti- social snobs playing at revolution, glorifying petty theft as
glorious restitution, who had dirty hands rather than calloused ones
and who spouted inane and self-contradictory slogans. In later life
Mauclair decided that anarchism was "an infirmity of youth. It was
not a system of social life, but a form of youthful sensibility, "^^
especially for young writers who would be attracted by its theatricalism
and who would welcome its "etiquette fwhich^ covered all our motifs of
1
2
discontent. "
Disillusion with anarchism did not make Mauclair any less
indignant about social inj ustice. By the middle of the 1890's he was
searching for another means of expressing his political beliefs.
French socialism provided an obvious alternative, but Mauclair felt a
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"lively aversion" to "leveling socialism, the 'party of stomachs'
...which seemed to prepare a world in which dreamers, thinkers, and
artists could not breathe. "^^ Although he came to realize that not all
socialists conformed to this stereotype, he never felt at home with a
party prone to denunciations of art as a bourgeois luxury. Under
socialism he would be returning to a symbolist concept of art for art's
sake, only turned upside down- -the socialists rejected art for its
inutility while the symbolists gloried in it for the same reason. The
basic problem was the "monstrous" socialist concept of utility which
defined as useless "everything which is not immediate sensualism:
"
Marxism, by imposing utility as the foundation of all social ideas,
without taking into account the multiple meanings of the word
useful, has perpetrated a frightening error All the aesthetic
and positivistic socialists.
. . repeat, like the brave Mr. Bounderby
of Dickens and also like M. Homais--for it is a bourgeois longing:
"the useful! Facts, nothing but facts !" They are imbued despite
themselves with an outmoded education so that the terms
morality or soul already seem like sacrilege to them. 15
Mauclair refused to limit a definition of utility to the organic needs of
man. "Is there really a need to demonstrate that there is a utility of
the second degree, an abstract utility?" Marxism must broaden its
base so it appeals not just to material needs but to moral and spiritual
ones, so it recognizes art as "useful from the eternal point of view,
from the viewpoint of secondary utility, . . . "^^
In short, Camille Mauclair in the mid-1890's, in his mid-twenties,
was very much out in the cold. As an artist, he was leaving symbolism
behind but had no particular place to go. As one concerned with social
injustice, he had rejected anarchism as inept and fantastic romanticism,
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while refusing to accept what he considered socialist utilitarianism.
Yet to side with bourgeois was unthinkable, although Mauclair realized
he was no longer sure what a bourgeois was. Did it mean wearing
clean underwear?
,
he asked himself. Greeting women politely?
Wanting property? If the definition of a bourgeois is, as Flaubert had
said,
-whoever thinks meanly, " Mauclair concluded he had found many
bourgeois among socialists and anarchists. Nowhere did he see a
way to unite art and life, beauty and utility.
In this context, we may comprehend the immense appeal of the
decorative arts movement for Mauclair and others of his generation. "
It provided, in the first place, a resolution of the artistic impasse in
which Mauclair found himself after the waning of symbolism. In the
second place, it suggested a resolution of a political dilemma, how to
help the cause of the people without becoming aligned with incompatible
and disappointing radical political groups. Together these considera-
tions meant that the decorative arts movement enabled Mauclair to
make the transition to a sociological aesthetic from the art for art's
sake tradition of decadent and later of symbolist circles. The
cause of the decorative arts was at once an artistic and a political
stand, a way for Mauclair and for others like him to reconcile artistic
consciousness with social conscience.
In the Nouvelle revue article of 1896 described above, Mauclair
concentrates on the decorative arts movement as an artistic reform,
but he also mentions its concurrent character as political reform:
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It IS m the ornamentation of everyday objects like pieces ofmoney and not in the success of unique and very expensive
things that we can usefully seek the diffusion of taste, that
we can envision the disappearance of monotony and of ugli-
ness, the artistic education of the public by humble and
everyday examples, locks, utensils of constant usage which
cost no more when they are made attractive.
Decorative art serves this educational purpose by acting as an
"intermediary" between the public and high art. "It is madness
to dream of communicating speculative art to the masses, who can-
not understand it, " but decorative art may be applied to everything
from clothes to furnishings to tableware without compromising its
nature as art, for practicality, cheapness, convenience, and sim-
plicity are its virtues. Decorative art can be
companion of our daily acts, evoked.
. . in all the little things
which are the multiple aids of our life, and which cling to our
soul by the thousand attachments of habit. They are impor-
tant, they partake of our intimacy.
.
.
^9
Elsewhere Mauclair explains that artists would educate the people
by
giving examples of taste to the masses, by leading them little
by little to a more delicate and intellectual state of mind, so
that the day of the economic revolution would not install in
power a mob of brutes whom the bourgeoisie has carefully
deprived of all opportunities for improvement.
What we see here is the formulation of an aesthetic ideology, a
program of social reform through aesthetic means, a union of artistic
theory and political program. Mauclair' s declaration is relatively
tentative and incomplete. For more detailed expressions of it one
might consult, among others, Roger Marx, Gustave Geoffroy,
Charles Saunier, Marius Vachon, Alexandre Ars^ne, Gustave Kahn,
Louis Lumet, J. -F. Raffaellii, Eugene Grasset, Victor Champier,
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Frantz Jourdain, Gabriel S^ailles, Eugene Carri^re, Alexandre
Charpentier, and Jean Labor. 21 These advocates of reform in the
decorative arts disagreed with each other on some points and changed
their own views over the years, but it is still possible to sketch
common contours of their aesthetic ideology. According to their
theory of art, useful objects can be beautiful, and this assertion
usually taken one step further to the conclusion that beauty of form
arises from the function of the object. Another fundamental aesthetic
principle of the decorative arts movement was that there is an over-
riding need for a new style of design appropriate for modern times.
Useful objects should not imitate a past way of life but should be
designed to meet the needs of the present by minimizing ornamentation
and by avoiding extremes of awkward plainness or gaudy pretentiousness
in favor of a harmonious simplicity.
These aesthetic principles were extended to the social conclusion
that ordinary people should be provided with useful objects which are
also beautiful in a functional way, that they are better off possessing
such goods than ones designed by other criteria. The key word linking
these artistic and social objectives is "democratization. " The slogan
that art must be democratized had three important meanings. In the
first place, it meant getting rid of the traditional hierarchy of the arts
which ranked fine arts like painting and sculpture above the lowlier
decorative arts like pottery or weaving. In a second sense, democ-
ratization meant that the hierarchy placing artists above artisans,
the creators of the fine arts above those of the industrial arts, should
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be eliminated. This rapprochement of the two types of producers was
a practical corollary to the theoretical rapprochement of beauty and
utility. Artists connected with the decorative arts movement began to
refer to themselves as "artisans" or "workers, " while on the other
hand much attention was given to improving the aesthetic education of
craftsmen (for example, by the establishment of educational libraries
of industrial art). 22 ^ third sense, the democratization of art
meant breaking down the social hierarchy of consumers which reserved
art for the consumption of a wealthy few. The ideal was rather "art for
all" by giving aesthetic merit to even the least expensive items. These
three forms of egalitarianism were inseparable, for through the
pleasing design of ordinary consumer items artisans would come to
share the prestige of artists, and beauty would emerge from museums
and the salons of the rich to permeate daily life. The democratization
of art would revitalize both art and society at the same time. As art
became part of the fabric of modern life, the taste of the masses wo\ild
gradually improve due to the presence all around them of models of
beauty. As consumers the masses would be trained in beauty, and the
social role of the artist woxild be that of "giving examples of taste to
the masses," to borrow Mauclair's phrase. Therefore, paradoxically,
the democratization of art depended on an elitist relationship between
artist and public, producer and consumer, teacher and student.
Let us look at another partisan of the decorative arts movement
in France in order to clarify and substantiate these general remarks.
Probably Jean Lahor [^Henri Caz alis] (1840-1909) provides the clearest
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statement of its aesthetic ideology simply because he is a rather obtuse
character, not given to subtleties, one prone to frankly elitist state-
ments which a more sensitive person like Mauclair would only imply.
Mauclair and Labor both came to the decorative arts movement out of
symbolist circles (Labor was a close friend of Stephen Mallarm^ and
published several volumes of undistinguished Parnassian poetry), ^3
otherwise they are quite different men. Labor was much older and
much more prominent as a spokesman for decorative arts reform. He
introduced William Morris to France in articles published in 1894 and
not immodestly referred to himself as the "prophet" of the decorative
arts in France. ^4 The most important difference, however, is
political. Mauclair is consistently and profoundly sympathetic to the
left while Labor is a conservative exemplar of the "new right" which
emerged in F ranee around the turn of the century-
-fiercely nationalistic
•and anti-semitic, anti-Dreyfusard, irrationalist and anti- egalitarian
without being royalist or clerical, a reader of Edouard Drumont and a
supporter of Maurice Barres' Ligue de la Patrie Franjaise [League
of the French Fatherland]
. Labor somewhat confuses the situation
by referring to himself as a socialist, but in reality his politics are
much further from socialism than those of Mauclair.
"What this contrast demonstrates is the enormous flexibility of an
aesthetic ideology which could accomodate both Mauclair and Labor.
The latter is much more outspoken than the former about the need for
artists to educate the masses, but they do agree on this need. In his
book L'Art nouveau (1901), a propagandistic piece written to praise the
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decorative arts exhibits at the 1900 exposition, Lahor explains that
since the French Revolution, the common people have lost their
creativity, their "divine unconsciousness, " and "they are unable, it
seems to me. to recreate [a decorative art] by themselves.
. . it is up
to us to give it to them again.
. .
" Lahor then proclaims the slogan
"art for the people" and explains, " W. Morris said before us: Art
must be made for the people--and by the people, he added, which I
believe impossible today [italics his]. "^6 j^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^.^^^^
the point, two years later Lahor published a book titled L'Art pour le
peuple
-a dgfaut de I'ar t par le peuple [Art for the people in place of art
by the people]
.
^"^ Indeed this dictum constitutes not a revision of
Morris' thought but a scrapping of it. Morris and his mentor Ruskin
consistently focus on the social roots of art and on the worker-
craftsman as artist, while Lahor divides society into an elite which
produces art and masses which consume it, ignoring both the produc-
tive role of these masses and the dependance of a healthy art upon the
health of society in general.
Lahor is also frank in stating his reasons for urging the aesthetic
education of the people. His efforts are spurred in the first place by
an altruistic desire to "renew and illximinate" their existence which is
"still too often without brightness.
. .
"^^ But he is also motivated by
fear, believing that "we who are the believers and devotees of art" are
faced with a "very great peril" from "the rising tide of democracy, of
the masses presently without taste, without education, as unconscious
as unmindful of all ideals.
. .
"^"^ Lahor compares the task of educating
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these ignorant masses with that of baptizing the barbarians undertaken
by the medieval Church. Giving the common man beautiful objects will
effect "little by little, slowly but surely, the education of his eyes and
his mind. And that is as important to us as to him.
.
.
"30
^ven if
Labor's motives are somewhat selfish, his goal should not be scorned
if it means providing the "barbarian" with the education, leisure, and
social intercourse which will enable him to enjoy art as much as the
present "believers and devotees of art. " This would be the democratiza-
tion of art in Guyau's sense of the term, the equalization of the ability
to respond to works of art.
But as Labor continues to describe the benefits of diffusing art to
the masses, it becomes clear that he is rather describing a form of the
democratization of luxury through the widespread distribution of objects
which will give the illusion of wealth. Echoing d'Avenel, Labor recounts
.that art used to be one of the luxuries reserved for the rich, so that a
century ago "the artisan, the worker, the man of the people could only
glimpse jealously through the barred windows of a palace the treasures
of art stolen by [the rich^
.
"^^ Today, he notes with pride, the worker
has a finer art gallery and library than a rich man ever did because he
has access to public ones. Lahor suggests a general program to set up
more museums in small towns ("with photographs and plaster casts,
the least village could have its own"), to offer courses and lectures
to the masses, to establish shops selling inexpensive art objects for the
33home. Once the housing and diet of workers are similarly improved
there will no longer be cause for envy, and "will we not have reason to
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think that the social question.
. . will be nearly resolved? "34 ^his is
not education but pacification through the establishment of "a certain
equality. "35 ^ahor even repeats d'Avenel's distinction between "two
Frances"-inefficient talkers on the one hand and silent doers on the
other-when he states his preference for a "simple and ingenious-
leader quietly making practical improvements in the daily life of the
people to the eloquent "entrepreneurs or wholesalers of public
happiness. " In the same vein, Labor advocates a "socialism" which
is practical rather than visionary, which will put an end to the "social
question" without violence through apparently modest steps to diminish
material inequalities among the classes.
Mauclair shares these fears and hopes, although he expresses
them in much more muted form. The fear of the barbarian masses
which Labor declares so openly is implicit in Mauclair's warning that
artists must lead the people to a more "delicate and intellectual state
of mind" lest they find themselves ruled by a "mob of brutes" after the
social revolution. Mauclair also sees that the removal of art from
luxury status is a way to ensure its survival from a destructive envy:
There will come the day when Cartel will be so imperative for
the people and will have rendered so many services that it will
be revealed as indispensable when the collectivist leaders
gravely declare that this bourgeois "luxury" will not be
tolerated under their reign. They will look for the famous
luxury in question to ban it: they will find it indissolubly
mingled \^dth popular culture, through the book, through the
social theater, through the poster, through furnishings, and
the censors will appear singularly late. 3?
258
Thus Maucla.r and Lahor share a highly ambivalent mixture of sympathy
for the people and fear of what they might do to the arts once they attain
political power. While many different motivations rallied individuals to
the decorative arts, it might not be surprising to find that this structure
of feeling was shared by many of them. The decorative arts movement
is best understood as a "form of sensibility, " to use Mauclair's phrase
describing anarchism, rather than as either a political party or an
artistic school. As such its great advantage was its flexibility. As
already noted, this aesthetic ideology provided a sort of open space, an
intellectual frontier, where individuals otherwise as disparate as
Mauclair and Labor could meet on common ground. This sensibility
could be adapted to the politics of radicalism, to a reformist program
of general improvement, or to an authoritarian conservatism. Further-
more, its flexibility allowed its adherents to cope with several personal
dilemmas all at once: to find new roles as creative artists, to allay
fears about the future of art, to help the masses, and to avoid restrictive
political factions. The adaptability of this ideology to such a wide variety
of personal and political motivations depended on a blurring of political
issues with aesthetic ones. More traditional political issues could be
ignored in common concern for aesthetic education; solutions to political
problems seemed to resolve aesthetic problems and vice versa. Labor
well expresses this blurring of categories when he concludes his book
Li'Art nouveau with the declaration that socialism, hygiene, medicine,
and morality are all forms of aesthetics, and that when one does
anything to improve humanity "one makes a work of art. ""^^
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Perhaps any cause which claimed so much, which offered to
resolve dilemmas both personal and public, both artistic and political,
was bound to prove disappointing in its actual results. The blurring of
categories led to intellectual confusion. The democratization of art
was supposed to improve both art and society, but this congruence of
interests between artists and public was proclaimed rather than
demonstrated. The notion that an artistic leadership could educate the
public was also an assertion only, an assertion based on a vaguely
technocratic response rather than a clear educational or political
theory. The very inclusiveness and flexibility which gave this aesthetic
ideology such appeal in the 1890's became liabilities after the turn of
the century.
Ten Years After
In 1906 Camille Mauclair published an article titled "L,a Crise
des arts decoratives" [^The crisis of the decorative arts] in the Revue
bleue, a weekly journal whose complete title, "Economic, political,
and literary review, " indicates its eclectic character. As the title
of the article indicates, by 1906 Mauclair is far less optimistic about
the reform of the decorative arts' than he had been ten years before.
In the first half of the article he appraises the questionable accom-
plishments of the previous decade. At first glance, he admits, it
appears that the hopes of the 1890 's have been realized. " C Decorative
art] is feted at the salons. . . . There is a brilliant stage-set. But there
is nothing behind this stage- set, and this golden facade poorly conceals
lan
come
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the immxnent decadence of one of the most beautiful virtues of French
art." What is the cause of thxs hidden crisis? Mauclaxr reminds his
readers of the original democratic aim:
-Decorative art is neither
luxury nor even the adjunction of paintings and sculptures to ordinary
objects. Its genuine and logical goal is a modification of ordinary
forms by a quest for convenience, for adaptation to new needs. "
Bridging the gap between art and consumer goods should also bridge
the gap between workers and artists so they can join in an "egalitar
and cordial entente of parallel efforts. "40 But neither result has
about. Once the applied arts were allowed in the official salons, "A
snobbism in reverse was born: and you saw artists formerly full of
arrogance declare themselves, with comic pride, 'worker-painters
and worker-sculptors.' Genuine artisans were eclipsed by moneyed
amateurs or by fine artists who amused themselves by playing at applied
art at the same time they continued to make conventional paintings or
statues. Egalitarianism was just as lacking among the consumers of
decorative art as among the producers. The handcrafted tooled leathers,
ceramics, furniture, and crystal were "reserved for millionaires, "
and even when more ordinary objects like forks were made "the prices
... of them were not exactly democratic ! " The same sort of reverse
snobbism which led artists to call themselves "workers" meant that
wealthy buyers displayed country furniture and porcelain soup-dishes
in their apartments although "these 'returns to simplicity' cost very
dearly, and this art had nothing 'social' about it. " Such attempts to
imitate a rustic style with costly materials and handiwork were
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reminiscent, Mauclair muses, of the snobbishness of des Esseintes,
who used the finest wool to make a carpet mimicking the flagstones of
a monastic cell. Mauclair concludes that in its social aims the hopes
inspired by the decorative arts movement have proved illusory: "The
deception was great. "^2
Mauclair also criticizes in aesthetic terms the style which
emerged from this "mania 'of playing at doing industrial art. ' " It is
a composite and baroque style, influenced by English art and
Belgian art, mixed with illogical fantasy, neither practical,
nor luxurious, amalgamating the naivet^ of Brittany, Berry,
or Picardy with Preraphealite aestheticism, the floral
symbolism of the school of Nancy and the spiraled ornaments
of embellished letters from the school of William Morris, the
zigzags, the ellipses, the medievalisms, in a pretentious' and
inconvenient jumble.
Artists who had been lauded as leaders in the decorative arts, even by
Mauclair himself in 1896, are now seen by him in much more skeptical
terms. When Alexandre Charpentier turned his hand to fashioning
ordinary objects like spoons and the heads of canes, "to tell the truth,
he juxtaposed some charming sculptures with these objects rather than
modifying the forms, " and the results were expensive. As for Galle,
founder of the school of Nancy to which Mauclair refers and which will
be discussed shortly, he "was a man of very intelligent intentions, and
a great glassmaker. As a 'cabinet-maker, ' he did more harm than
can be imagined. " Worse yet, the creations of the masters quickly
fell into
the last degree of ridicule by the clumsy imitations which
bourgeois commerce made of them. Everywhere today you
find traces of these pretentious pursuits, . . . objects of false
silver, with false cats -eyes, what-nots in papier-mach^
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aping the models of Gall^,
. . .blotters of embossed leather
which are only paper-leather. 41
Even fashionable furniture manufacturers who had been an "inexhaustible
source" of imitations of eighteenth-century styles began to add timid
touches of Art Nouveau, while the smallest retailer would sell "modern-
style" hatpins for twenty cents. "This trash has not spared snobbism
the ironic injury of its admiration, and all this is summarized in a
pretty pun.
. . : 'Liberty! what crimes are committed in thy name ! ' "^^
Mauclair's appraisal of the previous decade in the decorative arts
provides a lively if depressing description of how the attempt to fashion
an alternative to the dream world of consumption was transmuted into
the very thing it was intended to repudiate. In aesthetic results the
ideal of a sober, rational style somehow became twisted into "a com-
posite and baroque style.
.
.mixed with illogical fantasy. " In social
results, the democratization of art ended up either as expensive art for
the elite, or as democratized luxury for the masses. Let us examine
somewhat more thoroughly these twin sources of disappointment, the
artistic and the social, in order to expand on Mauclair's description
and to justify his conclusion that the decorative arts movement was a
failure in both senses.
Taking first the aesthetic results, any generalization about the
style which has come to be known as Art Nouveau is suspect since, as
Mauclair himself points out, the style is remarkably heterogeneous,
"composite. " But is not this very chaos one of the characteristics of
the exotic and fantastic decorative styles described in the previous part?
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There were certainly examples of economical, spare design from the
masters of Art Nouveau, but the French were well known for preferring
elaborate floral motifs and an exaggerated curvilinear style. Both at
the international exposition of 1900 and even more so at the exposition
of design held in Turin in 1902, French designs were widely criticized
for their overwrought ornateness in contrast to the sobriety of German.
Belgian, and Scottish creations.
Probably the major influence pushing French decorative art in the
direction of fantasy and elaboration was that of Emile Galle (1846-1904).
If any one figure in France may be compared with William Morris in
England, it is Galle: a number of his contemporaries draw that
46parallel. Like Morris, Galle made his example felt both as an artist
expressing himself in concrete models of design and training other
artists in his workshop, and as a theorist of the decorative arts in his
speeches, lectures, journal review articles, and exhibit notices. "^"^ In
the latter capacity particularly, he has not received anything like the
attention he deserves. His version of the aesthetic ideology of the
decorative arts was so influential that it should be described here
briefly. A good introduction to Galle 's ideas may be found in the
foreward to the statutes of the School of Nancy (published in 1901, the
statutes formalized the existence of a group of Lorraine artists sharing
common aspirations and tendencies which had long since gathered
around Galle):
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C the goal of the school] is to conserve in modern Frenchobjects, as much for objects of simple utility as for thoseof luxury, the sense of logic in construction, in the rationaluse of materials, the practical
.nstinct of convenl^Tncfand
Besides retaining a distinction between ordinary objects and luxury ones,
a distinction which any genuine democratization of art would eliminate,
the philosophy of the school as stated here distinguishes utilitarian con-
siderations of logic, convenience, and comfort from aesthetic ones of
elegance, beauty, and intellectuality. These aesthetic qualities are
superadded to the first: if beauty and utility are compatible, they are
certainly distinct. In practice too, to paraphrase Mauclair's assess-
ment of Charpentier, Gall^ juxtaposed decoration on a useful object
rather than modifying its form. 49 in fact Galle treats the object as a
pretext, as a carrier for the symbolic expression of emotions which is
what really matters to him. Galle inscribed useful objects with verses
from his favorite poets (especially Baudelaire, de Montesquieu,
Verlaine, Verhaeren, and Maeterlinck) and embellished them with
natural motifs, all of this decoration being intended, in the words of
one of his admirers, to "be evocative of thoughts beyond the
50
appearances they assume. "
The visual results are elaborate and ingenious rather than
harmoniously simple. Mauclair describes them in a 1909 article:
Landscapes in inlaid wood on buffets, quotations from Baudelaire
engraved on flowerpots, armchairs with spirals studded with dots,
friezes thrown into relief by tendrils, by noodles and by all types
of animal and vegetable filaments, symbolic screens, everything
contributed to this carnival. 51
265
As for practicality, Gall^ preferred to work with glass because it is
such a malleable and versatile material, but its fragility is evident.
His furniture was notorious for its discomfort and difficulty in being
moved. 52 But such notions of utility responding to the physical require-
ments of daily life are simply not emphasized by Gall^ and the School of
Nancy, although they do pay lip service to them. What counts instead
is the spiritual utility of these objects. In Gall^'s own words, art has
"a function of human culture, of awakening minds and souls by the
translation of beauties in the world. " In particular, he says, artists
have a duty to create objects which will bring beauty to city-dwellers
exiled from nature, so that artists serve as "educators, apostles of
color, of line, of beauty, missionaries to the interior.
.
.
"^3
We are back to the apprehensive assumption that the masses are
savages who need educating by a cultured elite. For all Galle's sym-
bolist aesthetics, he is not a partisan of art for art's sake. He is
proposing here a sociological aesthetic whereby useful objects serve
the needs of the people, albeit spiritual needs rather than bodily ones.
Is not the "function of human culture" a legitimate one considering that
man does not live by bread alone? Of course, many practical questions
are left unanswered- -most obviously, just how the objects are going to
awaken benighted minds and souls, and whether this can be done at all
if physical needs have not been satisfied first or if the objects involved
are expensive. There are unanswered aesthetic issues, too. It is
questionable whether an object like an armchair is the object best
suited to translate the beauties of nature to the urban savages dwelling
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in the heart of darkness. If we are wilHng to accept different definitions
of utility, is it necessary that every object serve them all at once? It
seems more sensible for a flower vase to minister to a spiritual need
for beauty through symbolic ornamentation and for an armchair to
serve the organic need of supporting the body comfortably. One nega-
tive result of Gang's influence on the French decorative arts is that his
ornate style originally devised for glass-making was extended beyond
its appropriate limits to places where it did not belong. Perhaps this
is why Mauclair concludes that Gallg was a great glass-maker but "did
more harm than can be imagined" as a furniture-designer.
There is a second aesthetic problem inherent in Galle's style
which also brings up the need for limits: even when objects are suited
for imaginative decoration, at what point do playfulness and ingenuity
overflow into absurd fantasy? This is the danger Souriau sees when
he warns that "at the farthest limit of plastic imagination" there is the
danger of losing contact with reality altogether, that "the game runs the
risk of being spoiled. "^^ Gall^ himself possessed a kind of internal
brake on his imagination because he was trained in botany and prided
himself on his scientific exactitude. Furthermore, his national and
especially his regional pride caused him to favor realistic designs of
flowers from his native Lorraine. But even his relative restraint and
realism gave way at times, as when he used exotic and even macabre
motifs like borders of stag-beetle mingled with poppies, or recreations
of fossil flowers. In addition, Galle'was at times carried away by his
own technical virtuosity. He was famous for experimenting with new
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techniques in color, pattern, and texture of glass. This ingenuity
allowed him to create works which are technically clever if not exactly
beautiful, such as a vase where dragonflies seem to be sinking into the
glass.
Art Nouveau designers in other media show a similar propensity
to let their imagination wing from the fantastic to the grotesque, from
reality to dream or to nightmare. Alphonse Mucha fashioned light
fittings using motifs from flowers said to be poisonous, arranging the
petals to conceal the electric light bulbs. Rene Lalique carved flowers
from horn and placed them under beetles made from gold whose wing
cases were fashioned from enamel or set with precious stones. Along
with other designers he created a new mythological creature, half-
woman, half-dragonfly, which provided a variation on the favorite Art
Nouveau theme of a dream-like, heavy-lidded maiden wrapped in
billows of draperies and hair- -half streetwalker and half goddess, one
55might say. Everywhere in this style floated strange sea creatures,
above all seahorses, for designers seemed fascinated by the mysteries
of underwater life and even created whole rooms to reproduce the sense
of being submerged. They would have felt quite at home in des
Esseintes' dining room where mechanical fish may be glimpsed through
the "portholes. " The fate of the decorative arts movement in France
sometimes reminds one of des Esseintes' attempt to flee Fontenay for
a healthy, invigorating excursion to England, only to end up back with
his bejewelled tortoise, carpeted flagstones, and hothouse plants. '
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So much for the return to fantasy in visual themes of the decora-
tive arts movement; what about its social themes, which Mauclair also
outlines in "La Crise des arts d^coratifs" ? He describes Art Nouveau
as an example of the democratization of luxury, not the democratization
of art. Mauclair further refines our understanding of the social fantasy
of democratized luxury by showing that it operates simultaneously on
two levels. On the top level an elite collects unique items like hand-
signed Galle works (which were regarded as museum pieces at the time)
in order to demonstrate its distance from the mass market. These
snobs play at the illusion of democratic simplicity as long as it is an
obviously expensive simplicity; Mauclair 's special disdain for this
tendency derives no doubt from his memories of well-bred youths who
played at anarchism in a similar way. On the lower level are the
masses who buy cheap parodies of costly Art Nouveau designs. There
is a special irony in the prevalence of such imitation since one of the
dogmas of the decorative arts ideology is the need to free design from
imitation of past models. These parodies, though of contemporary
designs, have the same intention of giving a pleasing illusion of wealth.
{Che alternate name for Art Nouveau was "Yachting Style, " because
objects designed in this manner were supposed to convey the impres-
sion of being on a luxury yacht. ) As Mauclair describes the situation,
the two levels, the high and the low, are locked together as if in an
unhappy marriage, dependent on the other partner but making life
miserable for each other because the existence of each vitiates the
enjoyment of the other. The lower group finds its pretentions to
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luxury mocked by the knowledge that the rich can afford the genuine
rather than the fake, as well as by the fact that soon everyone owns the
same parodies of which the luxury status then dissipates. As for the
elite, like des Esseintes it cannot enjoy its consumption of unique and
rare items in peace. It is forced to gaze forever at a distorting
mirror of its own pretentions - -in Mauclair's words, forced to endure
the ironic injury of the admiration of the masses. ^'^ At both levels the
decorative arts movement is a commercial hustle, of which the
imperatives rule the consumption of rich and poor alike.
To refer once again to terms used in the last chapter, we may
say that Art Nouveau objects do serve a social function, that in fact
their social function dominates over their utility in either a material or
a spiritual sense. The trouble is that their social value is totally tied
to their market value. These objects serve only to indicate the wealth
of the owner or to convey the illusion of wealth. All other possible
criteria for social standing- -talent, power, spirituality, service to the
community, intellect, courage- -are erased as the social hierarchy is
reduced to the common denominator of money. Because wealth is
expressed in a person's ability to consume, objects of consumption no
longer relate to a social hierarchy externally defined but become
themselves the hierarchy. And when objects no longer serve as
symbols of an invisible but real social order but become themselves
the concrete determinants of that order, we could say that we confront
a social (as opposed to individual) form of reification.
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The very fact that in 1906 Mauclair was already looking back
a movement which was just taking shape ten years before is itself
indication of the influence of the market on the decorative arts. What
he had hoped would be a general and permanent reform turned out to be
a transient fad. In this respect the term "art nouveau" is especially
revealing. Not only is it the first time in art history that a decorative
style is named after a commercial enterprise (Bing's store in the Rue
de Provence)^0 but also it tells us that (in the words of the modern
critic Mario Amaro) "To be different, unique, unpredictable, and above
all NEW was its main theme. "^^ An important component of the
aesthetic ideology of the decorative arts movement is the conviction
that designers must break with the past and create new forms to fit new
needs. But how long can a design be new? Probably not for much more
than a decade, and if the development of good design requires time then
the slogan "art nouveau" is inherently self-contradictory and self-
defeating. Furthermore, are needs going to keep changing at a rapid
pace--and should design keep changing even if needs remain relatively
6 2stable? With an insistence on novelty, art is reduced to a succession
of novelties, a series of "arts nouveaux, " and in this transience it only
resembles the commercial world which promotes one product until the
market is saturated, then dropping that to promote another. The
"search for continual novelty, " which Amaro defines as characteristic
of the series of modern "anti-styles" inaugurated by Art Nouveau, is
also a fundamental characteristic of the marketplace. It is ironic
that Mauclair 's original optimism was inspired by a reform of coinage.
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A decade later he is aware that money, not as objet d'art but as sign of
wealth, has in large measure directed the course of the decorative arts
movement.
Mauclair's Critique of the Aesthetic Ideolo gy
The conclusion that decorative arts reform was both an aesthetic
and a social failure led Mauclair toie-examine the assumptions which
had motivated it in the first place. This revaluation was made in two
Revue bleue articles, the last half of "La Crise des arts d^coratives, "
and one published several months earlier titled "Le Besoin d'art du
peuple" CThe people's need for art]
. Together these two comple-
mentary articles form Mauclair's most thoughtful attempt to analyze
the reasons for the false start of the 1890 's. The change in tone from
Mauclair's self-assured optimism of 1896 is evident from the opening
paragraphs of "Le Besoin d'art du peuple, " for he begins not by making
statements but by asking questions. In particular, he questions the
axiomof decorative arts reformers that people need and have a right to
beauty:
. . . what would be a right of which C"the common people! would
not feel the need? .... What is the common people? What sort
of beauty is accessible to it? Must it find [beauty! for itself
or receive it from the hands of another caste? This is what I
would like to know before discerning its need and fixing its
right. 65
The interrogatory form constitutes a basic point of the article, that
people must be asked what kind of beauty they want and need rather
than being told. Mauclair vigorously attacks "pseudoeducators" who
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falsely assume that the masses have a need and a right to art which
they, as artistic superiors, will give them. Acting on this assumption,
they pursue two erroneous courses, the first of which is to embark on
programs to disseminate artistic masterpieces to the masses. In what
is undoubtedly a jibe at Jean Labor, Mauclair writes:
They picture people as starved for masterpieces, waitingimpatiently for the opening of museums and libraries whSsebars were unjustly closed to them. It isn't true: they aren'thungry, and our preachers of social art are trying to breakdown open doors. Look at the public in the Louvre on Sunday
and you will be edified. Why should we lie in the face of the
evidence ?
The second course undertaken by these "preachers of social art" is to
create an art expressly for the masses by beautifying objects of utility.
When this alternative is tried
we fall into the strangest errors
--and we offer them a sort of
complicated (or falsely simple) jumble which calls itself indus-
trial art or Art Nouveau.
. . this hygienic and economical art
whose nudity mingled with childish symbols may amuse its
authors, who play at simplicity as with tin soldiers, but of
which the people can understand nothing. ^"7
The elite may enjoy pretentions of simplicity but the masses prefer
pretentions of wealth, loving "bad taste, false gilt, weepy engravings,
leaflets, melodramas, everything that can excite their imaginative
vanity and imitate rich interiors as they suppose them, just as a wine
decanted into a vintage bottle gives them the illusion of a grand cru. "
If forced to live in easily washable domiciles stocked with tidy
furnishings, people would soon fill them with "wretched color prints
[7 and^ Oriental porcelain vases bought at the fair, ..." But again,
there is no use lying in the face of the evidence, and facts must be
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faced: "We attribute to the people the psychology which we wish for it.
and not that which it has. "^^
Mauclair does not suggest that intellectuals and artists give up
and accept this love of bad taste and false gilt on the part of the masses.
Their task is rather to change the moral and social psychology of the
people which is at the root of its aesthetic preferences. A need for art
will develop only when preliminary non-aesthetic needs are taken care
of: "For example, hygiene, neatness, the desire for order around
oneself, and self-respect. " The character of the individual must first
be transformed so that he likes baths and a clean home, and dislikes
alcohol and swearing, for only then is "a ground for art" prepared.
".
. .
the work of art begins with himself.
.
.
" The proper task for
intellectuals is to try to stimulate a need for art rather than to assume
the need already exists. "In a word, it involves forming the character
of the masses to prepare them for art, and not at all to anticipate that
by putting them in direct contact with art will their character be
formed. "^^
Mauclair is repeating what John Ruskin, fountainhead of the
decorative arts movement in England, had said at least a half century
earlier, that art is the product of social character. His remarks also
remind us of Guyau's insistence that art communicates through sharing
experiences, not through sharing objects. Even if Mauclair 's remarks
are not particularly novel, they are still important. One of the tragedies
of the decorative arts movement in both England and France is how
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quickly and easily the insights of its founders were trivialized or
ignored. In some circumstances to remind can be as significant an
intellectual contribution as to create.
But Mauclair does not stop here. This preliminary moral educa-
tion is only the first step; its purpose is not to prepare the masses to
appreciate the art of the elite, but to prepare them for learning to
appreciate art by creating their own. Aesthetic taste can never be
instilled in the common man qua consumer, argues Mauclair. Only as
a producer, only as creator of objects rather than as consumer of them,
will he learn to express his aesthetic wants and needs. The people are
"made to create art, " and "we artists" must renounce trying "to give
them a taste for what we invent in thinking that we are giving them
pleasure—perhaps they will enjoy only an art that they would once more
begin to invent for themselves.
. .
" ''^ By working actively with materials
and by that method alone people will learn to appreciate the qualities of
line, of materials, of adaptation, of harmony, which are the essentials
of aesthetic understanding. Mauclair is still convinced that the decora-
tive arts are an "intermediary" between the common man and the fine
arts, but now he sees the aesthetic education offered by useful objects
as something the worker gains by making them himself rather than
through contemplating them passively. The educational relationship
between object and human being has been reversed. No longer does the
created object somehow teach the person, but the person through
creating objects teaches himself.
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This is a radical departure from the aesthetic ideology of the
1890's which posited a division of labor between artist-producers and
people-consumers. Having seen the ridiculous errors of the artist-
producers in their attempts to remake the decorative arts, Mauclair
is much more inclined to trust the people, who now seem less like
barbarians than like potential artists. Yet it is not the evidence of the
present, the homes crammed with cheap color prints and false gilt,
that gives Mauclair such faith in the aesthetic capabilities of the
ordinary man. He looks instead to the evidence of the past. In previous
centuries the people demonstrated their unquenchable need to produce
art, and indeed all the achievements of the fine arts have built upon the
creative energies of the nameless masses. What must be done is to take
steps which will once again allow the people to produce useful objects
as they once did at home or in small shops. Above all this change would
mean a reversal of the trends towards reduction of handwork and
increasing division of labor. Mauclair is well aware how sweeping a
revision of economic life would be necessary to make everyman his own
artisan. Still, it must be done: "Everything being done right now for
the artistic education of the people is only bragging, boosterism, or
blundering. There would be a solid result only through the reform of
the industries of art. ""^^ Because socialists are enamoured with pre-
sent industrial methods and suspicious of art as a bourgeois luxury,
they offer little hope for bringing about the changes Mauclair desires.
Instead he invests his hopes in a restoration of the pre-revolutionary
corporations which provided the institutional framework for the
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development of the memorable decorative styles of the past. The dis-
appearance of the corporations at the time of the French Revolution,
and not the simultaneous advent of political democracy, was responsible
for the subsequent decay of French industrial art. Since 1789 France
has continued to produce numerous talented craftsmen, but theycompose
"a disbanded army, which goes nowhere or employs itself where it can. '
The secret of the revival of the industrial arts "lies in this tomb" of the
corporative spirit, which must be revived in one form or another. "^^
Mauclair expands on this plan to restore the corporations in
the latter half of his article "La Crise des arts d^coratifs, " published
some months later. He is more convinced than ever that this re -estab-
lishment is the only way to revive the French decorative arts, but he
also sees the obstacles more sharply. The businessmen who currently
dominate industrial art organizations like the Central Union of the
Decorative Arts "voluntarily confuse" the interests of artisans and of
the applied arts with their own business interests. An "honorable and
comfortable tradesman" is not going to make money by providing the
masses with glasses, curtains, and furniture which are delicately
designed but not more expensive than the ugly objects presently on the
market. Such an initiative would, require a large investment in the
creation of new models, an expensive and risky proposition whereas
"the imitation of old styles means certain sale and easy execution. "
After all, "the immense majority of customers" want such imitations
because they want only luxury, or the impression of luxury. The
businessmen therefore claim that they simply give the public what it
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wants. They do make a pretense of encouraging new designs by intro-
ducing some modern models each season, but these are illogical, hasty,
ludicrous deformations of the projects originally fashioned by crafts-
men, who are moreover badly paid for their efforts. The businessmen
simply are not serious about new models and the results are predict-
able: the public continues to prefer pseudo- antiques, the owners
declare the public will buy only imitations, and everyone concludes that
there is no more style in France. A few connoisseurs manage to find
examples of good workmanship in the back alleys, "but what is their
restrained action compared to the imposing capitalism of the big
merchants? " The intelligent artisan is discouraged from proposing
new designs and is forced to make imitations to earn a living, so that
he is "fatally led to unintelligence. "^-^
What can be done to get around this resistance? Mauclair notes
experiments being undertaken to gather artisans in societies or unions
which would exhibit directly to the public "independently of industry
which edits [^their designs"] and of commerce which distributes them. "''''*
These occupational groups would receive state assistance through the
creation of national workshops where new designs would become state
property. Such schemes are suspect to Mauclair. because he fears
both the veto of business interests and the consequences of government
intervention. He continues to advocate a corporative system, whether
it be called a union, a federation, or a society. But he is no more
precise than he has been about this program, nor does he suggest how
it would overcome business opposition.
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Taken together these two articles point out two obstructive elites,
an artistic one and a commercial one, both of which claim to be nurse-
maids to the revival of the decorative arts but which in truth strangle
the babe in its cradle. Each group, in its own way, dictates to public
taste rather than permitting popular self-expression. Artists impose
a concept of design which is either that of mechanistic utility, a spare,
bare type of design which eliminates anything unrelated to physical
needs, or that of a spiritual functionalism, a "childish symbolism-
intended to elevate the minds and spirits of the barbarian masses but
which will necessarily fail in that aim until those minds and spirits are
elevated first. As for businessmen, they too have a concept of func-
tionalism which they impose on people
--that of profit. The form of
most useful objects is determined by their profit-making function, and
so the market (and not aesthetic taste, as Griveau would have it) is the
natural selector which directs the evolution of those objects. Mauclair
appears to conclude that the functioning of the market is in the long run
the most potent adversary of the decorative arts, for it is entrenched
in powerful institutions.
Mauclair is much less cogent in his proposal to revive a corpora-
tive spirit. At times he seems to want each person to make useful
objects for himself, but it is difficult to take seriously this program
for home workshops. One would have to go back to extremely primitive
times, almost to pre-history, to restore a society where everyone
makes all his own furnishings, pottery, clothing, houses, and other
such items. Mauclair may regret that the division of labor has
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proceeded as far as it has, but its entire elimination seems only a day-
dream. At other times, he seems to define corporations as groups of
honest craftsmen who work independently of the industrial system,
somehow reaching the customer without going through the intermediary
of the profit-oriented market. But is not this vision a return to the
idea of a producing elite
--genuine craftsmen, perhaps, rather than fine
artists, but still a creative elite-
-designing objects for a consuming
public? This is the very dichotomy of producer-consumer which
Mauclair condemns as inherently futile in elevating public taste because
only the activity of creating objects, not the objects themselves, will
teach anything. Yet returning to a situation where each person makes
his own useful objects is even more primitivist a program than
restoration of corporations of craftsmen. In both cases Mauclair,
usually so open to the future, succumbs to nostalgia for the past. He
feels the only hope for the aesthetic education of the masses is in their
role as producers, but modern techniques of production depending on
the division of labor and machinery render that hope futile. What
Mauclair seems to forget is that people may be producers in leisure as
well as at work, and in this sense the democratization of luxury,
specifically the liaxury of free time, may in fact encourage the
democratization of art, if not the marriage of beauty and utility.
Mauclair 's real dilemma is that he wants both. The aesthetic
ideal described in the previous chapter, according to which beauty and
utility would be merged in a functional form, conflicts with the demo-
cratic social ideal described in this chapter. Perhaps if people made
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their own useful objects they would learn to prefer simplicity and
solidity in design; but until that distant day arrives, their main role is
to buy rather than to make these useful objects, and as buyers they
resist the aesthetic ideal of functionalism. In good democratic fashion
they are free to vote with their dollars for the designs they want, and
the trouble is that they do not vote for the right candidates. They do not
choose a lean, efficient form that is reminiscent of the workplace, but
instead favor elaborate, luxurious forms that represent an escape from
it. Mauclair wants democratic choice and he also wants what he con-
siders good design. He is fighting a battle on two fronts: the reform
of the decorative arts involves not only the encouragement of good
models, but also winning public support for those models. If well-
designed objects never find their way into the average home, what has
been gained by having them produced again? The larger problem is to
create a market for those products. In"LaCrise des arts decoratifs"
Mauclair suggests that the market is there, that consumers presently
prefer ugly imitations because capitalism does not offer them a genuine
choice. He concludes that if capitalism could somehow be circumvented,
if incorporated artists could offer their designs directly to the public,
consumers would change their preferences. But he really doesn't offer
any evidence to support that hope. In "Le Besoin d'un art du peuple"
he has in fact argued that the taste of the people could be elevated only
when they all became producers, a distant day indeed. And in both
articles, he observes that consumers prefer luxurious objects to
beautiful ones, so in a sense he agrees that businessmen are right when
they claim they give the public what it wants.
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The concept of the democratization of art, so central to the
aesthetic ideology of the 1890's, is after all a social rather than a
visual concept. As a social theory it had two possible interpretations
which were not clearly distinguished. The democratization of art could
mean the egalitarian proliferation of art among the masses, the dis-
semination of art among the popular classes rather than its restriction
to an elite. It could also mean that the masses, either as producers or
as consumers, would be liberated to rule themselves in aesthetic
matters, in a sort of artistic self-determination. By distinguishing
these two meanings of the democratization of art. we can now appreciate
the apparent paradox that decorative arts reformers who used this
slogan still implied an elitist relationship between artist-producers and
people-consumers. Such reformers seek the broad distribution of art
among the people, the democratization of art in the first sense, but not
in the second sense of self-rule. Mauclair criticizes the benevolent
dictatorship of such reformers both for its authoritarianism and for its
lack of practical success. He finds the silent dictatorship of capital
even worse. Mauclair proposes instead that art be democratized in the
sense of letting people choose their own destinies, aesthetically speaking.
But will adherence to this second concept of democratization bring about
the first, or will it only bring about the democratization of luxury?
Mauclair really has little faith that people in their role as consumers.
"Liberty! What crimes are committed in thy name!" Democratic
distribution of beauty seems to presuppose rule by an artistic elite
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which imposes its enlightenment on the people to raise the general level
of their art. Democratic self-rule by the masses seems to imply a
leveling downwards, unless some way can be found to alter what the
consumer wants.
Would that be possible? To answer this question the motivations
behind the present wants of the consumer must be ascertained. Mauclair
had begun to do this in another article published in 1902. "^^ In it he
again considers the decline in the decorative arts which commenced at
the time of the French Revolution. He notes that at the same time the
institutions of production were altered because of the disappearance of
the corporations, the nature of the consuming public was changing also.
In pre -revolutionary times the industrial arts were patronized by the
aristocracy, while the bourgeoisie left the consumption of luxuries to
the nobility and restricted itself to utilitarian standards. But with the
revolution a new bourgeoisie increasingly came to command the market
for industrial arts, and the aristocracy declined in importance as con-
sumers. This new bourgeoisie had enough aesthetic pretentions to
desire luxury, but it also wanted to reconcile these tastes with economy,
"and it is thus that it invented all sorts of odious parodies of elegance,
. . .
and the producers, obliged to sell to live, resigned themselves to
making cheap luxury.
. .
"^^ What Mauclair sees around him in the early
twentieth century is only the extension of this process to the popular
classes. According to his own analysis, then, the decadence of the
decorative arts is due at least in part to the motivations of consumers
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which would obtain whether the institutions of production were capitalist
or corporatist.
Therefore the task is to reform not just the decorative arts but
the consciousness of the consumer. Furthermore, this task is not a
matter of reforming aesthetic consciousness narrowly defined,
for what needs to be changed above all is a social consciousness which
makes people want to appear and feel wealthier than they are, or to
flaunt the wealth they do have. Certainly such attitudes are closely
related to a class structure associated with capitalism in that the
bourgeoisie wants to live like the aristocracy and the people want to
live like the bourgeoisie. But the roots of envy go far deeper than a
particular economic structure. They are sunk deeply in the human
psyche and did not take hold only with the. advent of capitalism, how-
ever much that economic system may encourage their growth. Mauclair
is on the right track when in "Le Besoin de I'art du peuple" he describes
the need for a preliminary moral transformation as a prerequisite for
the development of aesthetic taste. Perhaps he identifies this trans-
formation of consumer consciousness too closely with cleanliness and
neatness, but his general idea remains valid that the necessary trans-
formation lies in the realm of general social morality. The problem
of the decorative arts is not an artistic one, really, and trying to
resolve it by art alone means going around in circles and running into
dead ends.
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Or perhaps there is a way out if the artist alters Ms conscious-
ness.
.
.Mauclair considers this alternative in two articles published in
the Revue bleue between the publication of the two just discussed. They
are titled "Le Style de la rue moderne" [The style of the modern street],
which appeared in December 1905, and "Le nouveau Paris du peuple"
[The new Paris of the people ] , published the following month. ^
These articles do not deal with the aesthetics of particular objects of
consumption, but rather with the environment of mass consumption seen
on a large scale in the undistinguished, unadorned, utilitarian milieu of
modern urban life. Mauclair is beginning to see beauty in this environ-
ment although it hardly conforms to traditonal aesthetic concepts.
Rather than saying beauty should be democratized, in whatever sense,
he says it i£ being democratized if the artist actively tries to alter his
consciousness. "We grieve in saying that our age lacks style, but at
this very moment we are in the process of composing one for it.
. . For
we must not look on but participate, and our duty is to try to
78
understcoid. "
The subject of both articles is the aesthetic style of the new
suburbs springing up to the south and west of Paris. These are working
class quarters, Mauclair cautions, where you might have been taken as
a child and never wanted to return, quarters which the bourgeoisie
think of as obscure and tragic places where women are hacked in pieces
and revolvers fired in broad daylight. While these suburbs may not
seem beautiful in the traditional sense of the word, our understanding
of the word "beautiful" shoiald be altered so that consciousness keeps
pace v/ith our visual impressions:
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The mind makes prejudices survive which sight no longerapproves.
... We still condemn things of which the vision
the late .Tt' T ''"^ ^"""'^^"^ ^ ^-°^-g factory inafternoon of an autumn day, we protest, nonethe-less, against applying the epithet "beautiful" to this factorv
andT/-^ ' verbalism of old classifications possesses us^'
ufto tL f charactei^is not yet equivalent fors to he Idea of greater beauty
. Thus we may judge poorly
Pari°s!80'^'''^''°'''
appearance of suburban
The difficulty is having to rely upon the same term to describe our
reaction to a crooked medieval house and to a new suburban one,
although the purposes of the two structures are entirely different. If
we see the two side by side, we are struck by a general impression of
their incompability, of disharmony and antithesis which makes us
suffer. We express this suffering by saying the one is beautiful and the
other is ugly. As a result "we always have a tendency to consider our-
selves intruders in the life which we have made. "^^ In the new suburbs
there is no such painful contrast. The modern structures replace
nothing interesting (unlike the so-called improvements on Montmartre
which Mauclair deplores) and so we are able to look at them in and of
themselves and to perceive their own distinct beauty. This is first of
all the beauty of utility in the straightforward sense of cleanliness and
comfort. This is an aesthetic of hygiene, of open space, of trees, air
and light, far preferable as a place to live than narrow passages heaped
with trash. If "all misery is ugliness, " as Souriau had said, then this
is the beauty of human beings who have been rescued from miserable
living quarters. "They have not substituted something utilitarian and
ugly for something inconvenient and pretty, but simply something clean
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for something filthy. "82
^^^^ ^^^^^ necessarily ugly.
The picturesque is only one form of beauty, that of detail, and the
beauty of the suburbs is to be found not in particular objects or orna-
ments, not even in particular buildings, but in the overall impression
of harmony, in the general silhouette and mutual relations of volumes.
The geometrical alignment of the houses and streets, so often dis-
missed as sterile monotony, has a horizontal rigidity which corresponds
to the vertical geometry of the tall buildings. The rectilinear design
originates in modern needs--the need for long, regular streets to carry
increased traffic, the need for taller structures to accommodate more
people in less space--and this utility becomes a "linear harmony" quite
unlike the accidental and capricious harmony of old cities. ^3 There is
a certain grandeur to these vistas, especially in the spectacle of
energy to be seen in the factory-filled plain of Saint-Denis "with its
thousands of smokestacks, its smelting fires, its innumerable beacons,
its interlaced highways where from all sides spreads the beautiful
mother-of-pearl smoke which the twilight embraces. " When night falls,
the beauty of the suburbs is at its peak as electrical lighting creates a
magical spectacle, making lighted houses and factories look like great
motionless ships afloat on a black ocean. ^4
In "L,e Style de la rue moderne" and "L.e nouveau Paris du peuple"
Mauclair seems to be drawing near the apprehension of a new kind of
social art, one which genuinely combines beauty and utility, one which
responds to the ordinary needs of ordinary people without condescension,
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one which is honest without being imposed, simple without being severe.
Yet this seductive vision also resembles the aesthetic of neo-barbarism
which Mauclair himself had defined so vividly elsewhere. Is he per-
ceiving a genuine modern beauty, or is he giving himself over to an
aesthetic which overwhelms the spectator and saturates the senses
with an impression of power? Mauclair hints at the latter possibility
when he comments that the new type of beauty may be appreciated
most fully not in Paris but in New York because
It is by the relationships of volumes that the series of houses ofNew York have taken this aspect of grandiose Assyrian barbarism
which, especially at night, with the magic of the lights, invites
the visitor to an unforgettable spectacle from the Brooklyn
Bridge. °-'
How can he reconcile this hymn to a grandiose American primitivism
with his lament expressed in another article written a few months
later that Paris is "becoming Americanized?"^^ Is the transforma-
tion of artistic consciousness truly a liberation, or is it instead a
submission to the dream world of consumption? These questions can-
not be answered because Mauclair 's ambivalence about this modern
type of beauty and about the way of life which produces it is too pain-
ful and profound.
The End of a Generation
Taken together, these four articles written from the fall of 1905
to the spring of 1906 constitute Mauclair' s most extended analysis of the
decorative arts movement. He acknowledges the failure of the original
conception, and while his criticisms of it and his suggestions for its
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revision are thoughtful and pertinent, they lack the vigorous simplicity
of the aesthetic ideology of the 1890 's. One is much more likely to be
inspired to take action, to launch experiments, on the basis of the
ideology than on the basis of a more mature recognition that reforming
the decorative arts is an extremely complicated and subtle task. By
1906 Mauclair was no longer sure how to proceed or how to exercise
leadership.
In addition, he was more isolated than ever. The passing of a
decade had not made him any more comfortable with socialists and
anarchists, and in addition he was alienated from other artists and
intellectuals to an unprecedented degree. A decade earlier the artistic
community had formed a sort of extended family for him which in large
measure compensated for his political isolation and gave him confidence
that artists and intellectuals as a group could provide the leadership in
public education which socialists and other left-wing groups were
neglecting. Mauclair 's increasing disillusion with the snobbish elitism
of this group has already been noted. Furthermore, by 1905-1906 many
intellectuals had lost interest in the public issues which had so attracted
the generation of the 1890's. The revival of classicism became a
O -J
dominant literary movement, and nationalism and traditionalism
were the cultural watchwords of the day. In this intellectual climate,
Mauclair was accused of being intoxicated by the idea of "social art" at
a time when the prevailing mood was to return to the creed that no real
artist would possess a political opinion.
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Mauclair was convinced that he was observing a watershed in
French intellectual life, nothing less than the death of the ideals of the
generation of the 1890's, his generation, and their replacement by
totally alien ones. He was further convinced that the crisis of the
decorative arts had to be understood in terms of a general collapse of
concern for social issues which had inspired his contemporaries to so
many exciting and fruitful experiments in art and life. He expressed
his response to this cultural transmutation in a 1905 article in the
Revue des Revues, "La Reaction nationaliste en art et 1 'ignorance de
I'homme de lettres" [The nationalist reaction in art and the ignorance
of the man of letters 3, which is remarkable for combining an
intensely personal testimony with an acute description of a general
cultural transformation. Maucalir's tone is elegaic as he recalls the
1890's with deep nostalgia and pays tributes to its memory:
I made my literary debut in 1890. I was eighteen years old. I
realize today by comparison that I became involved with "intel-
lectuals" (the word is as good as any) at a very interesting
moment in modern history, at a moment of paroxysm.
. . it was
an epoch extremely vital, restless, and incited by all sorts of
desires, but we saw that only later.
. . We mixed with public life
by leaving behind theories of art for art's sake and dandyism
I loved [my generation] infinitely, because it was active and
frank, because its purposes, its excesses, even its ridiculous
ideas (we had them, and how!) were born from a great desire
for inquiry, for moral liberty, for new formulas Yes, it
was an exciting decade, that of 1890 to 1900. What interesting
personalities were revealed and developed in it! What ardent
changes of tack, what desires and plans, what ideas taken up,
rejected, and taken up again, what a surprising need for general
transformation, what a curious movement of artists towards
social life. We saw many things die and we wanted to create
many others. It was the moment when the war generation was
surpassed by a new one which firmly intended to free itself
from the fearful hesitations, from the depression of its
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predecessor, and we fell upon all the prejudices, we had thegreat desire to renew everything, to recreate forms expres-sions, frameworks, to prepare the future.
. .. My generationwas a rich storehouse of ideas, of intentions. ofVypothe^es.
.
.
90
In contrast the intellectuals of 1905, while having achieved an unheard
of degree of literary virtuosity, seem to Mauclair to remain profoundly
and willfully ignorant of everything going on in society at large. They
represent a return to the tradition of art for art's sake. Their solution
for the reform of the decorative arts and every other social issue is
simply to forget the whole idea and to take refuge in an ivory tower.
Mauclair is not willing to accept this last alternative. His loyalty
to the ideals of the 1890's makes him feel that at the age of thirty-two
he is already a cultural anachronism. "The generations come so quickly
and the 'transmutation of values' is so rapid in the overheated alembic
of contemporary life,
. . .
"^^ The transience which has been mentioned
as increasingly characteristic of both the marketplace and cultural life
is a phenomenon which can be extraordinarily painful for individuals who
cannot quickly and easily shed one personality for a more up-to-date
one. Yet Mauclair refuses to concede that the ideals which formed his
intellectual personality are just another fad, now outdated. Those
ideals --of cosmopolitanism, of knowledgeability, and especially of
artistic involvement in public life- -should not be consigned to the scrap
heap of history. Mauclair insists that they have a permanent validity,
that they represent not just relative change but absolute progress. He
refuses to bid farewell to his generation. He is like a man standing on
the seashore refusing to take shelter while the waves of change crash
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down on him at ever shorter intervals. Like des Esseintes, he
possesses a certain nobility in the way he faces the rising tide, but he
too is utterly alone. Now that even fellow artists and intellectuals have
deserted him, with whom can Mauclair communicate? There is a
vague entity called "the people" which is left, but as consumers even
they show a distressing resistance to aesthetic values, and as producers
Mauclair can only turn to the evidence of the past to support his faith in
their latent creativity. So he is left to communicate with the dead:
I lived this period of which I speak so intensely and so quickly
that, although having joined with men older than myself by some
years, I soon came to think of myself as of the same age- the
battles shared, the setbacks accepted, the bad times and thegood put us abreast. And I knew some rare and beautiful beings
who have died, and who carry away perhaps the finest memories
of friendship that I will ever have been given on earth.
. . every
conscience, every soul among the survivors seems to me, I
must confess, of a crystal less pure: and with fthose departed]
I live at least as much as with contempories
, and often find
myself less alone. 92
In 1909 Mauclair published one last look at the decorative arts in
the Revue bleue
,
an article which makes depressing reading. ^3 Once
more he chews over the course of the experiment which began with
Bing's store and ended in "a moral and material bankruptcy. " The
merchants still use the same excuses for making imitations rather than
trying innovative designs; artists who do make some interesting attempts
are patronized only by a small elite of connoisseurs and work in isola-
tion; "the public does not at all feel the need of a social art and is
indifferent to it all"; the ridiculous hierarchy which places the fine arts
above the industrial ones remains unaltered. Mauclair still advocates
the re -establishment of corporations, especially in conjunction with
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efforts to revive the former centers of provincial art. At the end of the
article, Mauclair brings up another suggestion, or rather returns to an
old one, when he mentions plans currently under discussion to hold
exposition of social art to try to give a lesson of things, ..." He no
longer hopes an exposition will teach the public very much, but he d<
hope artists might learn from it as "a serious examination of the themes
of the future.
. .
" Even for this restricted purpose, however. Mauclair
foresees great difficulties from bureaucracies, officials, and merchants.
-To solicit their cooperation or to avoid it would be equally dangerous
and there would be the peril, and not in the lack of works. "'^5 Because
of their interests and because each speciality would lobby for a classifi-
cation which would draw attention to it. Mauclair concludes that only an
artistic dictator could organize the exposition properly:
It would therefore require the authority of an artist, of an
organizer, of an economist, of a lofty spirit imbued with thephilosophy of art, with knowledge of all industrial and artistic
techniques, and finally endowed with an indomitable character
to organize such a demonstration, to retain all its meaning
and to extract the true lesson from it. Should such a man be
found, he would moreover require an enormous social power
to resist the coalition of jealousies
. of routines, of greed, of
vain incompetence. His intervention would be equivalent to
reforming the teaching methods of the state schools, to dis-
arming the bureaucracy, to conquering the egoism of the
merchants, to returning to art criticism its dignity and the
extent of its action now paralyzed by paid advertising, to
imposing silence on the pride of painters and sculptors, to
galvanizing the ignorant, lazy, or frivolous public. Do we still
have such giants for this type of labor? It would require
nothing less than a Colbert! 96
Mauclair 's exasperation with all the obstacles he has observed for
fifteen years --from the public, business interests, proud artists,
meddling bureaucracy- -has reached the point of despair, and his
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isolation had reached the point where his only listener is an imaginary
aesthetic philosopher-king.
Three Responses to Frustration: Recapitulation
Only a small fraction of Mauclair's art criticism has been dis-
cussed here, and an even tinier fraction of his total literary production
which covers a remarkable range of genres and styles. He has been
examined at some length both because of his intrinsic worth as an
appealing and thoughtful writer, and also because of his value as a
representative figure in the artistic and intellectual history of his time.
A study of his life would provide an excellent way of studying the rise
and decline of the ideal of social art in France around the turn of the
century. The high hopes of the 1890's never seemed to be fulfilled
either for him as an individual or for his generation. The poignancy of
this fate may be felt particularly today by someone coming of age in the
1960's, for that decade gave rise to a very similar generational
experience. As this analogy suggests, the ideal of the democratization
of art and related social ideals are still vital. There is much to reflect
upon in the story of the French decorative arts movement. If Mauclair's
final sense of futility is especially sad because his youthful enthusiasm
was so wholehearted and generous, yet it was far from unique. The
note of frustration is collective as well as personal. Many other
advocates of decorative arts reform came to the same impasse.
Mauclair's particular response --loyalty to the need for reform while
acknowledging its extreme difficulties if not its impossibilities--
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occupies a sort of n..ddle ground between two other possible responses
to those frustrations-to press £or reforrns on an ever larger scale, or
to give up entirely. In order to suggest how Mauclair's response of
gloon^y reforn^isn. fits in the range of these other two possibilities, let
us review briefly some other thinkers already mentioned in this section
to see how their careers evolved in the face of the dilemmas presented
by decorative arts reform.
The case of Gabriel S^ailles closely parallels that of Mauclair.
From being one who in 1886 criticized Guyau's sociological aesthetic
from an extremely idealistic view of art, a view which elevates art far
above ordinary human needs, S^ailles was transformed by the turn of
the century into an advocate of. social art in general and of decorative
arts reform in particular. If this general transformation is comparable
to that of Mauclair, or of Labor for that matter, the difference is that
S^ailles joined with French socialists and became active in a wide range
of socialist causes such as anti-clericalism and pacifism. Although
generally suspicious of socialists, in 1902 Mauclair praised Seailles as
one of a new generation of leftist intellectuals attempting to define
socialism's moral and spiritual goals.
Despite his ties to an established political party, Seailles still felt
a sense of futility. In a 1912 article in which he expresses most fully
his hopes for the "socialization of beauty, " Seailles admits that the
cause of "the stagnation of the CFrench] decorative arts" is based deep
in social consciousness because
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our democracy lacks frankness, it does not search in its realneeds the original forms which satisfy them. Each one thinksless about showing himself as he is, in the truth of hTs conS^tlonthan about appearmg as what he is not. 98 '
The improvement of the decorative arts would require nothing less than
giving up social deceit, because falsehood is "always the principle of
ugliness" and "beauty can be born only as the expression of life in its
truth. " Seailles continues, "There can be a popular art only if people
are conscious of the frankness and dignity of the humble life which is
theirs, the feeling that this humility composes true greatness. "^9
Seailles is repeating the ancient message of Christianity that the humble
shall be exalted, but as an anti- clericalist he is not about to enlist the
Church as an ally. Still, some form of leadership is needed to bring
about such a radical transformation in attitude. It will not occur
spontaneously: "We delude ourselves with a vain hope if we expect the
social being, the collective being, by I don't know what general act, to
emerge from the routine which it follows with complacency. " If
Seailles does not go so far as to search for a strongman, he does seek
a creative few who understand and who can "act for all" by trying to
modify public habits "with a concrete effort. "^^^ What concrete efforts?
The steps that should be taken, Seailles says wearily,
have been pointed out a hundred times: sense of the unity of the
plastic arts. . . ; effort to teach design with taste, initiative, and
invention, . . . ; establishment in several selected cities of
schools and museums which respond to regional traditions and
originalities; cooperation among architects, sculptors, painters,
decorators; cooperation of artists and manufacturers in the
creation of models. ^01
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Like Mauclair, S^ailles also lends his support to an exposition of social
art which, he says, might arouse an examination of artistic conscience
or at least a fruitful competition with other nations.
But how discordant are these suggested remedies with his
diagnosis of social envy as the fundamental sickness! None of these
"concrete efforts" would do anything to alter the social dishonesty which
would therefore wait to be altered by indefinite "necessary and collec-
tive causes" in the future. In the meantime, how to tear the crowds
away from costumed mannequins and the Rue du Caire to an exposition
of the simple, humble, honest life? S^ailles admits that his suggestions
are hackneyed. Like Mauclair, he understands the problem but cannot
find the solution. They both end up prescribing education by objects,
education by an enlightened individuals, like physicians who dispense
drugs while fearing the disease may be incurable. They are reformers
but pessimistic ones. ^^'^
On the surface, at least, Jean Labor remained much more
optimistic. Once convinced of the justice of the decorative arts cause,
he never traveled very far mentally, never questioned the aesthetic
ideology as Mauclair and S^ailles did. What he did instead was to
extend the same ideology to an ever larger scale, from the design of
domestic objects to workers' houses to "art in the street"^*^^ and
finally to the whole environment, rural and urban. His methods also
remained the same except to grow in scale- -to get publicity through
books, articles, and speeches, to start an organization, winning
government and private support for it, to use the organization to
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sponsor projects like collecUng n^odels of design, establishing regional
museums, selUng cheap reproductions of artistic masterpieces, holding
more conferences and increasing the membership. 106 this activity
culminated xn the c ity- garden movement which was intended as a way
to unite city and country in one totally planned environment.
short, Labor took the steps S^axlles said had been recommended a
hundred times. In all this activity, however, Labor seems to have
succumbed not to despair but to evasion. He had the temperment of a
doer, not a thinker. He was far too busy with propaganda and
organizing to reflect on their ultimate efficacy. All the same, his
movement towards an ever larger scale of design constitutes a tacit
admission that consumer taste is not to be reformed on an individual
level: a general social solution is required which treats consumption
as a collective phenomenon. Yet the change of scale does not alter the
assumption that society may be improved by surrounding people with the
right things, that is, with things designed by an artistic elite for the
benefit of the people. Indeed, when this assumption is extended to the
scale of environmental design it is more authoritarian than ever, for
individuals no longer have a choice about buying particular objects but
have to live in surroundings planned for them.
This extension of decorative arts reform to the urban scale was
by no means a new idea in the 1890 's. The leader of the French city-
garden movement acknowledged as predecessors of the idea Fourier,
LePlay, William Morris, Napoleon HI, Ruskin, Saint-Just, Rousseau,
and even Saint Matthew, among others. As this list suggests, the
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idea of the planned environment was one which could appeal to all parts
of the political spectrum. The first city- garden built in France was
commissioned in 1904 by the Company of the Mines of Dorgues as
housing for its workers, ^0
^y^^^^ ^.^^^ workers' interests
rather than with those of the owners could find the idea of the large-
scale design just as enticing. There is a remarkable congruence
between the town actually built by the Dorgues Company and the ideal
factory town described by fmile Zola in his novel Travail [Labor]
(1901). m Zola on the left, like Labor on the right, wants to give art
to the people on a larger and larger scale. One of the characters in
"^^^^^^^ is Lange, a potter of anarchist politics, whose work is naive .
but lovely, a "happy development of the taste of the people, " combining
beauty and utility in the design of ordinary objects. When the Utopian
city- garden is finally realized, however, the small shop of this indepen-
dent artisan is replaced by an immense factory which churns out bricks,
tiles, crockery, and other decorations to adorn the houses of the
workers. Lange still refuses to give up his craftsmanship and to side
with technological progress. Since he is no longer needed to make
furnishings for houses, he creates extraneous little figurines instead.
Zola admires Lange but clearly regards him as an anachronism. Zola
is so enchanted by the possibility of large-scale production of attractive
consumer items that he never stops to question consumer tastes or
wishes. When a whole city can be furnished tastefully by factory
production, Zola assumes that the inhabitants will be happy in such
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clean, attractive surroundings. The magnitude of the scale made
possible by modern technology encourages him to avoid matters of
consumer consciousness just as Labor does.
This same evasion of the whole question of consumer values and
education may be seen in much more muted form in another socialist,
Charles Andler, whose lecture on the decorative arts was cited at the
very beginning of this part. His vision of the socialist future is con-
siderably less authoritarian than Zola's, but he too simply avoids
considering people as consumers. The "morality of the created thing-
is for Andler "a morality of the producer born of labor itself. " Educa-
tion of taste will be brought about through labor alone. Andler concludes
his lecture with a description of the royal porcelain workshop in
Copenhagen which sounds just like Zola's model factory in Travail -
-
plenty of light and flowers, spaciousness and cleanliness, happy
workers. There is the same fascination with large-scale production of
useful objects, the same hopefulness about the possibilities for pleasur-
able work, and the same lack of thought about who will buy these useful
objects. Labor, Zola, and Andler are all active reformers who main-
tain their hopefulness only by avoiding issues their practical activities
cannot address and by increasing the scale of design to that of a planned
environment.
A third response to the difficulty of reforming the decorative arts
is to give up. That course is taken by Maurice Griveau, who vividly
describes his journey from hope to despair in a short story- - really a
parable, or even a myth- -titled "Le Jardin d'epreuve" [jvhich could be
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variously translated as "The garden of proof, " "The experimental
garden, " or "The testing garden-^ first published in Mercure de
France in 1899 and later revised for publication in a short story
collection Histoires d'Art Cstories of art] in 1907. ^ 14 ^j^^ autobio-
graphical hero of the tale is Hyacinth, a lover of beauty who is appalled
by his fellow townspeople's utter disregard of the aesthetic qualities of
nature and of their lovely old village. In order to enlighten them.
Hyacinth first composes a treatise of aesthetic philosophy (a reference,
no doubt, to Griveau's own La Sphere de beaut^ and Les Elements du
beau), but it sits unsold in bookstore windows while the few academic
critics who read it praise it only as an "addition to the 'literature on the
subject. ' "115 Determined to reach a more popular and appreciative
audience, Hyacinth composes a series of short stories about beauty to
clothe his message in more appealing form (an allusion to Griveau's
own Histories d'Art mentioned above). This time scholars scorn the
work, but bourgeois socialites love it and invite its author to their
salons. There Hyacinth learns that, despite reading his tales, the
bourgeoisie supports municipal plans to raze medieval houses in order
to build a modern boulevard and to cut down the magnificent communal
woods in order to create building lots which would be sold to pay for the
boulevard. Horrified by their "vandalism, "^"^^ realizing he has enter-
tained but not educated these bourgeois barbarians, Hyacinth denounces
them and flees the salons, quits his desk job, and goes to work as a
gardener's assistant.
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In this role he makes his last attempt to awaken people to beauty
through a lesson of things rather than of words. He tries to grow plants
so ugly that the beauty of nature will be obvious to all by its perverse
opposite. Nature will not cooperate. The plants die or refuse to
become wholly repulsive. So Hyacinth turns to artificial material.
which can be made to do anything and creates a
-factitious flora.
garden "of fantasy or of nightmare, " where plants are showy or sinister,
of "a suspect and painful luxury" or disconcertingly strange, such
as giant or dwarf plants, ones resembling underwater forests on dry
land, or even ones imitating fossil flowers. ^^'^ The public is invited to
this exposition of monstrosities -
-and loves it! Overwhelmed by the
technical ingenuity of the experimental garden, impressed by the false
luxuries, they lavish praise on the imagination of the designer. Hyacinth
once again flees in rage and horror, and later returns to commit his
own vandalism and consigns the garden to the purification of fire:
And now that the Garden of Proof was no more, what to do? He
didn't know. But the certitude which shone for him from thousands
of flying sparks like so many living and phosophorescent day-flies
was this:
That an evil is not cured by a greater evil which exceeds it;
and that to make men appreciate the truth, it is a very bad
means to lie. 1 18
Like des Esseintes, that other lover of beauty ejected from a self-
created artifical garden. Hyacinth ends up utterly alone. Since neither
words nor objects can educate the uncomprehending masses, the lover
of beauty can only retreat to a purely personal code of honesty in the
midst of a world which knows it not.
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Because Griveau's bitterness might be attributed in part to the
personal disappointment of a provincial eccentric who never won a large
reading audience, it is worth noting that his conclusion was shared by
Robert de La Sizeranne. possibly the most widely read art critic of his
day. La Sizeranne 's comments on the Automobile Salon have already
been mentioned in Chapter I. and he deserves a second look here both to
indicate further his contribution and to note the symbolic impor-
tance of his final despair in that La Sizeranne had been the first to intro-
duce Ruskin. godfather to all modern decorative art movements, to a
wide French-speaking audience. As art critic for the Revue des deiDc
Sizeranne regularly reached a large and influential public,
and he became famous as the author of the book Ruskin et la religion de
beaut| CRuskin and the religion of beauty] (1897) which first appeared
as a series of articles in the Revue des deux mondes and which soon
became a classic even in its English translation. ^^'^ La Sizeranne
tended to view the Englishman as a hieratic prophet of beauty rather
than as a practical decorative arts reformer, and La Sizeranne himself
was no partisan of the decorative arts movement in any conventional
sense. While fascinated by the way modern technology was altering the
relationship of beauty and utility, he was by no means convinced that
these changes meant the two qualities of utility and beauty were identical
or even reconciliable. Some of his finest articles discuss the aesthetic
consequences of technological change --how artificial materials like iron,
unlike traditional natural ones like stone, do not require certain outward
forms but lend themselves to any fantasy; similarly, how the working
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parts of an automobile bear little necessary relation to its exte:
design; the effects of photography on painting and its independent status
as an art; and the distinction between the aesthetic quality of man-made
objects and the aesthetic quality of the experiences they make possible. ^20
On such themes La Sizeranne's original contribution deserves to be at
least as well known as his interpretation and dissemination of Ruskin's
thought. It is difficult to classify him, however, since he stands apart
to look at decorative arts reform from a unique angle, and this is why
discussion of his ideas has been omitted thus far-a reason which is
really to his credit. La Sizeranne's perception of the relationship of
beauty and utility make Griveau's assumptions look facile; his mind is
much more disciplined and learned, and his theoretical conclusions are
much more restrained. But in his ultimate judgment about the practical
possibilities of combining beauty and utility in everyday life. La
Sizeranne is as passionately despondant as Griveau and even expresses
his feelings in similar horticultural metaphors.
La Sizeranne presents his initial hopes for decorative arts reform
in 1900 article "Avons-nous un style moderne? " [^Do we have a modern
style?]
,
one of a series of four articles in the Revue des deux mondes
describing the aesthetics of the 1900 exposition. Like Mauclair, he
begins by asking whether there is a modern style rather than assiiming
there is one, and like Mauclair he ends up going around in circles.
After a witty description of Art Nouveau as a style "essentially sub-
122marine, " he argues that contemporary decorative arts resemble
primitive aquatic forms of life because their forms are ill-adapted to
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their functions. The needs of n^odern life should be for independe.
comfort, "an easy, light life, without ostentation, without inquietude, "
and a pleasing, simple modern style can evolve only when suited for
such functions. Then La Sizeranne breaks-off abruptly to ask another
question: "But is this the life we live? - He must conclude that it is not.
The needs that people should have are not the ones they actually feel:
modern life has evolved not towards an easy unpretention but towards
false luxury, show, and the prestige of rarity. Unfortunately objects
reflect all too faithfully this inauthentic function of social ascension. To
get people to renounce their present goals would require "a whole
revolution in our social condition. " But La Sizeranne is no revolutionary.
and he can only repeat advice which Ruskin might have offered: "Let us
seek first not a new art, but a new life, and the rest will come as a
1 23bonus. " He comes to the usual obstacle, recognizing the need for a
redirection of social evolution so major that it would amount to a social
revolution, and not knowing how to bring it about.
When Jean Labor read this article, he agreed with La Sizeranne 's
conclusion that moral reforms have to precede practical artistic ones
but added, "That is a lot, and doubtless too much to ask, and truly it
would be necessary to wait too long. "'^^'^ Labor, not being one to stand
and wait, went back to his propaganda activities while La Sizeranne did
more thinking and became increasingly discouraged. His state of mind
by 1903 is expressed in his response to an enqu^te published that year
in La Plume based on the inquiry, "Is the artistic education of the public
necessary? "12.5
-phis enquete is of great interest, for among the other
305
respondants are S^ailles, Augu^ Rodin, Eugene Carri^re, Octave
Mirbeau, and Gustave Geffroy. None of them is exactly overflowing
with optimism, for if they agree on one point it is that any artistic
education involves a shaping of the whole personality, an
-education of
life. -^^^ or
-a general culture. "^^"^ But La Sizeranne's response is
one of the longest and bleakest. He received the enqu^te upon his
return from his "annual pilgrimage.
. . to the privileged land of natural
1 28beauty, " the Riviera, where each year, he sees its beauty a little
more destroyed by man:
Everywhere enclosures go up, walls encase the roads, hotels
obscure the huts and the farm-houses, the gulfs are turned
into shallow basins, the small fishing boats disappear,
. . . noherd passes under the olive trees any longer.
. . Finally, the
ephemeral greenery of yesteryear is effaced to allow to live
only those exotic, geometrical, costly plants which an infamous
Ixixury imposes on our old Proven^ale earth, plants of a mathe-
matically predictable form, cold, glittering, spiny.
. . whichknow neither how to grow old, nor to mther, nor to die, nor to
mix by their changes and their rebirths with everything around
us and in ourselves which changes, evolves, is reborn and
dies!.
.
. 129
The worst of it, laments this Hyacinth, is that people prefer this ugly
artificial garden to the beauty of nature because of some innate,
ineradicable longing for ostentation and exoticism:
It is not only the sense of greed: it is the sense of "embellish-
ment. " It is not only to fill .their wallets that men have thus
banished Beauty from their native earth: it is to fill their eyes
with pleasing visions, with all the Greek disorders and all the
intemperances or ornamental protuberances of the Orient. An
unmixed admiration fills the inhabitants and the visitors to the
Riviera before the innumerable crimes which are committed
each day and which mean that each evening the sun sets on an
earth less beautiful than the earth which was lighted in the
morning by its first rays. 1^0
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The world is being turned into an exposition. To La Sizeranne these
preferences are worse than barbarian, they are so alien as to seem
non-human. In response to the question whether the artistic education
of the public is necessary, he replies that this inquiry
seems to me on somewhat the same order as this one- Is itnecessary to communicate with the inhabitants of Mars ifthere are any; Yes, doubtless, it would be necessary, but
what IS the use of speaking of the necessity of what isimpossible?
. . .
I sum it up. the artistic education of thepublic may be necessary, but it is impossible. 131
Concluding Remarks: Beyond Art
In 1886, almost a quarter-century before Mauclair decided the
decorative arts could be saved only by a Colbert, J.-K. Huysmans wrote
a short article in the Revue independante to protest proposals then being
made to establish a museum of the decorative arts:
. . .
the objects which will compose it will be for the most part
apocryphal, parliamentary recommendations forcibly trying to
impose on us a heap of lard; furthermore the ignominious trash
of the imitations launched forth by commerce will soil forever
the truly artistic models which a beneficient fate will perhaps
permit to slip into the pile of antique sham.
It will be like the antique coppers whose deplorable imitations
fill the storerooms of the Bon March^ and the Louvre; it will be
Japanese art for export, printing on faience and on cloth, paste-
board manufacture of Cordovian leathers on papier-mache, it
will be cheap luxury.
.
.
... I know you don't have to buy them, but you have to see
them because they fill up entire boulevards and streets !. . . you
have to submit to Cthis horrorH because the eye. .. wanders all
the same towards it and lingers there; there is in.it a forced,
morbid impulsion, the attraction of the horrible, the morbid
appetite of the monstrous, the unnatural craving for the ugly!-- 132
Huysmans concludes that the building destined for such a museum should
be consigned to purifying flames--along with all the other recently con-
structed architectural atrocities of Paris --for "Then, perhaps, people
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would realize that Fire is the essential artist of our times.
.
.
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How could Huysmans have been so perceptive in his vision of the
future of the decorative arts? He predicts the visible details of the
democratization of luxury, and he foresees that reform of the decorative
arts will never provide a viable alternative to the choice of nightmares
facing des Esseintes. Huysmans' perception is undoubtedly due in large
measure to the fact that in the person of des Esseintes he had already
created a species of decorative arts reformer who tries to surround
himself with exquisitely designed objects as a means of protection
against the vile proliferations of bourgeois consumption. In the fate of
des Esseintes, then, we gain a prophetic insight into the fate of the
decorative arts reformers. It will be recalled that A Rebours presents
a concrete example of the process of reification; the hero has his
vitality drained from him while the objects around him become pro-
gressively more animated and finally become dangerously independent
in their vitality. The decorative arts movement runs the same risk as
des Esseintes because it too attributes a tremendous power to things.
According to its aesthetic ideology, objects not only reveal and express
human beings but recreate them, shaping their personalities and destinies.
As La Sizeranne laments, more attention is given to the evolution of
things than to the evolution of life, and by confusing priorities in this
way, by attaching such extraordinary significance to things, the
reformers of decorative arts mimic the world of bourgeois commercial-
ism. Decorative arts objects may be beautiful and harmonious rather
than ugly and ornate, but they are still objects understood as potent and
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active agents. If mass consumption relies on things to create an
illusory world of wealth, the decorative arts movement relies on the:
to create an illusory world of beauty. Des Esseintes, bourgeois or
mass consumers, and decorative arts reformers have this in common,
that they use objects to make a refuge, an illusory universe preferable
to a less attractive or even vile reality. While the masses collect
luxurious objects as if those objects will make them in fact wealthy,
lovers of art want to surround the masses with well-designed objects
as if those objects will make the masses in fact lovers of beauty. When
things are attributed the power to create a universe, they may also be
attributed the power of destroying one: reformers of the decorative arts
tend towards the fantasy that replacing the concrete objects of mass
consumption is the same as replacing the economic system which pro-
duces them. Thus in the decorative arts movement we confront the
same ambivalence which afflicts des Esseintes, a simultaneous hatred
for and fascination with mass consumption, expressed in unconscious
imitation of the very phenomenon that is despised, "the attraction of the
horrible,
. . . the unnatural craving for the ugly! "
When things are invested with such importance, they are no longer
seen as inert but as vital. Decorative arts partisans not uncommonly
refer to useful objects as "companions" of man, ^•^'^ or. in Gall^'s
variation, as "brothers. "-^^5 Useful objects are living beings allowed
in the privacy of the home where they establish an intimate relationship
with the owner, in benign terms a relationship of such emotional
involvement could develop into a friendship, bound by ties of affection
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and loyalty. But objects seen in personalized terms are also potential
enemies. Someone like des Esseintes might have the resources to
ensure that he comes into contact only with friendly objects, but for
most people there can be no escaping the affronts of hostile ones. In
his autobiography Mauclair recounts that the composer Claude Debussy,
who made a meager living from music lessons and had to move fre-
quently from one shabby apartment to another, could not bear the
thought of touching the banal window handles found in these lodgings.
Despite his poverty, Debussy ordered a half dozen or so "artistic"
handles from Alexandre Charpentier so they could be taken with him
wherever he moved to replace the offending ones.
We may turn to Mauclair at greater length for one of the most
vivid, indeed frightening (because it flirts with the logic of madness)
descriptions of reification of consumer objects since Huysmans' portrait
of des Esseintes' life at Fontenay. In an essay written before 1909, ^^'^
Mauclair takes as his subject painters of still life, a term which in
French is expressed by the words "nature morte" [[dead nature]
.
Mauclair rejects the French terminology in favor of the German
"Stilleben, " comparable to the English "still life" or to the French
"la vie en silence, " because, he contends, objects do have a life,
silent and mysterious, a consciousness with a uniquely fantastic quality.
He continues, in a description which deserves to be quoted at length:
There takes place with objects what takes place with domestic
animals: a constant exchange with man, and a subtle com-
munity of "feelings, " certainly indefinable, as far as objects
are concerned, but we woiild be illogical indeed if we were to
conclude the inexistence of what we can't define directly. . . .
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Usage develops the physiognomy of an object, contact with itspossessor puts into it resources of expressiveness.
. ^^No Lydo time and its patma act on an object as on a living being andreinforce its significance, but also an object is sedlte orlaughable comfortable or ill at ease, according to where it isplaced, like a being. It is the confidant of life, it knows life's
secrets, it is a taciturn witness.
. . . There are relations of
affection or of antipathy between an object and its owner andm some way, a whole restrained imitation of our relations
'
with beings which move.
. . .
. . .
Not only have we admitted that the object accumulatesfeelings scattered around it, but moreover we can be led tothmk that, by a sort of countershock, it might restore these
sensibilities not always in the order foreseen by us Uitalicshisl
It thus would nave a second lile, personal and independent of our
control, and here we enter in the "fantasy" of which 1 spoke
. . .1 think that objects have their special life, that subtle
relationships are established among them when they are juxta-posed m the same atmosphere for a long time, that they learn
to esteem themselves, to know themselves, to fear themselves
to understand themselves. We have assembled them with a
certain taste to create a harmony-
-and I don't speak only of
luxury items, for even a kitchen is harmonious by the arrange-
ment of the utensils. There are here relationships of formst
of color, of proportions: would I be mad to conclude that
these relationships constitute a life analogous to that which
governs by reciprocities the elements of a crowd? 138
Mauclair ends his essay by urging contemporary artists to pay more
attention to past masters of still life (like Chardin) because:
Contemporary art is preoccupied with expressing silence, with
speaking "the language of flowers and of mute things, " with
introducing into painting a whole order of presciences, of
allusions, of creating.
. . the age of the symbolism latent in
everything, the suggestion of appearances, with going, in a
word, to search for life and reality beyond that which we see,
behind the shell of appearances, in the full region of the
subconscious. 139
The evolution of the decorative arts and of a "fine art" like painting may
therefore be compared in their common attribution of life to objects, in
their common "revelation, " as Mauclair puts it, "of the permanent life
of the inert " [[^italics his 3 • ^"^^ At the same time the decorative arts
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movement is insisting that useful objects should be seen as works of
high art, Mauclair is urging that high art reveal the vitality of
ordinary objects. Both tendencies elevate objects of consumption to a
level of great significance and dignity-but they also run the risk of
.
ending in a surreal universe which is a jumble of concrete but absurd
objects, of matter which has become opaque to the ideal. Our apprecia-
tion of the value of art is restricted when so much weight is put on the
visual arts, on things, as opposed to other aesthetic forms which are
not concrete.
As a corrective, we may recall how Guyau calls our attention to
aesthetic experiences which might not be embodied in any concrete
object it all. According to Guyau, human beings learn to sympathize
with each other through sharing aesthetic experiences whether or not
they are mediated by things. He does not suggest a mysterious life in
objects; in the commerce between man and things, he is certain that it
is the human being who gives life. With Guyau in mind, let us
remember that other non-visual forms of art may also create the
bonds of social sympathy. In a 1912 article, in fact, one decorative
arts reformer concludes that imminent failure of the cause can be
avoided only by urging novelists to portray artisans as heroes, by using
language to convey their intelligence and character and to describe the
beautiful things they make. The sympathy and interest aroused by the
novelist might direct the attention of the public --which still ignores
expositions of simple modern styles and prefers to buy showy Oriental
ones--towards shop windows displaying new designs, and might enable
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them to see their vast superiority over the vulgar objects now in their
houses. Here a fine art, literature, is called upon to be an inter-
mediary between the public and the decorative arts, to teach them
through syiTipathy and understanding what they have not learned from
objects. Nor is literature the only non-visual art which might be called
upon in the formation of a sociological aesthetic. Mauclair, an ardent
Wagnerian when Wagner was a cause c^l^bre in the 1890's, predicts in
1902 that music will be "the future cult, ... the grand communion of
feeling for the masses in the future, because it exalts all the dreams
and touches the soul without preliminary precautions. " He praises the
"essential utility of this art from the social point of view, that is to say
as the global emotion of souls,
.
.
"l'^^
This rediscovery of the social value of high art is an important
corrective to the patronizing assumption that ordinary people are
incapable of being moved by what Mauclair back in 1896 had called
"spec Illative" art, that they will respond only to objects affecting their
most immediate needs. The emphasis on assimilating art to ordinary
objects involves a sort of condescension about art, the feeling that the
arts are basically crafts and that anyone with a little training can
become an artist. It is not necessary to return to an extreme version
of art for art's sake in order to maintain that the arts have more pro-
found roots than in the satisfaction of physical needs, and that there are
emotional and intellectual sources of art which have nothing to do with
utility and which may be expressed in music, dance, drama, and other
forms unrelated to ordinary objects. Only a very inadequate understanding
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of artistic motivation assumes that it is necessary to appeal to people's
practical interests as consumers-
-or as producers-
-to arouse a love of
art. The faHure to form an alliance between art and economic life
hardly means the death of art. Human beings retain a capacity to create
and to respond to the arts on entirely different levels. Indeed, if they
did not have such a capacity, if the survival of art depended on its
infusion into economic activities, the future of art would be bleak
indeed. Because the conclusion of decorative arts reformers like
Mauclair, S^ailles, and La Sizeranne is that modern society expresses
itself in pretentious luxury rather than beauty, the only alternatives
they offer are for the fabric of society to be altered radically or for art
to remain the province of an elite. A third possibility is even more
drastic --to let art cease, at least for the time being. Both William
Morris and Saint-Simon (in his later years) suggest they would prefer
a suspension of art until social reform is achieved rather than have it
continue to express a defective society. ^"^"^ But art survives anyway
because people like to make art and appreciate it, because its origins
are not just in economic and social structures but also in pleasures
which are outside the logical adaptation of means to ends.
None of the thinkers we have examined end up recommending such
radical surgery. What they do conclude, however, is that art, whether
speculative or decorative, is extremely limited in its efficacy as a
means of social reform. Theirs is largely a negative conclusion: the
causes of ugliness are not fundamentally aesthetic and are not to be
cured by purely aesthetic means. This is not the conclusion that these
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reformers want to reach, but it .s the one their analysis ultimateb
forces on them. In this they are afflicted by what Graham Hough has
called, in reference to William Morris, "the basic schizophrexoia of
the modern intellectual. His analysis of the contemporary social
situation does not really lead to the conclusion that he wanted to
reach. "^^S ^hat "basic schizophrenia" is the root of the common
pattern of discouragement we have noted, a pattern which goes beyond
matters of personal shortcomings or accidental disappointments.
Indeed, if these thinlcers had listened to Huysmans' predictions of 1886.
they might have saved themselves a decade or two of intellectual a:id
practical efforts before many of them reached a similarly painful con-
clusion about the futility of it all. Still, while their participation in the
decorative arts movement was often personally frustrating, it did lead
to an intellectual advance over Huysmans. What was gained may be
described as the addition of social analysis to social prophecy.
Huysmans drew a startlingly accurate image of the future; Mauclair
and others offer a more detailed critical discussion of that image. The
negative side of this analysis --the warnings about the pitfalls of the
aesthetic ideology of the decorative arts and about the general inefficacy
of social reform through aesthetic reform-
-remains significant because
of the continuing appeal of such ideologies to some artistic and
intellectual circles. But there is also a positive side to their analysis.
They point to the urgent need to go beyond art altogether to other means
of self-expression and self-creation, to other types of experiences
besides aesthetic ones, to other modes of hximan interaction. Neither
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the understanding of consumer consciousness nor its reformation would
be furnished by art. The dream world of cons^amption would not be
designed out of existence. Establishing the necessity of a broader
frame of reference than the aesthetic is perhaps the most important
contribution made by the thinkers discussed in this part. In subsequent
chapters we shall see how students of social psychology, economics,
and moral and political philosophy took up the issues which decorative
arts reformers covdd pose but not resolve.
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PART III
ECONOMIC THOUGHT
CHAPTER V
THE DEFENSE OF LUXURY
The Background of Economic Thought
This part will present the contribution made by French econo-
mists to a better understanding of modern consumption. Their con-
tribution originates in a debate about the definition and morality of
luxury which engaged a number of them in the 1880's and 1890's.
Before describing the participants and terms of the debate, however,
the context of French economic thought in which it occurred needs to
be sketched. In establishing this context our task is much easier than
in the last part, where a paucity of secondary works made it extreme-
ly difficult to establish an intellectual context for the aesthetic ideas
discussed there. General surveys of economic thought, in contrast,
are plentifiil, offering a choice of older or recent works, ^ ones
written by Frenchmen or by non-Frenchmen, ^ and ones written from
various political perspectives. Still, in most of the general surveys,
especially ones covering large chunks of the history of economic
thought and not limited to the later nineteenth century or to France,
references to French economists are conspicuously absent. Modern
economic thought, born in England with Adam Smith (1723-1790) and
nursed by other English classicists like David Ricardo (1772-1823)
and by French ones like Jean-Baptiste Say (1767-1832), was reborn
in the latter nineteenth century in German- speaking co\intries, and
especially in Austria. Although the French did not participate in that
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imme-
renaissance of the 1870's, it must be described briefly in order to
appreciate what they did add to economic thought in the period
diately following, and why that contribution has received little
attention in secondary literature.
The Austrian school of economics, consisting of Carl Menger
(1840-1921) and two generations of his students, represents in many
respects a reaffirmation of the classical tradition, especially in its
goal of making economics an exact science of objective laws, un-
tainted by moralism and above all by historical relativism. Menger 's
famous debate with the leader of the German school of historical
relativism, Gustav Schmoller (1838-1917), a debate which reached a
climax in 1882, is essentially a methodological dispute between the
Austrian who would conserve the classical concept of the validity of
economic laws and the German who would overthrow it. Menger and
his students, however, stand the classical laws on their head, as it
were. Their reversal of the law of economic value forms the basis
of their renovation of economic thought. They contend that the value
of a market item does not depend on its production costs, as Smith
and his heirs claimed, but on its utility to the consrxmer. The law of
value is thereby turned around from an origin in production to an
origin in consumption. The famous law of marginal utility associated
with the Austrian school relates market value to an object's capacity
to satisfy the desires of the consumer in a concrete, direct, and per-
sonal way. ^ Not only does this law mark a conceptual shift from
production to consumption as the key element of the economic process,
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but also it signifies a sh.ft of emphasis from the objective transactions
of the external marketplace to the subjective calculations of the con-
sumer as he debates the relative satisfactions he would derive from
various types of consumption. Because it locates value not in objects
but in human wants, the Austrian school was widely known as the
"psychological" school of economics in the latter nineteenth century.
This term may be misleading, however, for it describes the content
of this school and not its methodolcgy. As already noted, the Austrians
believe that economics can be an exact science, and so they try to
discover objective laws which describe and predict the subjective
decisions of the consumer. In pursuit of this goal they use "idealizing
assumptions and generalizations to organize the data of social
behavior, "^ one of the most important of which is a psychological
model of the consumer as homo economicus acting according to per-
sonal interest in maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. This
model, inherited from classical political economy, is so crucial that
the term "hedonist school" was used interchangeably with "psycho-
logical school" to describe them. ^
The Austrians were not especially interested in expressing their
theories in mathematical terms, ajid in fact Menger insisted that rela-
tive utilities could not be measured quantitatively and that the numbers
he assigned them on his table of marginal utility were only approxim.a-
tions. Other economists who accepted the Austrian theories did go on
to express them in quantitative terms, however, so that the crude
"calculus of pleasure" of earlier utilitarian economists became much
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more sophisticated as methods were devised, for example, to graph
the curve of decreasing satisfaction as a consumer obtains more of a
given item until a point of satiety is reached. This quantification of
economic thought is another critical element in the late nineteenth-
century reconstruction of the discipline. Its achievements are
associated mainly with William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882) in England
and above all with the "school of Lausanne" led by L€on Walras
(1834-1910) and Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) which expanded the con-
cept of marginal utility to a more general theory of market equilibriiim
o
expressed in mathematical equations.
From all these developments French economists remained aloof.
German doctrines of historicism and state socialism left few traces on
French thought, ^ and, even more significantly, the concept of margin-
al utility and especially mathematical techniques, to which the French
could be openly hostile, met with little response. The economists
at the head of their profession in France—a group which included
Henri Baudrillart (1821-1892) and Paxil Leroy-Beaulieu (1843-1912),
who will be discussed at some length in this chapter, as well as
Gustave de Molinari (1819-1912), Fr€d^ric Passy (1822-1912),
J.G. Courcelle-Seneuil (1813-1893), L^on Say ( 1826- 1896), and
Yves Guyot ( 1843- 1928)--were true to the tradition of economic liber-
alism, being uniformly free traders and monometallists, firm
believers in the sanctity of private property, and equally firm oppon-
ents of socialism or state regulation. According to Joseph Schumpeter
in his History of Economic Analysis these "ultras of laissez-faire"
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were called the "Paris group" because from that city they controlled
the prestigious Journal des ^conomistes and most other economic
publications, professional societies, the teaching of economics at the
Collfege de Franee and other institutions, and above all the Academie
des sciences morales et politiques of the Institut de France "to such
an extent that their political or scientific adversaries began to suffer
from a persecution complex. " In the case of leftist economists this
complex was justified, for the Paris group used its dominant position
mainly to refute socialist doctrines. "But, " Schumpeter adds,
what matters to us is the fact that their analysis was, in its
methodology, as reactionary as their politics. All of them
were simply unconcerned with the scientific aspects of our
field. J. B. Say and Bastiat, plus a vague theory of marginal
utility, satisfied their scientific appetite.
Schumpeter admits that because the Paris economists were in close
contact with business and politics their works display "an atmosphere
of realism and of wisdom which compensates in part for their insuffi-
ciency of scientific inspiration, " but it is clear that to Schumpeter
this advantage does not make up for the lack of scholarly detachment.
French economists were also in close contact with the legal world
because courses in political economy, relatively few in the first place,
were organized under Faculties of Law in French universities Their
works tend towards a style of dialectic argumentation and textual
explication which resembles legal models rather than scientific or
mathematical ones.
Yet, in their own way, despite this stubborn traditionalism,
French economists too participated in the gradual shift of conceptual
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focus from production to consumption. To understand how that shift
was made in France, and how it took on a particularly moralistic
flavor, we must look at the ideas which did influence the Paris group
to an extent that ideas of marginal utility and of mathematical quantifi-
cation did not. Above all it is necessary to appreciate the influence of
Fr^d6ric Bastiat (1801-1850), referred to above by Schumpeter. Not
surprisingly, the conservative economists of Paris were more res-
ponsive to the economic thinking of a native son than to ideas imported
from Switzerland and Austria. Bastiat was in turn greatly influenced
by Jean-Baptiste Say. mentioned at the outset of this chapter as an heir
of Adam Smith, and so Bastiat serves as an important link between the
founding fathers of classical economics and the Paris group of the late
nineteenth century. Although these later economists refer to him
frequently and respectfully, it cannot be said that Bastiat founded a
school. His importance is rather in reinforcing certain tendencies
in French economic thought so that after him the liberal school "took
on more than ever a character of 'orthodoxy'.
.
.
"^^
Those tendencies were, first and perhaps most important of clII,
an optimistic faith in the beneficent workings of the natural laws of
economics which led Bastiat to refute the gloomier views of Ricardo
and Malthus and to title his most imposing work Les Harmonies de
rl'conomie politique £The harmonies of political economyj (IBSO)."^^
This basic optimism was imbibed by the Paris group to such an extent
that Charles Gide. a rebel from the group, grumbled that Paul Leroy-
Beaulieu may have changed Bastiat's words in places but that he
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always whistled the same tune. ^'^ Bastiafs influence is also e^ddent
in an "atmosphere of realism and wisdom" which Schumpeter praises
faintly as also present among his intellectual heirs. In Bastiat's case
that atmosphere came from engagement in business ventures and
political disputes under the Orl^anist regime, and later as a deputy
1
8
under the Second Republic. Finally, Bastiat exemplifies the pre-
ference for polemics and argumentation over scientific and detached
reasoning for which Schumpeter criticizes the Paris group. For
example, one of Bastiat's most popular works, Les Sophismes
^conomiques [Economic sophisms]] (1845), was first written as a
series of pamphlets for one of his many crusades, this one for free
19trade. As the title indicates, Bastiat's usual approach is to ridicule
the illogical reasoning of his opponents, whether they be protectionists
or Malthusians or socialists. In all these ways, then, we can see how
many of the tendencies of the Paris group as described by Schumpeter
were passed down from Bastiat. Just one indication of their interest
in him is the fact that in 1904 the Acad^'mie des sciences morales et
politiques proposed for its Prix Leon Faucher the subject "Fr^d^ric
Bastiat, his life and his works, " from which resulted the publication
of three books on the economist.
According to several memoirs, on his deathbed Bastiat mur-
mured, "Political economy must be treated from the viewpoint of
consumers. " Whether or not the quotation is true, he certainly
repeated similar maxims often enough during his lifetime, especially
21
in Les Harmonies de l'€"conomie politique. Even if the Paris group
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ignored Austrian theories, they inherited an emphasis on consump-
tion from Bastiat. According to him, the realm of production is
forever becoming entrenched in privilege, monopoly, and other forms
of private greed, while the consumer alone represents the general
interest, "the truly humanitarian interest. " Thus the broader stand-
point of the consumer should prevail over the limited outlook of any
producer. Bastiat applies this argument in his crusade for free trade
protectionism might hurt some individuals in their productive roles,
but the damage would be more than compensated for by benefits to
them as consumers. In all of economic thought and practice, he con-
cludes, consumption is the final end to which all else must be sub-
ordinated. ".
. .
it is not for farmers that there is farming, not for
industry that there are industrial products. . .
, but so that men should
22have at their disposal the most products of all varieties. "
What is strikingly different from the views of the Austrian
school is Bastiat's moralistic and indeed religious tone. Bastiat's
economic thought begins in a sense of religious awe before the
potential bountifulness of the world and ends in a sense of religious
mission to acquaint mankind with the munificence God has placed at
its disposal. This is the motivation behind his attacks on Malthus
and Ricardo, who envision a universe of scarcity rather than of
bounty, and it is the motivation behind his praise for the expansion of
man's needs as a sign of human perfectibility. The great drama of
human progress is that man is able to satisfy more and more needs
with less and less effort as he gradually overcomes the forces of in-
23
animate nature. Bastiat is always trying to demonstrate that the
337
functioning of economic laws results in harmony rather than in dis-
cord, and in matters of consumption he tries to demonstrate that
man's moral progress through the expansion of his needs harmonizes
perfectly with the economic need to avoid industrial crises of over-
production and unemployment. There is no reason to resort to the
artifices of protectionism to avoid such crises, Bastiat argues, as
long as we realize that human needs are not fixed but dynamic. The
continual expansion of new wants among the population can absorb the
expansion of production made possible by mechanization, and so it is
both a moral and an economic duty to educate the public in a" 'taste for
good livmg.
" On the other hand, there must be limits on that taste,
since people should learn to moderate and refine their needs.
Bastiat not only warns against what he called "sisyphism"-production
for the sake of production--but also against unhealthy desires which
result in worthless production. "A frivolous people requires frivolous
manufactures, " he writes in Harmonies
,
"just as a serious people re-
quires industry of a more serious kind. If the hximan race is to be
improved, it must be by the improved morality of the consumer, not
of the producer. "^^
Such references to the morality of the consumer are of course
wholly different in character from tables of marginal utilities or
curves of consumer satisfaction. While Bastiat's arguments for the
primacy of the consumer have earned him praise from some historians
r . , 27ol economic thought, his moralism has quite expectedly drawn the
fire of "scientific" economists, one of whom calls it a "pathological
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excitation" which is "sinister and declamatory, " adding:
From the first pages of his work Bastiat's belief in GodIS visible and in the last chapters.
. . where he talks aboutSocial Mover, Evil_, Pefectibility
, we are no longer dealing,with an economist. It is Saint John of Patmos who speaks.^8
For better or for worse, this moralizing bent is certainly one of
Bastiat's most important legacies to the Paris group, and it probably
the trait of the later nineteenth-century French economists which is
most striking to the contemporary reader. At a time when the econo-
mic thinkers in Austria and Lausanne were attempting to represent the
complexities of consumer behavior in precise laws and mathematical
formulae, their French counterparts remained unabashedly--some
would say hopelessly--impure in handling the same theme, or in
handling most any economic theme for that matter. One need only con-
sider the titles of representative works by representative members of
the Paris group--de Molinari's La Morale ^conomique [Economic
morality3 (1888) and Viriculture [a neologism meaning "the cultiva-
tion of manliness '"Q (1897), Guyot's La Morale de la concurrence
[^The morality of competition^ (1896), and Baudrillart's Les Rapports
de la morale et de 1'6'conomie politique pThe relationships of morality
and political economy] ( 1860)-to appreciate how strong is this
moralizing bent.
Indeed it is so marked that it connot be attributed solely to the
influence of Bastiat. A tendency to moralizing in French economic
thought may be discerned even before the rise of classical economics
in the ideas of the Physiocrats. Led by Francois Quesnay (1694-
1774), the Physiocratic school is distinctively French (it never met
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with any success in England)29 ^nd just as distinctively ethical in
tone. Its basic doctrine is a distinction between the sterile, deceptive
wealth of gold or silver and the genuine, honest wealth of agriculture
which, unlike money, can be consumed directly, can furnish direct
enjoyment, and can be renewed. The Physiocrats are usually dis-
missed for their seemingly reactionary preference for land over
commerce and industry, but the significance of their attempt to dis-
tinguish real from false wealth should not be underestimated. Even
their emphasis on agriculture seems less anachronistic if the concept
is expanded to include all natural sources of raw materials and energy,
and in any case the urgent call to distinguish genuine from deceptive
utility is definitely not anachronistic.
A similar argument might be applied in defense of the French
economists of the late nineteenth century. To borrow Gide's expres-
sion, they may change the Physiocratic words but they keep the same
tune of an ethical economics. That tune is, of course, what has con-
demned the Physiocrats, Bastiat, and the Paris group alike to relative
obscurity. They all seem to lie outside the mainstream of economic
thought which has cut ever deeper channels of objectivity, scientific
purity, and mathematization, so that by contrast the French always
seem to be splashing about in intellectual backwaters. Schumpeter is
right that their methodology is reactionary and unscientific. Gide may
30
also be right in saying these economists are justly obscure, and in
any case their approach is decidedly out of fashion. The question is
whether it is worthless. No claim is being made that any of the
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individual economists to be discussed here have the stature of Carl
Menger, for example, but what is being suggested is that the French
economic tradition deserves reassessment because of the type of
question it poses. If French economists were not overwhelmingly
successful at answering these questions, it may not mean they are
inept--on the contrary, most of them have considerable mental agility
but that the kind of issues they raise are inherently more complex
because they mingle economic considerations with ethical and social
ones.
The distinctive contribution of French economists is in handling
points of intersection where economic, ethical, and social issues join
and knot. Their concept of economics in inclusive whereas that of the
schools of Austria and Lausanne tends to be exclusive. The attain-
ments of the law of marginal utility and the mathematical curve of
consumer satisfaction, it should not be forgotten, depend on the eli-
mination of all consumer motivations except that of rational self-
interest. This crucial simplification, which is not based on empirical,
31
"scientific" data but on uncorroborated introspection, shows no
advance over the psychological model of the classical economists a
century earlier even if its economic results are expressed in more
sophisticated mathematics. The contention that value is determined
by the utility of an object to the consumer begs all sorts of questions
about how that consumer perceives utility and chooses among incom-
mensurate utilities. Such matters involving consximer psychology had
not seemed significant to classical economists, for in their day goods
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serving primary needs were scarce enough that their utility seemed
self-evident. By the latter nineteenth- century this was no longer the
case. Many more goods were available, and their relation to human
needs seemed much more problematical. The Austrians raise the
issue of consumer consciousness in pointing out that the consumer can
choose among competing marginal utilities, but their treatment of the
issue is curiously incomplete. The Austrians make other crucial
simplifications in economic thought besides this reliance on a reduc-
tionist consumer psychology. For example, they try to leave out
political judgments entirely and claim that their analysis is impartial
as to class interests. A similar posiLion of elimination in the name
of scientific neutrality is taken with respect to ethical judgments.
Utility is defined simply as the property of satisfying a desire of the
consumer, without any evaluation being made of the morality of that
desire.
French economists resist these positivistic tendencies in eco-
nomic thought. In theory some of them argue for the separation of
moral considerations from the science of economics: thus Guyot
34defends the model of a hedonistic homo economicus
, and
Courcelle-Seneuil argues in favor of a firm distinction between eco-
nomics as a science describing certain phenomena and economics as
35
a practical art of conduct. Yet in practice both write heavily ethical
economic studies, Guyot's La Morale de la concurrence being a demon-
stration of the wonder that perfect egoism has the same practical
results as perfect altruism, and Courcelle-Seneuil writing at length on
342
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moral as opposed to in^moral uses of wealth. Certainly a sin^ilar
distinction between theory and practice should be made for theorists
of marginal utility like Menger. but in the case of the French the
defense of methodological objectivity is far less consistent while the
practice of moralizing economics is far more consistent. For the
Paris group, in fact, a central issue is how to reconcile a possible
conflict between economic and moral duty implied by Bastiat and
others when they conclude that only the proliferation of need,
absorb increases in productive efficiency. The same conflict i;
implied by the "hedonist" school which, of course, does not claim to
prescribe a search for pleasure but which nonetheless says that this
search accurately describes consumer behavior. The Paris group is
not comfortable with this stance of value
-free neutrality. Is it true
that consumers are in fact seeking only pleasure, and if so how does
their behavior fit in with a moral tradition inherited from Christian
and non-Christian antiquity counselling self-discipline and restraint
of desires? Furthermore, how could that moral tradition be recon-
ciled with the new economic imperative to multiply needs in order to
prevent crises of unemployment and overproduction? Henri Baudrillart,
a leader of the Paris group, poses the dilemma in these terms:
What are we to think of such a conflict, which seems to place
modern societies in a terrible alternative, of renouncing either
morality or progress? Between the theory of the indefinite
development of needs and that of moderation in desires, is there
an incompatibility? Must civilization come to a halt in order not
to perish? ^'7
It is largely due to Baudrillart's influence that the attempt of
French economists to resolve this incompatibility came to rest on the
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issue of luxury. While Baudrillart was teaching political economy at
the College de France in the 1860's, he was so dismayed by the spec-
tacle of luxury under the Second Empire-both the public variety con-
sisting of the rebuilding of Paris with magnificent buildings and square,
and the private variety centered around the court of Louis Napoleon—
that he began an investigation into the history of luxury. The
resulting opus magnum, his L'Histoire du luxe priv^ et public depuis
I'antiquitg jusqu'^ nos jours [jhe history of private and public luxury
from antiquity until modern time si was finally published in four
volumes from 1878 to 1880. In this work Baudrillarfs goal as an
economic historian is to describe the various types of luxury through
the ages. As a moralist, his purpose is to argue for a moderate posi-
tion between "rigorists" who would abolish luxury altogether and
"apologists" who would defend it in all its forms. This choice of
Ixaxury as a subject is one of the best indications of the moralism of
French economic thought. The very term is laden with moral conno-
39tations, and it is inherited not from^ economists so much as from
Enlightenment moralists like Voltaire, Montesquieu, de Mandeville,
and Rousseau, and before them from a long line of ethical philosophers
stretching back through the early Church fathers into antiquity.
Baudrillart himself says of the topic, "There are few subjects which
touch both moral and economic considerations so closely. In it they
40
appear, whatever one might say, closely, solidly united. " In
raising this issue Baudrillart raises basic questions regarding moti-
vations for and ethics of consumption. How should luxury be defined.
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and how may it be distinguished from necessities? What is the proper
role for superfluity in human life? How may desire for superfluity be
restrained? In other words, through the subject of luxury French
economists begin to approach questions of consumer psychology which
the Austrians leave unresolved.
Furthermore, the subject of luxury also brings up some of the
most important social and political consequences of modern consump-
tion. Although the concept of luxury is ancient, to raise it in the later
nineteenth century is to reassess it in an entirely new social context.
Earlier the morality of luxury was a problem only for a tiny minority,
as most people were faced with resigning themselves to a subsistence
level of consumption at best rather than enjoying a choice of super-
fluities. But the democratization of objects of luxury also means a
democratization of its ethical dilemmas. A major revaluation of
luxury is required in an age of industrial progress, especially
regarding the question whether l\ixury is still luxury if it is cheap.
Baudrillart himself is aware that a new ethics of liixury is needed
"appropriate to our customs and to our times, " since it is becoming
clear that democracy is no bar against a phenomenon which had
hitherto been associated with monarchies and aristocracies:
What does luxury have to do, one might say, with the working
classes? It is natural to say such things if one attributes only
ideas of sumptuousnes s and elegance to this expression. But
... it should be extended to cover undesirable superfluity in all
its forms.
. . .
There is neither harshness nor paradox in main-
taining that these popular classes also must curtail something,
.... The need of enjoyments, hitherto restricted above all to the
superior classes, for whom religious teaching reserved its
teaching delivered from high in the pulpit, -this need for enjoy-
ments, in spreading more and more, has created a new
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congregation for new preachers.
. . whose task xs to convey thesanne truths m the name of science and reason. 41
Although the historical parts of Baudrillarfs L'Bstoire du 1uxe
are fairly tedious and uncontro versial, his ethical discussions at the
beginning and end sparked a debate about luxury which continued during
the 1880's and into the early 1890's. In 1881 Baudrillarfs tome was
reviewed in the Revue des deux mondes by fmile de Laveleye (1822-
1892), a Belgian economist and correspondant of the Institut de France,
who talces Baudrillart to task for being overly permissive towards
1
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luxury. De Laveleye plainly declares himself a "rigorist" and pro-
ceeds to attack luxury on moral, economic, and political grounds.
His article was expanded into a book published in 1886 under the
straightforward title Le Luxe fLiixury].^^ De Laveleye's book was
in turn reviewed by Baudrillart at a session of the Academie des
sciences morales et politiques held on July 30, 1888. Considering
that de Laveleye criticized his position very sharply, Baudrillart's
response is generous. He concedes it is better to lean towards
severity than to indulgence in this matter, and wonders mildly if
44luxury deserves "such a complete and uniform anathema. "
Baudrillart's review elicited some further brief comments from
fellow Academician Courcelle-Seneuil, who just the previous month
had published an article in the Nouvelle revue on "La morale et
I'usage des richesses" [Morality and the use of wealth]]
,
and from
Frederic Passy, doyen of the Paris group. At the next session of
the Academic, held the following week (August 6), Paul Leroy- Beaulieu
presented a more vigorous rebuttal to de Laveleye's book in the form
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of a long prepared statement which begins:
The principal use that man makes of the increase in his pro-
ductive power is the augmentation of his consumption and of
his enjoyments, notably of his consumption of luxury. The
more a society is civilized, the more luxury is widely dis-
tributed in all levels of the population. ^7
While Baudrillart backs off from a confrontation with de Laveleye's
rigorism, the younger Paul Leroy-Beaulieu is more than willing to
do battle. His paper inspired a general discussion on the morality
of Ixaxury both at tlat session (August 6) of the Academic and at the
following one (August 13): among those participating were Baudrillart
himself, Courcelle
-Seneuil again, and Paul Leroy-Beaulieu's brother
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Ana.tole Leroy-Beaulieu (1842-1912). After these sessions of the
Academie debate came to an end there, but discussion in print con-
tinued for some years. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu developed the ideas in
his Academie paper into a much more complete discussion of luxury
49published in the Revue des deux mondes in 1894 and expanded them
still again two years later in his massive five-volvime Traite'
th^orique et pratique d'^conomic politique [Theoretical and practical
50
treatise of political economyj . Charles Secr^tan (1815-1895), a
Swiss correspondant of the Institut widely read in France, followed
the discussions closely and was inspired by them to write an essay
51
on l\ixury for the Revue philosophique of September 1888. The
debate was also followed by Charles Gide, then an economist at the
University of Montpellier who had made his break from the Paris
group and was developing an alternative to its doctrines in an econo-
mics of solidarity. Gide would later present his response to the
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debate in subsequent editions of his popular treatise Princi£es
d'^conomie politique (Principles of political economy]
. (Further
reference to Gide is reserved for the following part ^vhere solidar-
ist ideas will be treated. )
Each of these econonriists has a unique perspective on the subject,
but without obliterating too many nuances it is possible to place them
in two major categories: those who generally defend luxury as part of
the general progress of civilization, and those who oppose it as a
source of personal and social unhappiness. Rather than recounting
the course of the debate as it wound from the 1880's into the 1890's,
an exercise that would be both tedious and occasionally confusing, we
shall outline major psychological, political, and economic arguments
of each of the two sides. We shall begin with Baudrillart, who first
articulates in detail the theory of the evolution of needs suggested by
Bastiat: it becomes the crucial argument in the defense of luxury.
That theory is then elaborated and refined by Paul Leroy-Beaulieu,
who will serve as a second major spokesman in favor of luxury.
Next we shall turn to the opponents of l\ixury, beginning with
de Laveleye himself who first enunciates the late nineteenth-century
version of the ancient protest against luxury. On this side of the
debate too the ideas of a septuagenarian are taken up (although not
quite so directly in this case) by a younger man, in this case by Paul's
brother Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, who will serve as the second spokes-
man against luxury. The conclusion of this section will suggest how
the opposing schools of thought about luxury may be seen in more
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general terms as opposing concepts of consumption. In many ways
the idea of lixxury is a cWsy tool with which to build a better under-
standing of consumption, but with it the French economists at least
undertake the task which others had neglected. Their legacy may
perhaps be seen in twentieth- century economics, where two of the
outstanding students of consimiption-
- Jean Baudrillaid (b. 1929) and
Jean Fourastie (b. 1907)-
-are French.
Baudrillart on Luxury and Needs
Baudrillart's interest in consumer psychology is evident from
the very outset of his Histoire du luxe . Instead of defining liixury
goods-
-something he never does, except to contrast them with
necessities and to identify them with superfluities, whether costly or
53
cheap --he examines the motivations for liixury. According to
Baudrillart, four basic "instincts of luxury" are innate and constant
in human nature- -sensuality, vanity, desire for adornment, and
desire for novelty. As Baudrillart describes these instincts, the
first three correspond to the three definitions of function or utility
described in the previous part: sensuality originates in physical
needs, vanity in the desire to impress others in society, and desire
for adornment in a thirst for the ideal akin to the aesthetic sense.
The fourth motivation, desire for novelty, is an important addition to
the list of needs served through consximption. It can accompany any
of the preceding three, and even when other motivations are fiilfilled
that for novelty can remain undiminished. Taken together these
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instincts drive human beings to keep multiplying their needs in num-
ber and complexity. The range of human desire is elastic, variable,
54
and finally unlimited.
Just how is this portrait of the instinctive, desiring consumer
to be reconciled with the portrait of the rational homo economicus
inherited from classical economic theory? This is one of the great
issues left unresolved by Baudrillart and other defenders of luxury.
Perhaps their idea is that the consumer will act reasonably to satisfy
his instincts, but certainly in Baudrillart's account there is much
more emphasis on instinct than on reason. This marks a distinct
change of emphasis in the classical tradition, especially when
Baudrillart goes on to defend desire as an economic motivation in the
strongest terms. He is well aware that moralists since antiquity have
warned that men must limit their desires or be caught in a wearying
and destructive chase after more and more things, Baudrillart boldly
disagrees with the conventional wisdom. For him the proliferation of
needs is identified with and indeed constitutes a definition of the pro-
gress of civilization. "Yes, the human soul is an inexhaustible source
of desires. From the economic point of view, from the point of view
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of the development of societies, it is good that this is so. " From
the economic point of view, expanding consumption stimulates expand-
ing production, for the manufacture of necessities alone is not sufficient
to keep man from "his most redoubtable, his most destructive enemy,
56
the force of inertia.
.
.
" From the social point of view, all the
dynamism of civilization, all its arts and attainments and restless
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activity, in short all its progress springs from desire for luxuries
which surpass brute necessities. But what about the moral point of
view? Is there indeed a terrible alternative between civilization and
morality? No: morality develops along with the rest of civilization,
and so the expansion of desires hastens moral progress along with
material. Man's moral and spiritual needs evolve along with his
physical ones, for civilization is a unity-
-"a laborious harmony, "
said Baudrillart, echoing Bastiat, "but nonetheless a harmony. "^"^
Although opponents of luxury tend to adopt a tone of moral superiority,
Baudrillart accuses them of blocking moral development in their
attempt to limit material development: "If it is true that the predom-
inance of material needs [over moral ones] presents very grave
dangers, the extinction of these needs is equivalent to nothing less
than brutalization. "^^
Now we begin to understand why Baudrillart neglects to define
luxury. There can be no absolute definition of it because it is a purely
relative phenomenon, evolving as civilization evolves. At any one time
the superfluous and the necessary make an "indiscernible mixture, "^"^
and over time the line between the two, uncertain at best, keeps shifting
as human needs become more complex. "The transformation of the
superfluous into the necessary is the law of civilization. "^*^ This
relativism suggests why Baudrillart chooses to compose an economic
history of luxury rather than a non-chronological treatise on the sub-
ject. Obviously his approach has much in common with the German
historical school, which insists there are no eternal laws of economics
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and that each society must be considered separately as a distinct and
unique entity. BaudriUart similarly insists that he can define luxury
only within the context of a particular civilization. But he is far frot
being wholly relativistic
,
because he retains an absolute concept of
something called civilization which progresses over time, and indeed
he insists that the degree of civilization is measured by proliferation
and complexity of needs. Capacity for production had usually been
taken as the index of historical development, and in Baudrillart's day
anthropologists were devoting much attention to classifying early tools
as a way of determining the sophistication of early civilization.
BaudriUart, on the contrary, uses consumption as the index of
sophistication, and even suggests that the development of productive
capacity depends on the previous development of capacity for
consumption.
As the reference to anthropological ideas suggests, Baudrillart's
frame of reference comes at least as much from theories of organic
evolution as from German economic historicism- -probably a good
deal more, in fact, as BaudriUart is explicit and insistent in estab-
lishing an organic basis for his theory of the evolution of needs. "In
observing organized beings, the first fact which strikes one is that the
multiplicity of needs is the sign of the superiority of species. "^^ It
has already been noted that BaudriUart emphasizes how needs have
become more complex over time, and when he turns to this organic
analogy he expands his argument in an important way. Many differ-
ent species, both superior and inferior- -in other words, having many
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needs or few--coexist at one time. In a similar way superior and
inferior civilizations coexist at one time: "What I have just said of
species, - adds Baudrillart, "may be applied to races. Races without
needs are races without ideas. "^^ Civilization therefore does not
progress as a unified bloc but is divided into races, each of which
develops at a different pace. Occidental races are "depositories of the
highest civilization which this globe has ever witnessed" because of
the complexity of their needs. At the other end of the scale are native
peoples whose needs are only beginning to be aroused as they come in
contact with colonizing Occidental races. In the evolution of needs,
the racial order recapitulates the historical order. Similarly the
social order within a society also recapitulates the historical order..
For example, working classes within western societies have few needs
when compared with the higher classes. According to Baudrillart, the
workers of Lille and Rouen live in unhealthy cavelike dwellings which
enlightened reformers may regard as intolerable but which the workers
64find quite acceptable. In non-human nature, in human races, and in
social classes, complexity of needs signifies superiority. If moradity
were based on the restriction of needs as "rigorists" claim, "the
oyster would be morally superior to the elephant or to the horse, the
savage to the civilized man, the peasant to the man of the superior
classes. "^^ Baudrillart's theory is not only one of historical develop-
ment--the progress of luxury being the key to the progress of civiliza-
tion- -but it is also a social theory- -the development of luxury being
the sign of social superiority.
353
Paul Leroy-Beaulien'
. Defense of Li,vnr..
This is the poxnt where Paul Leroy- BeauUeu begins to expand on
Baudrillart's ideas. Leroy-Beaulieu has been praised justly both by
contemporaries and by recent commentators as the most able and
interesting of the Paris group^^ and certainly in comparison to
Baudrillart his mind seems much clearer. His approach to the sub-
ject of luxury is conceptual rather than historical. Both in his paper
read to the Acad^mie on August 6. 1888. and in his amplified discus-
sion published m the Trait^ of 1896, Leroy-Beaulieu begins with a
formal definition of l\ixury as:
that part of the superfluous which goes beyond what the
generality of the inhabitants of a country at a specified
time consider as essential not only to the needs of exis-
tence but even to the decency and agreeableness of life. 67
Luxury is what most people in a society think you can do without. Paul
Leroy-Beaulieu appeals to collective consciousness rather than any
objective standard for his definition, and therefore elaborates upon
Baudrillart's idea that society is stratified according to perception of
needs, so that what the lower orders consider luxuries are often con-
sidered necessities by the higher orders. This subjective definition
implies an objective one, however, in that luxury is what most people
cannot afford to buy. "Each class considers as lioxury the objects
which its financial situation does not permit it to possess and which the
•
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superior class, m the contrary, has the means to use. " Far from
being democratized, Ixixury is defined by its limitation to an elite.
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Leroy-Beaulieu concludes his presentation to the Acadfmie with
an observation he would repeat afterwards as the key to the subject:
"The question of luxury is only one side of a wider question, that of
the inequality of conditions. "^^ Leroy-Beaulieu's defense of luxury
is truly only one part of his wider defense of inequality. Desire to
have more goods than others stimulates effort at all levels of the
social scale. The middle classes work harder than they might other-
wise in order to enjoy an "honorable and comfortable life, while even
among the lower classes some men and women labor longer to procure
certain secondary elegances, vulgar perhaps, but superfluous none-
70theless. " The stimulating effects of desire for luxury are most
pronounced among the inventors and directors of industry. Some of
them are so high-minded that they persevere just to render service to
mankind, but "there are other energetic, capable, and ardent men who
are guided by a less noble ideal and who are more sensitive to the
appeal of luxury than to the pure joys of the spirit or to the satisfac-
tion of an elevated self-esteem. "^^ At first glance it seems useless
for their wives to wear diamonds or to ride in expensive cars for
simple errands, but these luxuries do have a purpose after all, for
it is often to procure these goods for his wife or his daughters
and, for himself, the luster that results from them, that cer-
tain men have labored, invented, confronted risks, created
industries useful to the entire world.
. . One can believe that
supererogatory, exceptional efforts which desire for luxury
incites singularly augment the productive power of humanity,
even for necessary objects. 72
Even Baudrillart did not make such claims for the benefits of
luxury. When Paul Leroy-Beaulieu presented this hypothesis to the
Acad^mie, the older economist responded that inventors are
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motivated by noble ends or, at the most, by a desire for comfort
rather than for the "exceptional show" of luxury. "^^ Despite these
differences, however, both these economists tend to defend luxury
less by the pleasures of consumption than by its role in inciting pro-
duction. Baudrillart's belief that necessity alone is an insufficient
spur to economic progress has already been noted, and Paul Leroy-
Beaulieu's argument that luxury motivates entrepreneurs is only an
extension of this argument. In other ways Leroy-Beaulieu defends
consumption by appealing to the traditional ethics of production. For
example, he emphasizes upkeep
[
entretienj as a virtue of the con-
sumer. Like a good French housewife, the good consumer repairs
objects, keeps them in good order, and recycles them, for material
well-being may be served through more orderly consumption as well
as through increased production. Prosperous peoples understand this,
while barbaric peoples and children have no concept of upkeep
(Leroy-Beaulieu notes disapprovingly that "Buildings in ruin and new
^ .1^. . 74buildings are juxtaposed in Oriental cities. ") Another way he
defends consumption by reference to the virtues of production is seen
in his preference for more commodities over more time. Paul Leroy-
Beaulieu fears leisure. Economic progress will be slowed or halted
if people come to prefer more leisure to more goods, and he wonders
if this preference might not grow as primary needs are increasingly
satisfied. More leisure, as advocated by some socialists, would
result in a "relaxation of the intimate springs" of human activity and
75
lead to a "state of economic stagnation. . . " Leroy-Beaulieu assumes
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that hun.an beings are basically lazy and that civUi.at.on
.s in contin-
ual danger of sliding back into "the intellectual somnolence and
material privations of primitive ages. "
Yet Paul Leroy-Beaulieu brings forth other arguments for
luxury besides its role .n stimulating productive virtues like upkeep
and hard work. In fact, he makes a strong case that the consumption
of superfluities is ultimately what makes Hfe worth living. The basis
of his argument-and in this he echoes BaudriUart-is that there is nc
legitimate way to distinguish luxuries from necessities. Leroy-
Beaulieu rejects Bastiafs proposal in Harmon.es that survival needs
(like food) developed first among men and superfluous needs (like
adornment) came only later. The instinct for luxury, he says, is
innate and demands expression from the outset of human civilization.
Indeed any attempt on the part of economists to classify needs by
degree of superfluity is bound to be arbitrary. The only reasonable
way to classify types of consumption is by their object-food, clothing,
entertainment, education, and so forth-leaving aside the question of
superfluity as a false and misleading category. " While needs have
their origin in the unvarying demands of man's physical and psycho-
logical nature, those needs are "indefinitely extensible and variable
78m their forms or their objects. Through the combined operations
of imitation, habit, and heredity, the expression of human needs
becomes even more varied and animated. The development of luxury
therefore goes far beyond the physical requirements of man to express
"the aspirations of his intellectual and moral nature, notably the thirst
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for the ideal.
. . ^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^ _^
become expressions of spiritual
.deals, Leroy-Beaulieu cites the need
for ornamentation [parure] "which appears precisely the most frivolous
. . .
[but which] is the most universal and the most permanent.
.
.
" This
need is found among the most abject tribes; originating with the human
body, it is extended to a person's dependents and finally to everything
belonging to him-
-lodgings, furniture, domestic animals, tombs-and
finally "constitutes.
. .
the category of the ideal at least as much as that
80
of vanity.
.
.
"
The Limits of LuxurY
But where is the expansion of needs to end? Is there any
reason to limit this process of multiplication and complication?
Paul Leroy-Beaulieu may fear a return to torpor without luxury, but
too much desire for superfluities might lead to perpetual restlessness,
to a feverishly overheated chase after pleasure. Both he and Baudrillart
defend luxury, but their defense is not total. They cannot permit all
extravagances, no matter how perverse or extreme, and still contend
that luxury is compatible with morality. If on the one hand they oppose
"rigorists" like de Laveleye, on the other hand they cannot approve of
the degeneracies flaunted by decadents like des Esseintes. Immediately
after proclaiming that "it is good" for the human soul to be "an inexhaus-
tible source of desires" (see p. 349), Baudrillart hastens to add, "But
it is necessary to distinguish among those desires.
. . jamong"^ those
which it is beautiful and even obligatory to obey and those to which it
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is shameful to surrender. "^^ Having admitted the need for moral
distinction among desires. Baudrillart is not especially lucid in
explaining how to draw the line between luxury which is improper
[
abusif] and that which is permissible. Improper luxury may be either
absolute or relative. Absolutely improper luxury is "all luxury con-
demned by morality, propriety, and taste"--in other words, whatever
8 2
society generally disapproves. As for relatively improper luxury,
it means simply living beyond one's income: an expense which is per-
missible for a rich person is relatively improper for a poor person
(Baudrillart cites the inevitable examples of how the poor spend large
8 3amounts of money on tobacco and alcohol). As ethical philosophy
this is singularly unhelpful. The first rule is shallow because it defines
immoral luxuries as those condemned by social convention. The second
rule is irrelevant because it counsels against buying luxuries one can-
not afford instead of suggesting limits on luxuries one can afford.
Baudrillart admits that in formulating his ethics he wants above all to
find a middle point between rigorists condemning all luxury and
apologists permitting it all, and his concern with denouncing these
two extremes, his immoderate determination to be moderate, means
he never gets around to establishing an independent and viable ethic.
Once more Paul Leroy- Beaulieu begins where Baudrillart
leaves off. His goal is also to demonstrate that neither the ascetic
nor the indulgent ideal is satisfactory, and also like his predecessor
he recognizes two general categories of luxury, "healthy, intelligent"
85
ones and the "unhealthy, extravagant" ones. So far this is no
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imiprovement over BaudriUart, but Paul Leroy-Beaulieu goes on to
suggest an historical model which clarifies his distinction between
healthy and unhealthy superfluities. There are three general types of
luxury, he says, corresponding to three different historical situations:
primitive luxury characteristic of patriarchal societies through the
Middle Ages, decadent luxury as in the declining Roman Empire or in
the contemporary Orient, and the modern luxury of prosperous peoples.
As simplifying and generalizing concepts applied to historical data,
these models are "ideal types, " to use the term Max Weber would
introduce about a decade later. Certainly they represent a more help-
ful view of the history of luxury than Baudrillart's chronological
narrative.
The first two types represent what Paul Leroy-BeaxxLieu terms
unhealthy luxury. Primitive luxury is characterized by the presence of
a large number of servants, by a desire for ostentation, and by sheer
quantity of goods consumed. It still exists in some parts of the world
(like Russia), but has disappeared in the contemporary West. Decadent
liixury, instead of serving normal physical or intellectual needs,
"consists only in the search for very costly pleasures and objects,
only because they are costly, in systematic wastefulness, in the unique
satisfaction of extreme vanity. " This "grotesque.
. . criminal. . .
degrading, harmful, inavowable" type of luxury is not widespread in
modern times for the whole society is not in decadence, but Leroy-
Beaulieu warns that "There are, however, in the past several years,
in certain social circles, those who make a profession of dilettantism
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and of the decadent spirit, " such as certain aristocrats or the degener-
ate sons of rich bourgeoisie. Decadent luxury is therefore a sort of
86atavism of very limited scope.
Leroy-Beaulieu's main reason for describing these two types
of luxury is to show how radically different is the modern variety. This
last model is characterized by a search for comfort rather than for
magnificence, so that modern luxury is really much less ostentatious
than that of the past. Instead of being displayed in public, luxury has
gone indoors, so to speak, to be displayed in the privacy of the home
in the company of a few friends. Modern luxury is above all domesti-
cated. Dwellings have been transformed from shelters into homes that
are "neat, agreeable, diversified, animated by a number of interesting
objects. " In another major transformation, luxury no longer involves
owning people directly as inferior menials, but now consists of the
ability to command the labor of an honored class of artisans and artists
8 8who make costly products. Today's luxury is much more productive
economically because it stimulates manufacture instead of wasting
human and natural resources. Instead of tending to sheer sumptuosity
and quantity in a limited number of items, modern luxury prefers
diversity and elegance. Furthermore, it consists not of transient
objects and experiences but of durable items of which the consumption
is slow rather than rapid, such as jewels, furniture, works of art,
parks, and tapestries. All these are things Leroy-Beaulieu calls "the
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capital of enjoyment. " Finally, luxury today is not confined to a
small elite but "embraces and penetrates all of life; it reaches, in
different degrees, all classes of people. . . "^^ Like d'Avenel,
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Paul Leroy-Beaulieu credits new materials and techniques with making
"the difference between the lives of men of diverse classes.
. . much
less in the real enjoyments they can procure than in the value thev
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possess. " In all these contrasts between the characteristics of pri-
mitive and modern luxury-
-public vs. private, ostentatious vs. com-
fortable, elitist vs. democratic, improductive vs. reproductive,
quantity vs. quality, transience vs. durability-
-Paul Leroy-Beaulieu
upholds the modern type as vastly superior. To summarize his vision
of a healthy modern luxury, he turns to Holland of the seventeenth
century:
Who would not admire these cheerful dwellings of Amsterdam,
with commodious and modest proportions, embellished with
all those masterpieces -
-paintings of domestic scenes, of
animals or of landscapes--those elegant country houses, with- •
out ostentation, with their perfected culture of fruits and
flowers, ... 92
If modern luxury is morally far superior to that of antiquity,
it shows that moral improvement comes about not because of ethical
exhortations or government actions, but because of the slow and natural
development of customs. Further improvement in the morality of
consumption will come about as social life continues to evolve naturally
without interference from the state or other institutions. Leroy-
Beaulieu is especially opposed to sumptuary laws as a method of
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improving public morality in matters of luxury. Not only would this
be an unwarranted invasion of personal liberty, but it would also be
futile, for "insofar as the nature of most men has not been transformed
by philosophy or religion, it would be, from the economic point of view,
94
a fundamental error to try to suppress luxury. " Of course private
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individuals should be encouraged to direct public opinion against harm-
ful excesses. Basically, however, the consumer should be left free to
make his own choices, and matters of morality should be left to the
95
gradual enlightenment of public opinion.
In this case too Baudrillart hesitates to go quite as far as
Paul Leroy-Beaulieu. When the older economist views the historical
evolution of Ixixury, he is less impressed by the gradual moral improve-
ment it brings than by the fact that the political change from monarchy
to democracy had not brought about any marked diminution of its
excesses:
Today this passion for show, this taste for enjoyments, these
excessive expenses. . .have gained in extent with the progress
of affluence what they have lost in intensitv; it is an evil which
more and more reaches the very masses.
Baudrillart does not think that modern luxury is different in character
from the primitive type, for the same motivations which have made
extravagant wastrels in the past today create "vulgar knaves, fraudulent
bankruptcies, unscrupulous speculators, and young women without
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illusions who want above all to marry rich. " In a modern democracy
there seems no limit on desire: "it wants the impossible, it dreams of
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the unbelievable and the unlimited. " These pessimistic observations
probably account for Baudrillart's generous review of de Laveleye's
book delivered in the Acad^mie in 1888. In the decade since his own
book appeared, the development of needs may have seemed to be getting
out of hand, and de Laveleye- -whose book is published by a popular
press, Baudrillart notes approvingly- -is preaching restraint to the
masses. More than Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, Baudrillart sees a need for
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moral leaders like de Laveleye to warn against the dangers of modern
luxury. Moral guidance from private individuals is the only way to
combat those dangers, for against them the economic or political
arrangements of society are impotent, besides being "an abusive inter-
vention of authority in private life. "^"^ While Baudrillart is a good
deal less sanguine than Leroy-Beaulieu that historical evolution auto-
matically means moral improvement, he falls back on the same prac-
tical advice. Both economists apply to consumption the dogmas of
opposition to state action and support for individual liberty which also
lead them to oppose protective tariffs and labor laws in matters of
production. Any restrictions on consumption is a violation of the
cardinal rule laissez-faire. The consumer should be left free to pur-
sue his rational self-interest, a self-interest nonetheless guided by the
civilizing touch of religion and morality which moderate the instinct
for luxury.
Critical Remarks: Weaknesses of the Evolutionary Analo
The origins of this laissez-faire ethic of consumption may be
traced not only to the intellectual reflexes of economic liberalism, but
also to the evolutionary analogy on which Baudrillart and Paul Leroy-
Beaulieu base their defense of luxury. If moral and material needs
evolve together as a unified whole, then moral welfare will never
seriously lag behind material welfare because moral capacities expand
to keep pace with the expansion of goods available for consumption.
This theory is optimistic but hardly convincing. The relationship
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between moral and material progress, one of the central issues of
nineteenth-century thought, is never really analyzed as to their inter-
action. Their interdependence is asserted but hardly demonstrated,
and intellectual confusion results in ethical confusion. Paul Leroy-
Beaulieu, for example, condemns luxury which "prefers material
superfluities to.
. .
intellectual pleasures" ^^^-good bourgeois advice,
but advice which contradicts his own theory that "material superfluities'
are stimulants to moral progress and that material and moral needs
are interchangeable parts of the grand progress of civilization. When
that general evolution is defended as beneficial, there is little way to
discriminate among its particular manifestations
, to praise some while
condemning others, because they are all part of the same process. In
formulating specific ethical guidelines for luxury, Paul Leroy-Beaulieu
seems to retreat to the conventions of his class rather than use his
theory to create an independent moral code. We have noticed the same
tendency with Baudrillart, who resorts to defining improper luxury as
that which is generally disapproved by society. The distinctions these
economists make between proper or improper luxury, or between
healthy and unhealthy luxury, seem formulated to justify the way of life
with which they are most familiar.
This is not the only place where difficulties in the theory of
the evolution of needs are evaded by a retreat to defending contemporary
bourgeois luxury. Another example involves the final goal of the evolu-
tion of needs. A theory of evolution, of course, does not have to posit
a final end, for the process may proceed indefinitely without making
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progress, so that it constitutes change without improvement. However,
Baudrillart and Paul Leroy-Beaulieu clearly identify the evolution of
luxury with improvement by their assertion that the development of
needs constitutes the progress of civilization. What, then, is this
ultimate goal of civilization? The answer is never stated, but the
implication is strong that the final goal of luxury is a late nineteenth-
century upper bourgeois life: salons in substantial homes, books and
pianos, good art and good wines, travel and conversation. "^^^ This is
not necessarily a wrong-headed ideal by any means, but the question of
the final end of the evolution of luxury is too important to be left to
inference. To justify an existing lifestyle represents a narrowing of
intellectual focus away from a broad and disinterested inquiry. That
contraction is especially disappointing because it follows what is best
in the work of Paul Leroy-Beaulieu and Baudrillart, their catholic
defense of human needs as potential sources of dignity and idealism.
In this respect they continue the tradition of Guyau, who rehabilitates
consximption as something other than shameful submission to animal
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needs, and the tradition of other aesthetic thinkers mentioned in the
last part who argue that the concept of utility should encompass social
and spiritual as well as physical needs. Baudrillart and Paul Leroy-
Beaulieu are equally open in their understanding of the varied and mixed
motives which impel consumption beyond bare necessity. But having
made a case for consumption of superfluities, they have difficulty
defining its ultimate end or how it should be limited. These two prob-
lems with their theory are closely related. Only with an understanding
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of a final goal is it possible to place needs in a hierarchy, to order
and correlate them and to chose pr.orUies,
.n short, to keep consump-
tion of luxuries from proliferating indefinitely and aimlessly. Paul
Leroy-Beaulieu and Baudrillart tend to fall back on bourgeois luxury
as an image of that final goal, and on bourgeois conventions as defining
limits to Ixixury.
There is one more unresolved point in this evolutionary
theory of needs which results in ethical confusion, this one involving
the relationship between the development of human needs and the
development of products to satisfy them. Again Paul Leroy-Beaulieu
and Baudrillart suggest that these two parts of the evolutionary pro-
cess develop simultaneously without explaining the nature of their
interdependence. One possibility is that when a need arises, for
whatever reason, it stimulates people to manufacture products to
satisfy the need. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu and Baudrillart suggest this
possibility when they claim that the development of needs stimulates
industrial production. A second possibility is that products originate
independently for technological or commercial reasons, and that
human needs are born only when a means of fulfilling them is avail-
able. This latter possibility is analogous to a Darwinian view of
evolution in which the organism evolves in response to the external
environment. By the same token the first view might be called a
Lamarckian theory of consumption, according to which the need creates
the organ, or in this case, the need creates the commodity. Paul
Leroy-Beaulieu's and Baudrillart's failure to complete their biological
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analogy and to choose between these two alternatives
.neans that they
fail to explain the relationship between hun.an needs and con.x.erc.al
products. In etMcal terms, the Darwinian view suggests a not part.cu-
larly noble view of humanity, for man's needs are automatically
aroused by the environment rather having their source in the human
spirit as the Lamarckian view supposes. In economic terms, the
question is whether needs create the market, or whether the market
creates needs. In psychological terms, the question is whether people
feel needs which they cannot satisfy. If the sense of need creates pro-
ducts in Lamarckian fashion, then at each stage of history, at each
level of society, people create products appropriate for their needs.
Any sense of unfulfilled needs is positive and creative because it
results in the production of goods to satisfy those needs, and so there
is always an approximate balance between capacities for consumption
and for production. If the Darwinian version that needs are generated
by products is correct, however, it is possible to have a social situa-
tion where the market displays the same range of products to everyone,
arousing the same needs in everyone, while only some people have the
economic resources to satisfy those needs. If this latter interpreta-
tion is correct, then there is no reason for optimism that unsatisfied
needs are a source of progress. Instead they are a source of at least
temporary frustration and unrest because one can feel a need without
105being able to satisfy it.
In the previous part we saw how significant are evolutionary
analogies in the aesthetic thought of the period, especially in the
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attempt to arrive at an understanding of utility. They are also crucial
in our understanding of economic thought, and for the same reason that
reliance on them has implications far beyond the field of specialization.
Leroy-Beaulieu and Baudrillart base their whole defense of luxury on
an evolutionary analogy, and yet they fail to extend that analogy far
enough or to examine its implications. They turn to their upper
bourgeois culture to correct the deficiencies of their theory, when as
economist-moralists they should rather apply their thought to correct
the deficiencies of contemporary culture.
Critical Remarks: The Democratization of Luxury?
It is in dealing with the phenomenon of the democratization of
l\axury that the inconsistencies of Baudrillart and Paul Leroy-Beaulieu
become most obvious. That they are well aware of this phenomenon
may be seen in Baudrillart's apprehensions about the proliferation of
luxury in modern democracy and in Paul Leroy-Beaulieu's character-
ization of modern luxury as one permeating all levels of the popula-
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tion. Although Baudrillart has his reservations about the democra-
tization of luxury, he generally praises this process by which both
misery and luxury have become less extreme. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu
is unreserved in his praise for technological progress which enables
modern workers to have clothes and furniture which "for untutored
eyes, for myopic eyes, and even for the actual utility of things,
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[jive^ an approximation tending to egality. " This growing
egalitarianism in luxury is basic to Paul Leroy-Beaulieu's general
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optimism, for to him it means that the social question may be solved
without socialism and that inequalities in consumption may be elimina-
ted through natural evolution rather than through legal action. The
trouble is that he maintains simultaneously that inequality in consump-
tion is to be desired, as only inequality inspires every one to produce
more and thus to further the progress of civilization. If on the one
hand inequality is a blessing because it brings progress, on the other
hand the tendency to greater equality is a blessing because it brings
social harmony. On the one hand inequality is supposed to stimulate
civilization, and on the other hand the lessening of inequality is a sign
of the progress of civilization from unhealthy, primitive luxury to the
modern, healthy variety.
Paul Leroy-Beaulieu's cautious reference to "an approximation
which tends to equality" indicates his awareness of his predicament.
Directly after that statement he adds, "Thus the reign of machines
prepares the era not of a complete equality, certainly, which would be
a misfortune, but of a sort of uniformity of enjoyment and of comfort
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among men. " His circumlocutions suggest once again the menda-
cious attributes of democratic luxury. If it is so convincing that people
feel they truly share the same enjoyments and comforts, then they have
no motivation to work hard and will sink back into torpor, according to
Paul Lieroy- Beaulieu's psychological assumptions. But if the luxury
of the masses is not a convincing facsimile of the real thing, then it
will not bring social peace, and so talk of the democratization of luxury
is deceiving. In fact, according to Paul Leroy-Beaulieu's own definition,
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genuine dennocratization of luxury is impossible. Luxury is defined
as what nnost people cannot afford and what only a superior class has
the means to possess. Once an object is owned by most people, it
should therefore be reclassified as a necessity according to the process
by which "The frontiers of luxury keep retreating ceaselessly.
.
.
"'^^'^
At one point Leroy-Beaulieu says that the democratization of luxuries
means ordinary people may enjoy luxuries "in the sense of super-
fluities, " but this absolutist definition of luxury which depends on
a static concept of superfluity is just what he argues against so
vehemently everywhere else. The confusion could be resolved if he
were to accept a simple definition of superfluity as a non-essential
item and to speak of the "democratization of superfluities, " while
conceding that an elite continues to enjoy luxuries, defined as expensive
items. This characterization of modern consumption would be both
more precise and more honest. But both he and Baudrillart confuse
superfluity and luxury. They make a strong case for superfluity in
consumption as what makes life worth living, but then assume that
superfluity must also be a luxury, that is, reserved for a few. Thus
most people are condemned to a life not worth living. Cannot their
arguments in favor of the liberating possibilities of superfluous con-
sumption be accepted without also accepting their arguments for the
necessity of an unequal distribution of consumption? In particular
their argument that this unequal distribution of luxury is necessary in
order for civilization to progress seems unconvincing. It is reminis-
cent of eighteenth- century belief that all the links in the Great Chain
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of Being must be filled for the good of the universe as a whole.
Samuel Johnson's biting response to the notion that the torment of an
individual who fills an unpleasant part of the chain in some way contri-
butes to the good of the abstract whole may be applied to Paul Leroy-
Beaulieu's concern for the good of civilization as a whole.
Leroy-Beaulieu is more correct than he realizes when he con-
cludes that "the question of luxury is only one aspect of a much larger
question, that of the inequality of conditions. " What he fails to make
clear-
-and this final point of confusion, a most crucial one. is by no
means limited to Leroy-Beaulieu's use of the term-
-is whether by
"conditions" he means primarily goods people own or needs they feel.
One of the strong points of the theory of the evolution of liixury is its
demonstration that not only does the availability of material goods
change over time, but also that people themselves change in their per-
ception of needs, considering as necessities what used to be considered
luxuries. Then does the democratization of luxury refer to objective
products or to subjective sense of need? The two are by no means
equivalent. The masses might feel needs similar to those of the elite
without having the means to satisfy those needs, or conversely they
might have products dangled before them before they feel the need for
those products. Baudrillart suggests the latter alternative when he
claims workers do not want to move into decent housing promoted by
reformers because the workers do not feel the need: in other words,
products are democratized before needs are. Even if this were so--
and Baudrillart's claim is certainly questionable- -one could respond
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with the question, why aren't needs equal? Why shouldn't they be
equal? The true democratization of luxury involves a genuine
equalization of needs, not a specious distribution of imitation goods.
In their own way Baudrillart and Paul Leroy- Beaulieu are guilty of
reification, for they see equalization in terms of objects, not of people.
They assume large human differences will remain no matter how much
cheap luxury is distributed, and so their concept of luxury remains
thoroughly elitist. In accepting and even praising inequality among
people, once again we have the sense that these economists are using
theory to justify the status quo, and in particular to justify their own
status as upper bourgeois professionals.
The Austrian school of economists was attacked on similar
groxinds when in 1919 Nikolai Bukharin (1887-1938) wrote The Economic
Theory of the Leisure Class (New York, 1927) to analyze the sociologi-
cal roots of the Austrian school's critique of Marx. Bukharin con-
cludes that the theory of marginal utility glorifies the psychology of
the consumer and justifies the interest of a rentier class which does
not have to labor and fears any change in its privileged position as a
non-productive consuming class. This analysis may not be entirely
applicable to the Austrian school, but it does seem appropriate when
applied to the theory of the evolution of lioxury enunciated by the Paris
group economists. That theory, as exemplified in the work of
Henri Baudrillart and Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, has its distinct merits, but
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its fatal weakness is that it is so class-bound.
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(pp. 404-405).
^^See note 36.
46For a brief review of Passy's career, see Journal d'^cono -
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esting for the study of technology and that of class relationships"(£rait^ 4:276). Paul Leroy-Beaulieu thinks it permissible to taxsome^xury items which are harmful (e.g. alcohol and tobacco) in
order to discourage their use and to raise revenue, but even in the
case of harmful consumption the object should not be wholly forbidden
It is also permissible to tax inoffensive items (e.g. gold and silver
objects, horses, playing cards) not to restrict their use but to employ
such objects as "rather precise signs of wealth" (ibid., 4:279). TheFrench tax system both in Paul Leroy-Beaulieu' s time'and down to
the present day has relied heavily upon assessments of luxury items
as indications of wealth rather than investigation into the amount of
wealth possessed--the latter being regarded as an invasion of pri-
vacy. See also Paul Leroy
-Beaulieu, "Etudes sociales" pecember
1, 1894), pp. 547-555.
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^""^"^P^^/ ^^^^ Pa^l Leroy-Beaulieu wants to make thepoint that consumption has become much more specialized and variedover the centuries, he uses the example of the great variety of finewines available in France, and lists them with the precision and de-tail ot the connoisseur (ibid.
,
4:232-233).
102^,The same tendency is seen, for example, in the thought ofCharles Secr^tan. In his article "Questions sociales. II. Le Luxe"(passim), he argues that life should be the ultimate end of consumption
and that luxuries may serve that end. This argument is very reminis-
^^''rn°/ ^^^y^"^'
when Secr^tan begins to describe just what he meansby life, he ends up describing something very much like an upperbourgeois lifestyle.
103„For example, Baudrillart in his discussion of human needs
makes a point of adding, "We say needs, we do not say brutal appe-
tites" (Histoire du luxe, 1:50). Paul Leroy-Beaulieu similarly says,
"The increasing variation, the continuous extension of needs.
. . is
therefore due not to brutal and vile appetites, but to the pursuit of a
certain ideal" (Trait^, 4:235).
104
In_Trait£, 4:208-209, Paul Leroy-Beaulieu does mention how
consumption may direct production, but he adds that production may
also anticipate consumption. "The majority of discoveries and their
applications are an anticipation of production on a conjectural con-
sumption; they often give birth to the tastes they wish to satisfy. "
105C^ontemporary writers called upon evolutionary metaphors to
discuss this issue. For the Lamarckian view, Georges Renard said,
".
. .
it is commercial evolution which precedes, which 'launches'
industrial transformation.
. . . Production, in general, changes its pro-
cedures only to respond to new needs.
. . . The need. . . creates the
organ, which does not keep the organ, once created, from propagating
and increasing the need, ..." Renard, "La Marche de revolution
industrielle depuis cent cinquante ans, " Revue bleue
,
no. 26 (Decem-
ber 23, 1911), p. 811. A second part of the article appeared in no. 27
pecember 30, 1911), pp. 838-842. See also a book Renard coauthored
with Albert Dulac, L'Evolution industrielle et agricole depuis cent
cinquante ans (Paris: F^lix Alcan, 1912).
The opposite point of view is expressed by A. de Foville, "Le
Budget de I'ouvrier au 19 et 20 siecles, " Le Correspondant 218
(February 10, 1905):425 -451, in which he states, "It is not at all a
matter of the need creating the organ. The need, which exists only
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in a latent state, is revealed the day it can obtain satisfaction "
irustrated when he cannot satisfy these newly aroused need-, th..^
"unexpected exigencies [which] have surged up xn him f 'xhesocal result xs unrest because
-worker s' today sincTrVly beUeve
Ws^' Te Fo"?ri.'° 7 "^^^ - workers'of othertimes. De ville therefore agrees with d'Avenel's analysis that
a^anX^o tr°' ^°-P-^P-d-ts available to them wS productsvailable to hose of a similar class in the past (by which standardhey would come out ahead), but rather compare the products avaUableto them with the desires they feel (and by this standard they always
BudLV 1 -A ^^^-P^--lly PP- 443 and 445 in de Fo^ville's^
Foville
D'Avenel seems to have been an inspiration to de
to dA°.^^^^^^fu^
of Histoire du luxe. Baudrillart devotes a section
! r If-^ r passion for luxury and enjoyments spreadsout and IS distributed among the different classes" (4:666-679).
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Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, Trait^, 1:389. In 1881 he published hisi^ssai sur la repartition des richesses et la tendance^ une moindreinggalite aes conditions (i-aris: Guillaum.r. r^. \ A^^^^.^^^^.
that material inequalities were being reduced: workers' salaries were
rising while interest rates were falling, and so wealth was being moreand more equally distributed.
^°^Ibid., 1:390.
109_
Ibid.
,
1:274. See also Stances et travaux, p. 721.
110^
, ^Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, Stances et travaux, p. 720.
^^^This very question is raised by :6lie Hal^vy in "Les Principes
de la distribution des richesses," Revue de mgtaphysique et d e morale
no. 4 (July 1906), pp. 591-592. Hal^vy also raises the question as to
whether leisure as well as objects will be distributed equally (pp. 578-
579). In the course of the article he criticizes Bohm-Bawerk at some
length.
On Bukharin, see Johnston, pp. 85-86, and Roll, p. 405n.
CHAPTER VI
THE CHRISTIAN RESPONSE
De Laveleye and a Protestant Perspective on Luxury
The two writers to be discussed in this section, fmile de Laveleye
and Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, were on the fringes of the Paris group
rather than members of it. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu became a member
of the Acad^mie by virtue of his work as a political scientist. A pro-
fessor at the ^cole libre des sciences politiques, his two main areas
of study were Russian society and government, and the relationship
between the Catholic Church and the modern state. De Laveleye,
whose response to Baudrillart' s book initiated the debate on luxury,
is an economist but a Belgian one, serving as professor of political
economy at Li^ge. A correspondant of the French Academie, he is
yet another example of the intimate ties between French and Belgian
intellectual life in that era and of the role of Belgian men of letters as
a stimulus to French thought. A prolific writer, de Laveleye published
3
articles in French and English as well as in Belgian journals, in
addition to numerous books. His £iements d'^conomie politique
[^Elements of political economy], first published in 1882, went through
4
many French editions and was translated into seven other languages.
One other piece of biographical information must be mentioned in
order to appreciate de Laveleye 's and Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu's views
on luxury. The former is a devout Protestant and the latter an equally
devout Catholic. In responding to Baudrillart and Paul Leroy-Beaulieu,
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then, they regard luxury from a distinct perspective both profession-
ally and religiously.
The difference in perspective is evident from the opening salvo
of de Laveleye's 1881 article in Revue des deux monde. r.^^.^Ar..
Baudrillart's book, for the Belgian economist announces that, unlike
Baudrillart, he will define luxury, and that the definition contains in
itself the condemnation of luxury:
I call anything a luxury object which does not answer a primary
need and which, costing much money and consequently muchlabor, is within reach of only a few. ^
In more succinct terms, de Laveleye defines a luxury as anything at
once superfluous and expensive. ^ Both criteria must be considered
in deciding whether to classify an object as a luxury. For example,
a penny fan or a mirror are clearly superfluous in the sense of beina
unnecessary for survival, but they are so cheap that the pleasure they
give is worth their small cost and so they are not luxuries.
De Laveleye is as aware as Baudrillart that technological progress
puts many items which used to be luxuries v/ithin reach of the masses;
the difference is that de Laveleye does not call such inexpensive super-
fluities "luxuries, " reserving that title only for expensive superfluities
The difference between the two types of superfluity is largely techno-
logical, says de Laveleye, for inexpensive ones can be turned out in
large quantities by machinery, while the expensive ones require much
difficult labor, such as the tedious and blinding work of making fine
lace or the dangerous and exhausting labor of mining diamonds.
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While de Laveleye's argument neglects items which are expen-
sive due to natural scarcity rather than to labor costs, ^ its merit is
in forcing the consumer to confront the human reality of labor behind
the glamor of a luxury item, or of any consumer item for that matter.
The reality is too easily evaded because the consumer does not see the
worker, who may be thousands of miles away. In de Laveleye's words,
"the phenomenon of exchange""^ hides the facts of production from the
consumer. De Laveleye suggests that the transition from primitive to
modern luxury has not really replaced servants with objects, but has
rather substituted unseen servants, located far away and paid through
the medium of the market, for visible ones paid directly. In addition,
in modern times any one consumer product is often produced by a large
number of these invisible servants because of the widespread special-
ized division of labor. Only by thinking of all these operations as if
they were performed by one person can the consumer assess how much
labor went into the product, and whether that labor is worth the plea-
sure it affords. He must use his imagination, in the first place, to
visualize all the invisible workers who make a product, and then to
add up mentally all the various operations necessary to complete it.
De Laveleye appeals to the power of the consumer's imagination to cut
through the obfuscations and deceptions inherent in the marketplace
and in the division of labor:
The point which is most important and too often forgotten is this:
every luxury object costs much labor; could not this labor be
used in a more rational fashion? If you consider an isolated
indi\T.dual this truth will appear clearly. Is a man insane enough
to consecrate three years of his existence to make a jewel which
in reality will be of no use to him? What hides the absurdity is
the phenomenon of exchange and the ordinary fact that he who
388
wears the jewelry orders it from another. But if you considerhumanity as a single man, obliged to satisfy his needs by hislabor, you see clearly that it is madness to use a part of time
which IS so precious to cut diamonds when humanity often con-
tinues to walk with bare feet. 10
The consumer must imagine that he alone is the producer. When this
is done, the determination of whether any object of consumption is rea-
sonable or not may be reduced to a simple question. The consumer
asks himself, "'Is an object worth the trouble that I would take and the
time I would spend to make it myself? '"^^ If not, the consumer is
treating the producer unjustly in buying it.
De Laveleye keeps returning to the theme of social injustice in
his discussion of luxury. Baudrillart, as we have seen, accepts and
even praises the unequal distribution of luxury as a mainspring of
civilization, but to de Laveleye there is only injustice when the rich
invent "childish fancies" while the rational needs of the poorer classes
12
go unsatisfied. The wealthy have no economic duty to consume in
order to keep the workers employed, for the real way to help those
1
3
who labor is to increase their consumption. The only just distribu-
tion of consumption is an egalitarian one. De Laveleye pounces on
Baudrillart's defense of an unequal distribution of goods on the grounds
that workers piled in slums feel no need of anything better:
I ask him, is this reproach well-founded? Can you hold it
against them if their insufficient salary relegates them to holes
where a farmer wouldn't keep his dogs or his pigs? The largest
number of men, even in a rich country like France, have neither
lodging, nor furniture, nor clothing, nor a diet which hygiene
demands, and certainly they all want to have these things. 14
De Laveleye rejects the hypothesis that different classes of society
have different needs. There is a certain level of "rational needs"
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which is the same for all levels of society, and there is no great
mystery in defining it:
But, you say, what are these "rational needs" of which vouare always speaking? Who will trace their limit? Do youtherefore want us to return to eating acorns and to dressingm anin^al hides?
-I understand by rational needs whose
^
which reason acknowledges and which hygiene determines.
1 he latter can say very precisely that food, clothing and
shelter appropriate for each climate and season. Add tothese the inexpensive accessories which the progress ofindustry makes available to all purses. 15
De Laveleye's understanding of needs emphasizes physical ones as
opposed to social or spiritual ones. For example, he rejects
Baudrillarfs concept of a need for novelty as chimerical and destruc-
tive, 16 for his is a static view of human consumption in which physical
needs are stable while only the secondary "inexpensive accessories"
change over time.
Does de Laveleye therefore deny the evolution of human needs?
Paul Leroy-Beaulieu persistantly criticizes de Laveleye for defining
luxury absolutely rather than relatively, as if needs remain constant
over time. The younger economist often sounds like a con\d.nced
Darwinian attacking a more conservative biologist for stubbornly con-
tinuing to believe in the immutability of the species. But Paul Leroy-
Beaulieu 's charges are largely unfounded. De Laveleye defines luxury
not only by superfluity (an absolute concept) but also by cost (a relative
concept), and in the end superfluity is irrelevant, for it an item is
inexpensive enough so it is "available to all purses" then it is not a
luxury. If anyone holds an absolutist view of luxury, de Laveleye
counters, it is Baudrillart who "sees luxury above all in the superfluous
I am rather of the opinion of J. B. Say, who sees it in what is expensive.
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Yet Paul Leroy-Beaulieu is not entirely off the mark in his
criticism. Along with Baudrillart he defends the indefinite expansion
of needs, while de Laveleye wants a limit to their expansion, and in
this sense the Belgian is indeed an absolutist about luxury. Mechanical
progress may be bringing more and more "inexpensive accessories"
within the reach of all, but their accumulation should not go on indefi-
nitely. To equalize consumption is a necessity of social justice: to
limit it absolutely is necessary for personal morality. To determine
whether increased consumption would serve or damage morality, its
purpose must be related to the ultimate end of human life, to an
absolute concept of human perfection by which consumption is evaluated
and limited. De L-aveleye ventures a definition of that end, a synthesis,
he claims, of Christian and Greek ideals:
Perfection for man consists in the full development of all his
powers, physical powers and intellectual powers, and in all
his feelings, feelings of affection towards the family and
towards humanity, feelings of beauty in nature and in art.
If decisions about consumption were referred to this end, one important
consequence would be that additional time would be more valued than
additional commodities. Technological progress benefits the masses
by putting more goods in their reach, but in the long run its greatest
benefit is in providing more leisure:
Machinery producing more efficiently can provide us either
with more commodities or with more leisure. I maintain
that when our rational needs are satisfied, what we should
ask of it is not to create superfluities to satisfy factitious
needs, but leisure to cultivate our spirit and to enjoy the
society of our fellowmen and the beauties of art or of
nature. ^9
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Increase in leisure is also the solution to the moral conflict implied by
Bastiat's analysis that only the indefinite expansion of needs will keep
workers employed. Once a rational level of consumption is reached,
says de Laveleye, people should simply stop working. He is no
booster of labor:
This beautiful elegy of work jby BaudrillartJ is completely
justified insofar as it applies to the production of necessi-
ties. When it is consecrated to creating useless items, it
is a culpable waste of time, which is the st\iff of life and
which is given to us for higher ends; it is a theft made
against the culture of the spirit and against relationships
of feeling with the family and with humanity. 20
Far from fearing that without work man will sink into moral and intel-
lectual torpor, de Laveleye claims that only leisure raises him to a
level of intellectual and moral dignity.
De Laveleye 's conviction of a moral opposition between time and
things is part of a more general dichotomy he posits between spirit
and flesh. "Man has a double life, and consequently two orders of
needs; life of the body, from whence corporal needs; life of the spirit,
22from whence intellectual needs. " Each bodily need is "a weakness,
a bondage, and a temptation to sacrifice goodness and justice to
23
sensuality. " For example, a financier who continually worries
about his fortune finds his spirit weighed down by his mass of posses-
sions. "Without doubt he can be a useful wheel in the general work of
production, but is he in the path which leads to perfection and happi-
ness? The man without needs is without cares. "^"^ Conversely, he
who lives for the spirit "will have hardly any material needs. "
De Laveleye firmly rejects the notion that the consumption of objects
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is a way to realize a spiritual ideal. For him the ideal has nothing to
do with n^ateriality, which only gets in the way; the needs of the spirit
are to be satisfied with time rather than with things. Consequently
de Laveleye also scorns the idea that spiritual and moral progress
somehow depend on material improvement. As with time and things,
as with spirit and flesh, there is a trade-off so that what is gained by
one is lost by the other: "One might almost say that moral grandeur
is not in proportion to but in inverse ratio to physical needs. "^^ To
measure civilization by a criterion of "moral grandeur" is to use a
yardstick far different from that of economists who measure civiliza-
tion by productive power. De Laveleye thinks it absurd to call the
nation producing the most iron or cotton "the most civilized of the
universe" if its prisons are full and paupers roam its streets, while a
nation is considered "backwards" if it is populated by country folk who
till their own fields and live in non-luxurious decency. ^"^ His ideal of
civilization is found in Norway and Switzerland, which are stable,
agrarian, decentralized societies. "The development of needs is so
little the sign of the progress of civilization that it is in epochs of
permissiveness, of corruption, and of decadence that they multiply
and become refined the most. "^8 Our whole concept of civilization
must be revised to distinguish between "true and false wealth.
.
.
"^^
Is there much hope that people will begin to make this distinc-
tion? Obviously de Laveleye has no cosmic optimism that material
and moral progress inevitably will go hand in hand, but he does discern
signs of moral progress which will help keep Ixixury from getting out
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of control. He notes that in recent times "the growth of the empire of
reason" has tempered human vanity, the source of so much luxury. In
past centuries both sexes delighted in fancy fabrics and laces, but since
the beginning of the nineteenth century men have worn "the black dress
of the Quaker" so that simple neatness rather than ostentation has be-
come the standard of masculine elegance. Although women still like
to wear jewelry and to follow changes in fashion, there is no reason
why feminine vanity may not also be diminished:
Stuart Mill tells us Qiow] in his book on the condition of women.
Give her the instruction necessary for her to concern herself
with things of the spirit, and, like the modern male, she will
cease to delight in the quest for trinkets and geegaws. Chimera!
you say, feminine vanity is an incurable evil. I don't believe it.
Christianity has worked this miracle with the Quakers and in mon-
asteries: ... If the black frockcoat has replaced the garments of
silk and lace for men, why could not a similar change be made in
the costume of women? During all of classic antiquity wej-£ they
not content with a linen tunic and a chlamys of fine wool?
Vanity is excited in the first place by a desire to impress others,
and the fact that people care about others' opinion can be turned
against luxury as well as for it, being transformed into a source
of honesty rather than of deceit:
As luxury here has its source in vanity, what must be changed
is opinion. If opinion were enlightened enough to understand
that luxury is a barbarous, childish, immoral thing, and above
all iniquitous, the woman who today adorns herself with costly
objects to please and to awe, would be content with being beau-
tiful or pretty at small expense, which is certainly the most
charming fashion. . . to extirpate the luxury of o|^entation it
suffices to show its emptiness and its puerility.
The other motivations for luxury mentioned by Baudrillart are equally
capable of transformation. That of sensuality is not easy to combat,
but the senses are inherently limited and are satiated soon enough; the
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quest for very refined or unusual bodily pleasures is motivated rather
by vanity. Yearning for an aesthetic ideal is not to be satisfied through
luxury at all, for true beauty is to be found in harmony, proportion,
and simplicity. As for the desire for novelty, de Laveleye dismisses
it as a misguided social scourge which simple reason can overcome.
In sum, if Baudrillart and Paul Leroy- Beaulieu are optimistic about
the grand evolution of civilization, de Laveleye is rather more hopeful
about the possibilities of transforming human nature. To be sure, the
Paris group economists suggest that moral education might help res-
train excessive luxury, but in general their message is to warn against
expecting too much virtue on the part of weak humanity driven by the
instinct for luxury. In particular they call upon the female half of the
human race for the clinching argiiment as to the inextinguishable nature
of desire for luxury. De Laveleye 's opinion that even women can learn
the virtues of a simple life particularly demonstrates his comparative
optimism.
De Laveleye 's views on reforming human conduct are an indication
of the extent to which his whole concept of economic science differs
from that of the Paris group. Its representatives like Paul Leroy-
Beaulieu and Baudrillart think of economic laws on the model of
natural laws according to which human luxury evolves in the same way
plant or animal life do, through a natural process which is ultimately
beneficient but which operates outside of the human will. This is why
human beings should not attempt to interfere in the operations of that
process with artifical restrictions. De Laveleye, on the contrary, is
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much closer to the German historical school of economics. He
regards variations in the economic life of various societies and epochs
as resulting from different customs, history, and legislation rather
than from different stages in a universal evolutionary scheme.
De Laveleye's concept of economic laws therefore differs from that of
classical liberals:
The laws with which political economy is concerned are not laws
of nature; they are those which the legislator makes. The former
escape from human will, the latter emanate from it. 33
Since economic laws are made by human hands, they may be altered,
should be altered, to improve humanity. When Baudrillart says the
economist must take people as they are, de Laveleye disagrees:
Doubtless we must begin with what exists; but in the moral
sciences we must certainly search for what can be and above
all for what should be. We pursue an ideal; economists, in
my opinion have too often forgotten it.
In reference to the particular problem of luxury, de Laveleye
concludes there is no immutable, ineradicable instinct for luxury in
human nature, only circumstances which either encourage or dis-
courage it. To combat luxury, circvimstances must be altered. Trying
to reform individuals is not likely to be very successful: de Laveleye
agrees with Paul Leroy-Beaxilieu and Baudrillart that a rich man is
not likely to be talked into giving up his luxuries for the sake of virtue.
But de Laveleye remains convinced that virtue may be encouraged in
society as a whole through the passage of wise laws, and that changes
in individuals would gradually follow. The state should take an active
and positive role as an agent of social evolution:
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to legislators, and not to prxvateTndivTd;;! f/^ U^^^^^^^
tW °' preachers nor the arguments oreconoLstshat will bring about the disappearance of luxury, but theslow and continuous progress of institutions and of laws 35
In attaching much importance to positive legislation, de Laveleye is
consistent with the ideology of state socialism which is so closely
identified with the German historical school of economics.
The particular laws desired by de Laveleye are not sumptuary
laws, which are rejected by him not because they constitute too much
interference but because they are too mild. There is no point trying
to eliminate particular examples of luxury when the basic evil is that
some people can afford more than others. The goal of government
intervention should be to establish economic equality among its
citizens:
Make it so each one has a parcel of land, an industrial activity
or obligation, m a word a modest capital, democratize property,
and then, each person enjoying the integral product of his labor
'
this iniquitous luxury, which political economy condemns no less
than Christianity, and which is the inevitable result of extreme
inequality, will disappear,
. .
.
^7
Such egalitarianism is presently to be seen in agrarian societies which
have retained primitive forms of property-holding. The institutions of
agricultural community, which are so ancient and widespread, ^8 could
be extended into modern democracies, and indeed must be so extended
if these governments are to survive. Only when property is democra-
tized in this way will political democracy have a solid footing. An
ardent believer in republican forms of government, de Laveleye sees
the economic inequalities symbolized by luxury as a mortal threat to
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self-government. Just because democracy dxminishes the significance
of other distinctions, those of wealth assume more importance
.n the
general competition for pleasures and considerations. If distinctions
of wealth become too extreme, rich and poor will become locked in a
struggle which will tear apart the social fabric. Similar struggles
caused the fall of ancient democracies, and they will destroy modern
political liberties too unless democratic governments put into practice
the maxim, "To each according to his work. "^"^ No political system
can long survive which is not supported by a moral code, and the future
of democracies in particular depends on a citizenry which spurns luxury
in favor of hard work, simplicity, love of the countryside, and elevated
40
intellectual culture. The passage of legislation to promote economic
equality is therefore both morally desirable and politically necessary.
While de Laveleye agrees with Paul Leroy-Beaulieu that luxury has to
be understood as part of a much larger question, that of the equality of
conditions, they entirely disagree about the desirability of inequality.
Catholicism and Luxury
De Laveleye concludes his discussion of the dangers of inequality
with the exhortation:
The Gospel has brought salvation, even in this world.
. . . Modern
democracy will escape the perils [pi the ancient ones] if it
succeeds in realizing the ideal proposed by Christ and of which
the communion of its early days was the image, which is to say
genuine human fraternity. 41
This remark makes explicit what is implied all though de Laveleye 's
Le Luxe
,
that he writes from a thoroughly Christian perspective. When
he says morality is necessary to maintain democracy, he assumes that
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genuine morality is based on religious beliefs: "Without morals no
liberty, and without religion no morals, that is what history demon-
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strates. " A moral code based on a theory of evolution borrowed
from the natural sciences will never be an adequate substitute for one
based on Christian faith. De Laveleye goes on to specify that only
the Protestant variety of Christianity can shore up democracy and
combat luxury. He admires Switzerland and Norway as ideal civiliza-
tions mainly because they represent the Puritan ideal. Along with the
Puritan societies of Holland and New England, they are models of
plain living, high thinking, and decentralized self-government.
Catholicism, on the contrary, is pernicious both in its political and
its moral influence. In morals the Catholic Church is far too tolerant
of luxury, setting such a bad example by lavish ostentation in its
buildings and sacraments that de Laveleye even claims its influence
may be detected in the recent construction of the Paris Op^ra, a
"temple of vice
[
^luxure^ ! "^^ As a despotic institution, the Catholic
Church opposes political liberty and tries to extend priestly influence
into secular affairs. The tragic result is that in France, as well as in
Italy and Spain, political liberalism and religious faith are at odds.
There those who prize free political institutions must oppose the
religious ones, and the resulting division of allegiance is a source of
disorder and weakness. '^^
The examples of Baudrillart and Paul Leroy- Beaulieu might
seem to justify de Laveleye 's accusation that Catholic France is too
tolerant of luxury. The two French economists, however, are really
not representative of Catholic opinion in France. Their ideas on
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luxury originate in their faith in the doctrines of economic liberalism,
not in those of the Catholic Church. And yet even these economic
liberals must take into account the teachings of Christianity, which in
the late nineteenth century provided a strong and pervasive moral
tradition counselling austerity and self-denial. In defending luxury
Paul Leroy-Beaulieu and Baudrillart must explain how their position
may be reconciled with the Christian one. Their tactic is to acknow-
ledge the beauty of the Christian message and its inspiration as an
ideal while conceding that in reality most people will never be able to
live up to its lofty call. This is the context in which Baudrillart makes
his remark (criticized by de Laveleye) that political economy must
take humanity such as it is rather than as it might be. Paul Leroy-
Beaulieu uses the same argument that Jesus, the apostles--and Buddha,
he adds--are "fortifying examples" to moderate the "unbridled desire
for wealth" and to show "that mediocrity or even poverty can be allied
with contentment. " Still, he concludes, there is no chance an entire
society will be composed of people like Jesus or Buddha, "for the
overwhelming judgment of the human race has proclaimed Jesus and
47Buddha God, which is to say super-human.
In order to find French Catholics writing on luxury from a pri-
48
marily religious perspective, we must look elsewhere --or several
other places, to be precise, for in France there is a diversity of
Catholic traditions. De Laveleye is misleading in his assumption of
a monolithic Catholic menace. Menace or not, the Church in France
was far from united in its approach to political and social issues.
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Certainly on the question of luxury there was no single Catholic school
of thought. It is possible, however, to identify three general strands
of economic thought strongly influenced by a Catholic perspective
(keeping in mind that particular individuals might not fit precisely in
any of these groups, or might shift their positions markedly over
49time). The first group includes Catholic liberals -
-not to be confused
with liberal Catholics, who are defined by their religious liberalism,
but rather referring to those who advocate economic liberalism from
a Catholic perspective. Examples of Catholic liberals are Joseph
Rambaud (1849-1919), member of the Catholic Faculty of Lyon and
author of Cours d'^conomie politique [Course in political economy]
as well as of the Histoire des doctrines g'conomiques jllistory of
economic doctrines]] cited in the previous chapter, and Charles P^rin,
born in 1815 in Mons and later professor of political economy at the
Catholic University of Louvain. While their ideas are not without
interest - -e specially Perin's defense of renunciation as an economic
and religious virtue --in general they do not diverge enough from the
51general current of economic liberalism to merit separate attention.
The other two strands of Catholic thought share a hostility to
economic liberalism. The first is a motley collection of Social Catho-
lics and Christian Democrats, two groups by no means identical and
yet sharing a common sympathy for democratic principles and workers'
organizations. These Catholics have been accorded a good deal of
attention by historians in recent years, in part because of the personal
appeal of some of their leaders like Marc Sangnier (1873-1950), and in
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partbecax^ of the ideological and humanitarian appeal of the work per-
formed by the left wing of this movement in organizing both workers
and peasants. The relevance of this group to our subject is remote,
however, for it was much more involved with people in their role as
workers rather than as consumers, although of course it worked hard
to improve general living standards. ^2 practical efforts to institute
workers' groups and economic programs, in an ideology stressing the
need for better laws, institutional reform, and state intervention.
Social Catholics and Christian Democrats often resemble socialist or
quasi-socialist groups outside the Church, just as Catholic liberals
resemble non-Catholic economic liberals.
The third wing of Catholic economic thought, the school of
Frederic LePlay (1806-1883), has no such obvious secular parallel,
and perhaps for this reason it has seemed less accessible to historians.
LePlayists are as hostile to economic liberalism as are Social Catholics
and Christian Democrats, but for wholly disparate reasons. Their
program, which appeals to religion, family, and management [patronat]
rather than to the state, seems alien, and in the opinion of a good many
historians reactionary as well. Yet some LePlayists objected to
having the school classified as Catholic at all, on the grounds that its
doctrines are inspired not by Christian revelation but by scientific
53
objectivity. All this is quite bewildering, and as a result LePlayism
is usually summarized as an unlikely mixture of religion and social
engineering. But the school has more coherence than this, more
complexity than is suggested by its slogans of family and patronat
,
and
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more importance than might be surmised from its usual treatment in
texts. On the problems of consumption. LePlayism is considerably
more relevant and original than the other two schools of Catholic
thought, which by comparison look like religious versions of secular
intellectual trends. Here we shall examine briefly some elements of
LePlay's thought pertinent to our topic, and then see how one thinker
in the LePlayist tradition, Anatole Leroy- Beaulieu, brought that
tradition to bear on the subject of luxury in the 1890's.
LePlay on Consumption
The basis of LePlay's research technique, and consequently the
basis of his claim to scientific objectivity, is the family case study
which originates in a detailed questionnaire and results in a monograph.
The positivistic flavor of this precise, inductive methodology has often
been noted, but less often noticed is the subject matter to which this
method is applied- -that of family consumption patterns. The carefully
designed questionnaire of the LePlayists includes spaces for income
and expenditures of all t^rpes, not only strictly economic ones down to
the last centime, but also for less tangible ones such as recreation,
education, and even virtues and vices. The resulting family mono-
graph not only recounts the family's history and analyzes its means of
existence, but also assembles all its activities in the form of an annual
budget of which the itemized categories are labeled in advance.
"LePlay takes family budgets as criterion of his observational
54
method,
. . . that is to say, a pure criterion of the consumer. "
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Like any technique, this one is liable to be taken to extremes and
can easily be made to look ridiculous. At times LePlay, engineer and
graduate of the fcole Polytechnique, seems to think facts about people
can be mined like coal. Yet even today researchers are still trying to
find a way to quantify non-material income and expenses in order to
devise a genuine "social accounting" procedure. ^5 f^^^ ^^.^g
absurd, the concept of social accounting that includes non-tangible con-
tributions and liabilities is far more realistic than a strictly monetary
chart of debits and credits. Admittedly LePlay's techniques are crude,
but so are present-day ones. Furthermore, LePlay does not worship
the numbers themselves, but tries to apply them-
-as does d'Avenel,
who works with very much the same data only from historical sources
--to reveal the fundamental passions and concerns of life. LePlay con-
cludes that family life is the cradle of social morality and of consum-
er habits. His assumption, immensely significant, is that family life
and consumption can be understood only in terms of each other. For
LePlay the very concept of needs is familial, and by extension social,
rather than individual. He sees that needs understood in this sense
extend beyond ones of individual survival to social ones like education
and recreation; and, what is also new, he sees that needs extend in
time from generation to generation. (LePlay is a determined advocate
of liberty testamentaire
,
the legal right for a person to will at least
half his estate to whomever he chooses, as opposed to a legal restric-
tion forcing him to will everything to one person such as the eldest son,
or to divide the estate equally among sons as French law then required. )
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To regard the family as a unit of consumption, and to regard consumption
in familial and generational terms-these ideas illuminate the dynami
of both family and consumer life in a way that is a good deal more sig
ficant than is suggested by the usual bald reference to LePlay's being
"for the family. "^^
It is true that LePlay's emphasis on the family seems more in
a priori assumption guiding his inquiries than a logical and inevitable
conclusion arising from his data. He seems to have begun his
research with a predilection for stable, patriarchal, religious societies
such as might be found among some primitive peoples and in contem-
porary eastern Europe. LePlay has been criticized for looking at such
primitive societies not for objective explanations but for moral lessons,
for a type or model which he thinks should be reassembled elsewhere
rather than for a germ which might develop into a fruit- -the approach
of a traditionalist rather than of an evolutionist. ^"^ But is it not unreal-
istic to expect a purely inductive approach, unguided by any assumptions
or models, especially with a subject as vast as consumption? Even an
evolutionist looking for germs has in mind a fruit whose origins are of
special interest to him. De Laveleye, sympathetic with the historicist
school in economics, has in mind a model of consumption which he finds
in the agrarian, in some respects "primitive" communes of Switzerland
and Scandinavia. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, of the classical liberal school
of economics, also has in mind a model of modern consumption which
he finds in his image of seventeenth-century Holland. LePlay does the
58
same, choosing peuples -mod^es drawn mainly from societies in
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eastern Europe where he travelled widely. There is indeed sotnething
circular in the relationship between LePlay's model and his empirical
research:
hao^nvU''^'
^'"'^ method] showed him that there were noppy £amihes except those gathered under paternal ;^,fhL^tand hvtng according to the xln Commandments of the Dec I lieSo be It! but what does he mean by "happy families'" Tho^ewho hve m unity, stability, the love of God He thus mikes a
crrte'rTon'.'^ft"
°' happiness: but it is a ^^bTect^ve
Is there any objective criterion? And can one operate without any a
priori criterion at all?
De Laveleye has in mind an image of ideal happiness which con-
sumption should serve, just as Baudrillart and Paul Leroy-Beaulieu
make an a priori assumption that the dynamic progress of civilization
is attained when each person seeks his own idea of happiness. LePlay
criticizes their assumption: left on their own, he says, people may
tend to seek personal well-being, but they ^^rill not find happiness. In
their egotism people are often unwise, and so they need the guidance
of authority. In the first place that guidance must come from religious
faith, especially as expressed in the Decalogue. But a creed is not
enough, for authority must also be personalized, and so the other
foundation of society is the father. Other "social authorities, " un-
attached to the state but enjoying general social respect, dispense
social peace and act as a sort of extension of the paternal model. This
is the role LePlay sees for the patron. LePlay does not oppose state
action on principle as liberal economists did, but on the other hand he
does not look to the state first, preferring to trust decentralized local
self-government and the influence of social authorities.
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Certainly his conclusions follow from his assumptions, but no
more so than in the case of de Laveleye and Paul JLeroy-Beaulieu. One
suspects that what is discomforting in LePlay's work is less his method
than the content, which xs politically reactionary in many senses, sexist,
admittedly authoritarian-all of which is unappealing to an egalitarian
and secular age. This does not mean LePlay is all wrong, however.
For example, there is nothing inherently absurd or reactionary in his
analysis that individual human beings do not organize their consumption
wisely in view of their eventual happiness, that actions taken to
aggrandize personal well-being may be (to use the modern term)
counter-productive. At the least this analysis makes us reconsider the
assumption of the classical liberal economists that the consumer is the
best judge of his own interests when left alone to be guided by his
instinct for luxury. Furthermore, the idea that non- governmental
social authorities may play a crucial role in guiding consumption is a
helpful analysis of how consumption operates in society which suggests
an alternative to governmental controls as a means of restraint. With
LePlay we need to disentangle what is valid in his analysis from the
inadequacies of his specific remedies -- and we shall have to do the
same in the case of his follower, Anatole L.eroy-Beaulieu.
Anatole Leroy- Beaulieu: A Catholic Perspective
Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu is not a thorough- going disciple of LePlay
in the sense that Claudio Janet (1844-1895), for example, is usually
identified as such, but his sympathies lie in this direction. He pub-
lished articles in the LePlayist journal R^forme sociale, spoke at the
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Congr^s d'^conom.e sociale and at the fcole des haute. Etudes sociales,
both institutions organized by the school, and deUvered a eulogy at the
funeral of ^£^™le Cheysson
( , - 19 1 0) one of LePlay's most important
disciples.
° His sympathies with the school are also evident from the
general tenor of his thought. Like LePlay himself. Anatole Leroy-
Beaulieu is fascinated by eastern European societies, especially by
Russia in which he specialized as a political scientist. The Russian
mir is for him the fundamental national institution, antecedent to the
state rather than dependent on it. and in it he feels he glimpses a model
of genuine liberty, equality, and fraternity. Also like LePlay.
Anatole Leroy- Beaulieu is convinced that the failings of modern society
are not institutional but moral, and that only religion can "lift up TtheT
6 Z
soul [of the people) again. " But here the two part ways to some extent,
because Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu looks less to the words of the Deca-
logue than to the institution of the Papacy as the source of moral reform.
For him the Pope is the ultimate father. When Pope Leo XIII published
the encyclical Rerum novarum in 1891 to propose an alliance between
Papacy and democracy, Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu became a strong
supporter of the initiative. Without such moral guidance from the
Church, he fears, democracy will prefer power to liberty and will end
up either as a repressive socialist regime or as a Caesarist militarist
6 3dictatorship. The liberal tradition, which stresses individual
autonomy above all, is far too weak to combat the perils of democracy.
In his stern critique of liberalism, Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu once more
shows his affinities with the LePlayists. In its unjustified optimism.
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he argues, liberalism substitutes a non-existent rational man for the
actual passionate, egotistical, fallen one. Its abstract principles of
nationality, representative government, and religious tolerance have
only engendered strife among nations, parties, and religions. Liber-
alism and democracy must somehow be united, and the French Revolu-
tion must be superseded by a new one establishing a true reign of
justice, a reign not of Reason or other metaphysical entities but of
"faith, feeling, instinct, and love. "^'^
In short, as one strongly influenced by LePlayist ideas, Anatole
Leroy-Beaulieu disagrees completely with his younger brother Paul.
In these two the intellectual debate between liberalism and its critics
takes flesh and blood as a fraternal dispute. On the particular subject
of luxury, when Paul Leroy-Beaulieu adopted and defended the liberal
views of Baudrillart, Anatole took up the religious arguments con-
demning luxury initially expressed by de Laveleye. The week after
Paul presented his paper defending inequality and luxury to the
Acad€mie, Anatole made a short statement to the assembled company
quoting the Gospel on the evil of excessive wealth ("It would be easier
for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to
enter the Kingdom of Heaven") and ironically praised Ixixury as a virtue
because when a rich man throws away his money on it financial
65inequality is diminished. Anatole 's so-called defense of luxury,
remarked one observer of the Acad^mie discussions, relied on "argu-
ments diametrically opposed to the fraternal arguments.
. .
"^^ And
yet this discrepancy did not keep Paul Leroy-Beaulieu from repeating
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Anatole Leroy-BeauUeu's published response to his broth
v^ews on luxur, is found
.n a two-part article titled "Le Rigne de
1
'argent" [The reign of ^ney] published in 1894 in the Revue des deu
' U IS an indirect rebuttal, for, as the title inl~r
author's subject is broader than luxury, being nothing less than the
unprecedently naked power of money in modern civilization. Despite
lip-service to Christian virtues, writes Anatole Leroy-BeauUeu, in
reality the reign of money has replaced that of Christ. A few people
still celebrate the vii-tues of poverty and abstinence, but their attitude
is only a form of dandyism, of unrealistic nostalgia, because in truth
there are hardly any genuinely poor people left. The cause of this
new reign of money is in part material. Even if human vices have not
n^ultiplied. human needs have with the advent of industrial, scientific
civilization. "The boundaries of the necessary have receded.
.
.
"^
This sounds like his brother Paul, but Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu regards
this recession not as triumph but as enslavement. It means that even
those who disclaim opulence still assume a high level of comfort and
well-being which is also expensive. "We are slaves of our needs,
prisoners of our arts, of our industry, of our urban life, hence serfs
of wealth, subjected to the reign of money.
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All these material developments --
"what we call progress-^l-.
are crucial to the advent of money's reign, but even more critical are
two moral causes: the decline of religious faith and the advent of
political democracy. In the past religious faith never completely con-
quered "Mammonism, " but at least it was held in check. Now the
retreat of faith has altered man's whole perspective on life:
Jarth^ and'^'Jo
°^
T," ^""'''^"^d; his view is limited to thee th d t earthly goods; heaven, with its starry depthswhich used to beckon the soul. God's heaven has beenblocked off from view.
When life is limited to the earth, poverty no longer has meaning, and
money becomes the only idol to worship. This change in outlook has
affected not only Christians but also Jews, so that in both faiths the
traditional virtue of poverty has become an empty piety. The previous
year Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu had published a thoughtful and well-
received book Isra'e-1 chez les nations; les juifs et 1 'anti-s^mitisme
^Israel among the nations; Jews and anti- semitism] (Paris: Calmann
L€vy, 1893), and in his article on "Le R^gne d'argent" he expands on the
theme that contemporary anti- semitism is one result of the modern
idolatry of money. A common argument of anti- Semites, he notes, is
that Jews worship only money. At its best this type of anti- semitism
may represent a revolt of conscience against Mammonism, as person-
nified in the Jew, but it is a confused and finally mistaken revolt. The
reign of money should not be identified with Jews. In the first place,
mxost of them are poor. In the second place, money worship is not an
inborn Semitic trait but has been bred into that culture over the cen-
turies because it has been the only power of the Jew respected by
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Christians and Muslin,s. AU tWs leads up to the third reason why
anti-sen^itisnn is wrong: u is hypocrU.cal, originating not in a pious
aversion to wealth, but rather
.n a distinctly non-Christian envy for
those who have more rViri ct^ t.r,c r-u uiiiuic. (^nns ians should examine thp>ir r>iTr,^'-^o. j.iiL Lne own conscience
and motives regarding money rather than xmpute Mammonism to Jews.
The passion of envy is also fundamental to understanding how the
rise of democracy has contributed to the reign of money. The so-calle
democratization of luxury has only meant the proliferation of jealous
greed. Formerly possession of a fortune was generally accepted as a
caste privilege. Today everyone wants to get rich, and worldly goods
now seem within the reach of all so that being left out of the general
scramble for wealth is regarded as an injustice. In society today
money is sovereign, and, like traditional sovereigns, it has its nobility
The forms of democracy scarcely hide the existence of a new aristo-
cracy which is based simply on money. For the old nobility, whose
legitimacy was derived from personal distinction, a fortune was
accepted as a secondary accompaniment of that distinction. Now wealth
is the primary quality by which the new aristocracy "establishes its
titles and affirms its domain. " and this is why it is inevitably com-
pelled towards ostentatious luxury:
Money needs to appear When social distinctions are estab-
lished almost uniquely on wealth, each one is led to make a
show of what he possesses. Mammon, the new king, loves to
give himself over to spectacle; he is neither simple nor modest.
He is, more or less, a parvenu; ostentation does not displease
him; he does not at all fear to offend others; he needs to amaze
his neighbor. And as people everywhere imitate the powerful
of the day, the little people are persuaded to copy the kings of
money. For them it is a manner of extricating themselves from
the common herd. To remain below others seems to acknowledge
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oneself as their inferior; one seec, f.^
of society, as it calls itself do^ 'to tu"" '°an emulation of luxury, an assaS^ of k '}'^^'^^' bourgeoisie.
elegances. 75 ^' ault banal and artificial
The fatal contradiction of this new aHstoc.acy is that while its
displays Of elegance a.e often shahh, o. tn poo. taste, they a.e sttU
-rotating to the tnasses who cannot afford then,.
^„ ^^^^^^^^^^
barrier, a partition specifically erected to separate n.en and to „,a.e
the,, more aware of the difference of conditions.
^^^^^
be displayed in order to establish its dominion, but then
through l^ur^^^now m:re L«sTary\hr; "^^'"^racy and yet is tolerated less'?? ^ ^""^ aristoc-
Of all aristocracies, that of money excites the least respect and the
most envy. As a result it is highly unstable. Democracy brings at
once the reign of money and the jealous revolt against its displays:
this inability to live with or without the tyrant is the reason for
France's many revolutions. Like de Laveleye, Anatole Leroy-
Beaulieu is especially sensitive to the political dangers posed by
displays of luxury:
More than any other, probably, the aristocracy of money arouses
pe'^c^^b^e foVlt:'^th°' ^^^^^ of^Mammor.rnerr
privTlea.. of i u ^^^'^^ ^^se against what they call thei ges the rich, and socialism comes out of Mammonism.
1..
'
u^^'^"' ^^^g" democracy attacksess wealth than the wealthy. It doesn't want to destroy wealth,
he .n t f
"""^"^
'"^P^^^^^ ChristiL spiritt spirit of renunciation and of sacrifice, joyously detachedfrom the goods of this world. On the contrary, socialismamong the people, is nothing but the trade union of appetites andthe formulary of greeds. In the civil wars of the kingdom ofMammon, the satisfied and the dissatisfied are, in realityimbued with the same spirit, one wanting to take, the other
wanting to keep. Two egoisms grappling with each other 79
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The problem cannot be solved by institutional change or by the
suppression of a particular group, whether Jews or capitalists. Nor
is there hope in the dream that everyone can enjoy both more leisure
and more goods, for that would constitute a miraculous miltiplication
of wealth reminiscent "of the alchemists who tried.
. . to transmute
copper or base metals into gold. -^0 ^^^.^ ^^^^ ^ marvelous "philoso -
phers- stone" is found, only a few can enjoy luxuries and the masses
will continue to envy them. The only solution is to give up the belief
that salvation lies in wealth and material civilization. "The sickness is
in us, and cannot be cured by exterior remedies. "^^ A moral sickness
requires a moral remedy. The law is a dead thing when it comes to
reforming the inner person. Only a vital religious faith can root out the
softness, the love of comfort, the vanity and sensuality, only faith can
purify the soul so the reign of money will finally be overthrown.
Luxury: Democracy or Aristocracy?
In this article Anatole Leroy- Beaulieu again raises the theme of
the democratization of luxury which has proved so central to an analysis
of modern consumption. He contends that wealth and the luxuries it
buys have not really been democratized at all. for the masses are not
fooled into mistaking cheap imitations of luxury for the actual posses-
sion of wealth. What has been democratized is the passion for wealth
and the hope, however remote, of obtaining it. Modern society is
caught between two incompatible desires- -the one democratic, resulting
in an envious sense of injustice towards the new aristocracy, and the
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other aristocratic, resulting
.n an ostentatious display of worldly goods
to demonstrate superiority over the common crowd.
This conflict which Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu identifies is so per-
vasive in modern society that it is worth taking a brief look at another
contemporary description of it. In his book Les Antinomies .ntr.
I'individu et la social [The antinomies between the individual and
society] (Paris: Fglix Alcan, 1913), Georges Palante (1862- ? ). an
intriguing and neglected figure in the social thought of the era, des-
cribes the conflict from the viewpoint of an outspoken defender of
84individualism. In the chapter titled "Economic Antinomy, " Palante
identifies two general theories of consumption, the "aristocratic and
individualistic" and the "democratic and egalitarian. " The first one has
the virtue of liberalism in the sense of admitting "the greatest variety
of enjoyments, the greatest diversity of life.
.
.
"^^ But its flaw is its
injustice:
The aristocratic and individualistic theory is that of the partisans
of luxury. Luxury represents exception, privilege in economics;
the refinement of needs and tastes. By this claim it is the
superior raison d'etre of production; it is the flower of economic
civilization. The aristocratic individualist admits that since
society has no other goal than to produce superior men, it is
natural and legitimate that an army of slaves and workers sacri-
fices Its life and its ideal of democratic well-being to the comfort
and luxury of the privileged. °o
Socialists who uphold the "democratic and egalitarian" theory of con-
sumption would forbid egotistical luxuries and ensure that no one is
privileged in consumption-
-a fairer solution, but one which sacrifices
diversity to an enforced unity. Palante, a lover of individualism as
well as of social justice, cannot choose between the two alternatives,
and he feels that society in general is also unable to decide:
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There is today a strong tendency to the equalization of the con
deniocratic tendency to make equality prevaal In consumption! "
Palante adds a perceptive remark:
Throughout the vicissitudes of this conflict, one given nonethe-less remains constant: a measure of impersonal evaluation
which gives to luxury itself, m our civilization, a character ofbanality and anonymity.
The universal measure common to both the aristocratic and the demo-
cratic theories is that of supply and demand. Palante goes on to cite
Nietzsche at some length to the effect that in a "culture of tradesmen"
the needs of the individual are ignored because only the needs of con-
sumers en masse count. Individual values no longer have any
significance:
Only those values count which are in demand, which please the
generality, which, consequently, are already banalized, which
are quoted on the stock exchange, which respond to widely dis-
persed needs or ones susceptible of being widely dispersed.
The reign of supply and demand is therefore the reign of Money.
Did Palante read Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu's article, or did he just
happen to hit upon the same phrase? Because so little biographical
information about Palante is available, there is no way of knowing.
The major difference between him and Anatole Leroy- Beaulieu is that
the latter, writing from a Christian perspective, can suggest a resolu-
tion of the conflict between "the desire for privileged and individualized
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consun^puon.
. .
and the dernocratic tendency to make equality prevail.
.
.
'
The answer lies in limitation of all desires. Furthermore, the per-
spective of Christian faith also suggests why individuals are so wUUng
to submit to the banal and anonymous forms of consumption instead of^
ones which truly meet personal needs, a submission which Palante
laments without explaining. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu's explanation is
that under the reign of money the individual no longer has a sense of
his unique importance. Under the reign of Christ, a person stood in a
personal relationship to God and felt himself judged by God according
to the state of his immortal soul. Now Heaven is walled off. The only
recognition comes from earth, and so people clothe themselves in
layers of possessions, mediocre as they are, for money at least is
willing to appear in its nakedness. The social function of consumer
goods (as the phrase was used in the previous part) cannot be considered
apart from its spiritual function in an age of unbelief. People are intent
on forcing others to notice them because they no longer feel that God
notices them. The craving for banal objects and tasteless display is
less a cause for scorn than for pity, for behind it lies the pathos of
lost souls.
Concluding Remarks: Beyond Luxury
In Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu's article the subject of luxury is sub-
merged in the far broader concept of the reign of money, and so he
implies that the concept of luxury by itself is inadequate for arriving
at a more general ethics of consumption. Its inadequacy was recognized
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as far back as the 1888 Acad^mxe discussions, when Courcelle-Seneuil
warned, "I truly believe that if we continue to talk about this word
luxury, undefined and indefinable, we could keep up a discussion which
would last for centuries, classifying ourselves as rigorist, permissive
and moderate, without advancing a single step. It is a catch-all
term, he said, encompassing the luxury of the poor as well as that of
the rich, and he expressed doubt "that they can be submitted to the same
common material rule. ""^^ In addition, most ideas about luxury are
inherited from ancient philosophers, who uniformly consider wealth as
a matter of indifference or of scorn, something unworthy of attention
from an elevated soul. "This is indeed, " said Courcelle-Seneuil,
".
. .
the theory of Plato, of Aristotle, of the Stoics and of Epicurus
himself: it is also that of the Cynics and it was adopted by the Church
92Fathers. " Their attitude was understandable in societies where
wealth was obtained by slavery, pillage, and other unsavory means, but
today the social origins of wealth are far different and on the whole
more respectable. Moreover, modern society enjoys a sheer quantity
of wealth which the ancients could never have imagined. Courcelle-
Seneuil concluded that the precepts of the ancients regarding Ivixury
have little relevance to modern times. Young people learn them as
part, of their general classical training, but if they take these rules
seriously they find themselves completely lost once they graduate,
when "they see nowhere the contempt for riches with which they have
9 3been inculcated. " Lxixury still remains an important topic for
intellectual inquiry, being of all moral matters "the most important
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of all.
. .
at the present moment, the true social question. It is a ques-
tion of general conduct of which the solution must be found.
.
.
-94 is
time to cast aside the intellectual tools of antiquity and
-to underpin this
part of the social edifice, to repair it with solid materials, attending to
all the resources we can find in the knowledge of our time. -"^^ This
task will require going beyond the concept of luxury, a crudely moral-
istic term with no possible scientific content, to pose the larger ques-
tion:
-What use should men make of riches in the diverse conditions in
which they find themselves placed? -"^^
In his urgency to shake off the weight of the past, to devise stan-
dards appropriate for the modern age, Courcelle-Seneuil sounds like a
reformer of the decorative arts inveighing against subservience to
tradition. In ethics as in aesthetics there is the recognition that new
forms must be found to suit contemporary patterns of consumption.
Certainly Courcelle-Seneuil is justified in criticizing liixury as a crude
and outdated concept; the ethical dilemmas of modern consumption, like
the material commodities themselves, pile up so rapidly that they soon
overflow familiar categories which are buried beneath the profusion.
In his article Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu tries to develop related concepts
like a reign of money and a new aristocracy of consumption, to go
beyond economic categories altogether to find a way of comprehending
modern consumption as a phenomenon which is at once economic,
political, social, and spiritual. Having already moved beyond the topic
of luxury and even beyond the confines of economic thought, we shall in
the subsequent part move even further to the terrain of social philosophy.
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In the debate about luxury the last word must be accorded neither to
proponents like Paul Leroy-Beaulieu nor to opponents like his brother
but to Courcelle-Seneuil who argues that the concept of luxury has to be
scrapped.
Before moving on, however, we should acknowledge that the con-
cept of luxury served well in providing a point of departure for consid-
eration of modern consumption. Vague misgivings, ill-defined ideas,
and ambiguous feelings found in it an intellectual framework which
encouraged initial attempts at clarification. That clarification was
achieved in large measure because around the concept of luxury
crystallized two major schools of thought about the modern prolifera-
tion of superfluous commodities -
-one which defended it as part of the
evolution of human needs, and one which condemned it as a distraction
from the satisfaction of genuine human needs. In the previous part
reference was made to clusters of ideas which centered around aesthetic
concepts but also included psychological, social, and political ones. In
the debate about luxury we deal with a similar phenomenon, only this
time economic ideas form the centers. The term "clusters" is perhaps
preferable to "schools of thought, " for the latter might be misinter-
preted to mean two coherent doctrines of consumption expressed by
definable groups. Certainly the Paris school of economics was fairly
well-organized and visible, so that the ideas about luxury in particular
and consumption in general expressed by Baudrillart and Paial Leroy-
Beaulieu may be identified with a particular group of economists. The
opponents of luxury were a much more disparate lot. De Laveleye and
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Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu differ in nationality and profession; what unites
them is their Christian perspective, and even here they differ in sect.
As we shall see even more clearly in the following part, thinkers
opposed to luxury may have shared a loose cluster of ideas, but they
by no means formed a school. They were mavericks, and the fact that
they shared a general concept of consumption is apparent only in retro-
spect, whereas the common approach of the Paris school was so well-
known in its own time that it was accused by some of intellectual
tyranny.
How does identification of these two clusters clarify the position
of other thinkers discussed in this dissertation? Consider des Esseintes
in his strange self-discipline, his thirst for spiritual ideals and scorn
for purely physical maintenance, his quest for salvation, his disdain
for the consuming masses, and his fear that envy will lead to murder
rather than to progress, he sides with the advocates of restraint. Others
in the group probably wovdd not have immediately recognized or appreci-
ated the kinship; the unity of this second group, it must be repeated, was
not obvious at the time. The case of Georges d'Avenel may also be
illuminated by reference to the debate over luxury, for as an historian
of consumption d'Avenel deals with the same data that Baudrillart does
his Histoire du luxe. Both historians of consumption conclude that
the distinction between superfluities and necessities is tenuous and
shifting, especially since the advent of modern technology which has
brought the mass distribution of so many items hitherto considered
97
luxuries. They furthermore agree that this process constitutes the
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essential progress of civilization. But here they part intellectual com-
pany. Baudrillart (and Paul Leroy-Beaulieu. it might be added) never
really addresses the relationship between civilization's progress and
personal satisfaction, except to assume that most people prefer to
chase after goods than to renounce the chase. But for d'Avenel. and
for the opponents of luxury in general, the contradiction between per-
sonal happiness and collective progress, between the individual and
society, is a recurring and troubling theme. As more and more goods
are produced, d'Avenel says, so is more and more personal unhappi-
ness, because desires multiply faster than the goods:
In measure as individuals mingle and conditions improve, thepoor person has more resources, enlightenment, and desiresbut his desires perpetually surpass his resources. Even when
we shall have arrived at endowing the most disinherited among
us with abundant food, with comfortable clothes, with an agree-
able dwelling and with much leisure, all this in exchange for a
little work, do you therefore believe that he will regard him-
self as happy? Oh! but no! And what therefore is happiness?
Alas ! it is precisely satisfaction with what we are, with what
we have; it is resignation. This resignation is the opposite of
progress; and the opposite of resignation, ambition, effort, is
progress itself. But ambition and effort are not happiness,
except for a few dilettantes of the hunt for temporal joys who
prefer to chase than to catch and to see the game in the field
rather than in their plate. Therefore happiness is not progress.
The ardor towards the better, which is profitable for the collec-
tivity, is in some fashion destructive of the happiness of the
individual, because it encourages him to be never satisfied.
In this regard civilization, which gives so many real enjoyments,
does not give moral happiness; perhaps it is even contrary to
this, because it incites more appetites than it can satisfy, and
imaginary sorrows are no less painful. 98
Is there any way to resolve this contradiction? D'Avenel wryly suggests
that the chase after illusory needs at least provides amusement and
distraction for human beings who would otherwise have nothing to do
99but watch the days fly by and death approach. He indulges in
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cynicism here, for he knows that man's awareness of his mortality is
just what makes the satisfactions of consumption so hollow and fleeting.
Like de Laveleye, like Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu-indeed, eventually like
des Esseintes- creator Huysmans-d'Avenel concludes that only
religious faith provides a resolution to the contradictions of consump-
tion. The nineteenth century has given birth to mines, telegraphs,
sewers, political systems, and pleasures, but not to "resignation and
the ideal, which is to say peace and hope. Do the smoke of locomotives
and tobacco contain more than the smoke of incense? "^00 The sickness
of the century is one of the spirit:
. . .
if one piled up a hundred times more enjoyments, humanity
would be the prey of a terrible boredom, a boredom that one
feels in looking at cities which no steeple, no dome, no tower
surmounts, all things of first necessity, although perfectly
useless in themselves. Workers, peasants, all may become
bourgeois, " in the sense we give this word today, all maybecome thinkers, may well feel even Ihe sufferings of which
they were before unaware
--those of thought--and will be des-
pairing to be in the world, having lost the certainty of finding
a better one upon leaving this one. It is then that the people
will vomit up the lay religions, laboriously absorbed; they will
cry to have a soul and for someone to given them a God. 101
If des Esseintes and d'Avenel may be better understood by seeing
them as part of the anti-luxury cluster, the same is true of the decora-
tive arts reformers discussed in the previous section. The renovation
of the decorative arts may be seen as an important part of the late
nineteenth-century reconsideration of luxury because its partisans want
to combat what they considered a false identification of art and luxury.
They argue that objects are truly beautiful only when designed without
all the extravagant, dishonest- -luxurious --ornamentations extraneous
to its function. As de Laveleye wishes to distinguish between true and
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false wealth, so Mauclair wants to distinguish between truly beautiful
decorative art and the falsely pretentious. As Mauclair wants an
aesthetic functionalism, so de Laveleye calls for an ethical function-
alism. Aesthetic and economic thought converge in a common concern
for honesty and restraint, for genuine needs as opposed to spurious
ones, for the elimination of the unnecessary so that life will express
simplicity and harmony. In reaction against the complications and
confusions caused by a flood of consumer goods, moralists and artists
alike yearn for the beauty of necessity.
At the outset of Part Two, the movement for decorative arts
reform is described as a cluster of aesthetic, ethical, social, and
political values opposed to the values characteristic of the dream world
of consumption described in the first part. Therefore two sets of
opposing clusters have been suggested: the aesthetic style of the dream
world vs. that of decorative arts reformers, and proponents of luxury
vs. its opponents. Having just compared opponents of luxury like
de Laveleye to decorative arts reformers like Mauclair, is it possible
to extend the comparison to the first term in each set, thus merging the
two sets of clusters into one larger opposition? Paul Leroy-Beaulieu
and Baudrillart would protest mightily against being identified with the
type of consumption characteristic of a department store counter or an
exposition exhibit. This is not the type of luxury they have in mind,
they might well complain; their ideal is a sober seventeenth- century
Dutch household, not the riotous Rue du Caire. But on what intellectual
ground would they stand to make their protest effective? They are
never very clear about the final end of the evolutionary process, in their
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eagerness to laud the process itself. If the course of evolution gets off
the track, heading towards mass consumption rather than an upper
bourgeois model, they might be emotionally dismayed but their theory
of luxury provides little alternative to letting that evolution follow its
natural course. Their theory approves of the consumer's wishes, of
his envies and dreams, of his passive submission to desire. The
spectacle of mass consumption furnishes a sort of distorting mirror of
the theory of the evolution of needs, a spectacle of evolution gone awry,
and it thereby exposes the inadequacies of a theory of endless develop-
ment unrelated to a final goal. The shoddy and banal consumption of the
common people thereby holds up a mirror to the habits of the wealthier
classes, who may be more refined in their choice of goods but who also
tend to lack any idea of a final goal of consumption. Mass consumption
reveals the inadequacies of the bourgeois theory of consumption, much
as the wealthy patrons of the decorative arts are forced to view a mis-
shapen image of their own confusion in the vulgar parodies of demo-
cratized luxury. Baudrillart himself recognizes this relationship when,
at the end of his massive Histoire du l\ixe
, he finally confronts "the
characteristics and tendencies of the luxury of our times. " The
tendency of the poor to waste money on unhealthy luxury, he admits,
constitutes a perverted imitation of the rich:
The people, it is we ourselves. The people express our skep-
ticism by a brutal atheism, our studied refinements by enjoy-
ments that are within its reach, our love of luxury by passion
for superfluity harmiiil to its body and soul. If \the people^]
put matter and its joys above all, it is because others, placed
more highly, have taught it to them,
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Nowhere is the distorted image seen more sharply than at inter-
national expositions. In this same final volume Baudrillart devotes a
long section to an analysis of recent expositions as images of modern
luxury
.
.
it is notorious.
. .
that these great exhibitions, above all
devoted to striking and charming the eyes of the general public, appeal
to everything that glitters and seduces" rather than to anything useful. 10
He describes at some length the kinds of luxury "preached" by the
expositions which serve as an "initiation" to luxury for people of low
and moderate incomes. He can see why this spectacle might meet with
the disapproval of some:
They fear, not without reason, that for every philosopher who, in
the presence of these dazzling marvels, exclaims: "Here are somany things- 1 can do without," thousands of spectators will say
softly: "There are so many things I would love to have ! " They
fear that the poor person will be excited to envy the rich by these
exhibitions, which display so many objects which are beyond their
reach.
While sharing this sense of discomfort, Baudrillart cannot wholly side
with these "moralists and religious people"'^^^ without undercutting his
whole theory of luxury. He has spent nearly four volumes arguing for
the diffusion and propagation of luxury, and he appreciates that the
expositions are "one of the most powerful means for the diffusion and
propagation of luxury that has existed in the course of history. ""^^^ He
can only argue optimistically that reason will overcome envy, that
expositions as symbols of civilization's progress will inspire an abstract
admiration rather than a personal sense of grievance:
The poor person will be struck.
. .by the enormous quantity of
useful products put at his service every year under more
accessible conditions. The man who possesses only a small
income will convince himself that the majority of these luxury
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condxtxon. multiplies also the causes of tempLtTon YS?'"^"
''""'^
Baudrillart's tone is defensive and uncertain, as well it might be. How
is it that the consumer, supposedly motivated by self-interest, will rise
above it at the expositions to be content with what he has and to appreci-
ate rather the interest of civilization as a whole? Now we can begin to
see why so many observers of the exposition besides Baudrillart react
to them with such profound ambivalence. They see there, in a way of
which they disapprove, an image of the bourgeois forms of consumption
of which they approve. Like society in general, these observers are
caught in a conflict between aristocratic and democratic ideals of con-
sumption, between wanting luxuries which are the elegant blooms of
civilization, refined and gracious, reserved for the few who deserve
them-
-and yet recognizing that everybody wants to be one of the few.
In the never-never land of the exposition, the tension of this conflict is
temporarily resolved. There alchemy works, and the philosopher's
stone is found which makes it possible for every person to be an aristo-
crat with commodities and leisure at his disposal. The question of
opportunity magically disappears, and the gnawing pain of envy is trans-
muted into the joys of dreaming.
For opponents of luxury the expositions arouse not ambivalence
but unmixed disapproval. The fault of the expositions is precisely that
they "do nothing which is not done every day by civilization, " for this
civilization which continually "multiplies the causes of temptation" is
also to be condemned. Such are the thoughts that come to Anatole Leroy-
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Beaulieu when, like de Vogu^. he wanders around the grounds of the
defunct centennial exposition under the leaden skies of November
108
1889. His meditations are expressed in an article he published the
following month in the Nouvelle revue ^^-^^ ^^.^^^^ ^^^^
of letters to friends back home from a variety of imaginary visitors to
the exposition—among them the Shah of Persia, an African king, a
Hindu from Bengal, a Siberian merchant, a Chinese diplomat, an
engineer from Chicago, and a Prussian military officer. Only the
New World engineer finds any real cause for enthusiasm in the event.
The visitors from the traditional, authoritarian societies admired by
the author and LePlay express only dismay and pity at the confused,
presiimptuous, misguided, dishonest spectacle. Anatole Leroy-
Beaulieu's own judgment on the exposition is perhaps most evident in
the letter from the imaginary Siberian merchant to his family: "It is
the masterpiece of the ancient Enemy, disguised as an angel of light in
order to deceive men all the more.
. . God is absent, God has not been
invited.
. .
"^^^ The merchant tries to escape the hubbub by fleeing to
the top of the new Tower of Babel, the Eiffel Tower:
It seemed to me that I had been transported on the mountain from
whence the Temptor showed Christ the kingdoms of this world.
. . .
It was there, at my feet, in its festive apparel, perfidious Babylon,
displaying its palaces, its gardens, its wealth, sending a breath
of voluptuousness to me from down below. It smiled at me and
tempted me. I closed my eyes and, stiffening myself, I leaned
over the siren, and spat below.
But would Anatole Leroy-Beatilieu be any more successful in his
opposition to the dream world of consiimption, as symbolized by the
exposition, than were the decorative arts reformers? (Camille Mauclair,
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it will be recalled, reacted to the 1889 exposition by denouncing plans
for a similar event in 1900. )''^ We have seen that Mauclair and other
decorative arts reformers conclude that improved design will not alter
the popular attitudes nourishing the dream world, that a preliminary
moral change is essential-
-but they feel impotent to bring about that
moral change. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu agrees that moral reform is
necessary, and unlike Mauclair he is a believer and therefore calls
upon the Catholic Church to achieve that conversion. Yet his prescrip-
tion conveys a sense of hopelessness congruent with the pattern of
despair which afflicts many decorative arts reformers. The gap between
religious belief and secularism was so wide in France, for the conflict
between Church and State was so long-standing and pervasive, that
many Frenchmen were not able to cross it. ^^^^ among believers
the chance for a general religious revival (as opposed to isolated con-
versions) to a devout Christianity strong enough to resist the tempta-
tions of consumption seems remote. We may agree with Anatole Leroy-
Beaulieu that a return to Christian faith is essential, but we are inclined
to add along with the anguished La Sizeranne that there is no use dis-
cussing the necessity of what is impossible.
But we are by no means at a dead end either. The Christian
critique of luxury suggests a number of ways to achieve moral reform
other than through general religious conversion. There is LePlay's
insistence that the family is the cradle of self-restraint, and
de Laveleye's call for creative legislation to alter the social circum-
stances in which personal consumption takes place. In such ways these
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thinkers point to positive though finite steps which can be taken to
in consumption. In contrast, Baudrillart and Paul Leroy-Beaulieu have
a cosmic optimism that consumption is evolving beneficially, a view
which leaves little room for discrete reforms. Change for the better
must begin with an urgent sense that change is needed, and this sense
is precisely what the defenders of Wry lack. They have nowhere to
go, intellectually speaking, because they are basically defending a
situation acquise. They assume the evolutionary process is proceeding
well on its own, and so their ethical conclusion is that individuals should
be left alone to go along with its general current by which needs and
desires continue to multiply in number and complexity. The Christian
critics, however, see the evolutionary process as threatening both
individual happiness and social harmony. Their ethical response is
that the human spirit must resist the current of evolution. As critics
of culture rather than its defenders, they are free to maneuver; the
ideas they present can lead somewhere. Their ethics are largely
based on the Christian vision of the human soul placed in this world to
achieve salvation by overcoming the temptations of nature and the flesh,
but a similar ethical response could come from convictions other than
purely religious ones.
For example, the opponents of luxury show many affinities with
the somber intellectual strain of the Malthusianism which keeps
reappearing during the nineteenth century like a shadow over belief in
progress despite the dogged attempts of optimistic economists like
Bastiat to banish it. As Thomas Malthus (1776-1834) raised the
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spectre of ever- expanding population at the outset of the century, so do
IVfelthusians of consumption raise the disturbing prospect of ever-
expanding needs at its conclusion, suggesting a "law of indefinite dis-
content, in the words of one of them, whereby
-for one need satisfied,
two new needs arise, -l^^ Opponents of luxury transfer the Malthusi
outlook from the realm of reproduction to that of consumption, and
both cases the underlying apprehension is that material resources ca
never multiply fast enough to keep up with human desire. The proble
does not involve the distribution of goods, the shuffling around of
commodities, but the need for an absolute limitation of desire, a
renovation of human nature. Human nature cannot be left to follow its
own inclinations, or evil will befall both the individual and society. The
advice given by Malthus, and also by later opponents of luxury, is the
need for the exercise of moral self-restraint to resist the urges of the
flesh. This ethical conclusion recalls the comparison between sexual
and material desires which is implicit in so many descriptions of the
expositions and which is the basis of innumerable references to women
as creatures of consumption par excellence (especially in Zola's
Au Bonhe ur des Dames)
. Poverty and celibacy are allied and indeed
interdependent virtues in disciplining the flesh, "^^^ and this is why
Zola's praise of commercial lust is so incongruous with his praise of
Denise's sexual self-restraint in Au Bonheur des Dam es.
In this context it is clear why the matter of authority is so crucial
to opponents of luxury. For them there is no ambiguity about the rela-
tive weight of reason and desire in human motivation. Reason is weak
431
and desire is strong, so reason alone is insufficient to enable a person
to tame his instincts. People need the help of an external power to
overcome their own natures. Authority is expressed in the form of
moral concepts, but to be effective these concepts must also be em-
bodied in institutional form. Neither the ideas nor the institutions have
to be specifically religious, however. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu may
appeal to Christian doctrine and the Papacy, but de Laveleye appeals
rather to a sense of justice and to secular institutions, while LePlay
turns to science and to extra- governmental social authorities. In all
cases exterior authority saves the individual from the most degrading
slavery of all. that to his own greeds and envies.
In the next part will be examined some sociologist-philosophers
(for lack of a better term) who take up the idea of the need for new
types of authority in proposing secular resolutions for the problems of
modern consiomption. They build on the Christian critique of luxury
and arrive at a similar ethics based on renunciation and self- discipline,
but they defend their conclusions on philosophical and humanistic
grounds. Their position fits in with the cluster of ideas characteristic
of decorative arts reformers and Christian opponents of luxury, but
they emphasize neither the power of objects nor the power of the Church
to mold human personality. Instead their intellectual quest is for a
morale, a code of social morality, which at once grows out of and
modifies seciilar institutions, habits, and patterns of behavior.
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PART IV
SOCIAL THOUGHT
CHAPTER VII
STOICISM AND SOLIDARITY
The Quest for a Social Morality
The quest for a new social morality is a central preoccupation
of French intellectual life from the 1880-s into the first decade of the
twentieth century. In that era scholarly journals were flooded with
articles on morality and related topics of education and sociology;
numerous books on contemporary moral ideas were published; and the
topic was discussed at many academic forums, among them the
Acad^mie des sciences morales et politiques and the College libre des
sciences sociales. ^ Interest. was, moreover, by no means confined to
scholarly circles. ".
. .
the grand metaphysical questions which it would
have seemed would be excluded from worldly preoccupations became the
object of passionate discussions in novels, theatrical plays, and even the
conversations of the idle. A glance at articles appearing in journals of
general circ\ilation such as the Revue des deux mondes or Nouvelle revue
gives the same impression of a widespread discussion. Another indica-
tion of general interest is that in 1904 the f cole de morale charged a
number of professors and scholars with the task of teaching the public
about recent major systems of morality from which it could choose,
including those of Charles Renouvier, Auguste Comte, Frederich
Nietzsche and even of Karl Marx. The practical consequences of this
preoccupation with articulating a new moral code were by no means
insignificant. One example is a movement to reform criminal law, since
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the traditional moral iustifiraHor, • ,ai j c tion for punishment of offenders was being
revised. The institution most affected was the school system, for it
was the only one besides the Catholic Church which could hope to incul-
cate a new generation of Frenchmen with a moral code-and the
Church's power as a political organization was feared by many French
leaders much as they might approve of its moral teachings. Therefore
the University revised plans for secondary education to include special
courses in morality for its third and fourth classes "which were recom-
mended to the professors by ministerial instructions.
Before going any further it should be explained that the English
terms "morality, " "moral code, " and "social morality" are all inade-
quate translations of the French la morale
. In English "morality" and
related terms generally refer to the practice of virtue, or to a general
awareness (as opposed to a rigorously defined concept) of the distinc-
tion between right and wrong. Unfortunately, the idea of morality has
been trivialized in its connotation to the level of didactic moralizing,
the sort of preachiness associated with the Victorians. In the twentieth
century, the intellectual reaction against that type of moralizing has
been so pronounced that the whole area of moral thought has been
neglected. As a possible alternative, the term "ethics" is not much
more satisfactory than that of morality. Traditionally, ethics has
signified a branch of philosophy-
-the science of moral duty, or a system
of moral principles -
-and as such ethical thought has suffered from the
general decline in philosophical specxilation in modern times. Today
ethics is commonly associated with specialized rules of conduct, some-
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times having legal or quasi-legal status, which govern the behavior of
practitioners of medicine, journalism, politics, and the like. It has
become reduced to a narrowly professional frame of reference. More-
over, both morality and ethics tend to refer only to individual behavior
in the former case often to sexual conduct in particular and in the latte
case to professional conduct. Both terms therefore lack a social
dimension.
The French la morale as used in modern times has distinct
advantages over the English vocabulary. Since the twelfth century the
French have used this word to refer to the science of good and evil,
and for nearly as long it has signified the practice of right conduct as
well as its theory. In the late nineteenth century la morale became
invested with a more specialized meaning: the whole network of habits
and values in a given society, and even more specifically the scientific
study of such a system in a society. La morale by itself came to mean
the study of social morality, the appraisal of moral ideas and practice
in a social context. The definition and clarification of this term in the
late nineteenth century by ^mile Durkheim, Henri Bergson, and a host
of other figures provided an immensely usefxil category of thought- -one
less rigorous than ethical philosophy but not degraded to feeble moral-
izing, one that goes beyond individual consciousness to collective
consciousness, one that is open to sociological, philosophical, and
5psychological ideas alike.
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The quest for a new morale appropriate for modern industrial
society has already been noted in this dissertation. The moral con-
cerns of the aesthetic thinkers discussed in Part Two were emphasized
in order to establish their claim to intellectual significance outside the
boundaries of art history or aesthetic philosophy. Jean-Marie Guyau's
study of the
-problems of contemporary aesthetics" is part of his larger
effort to sketch "a morale without obligation or sanction. - and decora-
tive arts reformers propose a new morale de la chose c.rf. [to
borrow Andler's expression). Camille Mauclair suggests that the
major failing of modern socialism is its inability to provide a morale
above and beyond bread-and-butter issues. As for the anti- socialist
economists examined in Part Three, their moral concerns hardly need
to be pointed out, although they do need to be defended against partisans
of a so-called scientific neutrality in economic thought. ^ Now it is time
to take a broader view, to see aesthetic and economic thought as two
tributaries of the great current of intellectual concern with defining a
secular social morality. The 1880's, when the decorative arts move-
ment originated and when the debate on luxury commenced, saw as well
the genesis of explicit discussion of the need for a new morale
. The
1890 's brought the burgeoning of both economic and moral thought as
well as of the decorative arts movement, while the following decade
brought a gradual decline of activity in all these areas. Even the inter-
national expositions which divide the period into approximate thirds
may be seen as efforts to bring about the moral education of the masses
through the "lesson of things. " Yet the expositions perhaps educated
446
instead intellectuals who learned at these discomforting spectacles that
the masses were turning into amoral consumers rather than into
citizens of sterner fiber. Thus the end of the period brought a sense
not that a moral code had been found but that the topic had been worn
out. In 1905 one observer commented that over the previous two
decades,
despite the f^tes to which our country has invited a world aston-ished by our national activity, despite centenaries, whose cele-bration IS well designed to implant in the popular consciousness
the grand ideas which should guide it, still it is legitimate to
speak of a crisis of morale and of moralit^'.
The movement to define a new code of social morality, if ulti-
mately frustrated, is so important in its intellectual and practical
consequences that it could alone constitute the subject of a dissertation,
or, better yet, a book. What is regrettable is that no such work seems
to have been attempted. The situation regarding the moral thought of
the period is similar to that described regarding aesthetic thought in
Part Two-
-a plethora of unmined primary sources and a paucity of
secondary works. Perhaps the most helpful general works are books
published at the end of the period under review which attempt to sum-
marize contemporary social thought: examples are Gaston Richard's
La Question sociale et le mouvement philosophique au XIX^ si^cle
JjThe social question and the movement of philosophy in the nineteenth
century^l (1914) or Georges Palante's Precis de sociologie jPrecis ofDo(6th ed.
,
1921). As for more recent works, perhaps the
closest thing to an adequate secondary source is Theodore Zeldin's
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France 1848-1945, Vol. 1: Ambition, Love and Politics (197.3^. 9
this book is n.ore of a display of samples from the mine than an orderly
guide to it. (Its discussion of solidarity will be examined in more
detaillater on.) Therefore, the strategy used in this part will be
much the same as that in Part Two, to indicate the existence of an
intellectual trove and then to chose from it for closer inspection a few
specimens appropriate to our topic of the social ethics of consumption.
The first nugget, so to speak, will be the writings of the social
philosopher Louis Weber ( ? - ? ) on Stoic philosophy, which he
regarded as a particularly helpfiil source of ethical ideas and habits to
limit material desires through self-restraint. Weber's work is an
example of one major activity of moral thought in the period, the
ransacking of past philosophy for ethical ideas and practice appropriate
for contemporary needs. A second major direction of intellectual effort
proved even more fertile, and will be treated in more detail accordingly:
this is the borrowing from recent scientific thought in order to con-
struct an altogether novel, modern basis for social morality. The most
important result of this effort is the concept of solidarity, to which
Zeldin most recently has drawn attention. Solidarity is less a theory
of social ethics than an agglomeration of theories. Out of its chaotic
store of ideas, we shall examine ones which suggest how the consximp-
tion of individuals might be restrained and directed by society.
Exponents of solidarist thought to be considered are, first of all,
Charles Gide (1847-1932), a solidarist economist, probably the most
creative one of his day both for his concept of "the reign of the
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consumer" and for his practical efforts to usher
.t in; ^mile Durkheim
(1858-1917), whose analysis of the social and personal dilemmas posed
by consumerism are justly well-known; and, finally, Gabriel Tarde
(1843-1904), who of all the social philosophers examined in this section,
and indeed in this dissertation, is the most significant thinker about
consumption.
The Revival of Stoicism: Louis Weber
When the economist Courcelle
-Seneuil observes that in matters of
ethics of consumption "we are still living on the theoretical precepts of
classical antiquity" [iee Part HI, Chapter VI. p. 41?], the "we" refers
especially to French intellectuals. To turn to ancient philosophy for
guidance is almost instinctive for a group which has been educated so
rigorously in the classical mold. Yet Courcelle-Seneuil's criticism of
this reflex is not entirely fair. French thinkers, at least the better
ones, do much more than repeat the words of the ancients. The revival
is not pedantic but creative when it involves the effort to extract from
ancient philosophies the ideas most appropriate for modern times, and
to interpret them for contemporary audience.
Of all the ancient philosophies. Stoicism is probably the most
pertinent to the dilemmas of modern consumption. In its counsel of
detachment from material things, which in turn is based on a theoreti-
cal distinction between the active soul and passive matter, the Stoics
address directly the proper relationship between an individual and his
possessions. To French intellectuals around the turn of the century,
Stoicism also had an enormous appeal in its support for traditional
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Christian virtues such as poverty, discipline of desire, and scorn for
carnal pleasure without recourse to supernatural sanctions. Some of
these intellectuals, including Anatole France, suggest that the Greek
Stoics prepared the way for Christianity by their austere monotheism
and elevation of spiritual reality over fragile materiality. 12 The
implication is that Stoicism is an early and pristine form of Christian
ethics, untainted by later doctrinal accretions. As such Stoicism offers
the foundation of a secular ethics of renunciation with which to combat
hedonism--referring not to the teachings of Epicureans, who did not at
all define pleasure as enjoyment of material things (they lived on water
and barley bread) but as enjoyment of detached tranquillity, reason, and
virtue
--but to combat hedonism defined by orthodox economists as
13material self-interest. Thus it is not surprising to see that
de Laveleye quotes the Stoic Senecci in order to argue against the ortho-
doxy of the Paris group, or that Paul Leroy-Beaulieu in turn criticizes
de Laveleye as an "austere and fierce" neo-Stoic.
The extent of interest in Stoicism in France around 1900 may be
judged by the nximber of books and articles published on the subject.
For our topic the most stimulating of these publications are four articles
written by Louis Weber from 1905 to 1909 for the Revue de la m^taphy-
sique et de morale collectively titled "La Morale d 'Epict^te et les
besoins presents de I'enseignement moral" Jjhe moral thought of
Epictetus and the present needs of moral education^. Weber was
trained in philosophy and published articles on the subject in learned
17journals. Yet he was not really a part of academic circles. He
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earned his living as a bureaucrat at the Ministry of Labor,
seemed to seek a non-scholarly audience for philosophy by reviewing
that subject for Mercure de France and by takxng special interest in
educational reform. 19 He himself said that his goal is to link new
ideas with the traditions of ancient humanism.
Weber's articles on Epictetus must be seen in this light. In part
they expound Stoic ideas, but their author is particularly attracted by
the Stoic methods of inculcating those ideas in a practical and effective
way so that they become vital guides to social behavior. Weber is eage
to address the very problem which seems so intractable to other
thinkers--how to bring about in practice a reform in moral conscious-
ness. This is how he himself describes that problem:
Now it is an enormous and redoubtable task to awaken and conquerfor morality the young man who, when he looks at society with his
own eyes, sees at first in the foreground only episodes of a fierce
and merciless battle for the conquest of material well-being,
The contrast of this spectacle with the tableau of duties traced in
the manuals of morality is truly ironic.
. . one feels the impotence
of phrases and theories,
. .
.
^1
It may be assumed that Weber does not think much of the innovation of
special courses in morality in secondary schools as long as they teach
only moral theories. The crisis in morality is practical rather than
theoretical, he protests, and involves motivation rather than ideas.
The real need is, "in a word, to effect a conversion . "^^ The contem-
porary moral crisis may in fact be defined as "the more or less
conscious feeling of the impotence of principles to direct individual and
23
collective actions effectively. " The cause of this impotence is the
unfortunate dissociation in modern times of theory and practice which
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used to be united in the ancient schools of philosophy. Modern philoso-
phy inherited the ancient ideals of unfettered thought, of reason and
free criticism, but not the ancient practice of organizing philosophical
sects; the Church inherited forn^al institutions for inculcating habitual
moral conduct but lost the ancient spirit of reasoned inquiry. While
Weber laments this intellectual loss on the part of the Church, he
emphasizes that its example of religious education is an important
practical model in training the will as opposed to training the mind.
The Church converts individuals to morality in a way that has nothing to
do with supernatural or mystic experience, but simply with continued
training and indoctrination until its students "learn to will, and to will
according to moral rules or conventions. This type of education may
be, indeed should be, detached from supernatural sanctions and reunited
with reasoned inquiry. "Edification
, that is to say the formation of the
personality and the polarization of tendencies in a determined direction,
is therefore not at all the exclusive privilege of religious faith. "^^
According to Weber, Stoic philosophy also supports the idea that moral
consciousness is the result of edification. Stoicism equates immorality
with ignorance. Morality is not an inborn trait, as Kant and Rousseau
mistakenly argue, but is a straightforward "matter of instruction.
. .the
leading idea of Stoic philosophy is that morality is a technique: that the
distinction between good and evil is an idea which is acquired by
degrees.
.
.
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This understanding of morality is one significant contribution of
Stoic philosophy to the needs of contemporary civilization: a second is
its definition of "the distinction between good and evil" whereby good is
equated with liberty and evil with dependence. The whole physical
universe is divided between two great principles, active force and
passive matter. So too in the individual are opposed the inner force of
reason, which belongs to him freely and is directed only by him, and
the external force of circumstance
-bodily health, material possessions,
political or social events
--which he cannot control. The realm of inner
liberty is opposed to that of external necessity. Human liberty consti-
tutes "a permanent state of happiness- progressively attained through
"reflective and voluntary judgment, "^^ while everything else is a
matter of indifference. The body, for example, is "entirely made of
,,28
...necessities, as it may sicken, or be imprisoned, or die. All
these bodily circumstances are beyond the control of the individual, who
can find happiness only in the practice of right reason. In the same
way the philosophical spirit understands that happiness can never be
found in material possessions, since they are sources of dependence,
"slaves by nature, "^*^ being subject to loss, theft, poverty, and other
uncontrollable factors. The moral person who feels a desire submits
his emotions to reason, reflecting on his desire and asking whether it
relates to something external and enslaving, or to something internal
and liberating. According to this reasoned activity of judgment, he
acts on his desire or rejects it. The immoral (which is to say ignor-
ant) person is passively swayed by his impressions, incapable of
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reflecting on his feelings, and confused about the distinction between
things he can control and things he cannot. As a result he becomes
himself a slave to his own desires, which prove only deceptive and
disappointing, and he loses direction over his own life.
According to Weber, this Stoic concept of happiness as liberty
makes it a philosophy particularly appropriate for the moral education
of youth, who are at a stage of life where they are trying to develop a
sense of autonomy. To be sure, he says, the contrast between free-
dom and bondage is no longer immediately and concretely visible as in
ancient times, but the young person of today is also well aware of
modern bondage when he sees
... the ignorant and brutal masses, who still clearly give the
impression of enslavement to the crudest instincts. The crowds
who rush to racetracks, or who fill the ca£€ concerts on Sundays,
the caf^" terraces and bars at cocktail hour, are they much more'
sensible to the voice of reason than slaves in the time of
Epictetus? 31
Stoic education appeals to the naturally strong sense of pride among
youth which makes them want to rise above this common level. "Let
us not be at all scandalized in a hypocritical way regarding a moral
education which takes as its main support the self-love and naive ambi-
32tion of adolescence, for he who wills the end wills the means. " The
yovmg person gains a sense of his own personal dignity by deciding,
from the many moral environments of modern society, which ones to
reject: "he will acquire feelings of opposition with regard to environ-
ments dominated by the preoccupation of material satisfaction, an
opposition not at all of hostility, but rather of a distance at which is
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proper to stand from vulgar consciousness. -33 He faces a choice to be
one of the herd or to be a philosopher, and he must consciously
renounce the former to become the latter.
Besides these negative examples, the young person must also be
offered positive examples, moral heroes whose inner security and
mental fortitude he will want to imitate. In ancient times this exem-
plary role was played by teachers of philosophy. Young people in the
Epictetian school were awestruck by Stoic heroes like Socrates and
Diogenes and were "seduced by the prospect of belonging themselves to
an intellectual elite constituted by philosophers. "^^ Contemporary
society too needs special men who are "coaches"35 ^^^^^ develop-
ment. Their absence is keenly felt by young people. The grandsons of
the 1848 egalitarians have become worshippers of a Nietzschean hyper-
aristocracy-
- "The Uebermensch is in style"36. .^^^ ^j^.^^ ^^.^
extravagant ideal, its overblown rhetoric indicates how they crave a
moral example. The government may want schoolteachers to instill its
official morality, but they are not so well adapted to their mission or so
specialized in their function as ancient teachers of philosophy. Modern
society needs instead
chosen men, specially trained,who do not reflect only the ordinary
ideals, depreciated because they have fallen into the domain of the
mediocre, but who give the example of a moral action superior to
the average level.
. . .people seem to be close to wanting a moral
elite as they now have, thanks to higher education, an intellectual
elite. 37
This elite should be institutionalized in non- religious centers of
morality so Christianity does not have a monopoly on the organization
of moral discipline. Such centers would function as replacements for
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the ancient schools of philosophy and would resemble seminaries,
ethical societies, or the schools of Protestant sects like the Quakers
in the United States, Methodists in England, and Moravians in
Austria.
Weber anticipates the objection that such centers for moral educa-
tion would be "in a certain sense aristocratic (because such an educa-
tion could not be given to all).
. .
-39
responds, that they
would not be frequented by the sons of workers and peasants, but he
adds that such limitation is true for any kind of higher education. There
are no theoretical grounds to forbid a Stoic education for the common
people, but on practical grounds the necessity of daily labor keeps them
away. Only people with leisure can participate in the long preparation
necessary for the edification of the will. On the other hand, the very
wealthy live in an environment detrimental to the development of a
spirit of sacrifice and resignation. It is somewhere between the ex-
tremes of wealth and poverty, somewhere between the temptations of
the rich and the "thousand obstacles to a sense of personal dignity"'^^
bred by poverty, that the rare ground may be found which is fertile for
the flowering of morality.
Critical Remarks
With this admission Weber suggests that the Stoic education of the
will is really very different from the religious indoctrination he claims
as his model. The moral education of Christianity is universal because
it is based on a belief in the equality of all believers before God. The
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moral education of a neo-Stoic ethical culture society is parochial,
being based on a particular appeal to the sons of bourgeois who are
neither too rich nor too poor to receive its message. Weber may be
correct that pride and independence are effective motivations for self-
restraint among such bourgeois youths. But how many are left out!--
the rich, the poor, the middle-aged and elderly as well as children,
and above all women, whose supposedly uncontrollable wishes for
material things, according to so many nineteenth- century novels, could
drag down a Stoic father or husband to financial ruin. In its apotheosis
of ideals of individualism and liberty, Weber's updated Stoicism presents
a kind of renunciation which is a mirror opposite of Paul Leroy-
Beaiilieu's praise of luxury in the name of these same ideals. Weber's
notion of training a moral elite which scorns the masses also reminds
us of the self-s\ifficient pride of des Esseintes, or of the snobbish
buyers of decorative art objects who also tend to define their consiimp-
tion by opposition to that of the masses. Of course, Stoic theory con-
demns the search for happiness in materiality to which both des Esseintes
and the decorative arts movement succumb, for Stoicism above all dis-
courages tendencies to reification. Still, in its social ass\imptions
there are echoes of the quest for the rare and unique which are \inavail-
able to the masses. How will an aristocratic Stoic education inciolcate
self-restraint among the masses in an age of democratized liixury? It
could be argued that the neo-Stoic elite could set an example: but how
to set an example for the masses on the basis of scorn? For example
to be effective, there has to be some basis in common humanity, some
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acknowledgment of sinailarity. In Christian moral teaching, the
example of Jesus is effective because He is human as well as divine,
and people like Paul Leroy-Beaulieu forget this when they argue that
the example of Jesus should not be taken seriously because He is
"super
-human. "
The aristocracy of money, to borrow Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu's
expression, seems to call forth its opposite in an aristocracy of renun-
ciation. Both are intent on marking their distinction from the crowd,
while the crowd, meanwhile, is left ^vith "a thousand obstacles to the
sense of personal dignity, " with no leisure nor motivation to develop
moral qualities. The message of renunciation on the part of those
better off is not likely to attract them, while the message that will be
communicated is that their values and activities are disdained, that
their souls are lost to Mammon, with no promise of eventual salvation.
The modern "slaves" are thus left to crowd into caf^'-concerts
,
bars,
and expositions, to dream their dreams, while the sons of the bour-
geoisie can take pride in not being like them. The pattern of response
implicit in Weber's neo-Stoicism is therefore a familiar one, so
familiar that it may be termed a structure of feeling characteristically
aroused by modern consiamption. The structure may be summarized
as a troubled elitist pride. The pride comes from being different from
the vulgar crowd, and the troubled conscience from the continued
presence of that crowd, which continues to haunt those who scorn it.
As des Esseintes coiald not escape from mass consumption, as patrons
of the decorative arts cannot shake off a trail of cheap imitations, so
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the Stoic tries to define his moral code in opposition to the crowd and
seeks his liberty in an impossible isolation. These elitist responses
are all ones of opposition to mass consumption, and this basis means
they are the offspring of the age of mass consumption as much as caf^-
concert crowds. Even voluntarily doing without can be another status
symbol in the society of consumers, implying as it does that one has
the means to make a choice. A recognition of common humanity has to
begin with an admission that mass consumption involves all of society.
If this criticism of Weber's articles is unduly harsh, it is so
because this whole pattern of response, and not just its particular
expression by Weber, is being called into question. At the same time,
Weber deserves praise for his insights into the moral education of the
consumer which, far from being part of a familiar pattern, are uniquely
suggestive. Most fundamental of all is his appreciation of the kind of
edification needed-
-the inculcation of habits of thought so the consumer
can act with foresight, consciously and reasonably, rather than falling
prey to confused and ill-formed whims with little concept of how
fleeting desires relate to happiness. In other words, Weber rejects the
model of economic hedonism not so much because it is morally wrong
but because it is psychologically unsound. The individual consumer
does not intuitively understand his self-interest; he must be helped to
comprehend the relationship of exterior things to happiness and to
perceive the liabilities of consumption. Furthermore, Weber sees that
this type of training is an important part of the general education of
youngsters, and that the most potent educational method is that of
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example. JI not done consciously the teaching will be done haphazardly,
and rather than aUowing a haphazard education by adults who are them-
selves confused about consumption, it is in the social interest to pro-
vide coherent moral examples for the next generation. Weber's only
fault perhaps is not to stress sufficiently the possibilities for this type
of education, for he limits his scope to the formal schooling of adoles-
cents, whereas it could begin with much younger children in the school
of family life, as LePlay would emphasize.
Moral and Material Progress
Even this brief look at one of Weber's works suggests why he is
not a philosopher in any strict sense of the word. His interest in the
moral thought of the past is based primarily on his conviction that it can
be interpreted to help confront a present crisis. This bent towards cul-
tural criticism is also evident in his preoccupation with the problem, at
once philosophical and sociological, of the relationship between moral
and material progress -
-the very relationship which Baudrillart and
Paul Leroy-Beaulieu left unresolved in their theory of luxury. Weber
began thinking about the possibility of a dichotomy between moral and
material progress in 1905, the same year his first article on Stoicism
was published, and when in 1913 he finally published Le Rythme du
progr^s,
€tude sociologique [jhe rhythm of progress, a sociological
studyQ, it took the form of a concise, forcefiilly argued book which
indeed gives the impression of being the product of long consideration.
It also evidences a significant shift in tone from the articles on Stoicism.
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In those articles Weber already assumes a dichotomy between mater-
iality and morality in that objects never teach, only tempt, while moral
guidelines enabling the individual to deal intelligently with objects come
from outside them, namely from ethical philosophy. Earlier Weber's
response to that dichotomy is to propose an educational program which
in its content and methodology seems to provide a practical way of
inculcating those moral guidelines in at least part of the population.
The 1913 book offers no such solution. In it Weber takes a much
loftier view of the relationship of moral and material progress, pro-
posing a "law of two states" which he describes as one "which would
simply express this fact, that the human intelligence seems to have
progressed.
. .
by alternating phases of technical activity and ideological
[or reflective] activity,
. . .
"^^ Human civilization is comprised of a
rhythm of alternating phases, so that man concentrates his attention and
ingenuity first on exterior objects, or matter, and then on human rela-
tionships, or society. Weber cites anthropological evidence to demon-
strate that early man initially developed his technical intelligence by
fashioning tools, and only then entered a phase where his symbolic and
social intelligence developed as he learned to manipulate language.
This law of two states, argues Weber, is preferable to Auguste Comte's
law of three states because it is not presumptuous enough to make a
prediction about the future of civilization. It outlines an evolutionary
43process which is not to be confused with absolute progress. Further-
more, while Comte hypothesizes that all aspects of civilization will be
in harmony during each of the three stages, Weber's dualistic scheme
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concludes inevitable incompatibility between the ideas and modes of
thought emerging from the technical and the reflective intelligences.
There will always be a time lag between the two faculties, for one
develops as the other stagnates. With his model, Weber concludes,
we can understand the discordance of the modern age. The nineteenth
century has seen prodigious technical activity while moral thought has
languished. This sad but inevitable imbalance is a result of the inborn
dichotomy of the human intellect whereby mankind cannot deal with
things and ideas at the same time.^^ Civilization needs a fusion of the
two types of intellect, but his total synthesis is only an ideal, an
inspiration but never a reality.
In Le Rythme du progr^s Weber turns to philosophy to diagnose
an incurable illness of civilization rather than to prescribe a remedy.
Moral renovation is out of the question for modern society until the
tempo of industrial development slackens, and this is not in the fore-
seeable future. Yet there is no major incompatibility between Weber's
espousal of Stoicism and his law of two states. Stoic philosophy may be
seen as a holding action for individuals in an age which is incapable of
developing a generally accepted moral code. It served this purpose as
an ethical refuge during the waning years of the Roman Empire, and it
can serve the same purpose in the latter stages of industrial empire.
Weber himself points out that for the Stoics the concept of moral pro-
gress is a purely individual one. The Stoic does not blame his vices
on his civilization, nor does he assume that the morality of the individual
(at least of the superior individual) depends on general progress in
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custon^s and institutions. This Stoic view, says Weber, is very differ-
ent fron. the prevailing one which sees individual perfection in terms of
general progress towards a greater social, judicial, or economic solu-
tion; and he adds that the difficulty with teaching ethics in modern society
is that the student does not wish to obey moral rules which are regarded
as temporary, as subject to change when social institutions as a whole
are reformed to become more just. Weber does not hold out much
hope for such general moral progress in his age and addresses himself
to the few enlightened individuals willing to undertake their own moral
development. An ethic of restraint and self-discipline can be the solu-
tion for a happy few if not for society in general. Stoicism offers
individual but not social salvation.
The Principle of Solidarity
The idea of solidarity furnishes the bedrock of a moral code which
goes beyond individualism to embrace all of society. Of all the modern
systems of morality devised by the French it was the most popular and
still is the most significant. Louis Weber, who is fully aware of its
appeal, concludes his four articles on Stoic morality by arguing the
latter 's superiority over solidarity because "in [its] urdversality
[^solidarity isj too abstract and too complex to create morality in the
individual" and might even produce a "disorganized and unproductive"
moral harvest if cast upon unprepared minds. But solidarity in turn
had the great advantage over Stoicism of seeming intellectually up-to-
date and peculiarly appropriate for modern times. Solidarity had all
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the prestige of science. By appealing to evolutionary theory, it claimed
an objective basis for validity which seemed to place it above the rela-
tivity of the other philosophical systems competing for attention,
48Stoicism among them. Furthermore, while ancient philosophies like
Stoicism counselled detachment from society, solidarity was based on
the modern ideal that morality lay in commitment to the "social
49
whole. " As a result, solidarity was more widely discussed and
widely accepted than neo-Stoicism. The moderns triumphed over the
ancients. Solidarity became a sort of quasi-official philosophy of the
Third Republic, for its very vagueness meant that it could serve as a
common meeting ground for a wide variety of political, social, and
50
religious opinions.
In his book France 1848-1945 Theodore Zeldin calls attention to
solidarism as one of the "original efforts.
. .made to adopt new
approaches in institutional, religious, social and diplomatic ways" in
51
France of the 1890's. Zeldin, however, does not attempt to make a
thorough study of it in the course of a much broader synthetic work.
His goal is to call attention to this intellectual territory rather than to
explore it exhaustively. If Zeldin's contribution is to be criticized, it
is less on the basis of thoroughness than on the basis of context. His
chapter on solidarism appears in the section of the book devoted to
French politics, and, more specifically, it is presented as one of four
doctrines shaping French political life (the other three are opportunism,
radicalism, and socialism). Large portions of the chapter on solidarism
are devoted to much more familiar political subjects discussed there.
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evidently, to establish a frame of reference: Boulangism, the
Ralliement, the careers of M^line and Waldeck-Rousseau, and the
Dreyfus Affair. Even the portion of the chapter which deals directly
with solidarist principles treats them ina.political context. The Intel -
lectual background is described as an immature mash of biological,
social, and moral ideas until Leon Bourgeois "brought together all
these hints.
. .
to make solidarism a political doctrine. "^^ Then its
practical political results are discussed, especially mutualism and the
social legislation of the Third Republic. In the latter case Zeldin is not
very convincing in his attempt to demonstrate that such legislation
resulted specifically from solidarist ideas. As a result the chapter
promises more than it delivers, and remains a curious medley of
observations without a convincing demonstration of the main theme, that
solidarism is a political ideology of the Third Republic as significant as
socialism, radicalism, and opportunism.
Certainly solidarism was applied to politics by Bourgeois and
others, but the error is to see it as primarily a political doctrine. A
more appropriate context for it is that of the moral crisis around the
turn of the century described at the outset of this chapter. To be sure,
the effort to develop a viable secular morality was closely related to
the circumstances of French political life, especially the desire to offer
alternatives to socialism. As an oft-repeated phrase of the day had it
(Guyau's father-in-law was in part responsible for its popularity), "The
. , 53
social question is basically a moral question. " If proper moral
attitudes were instilled in the citizenry, the state wo\ild be strengthened
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enormously and the appeal of socialism would wither away. But
solidarism was not supposed to be a political doctrine among all the
others. It was less a principle for reforming the political order than a
basis for the moral education above politics which would complement
that order.
One way to clarify the desired relationship between morale and
politics is to recall that many French politicians respected the moral
teachings of the Catholic Church but feared its political influence. They
might have preferred a sort of division of labor whereby the state would
organize material life and the Church would organize spiritual life.
But since the Church seemed unwilling to settle for the spiritual sphere,
since its educational system was seen as instilling not just morality but
also superstitious beliefs and allegiance to ecclesiastical authorities
over republican ones, the state itself would have to undertake the moral
education which is a necessary complement to its political and economic
actions. In the 1890 's solidarism appeared the most promising principle
on which to base that moral education. It would function as a sort of
social engineering, a "social technology, " to use another phrase of the
54day. Admittedly the distinction between solidarism as a political
doctrine and as a moral code to complement political ideas is a fine one,
and in practice it was logically impossible for the French government
to sponsor a doctrine which was somehow independent of politics. Yet
the ideal was there, and by seeing solidarity in terms of the moral
crisis our appreciation of its significance is enhanced. As a political
doctrine, expressed in legal terms, solidarism was not especially
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nor it is
influential in shaping the course of French government then,
especially worthy of rehabilitation now. As a general concept of moral
education, however, as expressed xn the less precxse language of
sociology and ethics and psychology, its influence in the period may
hardly be overestimated, and a much stronger case can be made for
reexamination of its principles today.
The interest of solidarism lies precisely in the difficulty of fitting
it into familiar intellectual categories. Historians of biological thought,
of political and economic and philosophical thought, and above all of
social thought could all deal with it, and yet solidarism includes more
than any one of these categories. For example, a complete study should
even include an examination of the literary school of unanimisme
, led
by Jules Romains, which may be viewed in part as the application of
solidarist principles to the renovation of poetry. In its breadth and
lack of respect for familiar intellectual boundaries, solidarism resem-
bles the decorative arts movement, which has also been examined, if
at all, with tunnel vision. Rather than a narrow view of solidarism as
a political doctrine in the one case, and of the decorative arts move-
ment as an aesthetic doctrine in the other, both need to be seen as
merging in a unified and far broader movement, for decorative arts
reformers were trying to establish social solidarity through art.
Needless to say, no such synthetic study will be attempted here.
The more modest aim of this essay is to establish a context for
solidarist ideas in the quest for a renovated social morality, and the
rest of this chapter will try to see how those ideas were applied to the
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specific ^oral problem of consumption. Although the point has been
little noticed, the concept of the individual on which solidarism is
based is very much that of the consumer. "For the new [solidarist]
doctrine, m^an.
. .
is only the fruit, the product, rather than the
producer. "'^ Rather than actively engaged in building society or in
entering a social contract, as older theories tend to emphasize,
solidarism posits that the citizen
.s the passive, involuntary recipient
of social benefits. "Before being a producer, he begins by bexng a con-
sumer of material products as well as of moral, artistic, and intellec-
tual products, products accumulated over the centuries by toil, by
suffering, by the genius or the labor of generations past. "" Thus, like
any good consumer, the citizen of this solidarist model lives in perpetual
debt.consuming more than he can ever produce, and this involuntarily
acquired debt is the basis of his moral obligation to society.
The Collective Aspect of Consumption
While the specific concept of social indebtedness leaves much to
be desired, solidarity provides nonetheless an intellectual basis for
understanding consumption as a social phenomenon. Not only Weber,
but nearly all the thinkers discussed up to this point have tended to see
consumption in individualistic terms. In this respect, des Esseintes
again serves as a prototype, if not as a parody, of the isolated consumer
whose decisions, pleasures, and pains all happen in solitude. An eco-
nomic liberal like Paul Leroy-Beaulieu considers the consumer as an
individual motivated by personal self-interest; a Catholic like
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Anatole Leroy- Beaulieu, as a sinner who must find a personal salva-
tion by faith; a philosopher like Louis Weber, as an individual whose
moral fibre needs to be strengthened to shun the cafr-concert crowd;
even decorative arts reformers tend to think in terms of improving the
taste of individuals through better design of products for personal con-
sumption, like jewelry or furniture. In all cases the emphasis is on
the liberty of the autonomous consumer to govern his own consumption,
to choose indulgence or renunciation. If there is a social dimension to
this concept of consumption, it is that of competition, by which the
individual uses products to mark his distinction from the masses,
whether his superiority be understood in terms of wealth, of self-
discipline, or of asethetic taste.
How much liberty does the individual really enjoy in governing his
consumption? When a consumer decides to buy something, he does so
because he has a mental image of how his life would be improved if he,
and he alone, owned an object. At the same time, thousands and even
millions of other consumers may be forming that same mental image
and making the same decision. The collective reality that results when
many people decide to buy a product is entirely different from the image
which motivated the purchase in the first place. The object may lose
its Ivixury status, and therefore some of its desirability, when many
people decide to buy it. This declassification suggests that the individ-
ual consvimer is subservient to the mass market, for even while trying
to assert his liberty from it he must keep alert to it to remain one jump
ahead of the democratization of Ixoxury. Aside from such subjective
matters of social status, the massing together of individual decisions
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about consumption may have serious objective results. An obvio
example involves the automobile: consider the difference between the
image of comfort and speed called up by the sight of the wares of the
1904 Salon de 1 'Automobile, when relatively few people owned cars,
and the reality of foul air and traffic jams only a few years later when
more and more people owned them. The consumer's vision is
solitary, but reality is collective. Because the individual consumer is
forced to live with the results of other people's consumption, his free-
dom is necessarily curtailed by the presence of other consumers. The
consumer may be sovereign in his own little sphere of choice, but he is
powerless in the much greater sphere of mass consumption. To use
Benjamin Constant's language, he has individual but not collective
1-^ 59liberty.
Among the thinkers discussed to this point, the collective realities
of consumption were considered, if at all, in the economic term of
"public luxury" which is opposed to "private luxury. " As used by eco-
nomists the latter term refers to personal superfluities while the former
usually signifies state support for non-essentials such as concerts, art
galleries, and statuary. Economists discussed in the previous part
agree only in their perception that these two types of luxury are entirely
different in character. Paiil Leroy-Beaulieu, the advocate of private
Ixixury, criticizes "Certain men, at once artistic and austere, " who
would permit public luxury. Leroy-Beaulieu opposes public Ivixury as
he opposes all sorts of state actions. The state is more likely to spend
extravagantly than individuals because it can buy luxuries without
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explicit consent of taxpayers, he complains, and its decisions to buy
are likely to be motivated by favoritism rather than by good taste.
De Laveleye, on the other hand, supports public luxury as whole-
heartedly as he condemns the private kind. He is motivated by his con-
cern for improving the morals of the citizenry through good art and by
his willingness to accept government intervention to encourage that end.
When gardens, theater performances, and art museums are open to all.
he contends, they lose their character of pomp and instead put pleasures
usually reserved for the rich within the reach of all, to the profit of all.
On this point de Laveleye admits his rare agreement with Baudrillart,
who also supports "collective luxury, " and for much the same reason-
-
he hopes public luxury will counteract the proliferation of unhealthy pri-
vate luxury among the masses. In particular, Baudrillart advocates
state- sponsored f|tes [festivals] as a way to instill patriotic fervor and
other ennobling sentiments among the French people. Both Baudrillart
and de Laveleye consider public consumption primarily in terms of up-
lifting experiences which could be shared by many.
This is precisely the purpose of the international expositions.
If des Esseintes is the model of the individual consumer, then the
expositions are models of public luxury by means of which an experience
of consumption, because shared, could be unifying rather than divisively
competitive. But did the expositions fulfill this purpose? They exem-
plify a collective Ixixury in the sense that many people gathered there
and had similar experiences, but the multiplication of individual
experiences is not the same as the sharing of them. Descriptions of the
471
expositions already cited emphasize instead the isolation of the visitors
and their passivity. They received the same experience but did not pass
it on to each other, being locked instead in private reverie. The ex-
positions represent mass consumption, the repetition of individual con-
sumption, rather than a communal variety. They show the logical
extension of individualism in consumption rather than its antithesis. A
similar phenomenon is seen in the type of public luxury proposed by
decorative arts reformers like Jean Labor. His urban designs, while
they include community centers like libraries and schools, are based
on the mass multiplication of individual dwellings stocked with the same
well-designed furnishings. If this is the democratization of luxury,
then it is in the sense of proliferation rather than of active participation
and interaction.
To look forward rather than backwards, we may also seek to
understand the public lirxury of expositions and Garden Cities with
reference to the terminology of ^mile Durkheim, who characterizes
"mechanical solidarity" as "a social solidarity which comes from a
certain nximber of states of conscience which are common to all the
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members of the same society. " This is a solidarity of likeness which
is born when the "collective conscience completely envelops our whole
conscience, " when "our individuality is nil. . . . The individual conscience
... is a simple dependent upon the collective type and follows all of its
64
movements as the possessed object follows those of its owner. " The
alternative, in Durkheim' s terms, is an "organic solidarity" whereby
individuals are distinctive because "each one has a sphere of action
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which xs peculiar to hi^.
-so that personality is born and social bonds
strengthened at the same txme. We have already seen hints about
possible types of consun^ption that might promote a truly organic
solidarity rather than the mechanical solidarity of the expositions. One
example is Guyau's concept of sociability, the communication of aes-
thetic experience through shared "vibrations. Another is Mauclair's
groping towards a vision of the new suburbs of Paris as a total beauty
which is more than the sum of its individual parts. ^"^ But these are
brief episodes, nothing else. The principle of solidarity contributes
an intellectual scaffolding to help support the construction of an under-
standing of the social dimension of consumption-
-a task for which the
concept of public luxury is far too rickety.
There are two major ways in which solidarist ideas serve
towards this end. In the first place, solidarism is based in evolution-
ary theory, and more specifically in the idea that a new biological
reality is created when many similar organisms are brought together
and interact. When applied to matters of consumption, this biological
emphasis suggests that consumption must be understood as creating a
new organic environment which in turn reacts back upon the individual
consumers. Even today we are still trying to understand collective
consumption in these terms, and the currently popvdar term "ecology"
extends the principle of solidarity in consumption to the relationship
between human and non-human nature.
473
In this part, however, the emphasis will be rather on solidarist
ideas which direct attention to the moral, subjective consequences of
collective consumption as opposed to the physical, environmental ones.
Solidarism suggests new possibilities for the regulation of consumption
through social but non- governmental restraints. It shuns the two alter-
natives of purely individual restraints (e.g.
,
religious or philosophical
conversion) and of legislative ones (e. g.. sumptuary laws) a^d proposes
instead that social consciousness can be transformed at least in part
through the phenomenon of shared consumption itself. We have noted
how society can encourage consumption: why can it not also work to
limit consumption? The hope is that consumption can turn back on
itself and regulate itself. The possibility for establishing a new kind of
social authority, at once a product of modern consumption and the
source of its regulation, is the theme we will now turn to examine in the
work of Charles Gide, ^mile Durkheim, and Gabriel Tarde.
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CHAPTER VIII
CHARLES GIDE
Biographical Remarks
Charles Gide is the father of consumer cooperatives in France.
This claim is considerably less prestigious than Durkheim's to being
the father of modern sociology, but it is far less debatable. In a num-
ber of ways Gide's career resembles that of Durkheim, nine years his
junior. They both left the provinces
--Durkheim coming from Lorraine
in the east of Franee and Gide from the south near mmes--to come to
Paris for higher education, ^ after which they returned to the provinces
2
to teach before receiving the call to Paris around the turn of the cen-
3
tury. In both cases, the gradual ascent in academic life led to wider
renown. Gide's book Principes d'economie politique [Principles of
political economy], which first appeared in 1884, was a huge success
and ^ms eventually published in twelve French editions and ten transla-
tions. His other books were also widely read, for his clear and eloquent
4prose style transforms the "dismal science" into a fascinating one.
Gide's speaking style was equally extraordinary, and he was much in
demand as a speaker for general audiences. Yet despite his popular
and academic success, Gide, unlike Durkheim, never attained admis-
sion into the Institut de France. The reason is obvious. Whereas
Durkheim was an ardent nationalist and republican, Gide was a pacifist
5
and an advocate of "socialism of consumers, " causes that were some-
what suspect. Furthermore, Gide espoused them with an evangelical
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fervor which made his ideas appear xnore threatening to the established
political and social order than they were in reality. ^
The quality of moral intensity constitutes the overriding simi -
larity between the father of modern sociology and that of modern con-
sumer cooperatism. Durkheim preaches an ethic of the producer while
Gide with equal fervor proclaims a new ethic of the consumer. For
both this intensity of moral concern is derived to some degree from
origins in a highly self-conscious religious minority: Durkheim was the
son of a rabbi, and Gide's parents both came from families which had
produced many Protesant pastors. Unlike Durkheim, Gide continued to
practice his faith. He often spoke to Protestant groups in a tone remi -
niscent of a pastor, and he helped organize "L' Association protestante •
pour I'^tude des questions sociales" [The Protestant association for the
study of social questions] as well as other religious and charitable
8 ^.^groups. Gide was well acquainted with other leading Protestant intel-
lectuals of his day, like Frederic Passy, and was a particular admirer
of ^mile de Laveleye and Charles Secr^tan.
Although capable of making spontaneous commentaries on the
Bible, with which he was profoundly familiar, Gide's piety, as well as
his capacity for patience and charm, were hidden from most of his
acquaintances. In general society he evinced a glacial reserve which
was immensely intimidating. When he did express himself it was often
with brutal frankness or sarcasm which only increased the terror he
inspired. Gide was scrupulously truthful but seemed unable to combine
tact with his honesty. The fact that his social awkwardness largely was
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due to timidity, nervousness, and deafness did not ease the humiliation
of those who were his targets. Gide's distance from others was pain-
fully personal as well as social. The eldest of his two sons was killed
in World War I, and because of "an absolute dissidence in our social
ideas,
- to use Gide's expression, he was unofficially separated from
his wife during the last decades of his life. He lived alone in Paris for
most of the year while she resided at the family estate near NWs.
The unhappy paradox of Gide's personality is that this apostle of charity
and cooperation found it so difficult to express love or to draw close to
other people. After standing in mute solitude among ten people in a
salon, he would deliver a vivifying speech on human solidarity to an
enormous audience in lecture hall. One biographer notes,
Just as the sphinx of Egypt exercises all its fascination only at a
certain degree of distance, this strange propagandist would grasp
his audience in full emotion only when his cold and precise word
would fall like an echo issued from some distant cavern. Then
it appeared the impassible voice of truth itself. ^2
Gide's attraction, adds this biographer, was the reverse of the
Newtonian, as it "acted in direct proportion to the square of the
distances.
. .
" A fascinating summary of his personality was written
by his illustrious nephew Andr^ in an obituary article for the Nouvelle
revue franqaise :
QCharles Gide wasD Capable, it is true, of the most faithful
attachments, but always a little in abstracto and remaining
as unpenetrating as impenetrable, except in the realm of the
idea. ... I cannot imagine a human being who commanded more
admiration and who more discouraged sympathy.
. . .Always
steady and consistent and faithful to himself, he could not
understand others except through thought, or understand from
others anything but thoughts. Nevertheless, deeply capable of
the most sublime and lively emotions, but of a general order;
he could not have been less concerned with the particular and
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heart, which never beat so strongly as for the collective. 14
Let us now examine the social ideas which, to some extent at least,
must have compensated for the unsociable life of Charles Gide.
The Making of an Unconventional Economist
Charles Gide recalled that during his education in political eco-
nomy the word "liberty" was rung endlessly and that myriad virtues
were attributed to its plangency. From the earliest years of his own
teaching, however, Gide discerned grave deficiencies in the dogmas of
laissez-faire and self-help. They seemed to preclude social improve-
ment, to justify a complacent acceptance of the status quo. Gide's early
articles in the Journal des ^conomistes
, an orthodox publication, gained
him some notoriety among the Paris group for his unconventionality,
especially in the case of an 1883 article sympathetic to Henry George.
Gide's definitive break with classical political economists came in 1884
with the initial publication of his Principes d'economie politique of
which, in its author's words, "the quite heretical doctrines on landed
property, on the regime of the wage-earning class, on competition, on
the bankruptcy of laissez-faire, on the role of the State, . . .made a
scandal among the classical economists. "^^ Most scandalous of all
was the fact the book gave socialist ideas equal attention with liberal
ones and even treated them with some sympathy. Yet Gide was by no
means ready to turn to socialism as a replacement for liberalism. He
agreed with the socialists in disputing the liberal satisfaction with the
status quo, with their contention that there could be an order of things
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far better than the present one. But his constitution was so little that
of a revolutionary that he was repelled by doctrines of violent expro-
priation, and furthermore he was troubled by socialism's extreme
egalitarianism. Would the school of LePlay present an alternative,
then? Gide sympathized with its historical method^^ and careful obser-
vation of social facts, but its traditionalist emphasis on authority, and
especially on that of the Catholic Church, was unacceptable to him.
Gide was in a position somewhat similar to that of Camille Mauclair
after the latter 's rejection of symbolism. Having similarly rejected
his intellectual upbringing, Gide also found himself in an ideological
and personal no-man's-land, seeking a cause which would enable him
1 Qto unite the ideals of justice and liberty.
All this time, however, the makings of a new departure were
slowly developing in Gide's mind. The first book of political economy
he had ever read was the Harmonies of Bastiat, and he was "enrap-
tured" by its "enchanting tableau of an economic world where.
. . all
conspires toward the general welfare, and where egoism itself is only
20
an instrument which serves the final end.
. .
" Although rejecting this
optimistic assumption that the individual and the general interest
necessarily coincide, Gide retained the vision of social harmony as well
as Bastiat's admonition about the need to treat economics from the
21
point of view of the consximer. At the same time he was reading the
works of the Swiss and Austrian economists, especially Pareto and
Bbhm-Bawerk, and more than any other important French economist
Gide became their disciple. In his opinion these economists put a
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)ncrete
human face on economics by basing value and utility on the co,
needs of the^individual rather than on abstractions like property or
even labor. Gide also read extensively in the works of John Stuart
Mill, whom he felt anticipated the Austrian economists in many ways.
Finally, Gide developed a "filial veneration- for Charles Fourier. He
would claim later that Fourier's work made him decide on a career in
economics in the first place, and would praise him as showing more
power of imagination than any other man in the nineteenth century
except for Edgar Allen Poe.
All this reading provided hints and suggestions: what united them
all and allowed Gide to shape a new economics encompassing both jus-
tice and liberty was the concept of solidarity. Gide neither invented the
term nor read it in any specific place. It was in the air, or, to use his
own metaphor, as the twentieth century approached its reverberations
grew louder and louder as those of the word "liberty" grew ever
25famter. Still, it is true that Gide adopted the term long before it was
generally known and was the first to apply it to economic thought. In
the centennial year of 1889, at a conference in Geneva held in late
March, Gide first announced the formation of the new economic school
of solidarity-
-as opposed to the schools of liberty (the Paris group, led
by Passy), of authority (the LePlayists led by Janet), and of equality
27(socialists led by Stiegler). His speech still conveys a sense of his
excitement at having found a way out of an impasse both personal and
intellectual. Like Mauclair and many literary figures of his day, Gide
issues a manifesto to declare his rejection of past traditions and to
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proclaim a new departure. His concluding remarks will give some idea
of the eloquence and emotion with which he could express his ideas to an
audience:
You have in your mountains a wind that you call the fohn: it is ifI am not mistaken, a mild wind that blows from the i^h in thisseason and which announces springtime; it provokes the melting ofthe snows and makes the glaciers and snowbanks stream down theslopes of the mountains in a thousand sources of dancing waters
which descend, singing, towards the valley, towards thS lovdands
as if they were joyful to feel themselves delivered from their pri-son of ice and be able finally to do something useful and good inthis world, were it only to quench the thirst of a blade of grass orto turn the mill wheel or to give some bread to man. Now this isthe fohn which blows at the moment in the domain of economics
in those inaccessible regions where science has been enthronedfar above poor men, at the height of the eternal snows. It is this
new breeze which makes the old doctrines melt, like the old snow
and carries them away in a torrent and makes them descend at
last from the heights down to the lowlands, to the very low lands
to serve for something good, to penetrate even into ordinary life! 28
Would Gide, like Mauclair, find his springtime hopes blasted by the
passage of time?
Solidarity and Economics
Gide recognizes that the idea of solidarity is amorphous, but that
seems to him an advantage rather than a liability in his goal of renova-
ting economic thought. Instead of nurturing another narrowly-based
school of economics, solidarity- promises to launch an economic move-
ment which will synthesize biological naturalism, Christianity, anar-
chism, and even state socialism. While the concept of solidarity may
have had many sources, the one that matters above all is that of bio-
logical science. To Gide and many others of his day, the principle of
solidarity is convincing because it is based on scientific objectivity.
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In his most important speech on the subject, given in 1893, he empha-
sizes that solidarism is not just another theory but "a fact, a fact of
capit^ importance in the natural sciences, because it characterizes
life. Natural science has no faith in liberty, he goes on, for it can
accept only determinism in its sphere; nor can it uphold equality, for
according to Darwin natural inequalities are the basis of selection and
progress; and as for "fraternity
, this old word no longer has any
credit" for "serious men" believe only in personal interest whether in
science or in business. All these slogans, and even that of justice,
are relegated by science to a region of pseudo-entities, of abstract
unrealities. In contrast the reality of solidarity is demonstrated every
day in every living creature. Life itself is made possible only by the
solidarity of diverse functions, and death is only the rupture of that
solidarity. Gide's respect for a biological and, more specifically, for
an evolutionary perspective is one reason for his dissatisfaction with
classic political economy, which tends to see economic facts and insti-
tutions as fixed and to appeal to immutable natural laws. Gide is con-
vinced instead that natural law presupposes change rather than excluding
it, and that while economic laws may be immutable, economic institu-
3
1
tions and facts are certainly not. Thoroughgoing evolutionist that he
is, Gide is nonetheless not a Darwinist, despite his occasional appeals
to Darwin's authority, because "we think that the spring of evolution is
not competition for life, but cooperation for life, not at all war, but
32
love. " These views are close to those of the anarchist Pierre
Kropotkin. Like Kropotkin, Gide uses the term "mutual aid"
JjMentraideJ to refer to the cooperation all living creatures lend to each
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other, which^constitutes the source of general progress rather than
competition. Gide concludes from the teachings of evolution that the
gradual development of a spirit of cooperation among mankind is by no
means wishful thinking, but will happen anyway because it is in the
nature of life to develop in this direction. At the same time Gide takes
pains to add that human progress consists of man's increasing aware-
ness of his solidarity and encouragement of it. Therefore, it is not
utopianism but scientific fact which promises that someday society will
be transformed into "a sort of great society of mutual aid where natural
solidarity.
. .
will become justice, where each will take his part of the
burden of others and will gather also his share of the profit of others. ""^^
Besides being a biological fact, solidarity is an historical fact.
The evolution of human society as well as that of nature points in this
direction. The development of human needs over the centuries has
made people more dependent on each other:
.
. each new need con-
stitutes one more link among men and thereby augments the feeling of
solidarity, which is for us the criterion of progress. "^^ The techno-
logical and medical discoveries of the nineteenth century have greatly
increased interdependence. Gide refers to the recent development of
the germ theory of infection as an event which "has made the idea of
solidarity penetrate not only in our minds, but into the daily and inti-
mate preoccupations of each one of us"- -citing as an example a recent
(1893) order forbidding spitting in Parisian buses in order to prevent
the spread of tuberculosis germs. (He does not mention the successes
which germs owe to their solidarity. ) As for recent mechanical
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inventions
--railroads, telegraphs, telephones, electric lights, metal
bridges, tunnels, daily newspapers- they may not make people happier
but they assuredly serve
to tie together the lines of national or international solidarityamong men by permitting them to communicate more rapidlyby putting them into contact with each other, and by makingthem vibrate in unison and instantaneously in the communion
of the same interests, of the same emotions, in giving tohuman kind the consciousness of its unity. 37
In this lecture on solidarity, given the same year Durkheim wrote De la
division du travail, Gide seems to suggest that a conscience commune.
far from perishing, is just being born, with modern technology as
midwife.
Then Gide cites another argiiment for the validity of solidarity
which is quite unlike his appeals to scientific and historical fact:
Finally the school of solidarity has grown from yet another tribu-
tary coming from a wholly opposite source, by which I mean
Christian philosophy and theology The dogma which makes the
basis of the Christian doctrine, to know that all men born or to be
born are condemned to carry eternally the penalty of the original
sin of a single man, the first man, but that they can all escape
from this condemnation by appropriating the merits of another
unique man, the Man-God, dead on the cross, this double dogma
of the fall and of the redemption, this great and tragic explanation
of the origins and the destinies of the human species, is obviously
nothing but the theory of solidarity itself taken to its highest
power. 38
Furthermore, a general spirit -of solidarity fills the New Testament in
the proclamation that we are all parts of the same body in Christ. Gide
rejects any notion that Protestantism is an individualistic religion
incompatible with solidarity. Both Christian dogma and the spirit of
the Bible are so imbued with it that it "has been welcomed by social
Protestantism with enthusiasm. Social Protestantism has even
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immediately claimed it as her own and complains that it was stolen
39from her.
. .
"
For Gide it is the "striking coincidence" between the teachings of
the Gospel and those of science^^ which makes possible an economics
that is ethical as well as objective. As the slogan of solidarity became
increasingly popular, Gide took care to defend his ethical definition of
the term. In a 1902 book he distingmshes three kinds of solidarity. That
of the liberal economics
--and here Gide has in mind Yves Guyot, who
published La Morale de la concurrence [The morality of competition]
six years before
--is based on the claim that exchange and competition
will automatically create solidarity between producer and consumer,
since competition will make each producer outdo the other in zeal to
serve every interest of the consumer. In Gide's opinion, competition
among producers leads rather to falsification of goods among smaller
merchants and price-fixing among the larger ones. The basic fallacy
of Guyot's approach, he concludes, lies in the attempt to reconcile
4
1
two opposing concepts like solidarity and competition. A second kind
of solidarity is the mechanical solidarity of the "sociologues"--and here
Gide has Durkheim in mind- -to be achieved through the division of labor
so that each person depends on the specialized work of others to satisfy
his own needs. This, said Gide, is an unconscious, fatalistic, and
therefore immoral form of solidarity, that "of the blind and of the
42
paralyzed. " In contrast, Gide emphasizes the importance of con-
scious moral intent as opposed to involuntary development. The third
kind of solidarity is that of cooperation, and this type points the way to
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a vast general movement of economic and moral improvement through
43conscious cooperation.
Theoretical clarification is not enough, however. Solidarity also
has to be realized in practical terms, if it is not to remain locked up in
theoretical ice. In 1889 Gide notes that the new school of economics he
is proclaiming is known either as the cooperative school or as the school
of solidarity, and he is happy to accept either term or both. "Socialism,
. . 44
cooperativism, it's all one. " Solidarity is to be realized through the
establishment of cooperative associations. Once again Gide lays no
claim to primacy nor originality. The call for producers' cooperatives
was a staple of early French socialism, and in his own day numerous
credit and mutual aid (insurance) societies were formed. What makes
Gide's approach unique is his insistence that consumer cooperatives
should be the preeminent and \altimately the unique form of associa-
45
tion. To understand why, we must appreciate Gide's concept of "the
reign of the consumer. "
The Reign of the Consumer
This is the title of Gide's best-known speech, delivered in
Lausanne in January 1893. It was immensely inspiring to his listeners,
who were enrolled in a course on cooperation at the University of
Lausanne, and it remains his most concise and forcefxil statement of
his central themes: the consumer has been unjustly subjected to the
producer, and the consumer must assert his supremacy through the
46
establishment of consumer cooperatives. This defense of the
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consumer presupposes a defense of consumption, and Gide begins his
speech with an impassioned defense against accusations that it is
parasitical, sensual, and amoral.
.
. if consumption is ignoble,
Gide replies, in terms reminiscent of Guyau, "life is also, for con-
sumption is life, and to develop the powers of consumption is to develop
in the same proportion the powers of life. "^"^ Furthermore, it may be
shared and thus express the solidarity of life:
... to consiime is not only to eat a good dinner, - -for those who
like to treat themselves alone are very rare!--it is to invite
some friends, it is to offer flowers or candy on New Year's
Day, it is to make others enjoy the pleasures of good company
at the same time as oneself, it is, even better, to let the masses
hear concerts, or let them into libraries and museums.
. . . It
should not be forgotten that even under its most violgar and animal
form of eating, consumption has perhaps a more sociable character
than production, and the proof is that people have never found a
better means of fraternizing than eating together at the same
table --and even the most august symbol of communion is an act
of consumption, a table with bread and wine, the Lord's Supper.
He is tired of hearing that only captains of industry or workers are
heroic. The consumer is the unsung hero of society. Those who pre-
tend to honor him-
-such as Bastiat and his liberal heirs who laud con-
sumption as the true end of political economy and flatter the consumer
as the supreme judge of his own interests - -are false friends. The only
power they are willing to grant the consumer is the wholly negative one
of refusal to buy, and this is a paltry right indeed. They pretend that
the reign of the consumer is an accomplished fact, while in truth it is
only a distant ideal:
... in fact, it is not true that the economic world is organized in
view of consumption: on the contrary, it is uniquely organized
in view of production, or, if you prefer, it is organized in view
of profits and not of needs. In fact, each time any enterprise
493
whatsoever is established in the world, he who establishes it is
raUhouTh""^"^ "i'^ ^"^"^ ^° - socLl needalthough e may perhaps say so in his prospectus) but only if itwill reap profits, if it will make money for him. 49 ^
Because "the whole art of industry is.
. . to bring forth the need" rather
than to answer genuine ones, society has been inundated with adver-
50 ^tismg. Buried beneath this flood, consumers are by no means the
best judges of their interests. They feel a need for the prodigious
variety of absinthes and aperitifs on the market, for example, only
because "manufacturers and retailers have covered the walls with
juxtaposed posters repeating a hundred times: Byrrh ! Byrrh ! Byrrh!
or Kling
! Kling ! Kling ! until the consumer is hypnotized. "^^ For
similar reasons each year fashion announces that last year's clothes
are hopelessly out of style, and then thoughtfxilly provides new ones
out of fabrics "which instead of lasting for generations as did those of
52
our forefathers, last only a season. " The consumer follows along
because he is quasi-hypnotized to act by instinct, and "no one today
believes any longer in the infallibility of instinct, even among animals.
His choices betray laughable ignorance in material items (he can no
longer recognize decent wine or meat) and downright stupidity or per-
version in buying entertainment or reading. Because small commerce
is rapidly and necessarily becoming extinct, the consumer is increasin
at the mercy of the "commercial feudalism" of huge department stores
which exploit their staff, waste money on interior decoration, and do
everything to encourage unnecessary purchases "to the point of making
54
it a genuine form of madness which is called kleptomania , ..."
Lacking any organization, consumers only serve as an outlet for
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producers (who are organized into powerful unions) "as the role of
55bottles is to receive the wine poured into them. "
The consumer is as ignorant of his responsibilities as of his
rights. He looks only for a cheap price without considering whether it
was made possible by the murderous exploitation of workers. Nor does
he consider his duties towards domestic animals, so often mistreated
nor towards wild animals which may be sacrificed to satisfy some whim
of fashion, nor towards "inanimate nature, forests, plants, natural
56
resources, that modern industry pillages.
. .
" Unless the consumer
wakes up to his responsibilities towards the environment, the great
hillside vineyards of France will disappear before the competition of
cheap brews from the lowlands, ajid the forests which provide shelter
for water and birds will be cut down unless coal is burned rather than
wood. "How stupid and depredatory is the present function of the con-
sumer!" exclaims Gide, "and how efficacious and beneficial it could be
57
for the world if it covild be put to good use ! "
The purpose of the consumer cooperative is to make the consumer
reign in practice as well as in theory, to allow him to assume both his
rights and his duties. These cooperatives will for the first time give
consciousness and will to the hitherto amorphous, passive "herd of
58
sheep. " On the most basic level cooperatives will restore the con-
sumer's right to good merchandise at a low price. Moreover, this
institution will fill a moral and educational role as well as an economic
one. By educating the consumer, the cooperative will be an instrument
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of social justice and moral change. The education will be in part
material, by teaching, for example, that good bread is not pasty and
white; in part economic, by expounding the role of capital, the dangers
of credit, and the details of running a business; and above all moral, by
arousing awareness of responsibilities towards society and nature.
The cooperative can make inquiries into the origin of products and give
preference to those made by unionized workers or by production
associations. It can insist on decent wages and working conditions for
producers. No longer would intermediaries hide the facts of production
from consumers: Gide has great faith that face-to-face contact between
different groups would do much to reduce antagonisms. Cooperatives
can also forbid altogether the sale of dangerous, stupid, or immoral
products, such as alcoholic beverages, pornographic literature, or
60
songbird feathers. The experience of cooperation would also be a
moral education by showing an alternative to egoism and competition,
by "reacting against the individualism that dessicates us" without going
to the other extreme of levelling through coercion. Above all it would
instill honesty by teaching members "to banish the lie under the form
of advertisements, and fraud under the form of falsification of
61
commodities, ... to acquire the sense of commercial honor. . . "
Gide's vision of consumer cooperatives goes even farther than
this, finally disclosing a glimpse of a classless society of lasting
harmony. For the time being associations of production, credit, and
insurance would continue to exist along with consumer cooperatives,
but these other associations would gradually wither away as the role of
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consumer cooperatives continues to expand. The inherent drawback of
credit and insurance associations is that they apply only to certain
people on special occasions. The weakness of producers' associations
is that they represent the interest only of the particular group. In con-
trast the activity of the consumer cooperative will penetrate the daily
life of everyone, and, even more significantly, will represent the
general interest as opposed to the particular. In the economic sphere
the consumer cooperative is the equivalent of universal suffrage in the
political sphere, "for everyone is a consumer just as everyone is a
,,62
citizen.
. .
" That is why the cooperative of consumers is not a class
institution but the germ of a classless society. In time consumer
cooperatives will assume responsibilities of credit and insurance and
even of production, for they will begin to manufacture their own bread,
wine, and industrial goods in their own factories and farms. As this
happens, the antagonism between producer and consumer will disappear
63in a Hegelian synthesis whereby the two are merged into one being.
A pax romana will come over economic life. Consumer- workers cannot
be divided into conflicting interests, for they all have the same interest
in procuring the anost goods at the least expense, and this is identical
with the interest of all society and indeed of all humanity. The con-
sumer cooperative of today is the microcosm of the future society, and
the reign of the consumer will usher in a complete reorientation of
economic thought and practice. Gide ends his speech with the ringing
voice of prophecy: "The nineteenth century has been the century of
producers; let us hope that the twentieth century will be that of the
64
consumers. May their kingdom come!"
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The Consumer Cooperative Movement
"Cooperatism is not a shop, but a star, "^5 ^.^^ ^^^^ ^^.^^
besides twinkling in the heavens cooperativism had to shine in shops
on earth. Gide devoted much time and energy to its practical success.
Part of his quarrel with Paris group economists stems from their rigid
separation of economic science and economic art, or of theory and
practice. Gide feels that demarcation is unrealistic, because the two
necessarily interpenetrate. It is also uncharitable. For economics to
diagnose economic troubles and then refuse treatment justifiably gives
it a reputation as a dismal science, a science without a heart-
-or rather
without a brain, in Gide's opinion. Because his involvement with
cooperatism was both intellectual and practical, an assessment of his
ideas should be accompanied by a glance at their practical application.
The year 1885 marks the commencement of a self-conscious
movement for consumer cooperatives in France. In that year, about
one-third of the three hundred-odd consumer cooperatives then
scattered around the country met for the first time in a general con-
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grass. Although the meeting was held in Paris, its two principal
organizers, ouard de Boyve and August Fabre, came from Nfmes.
The former, a gentleman of modest but independent means, had an
English mother, subscribed to English journals, and corresponded
with English Christian socialists who first inspired his interest in con-
68sumer cooperatives. Fabre was more eccentric. A small business-
man turned worker, he was passionately fond of Fourier and of
69America. These two organizers had little in common except their
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Protestantism, and even then Fabre turned more and more to spirit-
uaUsm so that towards the end of his life he was speakxng only with the
dead through a medium. This improbable combination of leadership
began when each became involved with a small group of cooperators-
de Boyve inspired mainly by the English example, and Fabre by French
Utopian socialism-and their groups finally merged to form a consumer
cooperative open to all the inhabitants of ^mes. "^^ Because of the
importance of the NlS^es cooperators in calling the national congress
and establishing a national federation, that Federation became more
widely known by the name of the School of N^mes than by its official
title of the "Union cooperative des soci^t^s franjaises de consommation'
[Cooperative union of French societies of consumption].
Before 1885 Gide knew little about the cooperative movement
except for one lecture he delivered some years before on the Pioneers
of Rochdale. He was at the stage where he had broken with liberal
economists but had not yet formulated an alternative approach. In that
year, having heard about Protestant cooperators from his home town
whose economic ideas were similar to his own, Gide wrote de Boyve to
offer his services. As Gide was the first economist of academic repute
to show any interest, de Boyve asked him to head their new journal.
The first Congress, which had already been held, had voted to establish
this as an official organ of the School of Nftnes. Gide chose as its title
Emancipation and as its motto "Ni revolt^s ni satsifaits" {Neither
rebellious nor satisfied]. The following year Gide was entrusted
with delivering the opening speech at the second national congress, and
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on that occasion his lecture. "The Prophecies of Fourier, " outlining
moral and social as well as economic goals for cooperation, was
received with fervent, almost ecstatic applause. "^^ Three years later,
in 1889, Gide again addressed the annual congress, which was held in
the Palace of the Trocad^'ro during the exposition. "^^ By that time, he
was clearly established as the prime spokesman for the consumer
cooperative movement.
The societies belonging to the School of Nfmes in that era usually
began as food cooperatives, especially for common items like bread
and wine; it was hoped that the diet of the common people would improve
at the same time as they saved money. Later on many cooperatives
branched out to other staple items such as furniture and clothing.
According to the policy established by the early congresses, the cooper-
atives sold at usual retail prices and then returned some of the surplus
to individual members, reserving the rest to support programs of
education and of production (either by setting up factories or by sup-
porting separate producers' cooperatives with capital and orders). The
purpose of the refiind to the individual was to attract members; the pur-
pose of the collectively held benefits was to work toward the \iltimate
goal of the organization of production. No matter how much a member
purchased from the cooperative, he had only one vote, for the aim was
to run the organization like a small republic. In politics, the School of
N5!mes adhered strictly to a position of neutrality. Because the con-
sumers were supposed to represent the general interest, the coopera-
tives held aloof from the program of any political party, religious group.
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or socal class. This n^oderate program, continued to attract
societies. The total number of cooperatives grew to about eight hun-
dred by 1889 and to double that in 1900. but the societies adhering to
the national union continued to be in a distinct minority. The number
of adhering societies approximately tripled from 1886 to 1893, but
this latter year there were still only about one hundred fifty societie
belonging to the national federation out of approximately one thousand
consumer cooperatives in France.
In attaining this modest success, the School of Nfmes had to over-
come hostility on three sides. One source of opposition- which may not
have influenced the common man very much but which discouraged other
leaders of Gide's caliber-
-came from the Paris group of economists,
led by Paul Leroy-Beaulieu. To be sure, the establishment of coopera-
tives was not inherently contrary to economic orthodoxy. Liberal econ-
omists accepted the concept of free association for mutual aid among
workers, and in this respect consumer cooperatives were a praise-
worthy if not very important effort which tended to calm revolutionary
passions. These cooperatives coiild also be defended by Paris group
economists as a method of savings in the form of the annual refund and
as a healthy form of competition for traditional retailers, although
liberals objected to granting them special legal favors beyond those
allowed to ordinary businesses. Liberals ranging from L€on Say
(grandson of J. B. Say) to L^on Walras therefore welcomed the coopera-
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tive movement. From the beginning, however, elements of the School
of Nfmes program disturbed some orthodox economists. Although the
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School renounced revolutionary collectivism and dogmas of class
struggle, still it retained a popular and even socialist character. Its
talk of replacing competition with cooperation, of emancipating the
working class, and of eliminating intermediaries between producer and
70
consumer were also suspect.
The definitive break came when Gide concluded his address to the
1886 congress with the declaration that the immediate goal of the con-
sumer cooperative movement was the "economic education of the working
class" and the more distant end "the emancipation of the working class
through the transformation of the wage-earning system [salariatj .
""^"^
With this pronouncement the School of Nftnes openly shed any aura of
bourgeois conservatism and thus forsook the role seen for it by liberal
economists. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, shocked to hear such words from
another professor, responded in L'^conomiste fran(;ais
, the journal he
edited, that "Wage -earning is the form of contract par excellence. Its
suppression appears neither practicable nor desirable to us. There are
8 0
certain fixed positions from which humanity will not stray. " Leroy-
Beaulieu further declared that doctrines of solidarity, cooperation, and
mutual aid could never have anything in common with the laws of politi-
cal economy, and to emphasize the unscientific nature of Gide's formulas
he called them ones of "palingenesis" from which their author dreamed
8
1
of constructing an entirely new world. Such anathemas did not deter
Gide. In 1889, when he again addressed the congress, he proposed that
cooperatives of consumption would eventually take control first of
commercial establishments, then of industry, and finally of agriciolture.
It was the centenary of the outbreak of the French Revolution, and a
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revolutionary tone marked Gide's speech on this occasion. "What is the
consumer?" he asked, paraphrasing l'abb€ Si^s. "Nothing. What
should he be? Everything. "^^ p^^ Leroy- Beaulieu reacted to such
pronouncements first with scorn, comparing cooperation to the frog who
wanted to make himself as large as a cow, and then with silence. Both
L'fconomiste frangais and the Journal des ^conomistes (directed by
Guyot) joined in suppressing any references to the School of Ntmes or to
its leader if by chance an unsuspecting contributor should mention
8 3them. After 1889 the rupture between the School of Nfmes and the
Paris group was complete and permanent.
A second group which originally regarded the School of Ntmes with
a mixture of sympathy and suspicion was composed of Catholic coopera-
tors, especially LePlayists. LePlay himself had never discussed
84cooperation, even in his two-volume work on English social problems.
On the other hand, many of his disciples looked upon it favorably.
Claudio Janet called cooperation the only social experiment which had
succeeded in the nineteenth century and, although in many ways an eco-
nomic liberal, he did not go along with Paul Leroy- Beaulieu 's denuncia-
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tion. But the Catholic concept of cooperation differed widely from that
of the School of N?!mes. Gide wanted the societies to be run like a
democratic republic, while the LePlayists envisaged them as an oppor-
tunity for patrons to exercise stewardship. In Janet's words " [The
cooperative society] should furnish to classes privileged with regard to
fortune and education one of the best means of exercising the duty of
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patronage inciimbent upon them. " In general, LePlayists were far
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less interested m cooperatives than in corporations along the lines sug-
gested by Durkheim. which will be described in the following chapter.
Underlying this institutional difference, of course, is the difference in
religion. Gide contrasts the Protestant preference for consumer
cooperatives with the Catholic preference for corporations of patrons
and workers in the same trade. The name corporation "holds no terror
for us, " he remarks, since the idea of uniting rich and poor in the same
organization is always laudable. However, the corporation as envisaged
by Catholics has "a character a little too aristocratic, it implies a state
of dependence of the working classes which renders it always somewhat
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suspect m o\ir eyes.
. .
"
This is a mild reproof, for Gide was eager to win any support he
could find for cooperation and hoped to forge an alliance with interested
Catholics. At first the signs looked favorable. M. Fougerousse, editor
of the LePlayist journal R(^forme sociale
, was so sympathetic that he
was named secretary-general of the national federation and took an
active part in the early congresses. But he was unliappy with the
emphasis placed on the eventual goal of transforming the wage system
by taking over ownership of the means of production. Fougerousse
argued that it was foolish for the societies to devote a portion of their
benefits to creating societies of production, when those benefits could
89be put to better use in providing pensions, insurance, or housing.
LePlayist cooperators continued to protest against "collective coopera-
9 0
tion, " while some of the cooperatives in the School of NTmes chafed
at their conservatism. In 1889 the cooperatives of Paris refused to
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vote for Fougerousse as secretary-general, and he had to quit the post.
Later Fougerousse got involved in a sorry lawsuit with cooperators in
N?mes who published a pamphlet he considered defamatory. This rup-
ture too was complete and permanent, much to the regret of Gide and
other leaders who considered Fougerousse a man of enlightened and
sincere convictions who could have aided the School of Nfhnes even while
9
1
disagreeing with some of its aims.
A third hostile group was composed of socialists, but the story of
this relationship is quite the opposite of the other two: rather than a
tentative accord followed by schism, socialists and NiVnois cooperators
began in schism and ended in reconciliation. Early French socialists--
not only Fourier, Gide's hero, but also others like Saint-Simon and
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Liouis Blanc --had been enthusiastic about cooperation. But the new
variety of socialism born in the 1870's was heavily influenced by
Marxism and condemned such associations as feeble bourgeois
reformism benefitting only a few privileged people and distracting
93
workers from the socialist revolution. As Gide said, cooperatism
was too socialist for the liberals, too liberal for the Catholics, and too
94bourgeois for the socialists. Then there was the matter of personali-
ties. The three founders of the School of N^Vaes were bourgeois, all
unconventional to be sure, but still bourgeois, and Protestant ones at
that, "which is to say, " Gide explains, "of a religion which is reputed
to be ultra- individualist, even capitalist. " Gide responds that Protes-
tantism is by no means "ultra- individualist, " and as for being bourgeois,
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I have never personally denied my origins. There is no morejustification at blushing at being bourgeois than to be proud of
It, and besides modern socialism owes almost everything it is
to the bourgeois. 95 ^ ^
But this was not the serious source of disagreement in any case.
Far more fundamental was the fact that socialists believed in the pri-
macy of the producer and Nl^nois cooperators in the primacy of the
consumer. According to the socialists, value comes from labor, and
therefore economic wealth belongs to the producer. According to the
cooperators, value is determined by final utility which is the projection
96
of the desires of the consumer. Furthermore, the socialist concept
of the class struggle was at odds with the cooperators' claim that the
consumer stands above class interests. These theoretical disputes
could lead to significant differences of position in practical matters.
As Gide was the first to admit, a union of producers will make demands
--for higher salaries, shorter hours, for the slackening of production to
prevent unemployment-
-which are diametrically opposed to the interest
of the consumers in lower prices and abundance of products. In particu-
lar the issue of strikes divides producers and consumers. From the
consumers' point of view, a strike is always an evil, although Gide was
willing to accept it in some cases for the higher purpose of getting rid
of the wage-earning system. He trusted that in time the need for strikes
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would disappear. If cooperators were suspicious about how unions
would use their power, the socialists were equally suspicious about the
potential power of consumer cooperatives. Some socialists called them
a form of trickery, arguing that when a person lowers his cost of living
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by purchasing goods more cheaply at a cooperative, he will also be
lowering his wages as a producer.
So it is not surprising that in the 1880's French socialists refused
to work with the School of N!fVnes, and that some consumer cooperatives
of a socialist character refused to join the federation. Such intransi-
geance was especially true of cooperatives around Paris which had been
united even before the establishment of the national union. They were
among the liveliest of the societies in France and were under the
influence of Jules Guesde, the leading Marxist in France at the time. '^'^
All but a few of these cooperatives boycotted the School of Ntmes and
denied its right to assume the title of a national union of consumer
cooperatives. The Parisian cooperatives that did join, as we have seen,
were instrumental in removing the LePlayist Fougerousse from the
leadership.
In time the attitude of the socialists began to soften somewhat, not
in the least because consumer cooperatives continued to attract
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workers. The attainment of a detente was in large measure due to
the influence of leftists from Belgium, where cooperators and socialists
had worked side by side for some time. While Belgian cooperators did
not agree entirely with the program of the School of N^mes, preferring
to see consumer cooperatives as weapons in the class war rather than
as instruments of reconciliation, they attended the 1889 Congress in
great numbers and adhered to the program formulated there with only a
few reservations. The declarations of the Belgians in support of
cooperation were heard by French socialists, especially those led by
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BenoTt Malon, editor of the Revue socialiste.
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Still socialists hestitated to cooperate with the national federation
because it included a few Catholic societies, and especially because its
central council included a representative from consumer societies of
the P-L-M [Paris-Lyon-Marseilles] Railway, who seemed in their
eyes a tool or even an accomplice of capitalism. Instead of joining the
established union, socialists in 1895 proceeded to create their own
national organization, the Bourse des cooperatives socialistes
(Exchange of socialist cooperatives^. In several ways the cooperatives
belonging to the Bourse differed from those adhering to the School of
N?hies. The socialist ones usually admitted only workers, or at least
wage-earners, rather than being open to all comers. Also, while in
principle the socialists condemned the distribution of refunds to
individuals as capitalistic and egoistic, in practice they distributed a
large part of the benefits to individuals in order to gain members. Any
surplus was devoted mainly to insurance or pension schemes, or to free
medical service. Finally, the cooperatives of the Bourse were openly
socialist rather than claiming political neutrality, which they denounced
1 02
as an evasive charade. This matter of neutrality was the most hotly
debated issue between it and the national union. Gide was convinced
that a neutral stance was absolutely necessary, first, as a matter of
tactics to gain members, and, secondly, as a matter of principle in
establishing the consumer as the representative of a truly general,
truly human interest. The two federations exchanged long and bitter
invectives. Doctrinal differences were exacerbated by the fear of the
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leaders of each that a merger woiold eliminate their influence. The
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consequences of the rivalry were, Gide laments, "deplorable. "^^^
Foreign cooperators called the French movement the least impressive
in Europe. Many cooperatives decided not to join either society
rather than take sides in the quarrel. Each of the federations finally
rallied three or four hundred societies out of the three thousand or so
that existed in France by 1910.
This state of affairs lasted for seventeen years before the two
groups finally reached a compromise. This achievement was due
mainly to socialists who, unlike Guesde, were influenced by older
traditions of French socialism as well as by Marxism: Eugene
Fourni^re, the aforementioned Malon, and above all Jean Jaur^s.
Their efforts toward reconciliation were aided by the continued appeals
of foreign socialists, especially the Belgians, that French socialists
accept the cooperativist program as s\ifficiently advanced. The advent
of a new generation of cooperators sympathetic to socialism also
helped. ''"^'^ On Christmas Day 1912 the two unions finally merged into
the F€d€ration nationale des soci€^t^s fran^aises de consommation
[jS^ational federation of French societies of consumption^
. The Bourse
and the Cooperative Union were both dissolved and the new organization
was independent of attachments to either of them. The new National
Federation was organized on the basis of a manifesto which made
numerous references to collectivism and concluded by calling the new
organization an "organ of the emancipation of workers. " This phrase
disturbed Gide, who wanted consumer cooperatives to recognize
107
workers only insofar as they are also consumers; but the manifesto
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did not mention the class struggle nor adhesion to the socialist party.
The formula arrived at was that while the principles of cooperation
were in accord with those of international socialism, the cooperative
movement was autonomous. The matter of distribution of benefits was
left to individual societies, and the only cooperatives excluded from
membership were "capitalist and patronal" ones with specifically anti-
108democratic rules. The cooperative movement of the 1880's, which
could have moved in a number of different directions, eventually moved
towards socialism without embracing it entirely. On each side the more
extreme cooperatives refused to join- -for example, the P-L-M railroad
cooperatives on the right, and the Marxist cooperatives in the north of
Franee on the left- -but their loss was more than compensated for by
new adhesions, so that the new federation began with about a thousand
member societies.
World War I, which proved so devastating to so much in French
society, only strengthened the consumer cooperative movement. A gulf
opened between production and consumption due to the diversion and
destruction of productive capacity. Because it was impossible to restore
the balance by increasing production, demand had to be reduced. Faced
with xinprecedented general shortages, consumers began to realize that
they could not depend on laissez-faire to meet their needs. It was
equally clear to governments that consumption woxild have to be
organized, and accordingly the state took a much more active role in its
regulation through rationing, gathering statistics, and (in France) the
establishment of a Conseil sup€rieur de la coop^'ration ^uperior council
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of cooperatioiTlto handle matters of consumption. ^^"^ One lesson of the
war was that demand, while much more elastic than had been supposed,
had to be curbed through government rationing rather than through
voluntary efforts. Another lesson was that voluntary efforts were
qTiite effective when they involved consumers banding together to defend
their rights. When strikes sabotaged production, "civic unions" were
organized to resist this danger to the consumer's interest. Con-
sumer cooperatives mxiltiplied rapidly and battled to keep prices and
profits down at a time when conditions of shortage encouraged inflation
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and profiteering. By the end of the war, the National Federation had
nearly twice as many member societies as in 1912.
After the war the subject of consvimption continued to play a dom-
113inant role in discussions by economists and the general public. In
April of 1921 Gide and over one hundred fifty other teachers in institu-
tions of higher learning signed a "manifeste coop^ratif des universitaires
"
Q:ooperative manifesto of professors^ elaborating a program for the
"socialisrn of consumers. "^^"^ In the same year Gide assumed a Chair
in Cooperation established for him by the National Federation at the
College de France. This was the pinnacle of his academic career.
About the same time the National Federation strengthened its ties with
the C. G. T. [confederation g^n€'rale du travail"}, the largest union in
France, and established a central bank for the consumer cooperatives
which grew rapidly. L 'Emancipation continued to be published
(Alain was a contributor), and it was supplemented by the Revue des
^'tudes cooperatives, edited by Bernard Lavergne, also from N?mes,
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who as much as anyone assumed leadership of the movement as Gide
grew older. In writing a brief history of the School of Nfmes in
1926, Gide noted that of the thirty-six members of the Central Council
of the National Federation at that time, only three were of the first
generation of the School. He felt the future of cooperation was in good
hands with this new generation. "The School of Nfmes only wanted to
be one of the modest tributaries whose destiny is to swell a little the
grand current of universal cooperation and to lose itself in it
joyously. "
Widening Circles of Influence
Charles Gide was nearly eighty when he wrote these words, but
they still have a tone of youthful enthusiasm. In marked contrast to
Mauclair and so many other intellectuals already mentioned, he never
despaired of the cause of his youth, never seriously changed his posi-
tion, never retired to a more remote philosophical or religious per-
spective. His generation did not disappear but passed on its hopes to
the succeeding one. His manifesto of 1921 is as buoyant as that of
1889. This unusual consistency of thought and attitude must be attri-
buted not only to the rigidity of his personality but also to the consider-
able practical success of the cooperative movement. While it hardly
brought about social renovation, it did accomplish enough to encourage
Gide. In this respect the fortunes of the consumer cooperative move-
ment mark an intriguing parallel with those of the decorative arts
movement and programs for moral reform. All of them were at once
>rm
was
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intellectual and institutional initiatives, seeking to renovate both thought
and social practice. All three had their roots in the 1880's and rose to
prominence around the turn of the century. But after the turn of the
century came a parting of ways. By 1905 the decorative arts move-
ment had largely degenerated into commercialism; educational refo:
and corporatism had foundered while the Ralli^ment (which Anatole
Leroy-Beaulieu, among others, had supported so enthusiastically)
aborted by the Dreyfus Affair and the final separation of Church and
State in that year. The consumer cooperative movement was also at a
low point then, but unlike the others it recovered and not only survived
the first world war but emerged stronger than ever.
Yet it would be misleading to paint the consiimer cooperative
movement as an unqualified success story. Gide may have retained
his optimism till his death in 1932, but since then the movement has
simply survived. In 1958 Gide's heir Bernard Lavergne was still
trying to convince Frenchmen of the need for "the hegemony of the
consumer, " and took comfort from the lack of response by reminding
himself that "only the future will separate the good seed from the bad"
and by quoting Auguste Comte that "Humanity includes far more dead
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than living. " This last remark is sadly reminiscent of Mauclair's
admission in 1905 that he felt more at home with his dead comrades
of the 1890 's than with those then alive. Yet Lavergne's despair of the
1950's may seem premature from the perspective of the 1970's, when
it appears that consumer organizations are just beginning to take hold.
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The problem is to find a valid standard by which to evaluate the
historical significance of a movement such as that for consumer
cooperatives. One standard is that of relative magnitude in the past,
which Zeldin appeals to when he points out that cooperatism and
mutualism were considerably more numerous than trade xmions in
France around the turn of the century. Zeldin complains that the his-
torical profession has given a disproportionate share of its attention to
the unions, which in France were relatively small and weak, while
neglecting to study these other societies. Another historian might
respond that his duty is to examine the origins, insignificant though
they may be, of institutions which have immense significance for the
future- -which is of course why so many historians sympathetic to the
labor movement have devoted their attention to the early days of the
trade unions. A similar argument would have to be made for consumer
cooperatives. As Zeldin again points out, they were far less numerous
and their membership far below that of the mutual aid societies. In
this case too, it can be argued that iiltimate historical significance is
not identical with size in a particular period, and that small beginnings
deserve as much attention as dead ends.
But who can be sure what is ultimately significant? Is the organi-
zation of consumers destined to outstrip the organization of producers,
and at what point in history do we stand to make this judgment? In
evaluating the significance of social prophets like Gide, the historian
must engage in a little social prophecy of his own. The situation with
Gide is even more complicated because the organization of the consiimer
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which seems to be taking place is not always, or even usually, in the
form of cooperatives. Much of the organization has taken the form of
ad hoc groups or of government bureaucracies. Unlike the historian of
trade unions, the historian of consumer consciousness cannot be satis-
fied with tracing the evolution of a particular institution, in this case
that of the consumer cooperative. Gide's basic idea of the"reign of the
consumer"seems to be finding realization not in the institution he
encouraged but in a far more amorphous and complex collection of con-
sumer groups. Yet it is the concept of consumer consciousness and not
the particular vehicle of it which is central to Gide. In evaluating his
prophecy it is therefore legitimate to look beyond cooperatives to wider
circles of influence and kinship, to those consumer organizations which,
while not in cooperative form, put into practice some of his basic tenets.
In Gide's own time his leadership encouraged other experiments in the
organization of consumption. Two of them will be described here to
suggest a wider context for consideration of his work.
Garden Cities
Like so majiy other reformers of his day, Gide was distressed by
the lack of decent housing for workers. He considered this need second
only to food as fundamental to consumers, yet first in the difficulty of
satisfying it under the present economic system. "Of all expenses it is
the one whose augmentation is the most certain, the most rapidly
increasing and the most disproportionate to the budget of a working
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family. " Because this need above all others demands collective
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responsibility. Gide urged consumer cooperatives to include housing in
their programs. To do so a society had to possess considerable capital,
and because most French societies were not in this position, Gide also
advocated the establishment of special organizations solely to construct
housing. In 1908 there were 149 such societies in France financing
housing not only by the deposits of members but also by loans obtained
from regvdar banks. Gide admitted this was a small number. -^^^
Another alternative strategy was the construction of whole cities for
workers by corporations which could raise their own capital. These
cities could be marvels of comfort, Gide said, and he felt their con-
struction was indispensable for factories and mines situated far from
urban centers where workers could not be hired at all unless housing
was provided. But in general he grouped such cities with other
"patronal institutions" of the school of LePlay, criticizing them all for
their basic weakness in that the workers, "believing themselves
exploited, . . . feel little gratitude towards the patrons and see it as a
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sort of servitude. "
Yet Gide was a major inspiration of Georges Benc^t-Jj€vy,
who established the first society for Garden Cities in France. BenoTt-
L€vy was one of the young students who gathered around Gide at the turn
of the century when the latter came to Paris to teach. According to
Bencr^t-Ij€vy himself, he first dreamed of establishing an association
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for Garden Cities in France while taking a course from Gide. He
also acknowledged many other sources of inspiration, among them
LePlay, Ruskin, Cheysson, Napoleon III, and Bergson, for he is nothing
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if not eclectic. The concept of Garden Cities has already been
interpreted as an outgrowth of the decorative arts movement which
operated on the assumption that the mentality of the consuming masses
could be altered if well-designed objects were provided for them. Cer-
tainly Benott-L€vy-s approach fits this description. According to him.
the creation of social evil or prosperity ultimately depends on the
architect who designs cities and homes, and social solidarity is to be
achieved through architectural design on a preconceived plan. He is
particularly enthusiastic about the Garden City planned and built by the
mining company of Dorgues, which he calls "an essay in popular
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art. Clearly Benott-L€vy advocates art for the people rather than
art by the people.
Gide makes it clear that this was not what he has in mind by
solidarity or by cooperatively-built housing. In a 1904 article in the
Semaine litt^raire
,
he describes the appeal of Garden Cities (he had
just toured one in England being built to house thirty thousand people)
and explains the idea of building a wholly new environment on a rational
plan away from the physical setting of the old society. Then he asks a
question: will many people want to live in such surroundings?
It must not be forgotten that those workers [who are supposed to
be attracted to Garden Cities] are precisely those who left the
country to go to the city. I certainly understand the response
that the village life they fled was odious, while life in the Garden
City will be full of interest. It's possible. But the trouble is that
what disgusts us about life in the big city is precisely what pleases
the masses, and especially the poor. Many of them, men, women,
or even children might prefer their sordid houses, their leprous
walls, the promiscuity of neighbors with whom they chat from door
to door or across the partitions, the traffic and the noise of the
street, and especially the caf^-concert and the "uncontrolled"
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retailer [of alcohol]
-to all the lawns and flowers of the Garden
<-ity.
.
.It will be necessary to modify in the soul of the peoolewhat one moralist has called, in a very happy expressioT ''theorder of enjoyments. " Therefore a whole education has to be
achieved first: it is not impossible, but it will be long and atthe moment I fear that the clientele of the future city will be
recruited especially among those who are tired of the strugglefor life and of noise,
... or who, disillusioned like Candidef say
with him, Cultivate your own garden. " But these are alreadyphilosophers, and it would certainly be imprudent to count on
thirty thousand philosophers to populate the future city. 128
It is an absorbing passage, not only because of Gide's prophetic vision
of retirement villages, but even more for his reference to the need for
a preliminary transformation of the consumer's soul which echoes
Mauclair's analysis of the futility of the deocrative arts movement fee
PartU, Chapter IV, p. 273]. Unlike Mauclair, however, Gide is con-
fident that he has a way to achieve that preliminary transformation of
the consumer qua consumer. Gide feels conversion is necessary--he
takes very seriously the Biblical admonition "You must be born again"
--but does not rely on personal religious experience to bring it about.
Instead the experience of cooperative action will transform the individual.
The practical action of solidarity "consists of modifying the man by
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modifying first the environment in which he lives.
. .
" By environ-
ment, Gide means social, not physical, surroundings. He always
emphasizes that solidarity in housing will be achieved by having people
associate to build houses rather than from the design of buildings. His
plan for a future city includes not just housing but also associations for
consumption and production to change the social environment. In his
Semaine litteraire article Gide reiterates the importance of having the
consumer society retain ownership of the houses, renting them rather
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than selling then.; it is essential that the society assert its dominance
over the buildings for
the corrosive action of the material and social environment wastes
Ji"^^^J^^^^turning to the state of affairs one wishes to abolish.
It will be quite otherwise in the future city because, beforebuilding the house, one creates the environment and because the
society retains at once ownership of the houses and of the
environment.
In the truly cooperative city "the city would be united not only by the
fact of domicile, but by a genuine association-
-a small autonomous
world, a microcosm would be created which could teach us now what
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the future society will be. " The new society is that of association,
of the human environment, not of the material one.
The Social League of Shoppers
In 1901 Mme. Henriette Jean Brunhes, a Parisian housewife who
was an avid reader of Ruskin and leader of a women's charitable group
"L'Action pratique" [Practical action"], happened to receive from an
American friend a clipping about a Social League of Shoppers that had
been established in New York about ten years earlier. The American
League had had considerable success in persuading New York depart-
ment stores to improve conditions for their employees by publishing
"white lists" of stores which adhered to certain standards of working
conditions and by urging members to patronize these establishments.
Several similar leagues had been established in other American cities.
Mme. Brunhes was intrigued. She spent a year studying the American
leagues, and then in early 1903 established the first "Ligue sociale
d'acheteurs" [Social league of shoppersj in Paris. -^^^ Membership
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cost five francs. Most of the members (as was also true of the New
York group) were upper middle-class women. They made four pledges:
(1) not to place an order without asking if it would require work at night
or on Sunday; (2) to avoid last-minute orders, especially at busy periods;
(3) to refuse any delivery after seven in the evening or on a Sunday, so
as not to be indirectly responsible for longer working hours; and (4) to
pay bills regularly and without delay. Also in 1903 the Ligue published
its first white list of acceptable places to shop, beginning with a list of
couturi^res who made various pledges regarding the treatment of their
workers (e. g. , no more than nine hours of work a day, no "homework").
The following year the Liorue extended its scope to publish white lists of
bakeries and laundries, and began to prepare a series of inquiry sheets
informing members of working conditions in various shops and factories.
The Ligue also began to publish special bulletins on various subjects,
such as the particularly long and hard hours imposed on salespeople by
the winter holiday season. The year 1904 also brought the first
international conference of Shoppers' Leagues, held in Geneva, which
was attended by representatives from the United States, France,
Switzerland, and Germany. In subsequent years the Paris Ligue con-
tinued not only to add more white lists and more societies in the pro-
vinces but also to investigate the housing conditions of domestic servants
and workers (Georges Bencfft-L^vy was a supporter of the Ligue) and to
intervene in labor disputes. ^^"^
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The basic principle of the Ligue is that the shopper is ultimately
responsible for working conditions: its basic goal is to use the econom
ic and social power of the shopper wisely so that working conditions
will be improved. According to Mme. Bergeron, one of the leaders of
the Paris organization, suppliers and consumers share an ultimate
interest in seeing the elimination of bad working conditions so that
everyone will have more well-being and happiness. The "stroke of
genius" of the Ligue, she adds, is in giving an economic advantage to
the humane treatment of workers in the form of the white list, a form
of free advertising which increases the business of decent employers.
Rather than being asked to make sacrifices, producers can painlessly
135reach "an equitable entente" with consumers. To reach this goal,
the Ligue has to raise the social consciousness of the consujner. The
consumer has to be educated to support certain sources of production
in preference to others regardless of price--in other words, to con-
sider moral duty along with price and convenience. In part, that moral
education consists of developing the imagination of the shopper to fore-
see the collective results of individual decisions multiplied many times
over:
We might better render an account of our responsibility if we could
individually ascertain and touch with our fingers in some way the
resvdts of our exigencies. But look, we are a multitude; and the
evil accomplished in numerous and good company loses three-
quarters of its disagreeable aspect. Every one wants to eat fresh
pastry on Sunday afternoon or Sunday evening; all women order
their new hats and dresses for Easter; where are they who ask
themselves what the result is for the baker, for the cook's boys,
for the dress maker and his workers? ^36
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But in part the shopper lacks an awareness of moral responsibility not
through lack of imagination but through inevitable ignorance due to the
dissociation of production and consumption. The individual shopper is
unaware of conditions of production in large measure because the pro-
ducer prefers it that way:
The Ligue member sees the store and cannot enter the storeroom.
She sees the fitting room and cannot go into the workroom. She
sees the elegant pastry shop and cannot visit either the narrow,
overheated rooms where the workers toil, nor the rooming houses
where the little scvillery boys are lodged and piled up. 137
Only with the power that comes from unity can shoppers inform them-
selves about conditions which otherwise "would necessarily escape
138them. " For this reason the Ligue demands the rights of interven-
tion, inquiry, and publicity, despite protests from some liberal eco-
nomists like Guyot that consumers are incompetent to judge the technical
1 39
organization of labor.
As we have seen Gide himself did not directly aid the establish-
ment of the Ligue. He himself notes that it was "inspired by social
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Catholicism, " and this assessment is corroborated by the fact that
Mme. de la Tour du Pin was an early supporter and that an early article
141
praising it was published in the Catholic journal L'Univers . Cer-
tainly the organization has something of the "aristocratic" character
that makes Gide vineomfortable with LePlayist corporations. After all,
it is composed of women who can afford to pass up a bargain. Gide
feels that in the long run a democratically organized consimier coopera-
tive co\ild exert more influence in improving conditions of production.
The Ligue does not go nearly so far as a consumer cooperative. It
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limits itself to establishing more harmony between consumers and
producers, but these remain two distinct groups, whereas Gide fore-
sees their eventual synthesis. Also, Gide feels it is the duty of the
consumer "to put an end at the same time to the consumer's exploita-
tion of man and his pillage of nature, "^^^ whereas the Ligue deals
only with the first of these two responsibilities. Yet the Ligue does
stand for the assumption of moral responsibility by the consumer and
for direct contact between producers and consumers. These are two
fundamental principles of "the reign of the consumer, " and so it is not
surprising that one of the most enthusiastic early supporters of the
Ligue quotes at length from Gide's speech by this title to explain the
purpose of the organization. "^^^ At the end of 1907 Gide himself
announced his support for the Ligue in an article in the Semaine " •
litt^raire. This was the first endorsement of the Ligue by a profes-
sional economist, and as such it was greeted as "a great light of
144
hope.
"
From Gide's point of view, it was a ray of hope to see the advent
of an organization addressing itself directly to women as cons\imers.
He recognizes that women usually make most of the purchases for a
household, and that the distinction between producer and consumer is
in large measure equivalent to the distinction between men and
145women. Yet despite their disproportionate role in consumption,
women are precisely the ones who most resist shopping in consumer
cooperatives. Gide understands why a woman might prefer to shop in
the corner grocery store. Its convenience "is not of small importance
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for a housewife often fatigued or having little free time between he:
chores and errands, " and its friendliness and small personal favors
are usually lacking in a larger establishment. Besides, she would be
spared the trouble and indignity of writing down each penny spent in a
notebook as must be done for a cooperative. Gide's tone is unvary-
ingly and unusually sympathetic regarding the vexations and toil of
running a household (perhaps because he had to oversee his own house-
hold during the years he lived along in Paris). Yet he also urges
housewives to drop their hostility towards cooperatives. There is
nothing insurmountable in their opposition, he affirms. Cooperative
stores could be made much more attractive and could sponsor gatherings
where a woman's understandable desire for sociability could be satisfied.
He also urges that women be included on the administrative council of
cooperatives, where their domestic experience could be of great help:
"it must not be forgotten that the first cooperative association that
1 48existed in the world is the household. " Unlike abstractions such as
socialism or even solidarity, unlike producers' cooperatives, the con-
sumer cooperative is a concrete reality which directly touches women's
lives. One reason why Gide retained his optimism about the future of
consvimer cooperatives is that he observed the growth of feminism,
especially after World War I, and regarded it as an important asset to
149the consximer movement.
Much of the interest of the Ligue sociale d'acheteurs lies in its
alliance of feminism and consumerism. We have seen how women are
typed as the creatures of consumption par excellence. They are the
524
ones who crowd into department stores like Au Bonheur des Dames,
who crave luxury, who gape at fashion displays in the expositions,
who furnish the symbol of the exposition itself. Much of the pejorative
nature of the whole concept of consumption comes from this identifica-
tion with female submission to organic needs. The Ligue is an effort
by women to turn this identification as consumers into something posi-
tive rather than negative, to raise a peciiLiarly female activity from
the level of indignity and shame to one of dignity and responsibility.
The Ligue tries to transform shopping from a purely utilitarian activity
to a moral one, from an occasion for socializing to an occasion for
exercising social responsibility. In the women's sphere it brings the
inculcation of habits of moral conduct that Louis Weber urges in the
man's sphere. Explains Mme. Briinhes,
We force into accord with our principles our daily actions, our
little everyday purchases, which are certainly, in appearance,
the most trivial, insignificant, and even, it is believed, the most
indifferent acts, . . I ask you, will not the effort shown in the
thousand actions of daily life be the most efficacious and the most
extensive means of social work? 151
The Liigue women are claiming that institutions of consumption, just as
much as institutions of production, instill not only a sort of technic cil
expertise but also a moral awareness. Although the Ligue accepts the
traditional dichotomy of male and female, of producer and consumer,
its insistence that consumer-women have to learn about the realities of
production in order to buy wisely means that the two spheres of sex
and economic function are nonetheless brought closer. When Guyot
complains that the Ligue is incompetent to judge the technical organiza-
tion of labor, he is resisting not only the meddling of the incompetent
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consumer in production, but also the meddling of incompetent women in
a male domain. It is precisely this incompetence that the Ligue pro-
poses to remedy. Its fundamental message is that women should give
up fantasy for reality, that they should base their consumption not on
dreams but on deliberate consideration of facts. This turn to reality,
concludes the historian of the Ligue, constitutes the real revolution of
these organizations:
In place of or beside the romantic woman, nourished by frivolous
literature, made wholly of sentimentalism and of passionate
pseudo-psychology, this revolution forms, educates a woman
living in the reality of the world that surrounds her, aware of the
siifferings of misery and of labor, touched with other sorrows
besides those of the fictive heroes of books,
. . . and those of
torments which are born from conflicts of passions and complica-
tions of love. ^
There is a sharp contrast between Gide's portrait of the poor
brow-beaten consumer as the prey of producers and retailers, and the
Ligue picture of the thoughtless consumer as "the tyrant who imposes
153her fantasies" on them. But contrast does not necessarily mean
incompatibility. The consumer is unquestionably threatened by strikes,
monopolies, price hikes, and all the other tyrannies of unions and
management; yet the same consumer also must assume responsibility
for "the exploitation of man and. . . the pillage of nature" he causes. The
particular criteria for making consumer decisions set forth by the Paris
Ligue may be largely outdated, now that legislation regulates working
hours and conditions to a far greater extent. Still the principle of
forcing the consxmier to ask, "Whom am I patronizing in purchasing
this object? " is far from obsolete. Some producers should be
encouraged while others should be discouraged, and many criteria can
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be taken into account in making this distinction. Today this sort of con-
sumer awareness is mainly limited to boycotts of particular products
which happen to come to the public attention (Farah pants, grapes), and
similarly abuses of non-human nature, which the Ligue did not include,
are resisted by ad hoc boycotts of products (e. g. , furs) or sources
(e. g. , Japanese fishing industry). The advantage of the Ligue is
that it furnishes a more permanent and thorough mechanism for investi-
gating the sources of products and a stable organization to arouse con-
sumer consciousness. "The social responsibility of shoppers! Who
among us has seriously thought about it?""^^^ The question is still valid.
Critical Remarks
Since the concept of the "reign of the consumer" is central to
Gide's thought, it should also be central in evaluating his contribution.
A good place to begin this evaluation is Georges Sorel's charge that
"the reign of the consumer" is a notion of the corrupt bourgeoisie:
Philanthropists who preach cooperation and ceaselessly repeat
that the order established by capitalism must be reversed, that
consumption must be rendered its power of direction; such senti-
ments are natural with people who, receiving rents, salaries, or
professional fees, live outside of productive power; they have as
an ideal the life of the lettered idler. The socialist ideal is
completely different. ^
Is Gide with his theory of the cons\imer-king as much a prisoner of
social class as Paul Leroy-Beaulieu with his theory of Ixixury? Cer-
tainly the fact that Gide breaks with the Paris group and is later excom-
municated by it is not a sufficient response. Gide keeps much in com-
mon with economic liberals despite this quarrel. He himself acknow-
ledges their common descent from classical economists like Bastiat,
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Mill, and Walras. ^^^^ colleagues felt he was working
within the traditions of French liberal economics. His collaborator
Charles Rist called him "a liberal of high birth" ("un liberal de grande
race") and professed incomprehension that the orthodox economists did
not recognize their kinship with him. stm, the rift between Gide
and the Paris group is too serious to conclude that Gide is a sort of
closet liberal. His quarrel with the orthodox liberals is as irrecon-
cilable as is that between Gide and socialists. For beneath the
wrangling of socialists like Sorel and liberals like Paul Leroy-Beaulieu
lies a basic agreement on the supremacy of production. Socialists and
liberals may dispute the respective roles of capital and labor in pro-
duction, but they both are true descendents of Adam Smith in focusing
on its laws. The supremacy of the consumer is an idea as foreign to
the socialist imbued with theories of class struggle and the eventual
victory of the working class as it is to the liberal concerned with the
entrepreneurs, profits, and competition among producers, despite
any lip-service to Bastiat.
From this perspective it seems of little use to label Gide's thought
as bourgeois, or to expend much energy defending him against this
accusation. His intellectual inspiration is to leave behind such labels,
to foresee that the category of consumer will become increasingly more
significant than categories based on production. "The nineteenth cen-
tury has been the century of the producers; let us hope that the twentieth
century will be that of the consumers. " In the twentieth century, whether
in praise or disgust, socialists and liberals alike have repeatedly
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remarked on the progress of "embourgeoisement, - meaning that
workers have come to live and think more and more like the middle
class. In Gide's terms, this historical change is more appropriately
described as a shift in dominance from productive roles to consumptive
roles in all society. For practically everyone, no matter what type of
work they do, the relative significance of work and consumption has
shifted in favor of consumption. This shift that may be seen in self-
identity, in allocation of time, in expenditure of energy, in political
power, and Gide would add. it should be manifest also in social institu-
tions and in concepts of moral responsibility. This is quite a different
analysis from the socialist one, which tends to identify superfluous con-
sumption with a particular class, the bourgeoisie, so that socialism can
describe the increase in superfluous consvimption only as the permeation
of bourgeois values, and can label an analysis from the standpoint
of consumption only as a bourgeois analysis. If the liberal analysis
of consumption is class -bound, the socialists have difficxilty coming to
terms with consumption at all because of this conceptual limitation.
"With Gide, in contrast, the concept of consumption, which for so
long had been only vaguely suggested, becomes explicit and central.
And this change means a reorientation of economic thought and practice
alike. When viewed from the angle of consumption, familiar economic
phenomena are seen in unfamiliar light. A good example is found in
Gide's response to the advent of the automobile, which occurred during
the middle years of his life. Socialists welcomed this event because
the automobile industry provided many new jobs. Paris Group
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economists like de Molinari, Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, and Guyot unani-
mously praised the automobile because it would increase productivity
and national wealth. Gide seemed to be alone with his doubts. It is
true, he said in an interview, that the automobile industry would
employ thousands and would build many factories, but there were draw-
backs too. In the first place, consumers who bought autos would not
spend as much money on other items. Furthermore, from the view-
point of consumer psychology,
each one can taste in his lifetime only a limited sum of sensations;
the time consecrated to that of "automobilism"-
-(and I believe it
will be very great)- -will be taken at the detriment of certain others:
the theatre, museums, reading There is a proverb that says:
"All that glitters if not gold. " I think that somewhat with regard
to the automobile. -^^^
Certainly Gide's vocabulary is much less precise than that of employ-
ment or productivity figures, and yet he is trying to find a way to deal
with the future of consumption. In doing so he directs others to a new
intellectual territory that needs to be explored in order to iinderstand
and direct social change. Such metaphors of exploration are used by
Gide himself. He compares his thought with the voyage of Christopher
Col\imbus who, instead of searching for the route to the New World by
the Near East or around Africa, chose instead
to travel in the opposite direction from his predecessors and
arrived before them on the banks of the New World. Let us do
as he did, change our tack, and heading the bow in the opposite
direction, we shall more certainly and more quickly discover
our America! 16-^
Reading such passages a half century later, we may feel that
Gide's excitement at his discovery of consumption makes him overly
optimistic about its potential consequences. The possibility he never
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really faces is that consumers would indeed become increasingly
powerful but would not simultaneously become more organized, edu.
cated, and moral
--in brief, that the reign of the consumer might
become the tyranny of the majority. "The French Revolution has
realized democracy in the political order, " Gide affirms. "Now,
cooperation is democracy in the economic order, because it is the
conquest of industry by the popular classes. "-^^^ Gide's ideal is the
democratization not of luxury objects but of economic power, but he
lacks a healthy skepticism as to the wisdom of "the popular classes"
of consumers. He has great hopes for consumer democracy because
he sees it as the only genuinely egalitarian basis for society, since
consumers, as he repeats ceaselessly, are united in representing the
genuine human interest.
The assertion becomes an axiom with him but is nonetheless mis
taken. There are tremendous differences among consumer s - -to take
one example, between members of the Ligue sociale d'acheteurs who
can afford to pay more for a dress made by a h\imanitarian courti^re,
and the worker's wife who has to hunt for bargains on the department
store rack if she is ever to enjoy a new dress at all. In this case the
difference of interests among consumers comes back ultimately to
their respective incomes, and those incomes derive ultimately from
productive roles. The claim that everyone is a consumer is a valiant
but unsuccessful attempt to evade the continuing reality of social
class. And there are other sources of division among consumers,
even among those within the same class, for the interest of the con-
sumer is not objective but highly subjective. Any household will
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furnish examples: the wife wants to buy a pair of skis while the hus-
band prefers a kitchen appliance, one child wants a tricycle and the
other a toy train. Even within brackets of the same age and sex, one
person may want to be a consumer of "automobilism, " another of
books, another of bicycling, and so forth. There are vast differences
in class, age, sex, education, and temperment which give consumers
entirely different interests.
The psychology of the consumer is another new world, one Gide
never explored. To penetrate this terra incognita we shall have to
find other intellectual guides. We shall find that this territory en-
compasses more than questions of why consumers choose to buy
particular items, that it opens into broader questions of how people,
wisely or not, seek happiness and fulfillment through consumption.
Gide is unique in perceiving and articulating the political and economic
issues of consumption. Coexisting with this level of inquiry, however,
is an entirely different level involving the relationship of modern con-
sumption to the enduring human quest for meaning in life. In exploring
these existential issues, ^mile Durkheim and Gabriel Tarde are the
pioneers.
NOTES
CHAPTER VIII
Gide went to Paris to study law, having been influenced in this
choice of profession by his older brother Paul, a famous jurist (andfather of Andr€ Gide). Later Paul encouraged Charles in the latter'
s
switch to political economy, in which Charles took his agr^gation in
1874.
There is no satisfactory biography of Charles Gide. See A. La-
vond'fes, Charles Gide: un pr^curseur de I'Europe unie et de rONU.Un apotre de la. cooperation entre les hommes, preface by Bernard
—
Lavergne jUzes (Card): La Capitehe, 19533, and Tsunao Miyajima
Souvenirs sur Charles Gide 1847-1932 (Paris: Librairie du Recueil
Sirey, 1934). See also a review of his life and works in Revue d'6'co-
nomie politique (1933). pp. 144-157, which also includes a detailed
bibliography (more complete citation unavailable). This is the journal
established by Gide: the 1933 review appeared shortly after his death.
2
Gide filled first a chair of law and then one of the few existing
chairs of political economy at the University of Bordeaux from 1874
to 1880. He moved to the University of Montpellier in 1880 and stayed
there until 1898.
3
In 1898 the University of Paris asked Gide to occupy a chair of
social economy in the Law Faculty that had just been established by
the Comte de Cambrun. In 1905 Gide became titular professor of
political economy at the Law Faculty, and in 1919 he was made an
honorary professor.
^^douard Doll^ns, "Charles Gide, " Semaine litt^raire, no. 1015
(June 14, 1913), p. 277. See also the cartoon in Miyajima, pp. 142-143.
5For example, in Gide, "La Consommation, " Revue de m^taphy-
sique et de morale, no. 2 (April-June 1921), p. Z4T.
^By Gide's own admission, in many ways his program is compa-
tible with that of the French Radical -Socialist party. See Miyajima,
p. 142; also pp. 177-179.
See Lavond^s, p. 84, on Gide's sermon-like speeches; also see
pp. 8, 12, and 197. Almost everyone who came into contact with Gide
seems to refer to him at some point as an "apostle" or "preacher. "
gThe Association protestante was established in 1887 (see Lavon-
d^s, pp. 177-178). Gide also supported the Association de la paix par
le droit, a pacifist organization. He also knew and aided Paul Dou-
merge, who established the important Protestant review Foi et vie,
and he was involved with the Congr"^s du Christianisme social (Lavon-
d'hs, pp. 110-111, 180-183.
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^
On de Laveleye, see LavondSs, p. 176; on Secr^tan, see ibid.
,p. 170. Passy's son, incidentally, established a commune in easternFrance called Liefra [Libert€-^galit€-fraternit<] (ibid, p ITOn)For a particularly revealing statement of Gide's Protestant faithsee his speech to a circle of young Protestant students: Du rSle pra-
'
tique du pasteur dans le s questions sociales
. Rapport prgsent€ ^i assembl^e g^n^raie de 1' Association protestante pour l'€tude pra-
tique des questions sociales tenue Nimes le 18 et 19 octobre 1888(La Vigan: Soci^t^ anonyme de I'imprimerie Viganaise, 1888).
This whole world of Protestant social thought and kction in France
awaits its historian.
10_
Lavondes, p. 193, says Gide was considerably more at ease
with humble folk than in high society (see examples given pp. 190-193).
IL..
..
,^Miyajima, p. 64. Gide's wife came from a conservative patri-
cian Swiss family, and she thought his social ideas were dangerously
radical. Miyajima quotes Gide as calling himself an "old bachelor"
(p. 33). Lavond"fes gives a poignant picture of Gide working alone late
at night in his silent Paris apartment, pausing occasionally to poke
the embers in his study fireplace (pp. 121-122).
12
Lavond"fes, p. 224.
^^Ibid.
14
Cited by Miyajima, pp. 58-59; appeared in the Nouvelle revue
fran£ai_se_in August and October, 1932. Miyajima disputes this por-
trait of Gide, saying he was in reality a much less remote person
(pp. 56, 58-59). Lavond'^s, on the other hand, points out that Miya-
jima seems to have practiced a regular "cult of personality" regarding
Gide, a judgment which is certainly supported by reading Miyajima'
s
biography (Lavond'^s, p. 127). Certainly the relationship between
Gide and his Japanese disciple is curious. Gide does seem to have
acted more warmly towards Miyajima, his wife, and his children than
towards most of his compatriots.
15
J. Gaumont, Histoire g^n^rale de la cooperation en France, les
id^es et les faits, 2 vols. (Paris: F€d€^ration nationale des coop€ra-
tives de consommation, 1923-1924), 2:120. Volume 2 is subtitled "For-
mation et d^veloppement de I'institution cooperative moderne. "
^^Gide, L'^cole nouvelle, (n. p. , [1890?]), p. 79. The date of the
break is disputed. Gaumont, p. 120, says it was in 1883. Theodore
Zeldin, France 1848-1945, vol. 1: Ambition, Love and Politics (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 655, says also that Gide declared against
laissez-faire in 1883 with the publication of his Principes d'^conomie
politique.
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Gide fcole nouvelle, p. 147. This source appears to be froma lecture gxven by Gide on March 28, 1890, announcing a "new school"
rlT7T^ ^v?"'''' (see text). However, there is no complete title
^
A
'
f/^^,
furthermore the volume is misshelved in Widener Libraryunder the "education" heading. Despite all of this, the volume is a
o^X ^^^^y ^^"^^ °^ consumer cooperativism andn the development of Gide's thought.
18„ .
-
•
' ^^^* ^'"^^ ^^^^ LePlay looks for examples and models
P.lt^n^ r^f^^^^"" l^?"" '^f^^^^ ^^^"^^ °^ ^^^^ting institutions. Seei^ar III, Chapter VI, n. 57.
19,
Lavond^s, pp. 78-79, quotes Gide as saying, "It is truly impos-
sible to suppose that reasonable and civilized beings will not succeed
at resolving the social problem which consists of reconciling iustice
and liberty. " *
Gide, Ecole nouvelle, p. 103.
21
Z. Strat, Le R6le du consommateur dans I'^conomie moderne(Paris: Editions de U vie universitaire, 1^22), p. discusses
Gide's rejection of Bastiat's optimism. (For an example of Gide
recalling Bastiat's deathbed words, see Gide, "La Consommation "
p. 237. )
Strat' s book is composed of his dissertation for a doctorate in
politics and economics from the University of Paris (defended Jiine 3,
1922). M. Germain-Martin was the head of his committee; the other'
two members were F. Faure and fdouard Doll^ans. Strat was a
member of the Bourse d'^conomie politique at the University of Jassu,
and the Ministry of Public Instruction in Romania paid for his studies
at the Sorbonne. His dissertation is divided into three major parts.
The first part presents an historical survey of ideas about consump-
tion in French economic thought, ending with a long section on Gide.
The second part examines various methods of protecting the consumer:
self -protection by individual consumers, in groups, and by the state.
The third part is concerned with the place of consumption in the modern
economy, particularly with reference to the 1920 economic crisis.
Strat is a strong supporter of the "reign of the consumer" (a phrase he
uses).
22
Gide, Principes d'^conomie politique
,
9th ed. (Paris: L. La-
rose et L. Tenin, 1905), pp. 54-68, and Gide, Cours d'^conomie
politique (Paris: L. Larose et L. Tenin, 1909), pp. 44-62. See also
the thesis by Gide's student and disciple Bernard Lavergne (Gide was
head of his committee). La Th^orie des march'es 6'conomiques (Paris:
Arthur Rousseau, 1910), which presents a detailed summary of the
Austrian theory of value and a critique of the economic equilibrium
theory of Walras. See also Lavergne, L'Ordre coop^ratif, ^ude
g€n^rale de la cooperation de consommation, 2 vols. (Paris: F^ix
Alcan, 1926), 1:25-26, 28, for discussion of the "psychological" school.
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Miyajima, p. 101.
hv f^yA^^^T^'u 1--84-87, says Gide was especially impressedby the idea of a "comptoir communal" (to precede th^ ..f.-Z u I .
full-fledged phalansteries) which ^oJ^llZl^'^^^^^^^^^^
at the lowest possible price without the intermediary of a retailerSee also Miyajima, p. 128. ^ Ld i .
25
.Gide, La Cooperation; conferences de propagande (Paris:
lonn?'"''^
^ ^ocret6 du recueii g^n^ rai des iois et des arrets,
1900), p. 145. Hereafter referred to as Propagande.
26^,
Strat, p. 113. In Principes, p. 40n, Gide cites other solidarist
economists, among them Fouill^e, Guyau, Secr^tan, DurkheimMarion, Izoulet, Bourgeois, and Tarde.
For more discussion of solidarism'as applied to economic thought
see Charles Gide and Charles Rist, Histoire des doctrines rconomiane...nh ed.
,
2 vols. (Paris: Librairie du Recueii Sirey, 194V), 2:624-650- " •
Rene Gonnard, Histoire des doctrines g"conomiques depuis'les physio-'
1^^^^%' (Paris: R. Pichon et R. Durand-Auzias, 1947), pp.4T9-^1; and Joseph Rambaud, Histoire des doctrines
€'conom\ques(Pans: L. Larose; Lyon: Auguste Cote, 1899), pp. 359-365.
27
Gide and Rist, p. 630n.
28 ^Gide, Ecole nouvelle
, pp. 137-138. See also Gide's contribution
titled "Justice^t charit6" in G. Belot et al. (eds. ), Morale sociale:
le9ons profess'ees au College libre des sciences sociaies (Paris: F€lix
Aican, 1899), pp. 192-214.
—
29
Gide, Propagande, p. 147. The speech is titled "L'ld^e de
solidarite en tant que programme economique" and was delivered to
the Cercle des
-^tudiants protestants de Paris in March 1893. It was
originally published in the Revue Internationale de sociologie (October
1893). —
^^Ibid.
31Rambaud, p. 342.
32
,
^
Gide, Ecole nouvelle, p. 140.
33 ^
Gide, L'Ecole de Ntmes; cours sur la coop^ation au Colleg e
de France [Pgcembre 1925-Avril 19263 (Paris: Association pour
1' enseignement de la coop^'ration, 1927), p. 158. See also Gide,
Propagande
, pp. 147-148, 234.
34
Gide, Propagande
, pp. 154-155.
35
Gide, Cours, p. 36.
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(jide, Principes, p. 47.
r.r. ^^7^\tV ^J°P^g,^^^^' PP' 149-150. See also Gide, fcolenouvelle,pp. 152-153. Note the similarity of Gide's vision to the "global village '^foreseen by Marshall McLuhan. ^
^^Ibid.
, p. 151.
39Gide and Rist, pp. 616-617. In Du reie pratique du pasteur
Gide cites as other Protestant advocates of solidarity Charles RobertErnest Naville, M. le Doyen Bois, and Charles Secr^tan. He also
'
cites Secretan in Propagande
, p. 154. See also Gide, gcole de Nimes
p. 91.
Gide, Propagande, p. 152.
41
Strat, pp. 114-115, citing Gide's Essai d'un philosophe de la
solidarity (Paris: F^lix Alcan, 1902). See also Gide, "La Consomma-
tion, " pp. 237-238.
^^Strat, p. 114.
^^Ibid.
, p. 115.
44
Gide, Propagande, p. 229. See also ibid., p. 162. In Cours,
p. 515, Gide refers to the word "cooperativism" as a neologism!
Strat, p. 112, remarks, "People too commonly separate solidarism
from cooperativism, forgetting that the latter is only the practical
formula, the economic formula, of the former. " See also ibid.
, p.
245.
45^ ^ „Leon Bourgeois mentions consumer cooperatives in the appendix
to his La Solidarity (Paris, 1895), p. 186. For citation and quotation
see Strat, p. 111.
^^"Le Regne du consommateur" appears in Gide, Propagande, pp.
207-227. A resum^* appeared in the Bulletin de I'union cooperative,
Paris, February 1898, and in the Bulletin de la Soci^t^" vaudoise
d' utility publique in March 1898.
47
Gide, Propagande
,
p. 209. For other statements on the dignity
of consumption, see Gide, Cours, p. 714; Gide, lEcole de Nhnes, p.
202 ("consumption, in the higher sense of the word, does not mean
satisfaction, enjoyment, destruction, but accomplishment"); and
Strat, p. 115, quoting Gide ("consumption is not a pathological, acci-
dental, intermittent state, it is the normal and continuing act of life").
48
Gide, Propagande
,
p. 209. In Principes, pp. 47-48, Gide
says a life of abstinence is to be condemned because it sets a person
off by himself.
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41 49 L^rn^ see his Principes, pp.4 - , and Cours pp. 37-44. Gide notes his debt to Tarde in his
fn capl'cTtranriltl' Tr'^''^ ^^-^ -g-^ing their limrtat\on
socTaffoXr 1 1 "^'^f''^^ substitution of
ism of n. r "° ^"^^^"^^ Malthusian-
A % ' ^^'^"^e^ts on Malthus, see his Principes, pp. 562-565, and Cours, pp. 714-719. —'
49
t^. r. ^''^V
P^QP^Pa"^^> P- 211. Strat, p. 116, quotes Gide as callinghe present consumer "ce Jacques Bonhomme taiilable et corv^able*^
merci. '
For a typical expression of the idea that consumption actually
regulates production, see Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, Trait^ th^orique et
f8^^M'^Tww''??iu"''! (Paris: Librairie Guiliaumin ,4;20/-^UV. According to Leroy-Beaulieu, the consumer is the
sovereign judge" who is free not to buy if he thinks an item is too
expensive.
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,
1
'
Propagande
, p. 211. In ibid.
, pp. 87-89, Gide describes
the Galerie des machines at the Exposition as a collection of mechani-
cal monsters out of control, and he asks what they have to do with ful-
filling genuine human needs.
^4bid.
, pp. 211-212.
^^Ibid.
, p. 212.
^^Ibid.
, p. 213.
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Ibid., pp. 175, 269. Gide refers to Zola's thesis that big com-
merce will gobble up small commerce as expressed in Au Bonheur
des Dames (ibid., p. 241). For more of Gide' s comments on Zola and
on Zola' s novel Le Travail, see Lavond^s, pp. 184-187.
Opposition to department stores was voiced from other quarters.
For another protest which relies on the analogy of feudalism, see
Francois de Nion, "La Ligue. --Une campagne contres les grands
magasins, " Revue ind^pendante, n. s.
,
21 (November 1891):145-154.
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Ibid.
, p. 215. For jjiore on how the power of labor dictates
economic life, see Gide, Ecole nouvelle, pp. 161-162, 200-201.
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Gide, Propagande
,
p. 217.
Ibid.
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Ibid.
, p. 221.
59
Ibid.
, p. 226.
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60^,
„,^,. 1 V.iF' • ^'"^^ ^^y^ consumer should refer to four
is after' cLt'l
^^^^h--" ^own by RuskL
c:-;-r. . r ^ ' ^ "^^^ illuminated this social respon-sxb Uty of the consumer" (ibid. ). The articles are: {l)to inform Mm-
^rod^c'ed mto Ls^"' V^^'i^-^ ^^^^ whicTi^was
bv J fl
""^ himself it is sold by the merchant and purchased
(4)to consider If the use he will make of it for himself can benef t thecommunity Lavond^s, pp. 187-188, quotes Gide as saying abouRuskin that
-'in this aesthetic socialism [there is] a small part ofpuerility and a large part of truth. "
For Gide the whole question of luxury becomes subsumed in thegoal of making the consumer aware of his responsibility. There is
nothing inherently wrong with superfluity; what the consumer mustbe aware of is how much wealth or labor is represented by a luxuryproduct, m a situation when present wealth is inadequate to fulfill thebasic needs of many people.
. . it appears as a very categorical duty
not to divert towards the satisfaction of a superfluous need a largepart of the energy and wealth available for the necessities of existence
It is a question of proportion. Bad luxury or prodigality consists in
a disproportion between the quantity of social labor consumed and thedegree of individual satisfaction obtained" (Gide, Cours, p. 738; see
also pp. 736-740, and Gide, Principes, pp. 569-575).
^^Gide, Propagande
, p. 197. In Cours, p. 516, Gide writes that
cooperatives will not abolish private property but will bring about its
"generalization in making it accessible to all in the form of small
pieces" and will create as well (above and beyond individual property)
"a collective property dedicated to works of social utility. "
62^.
,Gide, Propagande
, pp. 163, 224-225.
^^Ibid.
, p. 104.
^'^Ibid.
, p. 227.
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Strat, p. 117. In the original French the phrase reads, "Le
cooperatisme, ce n'est pas une boutique, c'est une
€'toile. "
66Gide. £c ole nouvelle, pp. 131-133.
6 7On July 27 met the first Congr"Ss des soci^t^s cooperatives de
consommation de France. For the text of the program decided upon
there, see Gide, ^conomie sociale. Les Institutions du progr'^s social
au debut du XX^ si^cle
,
3rd ed. (Paris: L. Larose et L. Tenin, 1907),
p. 190n. For a brief history of the movement in general, see ibid.
,
pp. 183-194. This first congress established a permanent central com-
mittee, a federation for purchases, an annual congress, and a journal.
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KT^.i ^'^Vt^^^'f^ ^^^^ especially to Vansittart NealeNea e and Holyoake. historian of the Rochdale Pioneers, attended thefirst congress of the French cooperators although Holyoake did notknow a word of French (Gide, fcole de Mmes
. pp. 19 28-29)As m the case of the decorative arts movement, there are many
connections with England and Belgium that are highly significant. SeeLavergne, Ordre, pp. 210-234; Gide, fconomie s ociale. pp. 174-180;
P- Les Soci^t^s c ooperatives d e consommationZnd ed. (Pans: A. Colin, IVIU), p. Zb; and Louis Bertrand, Histoirede la cooperation en Belgique; les hommes--les id e^s--les faits pre-
1903^
^^^^ Vandervelde, 2 vols. (Brus sels: bechenne etCie. 1902-
1903).
69Fabre and Gide took long evening walks during which they dis-
cussed Fourier in Uz^s, the little town near Ntmes where they both
resided. Fabre had lived in a semi-phalansterian production coopera-
tive for some time (the Familist^re de Guide). See Gide fcole de
Nlmes, pp. 20-21.
70
Gide, Ecole de Mmes
, pp. 22-23, 75-78.
71De Boyve and Fabre originally met at the Soci^te d'^conomie
populaire, established for the discussion of economic questions. The
name of the society, interestingly enough, was later changed to La
Solidarity.
Gide, ^cole de Ntmes, p. 80. Another slogan of the society
was "Chacun pour tous, tous pour chacun" (see Gide, ^cole nouvelle,
pp. 254-255, and Gide, Propagande
, p. 162). The visual symbol was
two interlaced hands (Lavond^s, p. 81).
73See description in Gide, Ecole de Ntmes, pp. 81-82, and in
Gaumont, pp. 121-123. The text is reprinted in Gide, Propagande
,
pp. 276-311.
74
See description in Gide, Ecole de Ntmes
, pp. 83-84. Text is
in Gide, Propagande
,
pp. 78-108 ("De la cooperation et des transfor-
mations qu'elle est appel^e \ r^aliser dans I'ordre ^conomique" ).
Delivered at the Congr^s internationale des societes cooperatives de
consommation held at the Palais du Trocad^ro, September 8, 1889.
7 5
Gide, Soci^t^s cooperatives, pp. 264-276, on the program.
Incidentally, the establishment of the Harvard Cooperative Society
is mentioned in Gide, ^conomie sociale, p. 183.
76
Gide, Propagande, p. 116. See also pp. 117-120 for a general
summary of the situation in France. See also Gide, Economic soci-
ale, p. 183.
"^^Gide, £cole de Nimes
, pp. 45-53; Gide, Societes cooperatives ,
p. 257 and 257n; and Gonnard, p. 475.
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Giae, Ecole de NlTmes, p. 44.
79
Ibid.
, p. 82.
80.,
^Ibid. See also Gide, Propagande. pp. 134-135.
Gaumont, p. 129.
82
Gide, Propagande, p. 83.
83
Lavondfes, pp. 108-109; Gide, Ecole de Ntmes. pp. 83-85 ForPaul Leroy-Beauheu's critique of consumer cooperativism, see his
article published in the Revue des deux mondes which is reproducedin his Traits, 2:556-643 (Chapter 18). For other derogatory refer-
ences by him, see the Trait^, 1:375-376, 405, 411.
84
Gide, Propagande, p. 137.
^^Ibid. Also Lavergne, Ordre, p. ix.
86
Gide, Propagande, p. 138, quoting from Janet's Le Socialisme
d'etat (p. 422T
87Gide and Rist, p. 603n. See also p. 607.
88
Gide, Du Role pratique du pasteur
, pp. 28-29. For general
comments on the school of LePlay and the evolution of the patronat,
see Gide, Cours
, pp. 671-674.
'
89<^Emile Cheysson, another LePlayist, also favored turning over
all benefits to insurance schemes. See Gide, ^cole de Nl^es, p. 219.
90
Gide, Propagande, p. 131.
91
Ibid.
, p. 138. For other differences between LePlayist coopera-
tives and the School of Nftnes, see Gide, ^cole de Nltoes
, p. 219.
92 ^See Gide, Ecole de Ntmes, pp. 56-57, on Proudhon's more
complex and changing views on the subject.
^^Ibid.
, pp. 53-56.
94
Gide, Propagande, p. 138.
95Gide, ^cole de Ntmes, p. 91.
*^^Gide, "La Consommation, " pp. 243-244.
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•'^u, £.£,7 notner comment isthat the worker defends the " xicul j.a
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lecon;
Alcai
98 ^Gide, Ecole de NWs, p. 58. The socialist objection is basedon the iron law" stating that a worker's salary is always regulated bythe expense of his upkeep and will never rise above that level.
99
^"^Ibid.
, p. 88.
Ibid.
, p. 90.
^^^Gide, Propagande
, pp. 142-143.
102
.
.Gide, Societes de consommation, pp. 258-264. Lavergne
compares the two groups in Les Cooperatives de consommation enFranee (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1923), pp. 52-54.
103
Gide, Ecole de Ntmes
, pp. 100-109.
^^^Ibid.
, p. 110.
105
Lavergne, Les Progr^s de la cooperation de consommation en
Europe depuis dix ans (1900-1910 ) (Paris: L. Larose et L. Tenin
reviews the state of affairs and concludes that slow progress
is due not only to the schism but also to poor administration (see
especially pp. 35-40).
^^^See Gide, i^cole de Ntmes, pp. 113-114, for other names,
among them that of Albert Thomas as a sympathetic socialist. On
the role of Jaures, see J. Gaumont, Au Confluent de deux grandes
id^es; Jaur^s, coop^rateur (Paris: F6d€ration nationale des coope-
ratives de consommation, 1959).
Gide, !^cole de Nlmes, p. 117. Gide adds, "It is true that
there was care not to say the emancipation of the 'ouvriers' but
that of 'travailleurs' and that everyone could be included in this
qualification" (ibid. ).
1 08
Ibid.
, pp. 115-117.
109
Gide, "La Consommation, " pp. 241-243.
^^^Ibid. National Leagues of Economies were formed in almost
all countries to urge people to abstain from consumption, but they met
with little success.
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Also on the war, see Strat dd 25-2f^ 171 i^q c^. i
a doctoral thesis by Jekn Boulane;r
-'Les CoonA'.t a
'°
fir^^ T ^ J " j-fjuidnge , j^ pera ives de consomma-
Lille (sTr?t"n "^7 '"i ^''T'' " University ofi Strat, p. 7, see also the entire bibliography in Strat, pp 7-12)
113
the fi^.t^r^'/^'/^^'^^^' ^^^^ ^^20 economic crisis was
GiA. n r
'° -°nsumer resistance to inflated prices. See also
Suation '^'-'^^ on the postwar economic
114
Gide, "La Consommation, " pp. 242-243.
115
•.u .u^^it^.'^P*
^'^^^
"^^^ made an agreement
with the F^d^ration nationale in which the CGT recognized consumer
cooperatives as one of the elements of a new society. A represen-
tative from the F^d^ration nationale was given a seat in the Conseil
fm°,''?J?i''^''^
'^'^ travail of the CGT. For a general history of theiVi3-1923 period, see Gaumont, pp. 677-682.
^^^On Lavergne, see Gide, fcole de Ntmes, pp. 277-280 andGonnard, pp. 477-478. Lavond^s says Lavergne became the'"theo-
retician of cooperation" (p. 119). See also note 22.
^^"^Gide, Ecole de Ntmes. p. 282. For a bibliography of works
on the cooperative movement in France, see Lavergne, Cooperatives
de consommation
, pp. 211-212, and Gide, Societes de consommation
pp. 277-279 and 28n. '
118 ^ yLavergne, L'Hegemonie du consommateur, vers une renova -
tion de la science ^conomique (Paris: Presses univer sitaires de
France, 1958), p. 17. He also remarks that he and Gide sometimes
felt like prophetic voices crying in the wilderness (pp. 8, 338).
119
Zeldin, France, pp. 661-662.
Ibid.
121 /Gide, Societes de consommation, p. 120.
122
Ibid.
, pp^ 119-127. See Georges Benott-Levy, La Cite'-Jardin,
3 vols. (Paris: Editions des Cites -Jardins de France, 1911), 3:179-195
on legal obstacles; he discusses the need for the law on cheap housing
passed April 13, 1906, to be rewritten so societies can take advantage
of it.
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Gide Cours, p. 730 and 730n. See also pp. 728-733 on othertypes of lodging societies. See also Gide, Princfpes
, pp. 578-581
Lavond^s, pp. 119-120; Benoh-L^vy, 3:165.
^^^Benott-L^vy, 3:221-226. On Bergson see 3:21-22 where theauthor explains how Garden City architects put into practice theimmortal principles of creative evolution. "
^^^Ibid., 3:20, 26-27.
Ibid., 3:198. Also on Dorgues, see 3:25, 176, 195-213.
128
9 nOlf'^^^l,"^^
^^"^^^^^ ^^t^^^^^^e. no. 523 (January
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Ecole nouvelle, p. 152. See also Gide and Rist, pp. 621-622, on the topics of art for the people and garden cities.
130
Gide, "Cite-jardin, " p. 16. For more on the debate between
ownership vs. renting, see Gide, Cours, p. 733, and Gide, Soci^t^sde consommation
, pp. 119-127.
131
Gide, "Citi-jardin, " p. 17.
132On the New York group, see Maurice Deslandres, L'Acheteur,
son role ^conomique et social; les ligues sociales d'acheteurs (Paris':
F§lix Alcan, 1911), pp. 1-26. On French organizations, see Deslandres,
pp. 27-92. See also H. La Coudraie, "La Ligue sociale des ache-
teurs," Semaine litt^raire, no. 518 (December 8, 1903), p. 588. In
Cours
, p. 721, Gide states (incorrectly) that the French league was
founded in 1900.
133
Deslandres, p. 43.
134
Ibid., pp. 44-92 passim. The second conference held at
Geneva in 1908 is described on pp. 70-74.
Deslandres also wrote about workers' housing in Le R6le des
communes dans I'am^lioration du logement ouvrier (Paris: Soci^t^
fran^aise des habitations k bon march^, 1914). The same is true
of H. La Coudraie, the other major source of information about the
shoppers' leagues: see her "Le Logement au point de vue esth€tique, "
Semaine litt^raire, no. 564 (October 22, 1904), pp. 515-516, and "La
Ville du bonheur. " Semaine litt^raire, no. 645 (May 12, 1906), pp.
227-228 (this latter article deals with Garden Cities). Interest in
Garden Cities and in Shoppers' Leagues seems to coincide.
135La Coudraie, "Ligue sociale, " p. 588. She remarks, "You
may be surprised to find me citing a sporting society, " and goes on
to note that the French Touring Club is an example of a consumer
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th?.^^i^^'l°'l T^^^^ ^^^^'^^ P^^i^i^^ pressure on producers in
process of transforming itself in a most happy manner" (ibid )
'^^Ibid.
'"ibid.
l^^Ibid.
139
Gide, Cours, p. 721 and 721n, refers to a brochure by Wuarin
and an article by Guyot in the 1907 Journal des ^conomistes making
this accusation. Gide says the debate was incited when the League ofSwiss shoppers made an inquiry into chocolate manufacturers. "The
manufacturers whose chocolate was not deemed worthy of appearing
on the white lists were naturally very annoyed. " Gide goes on to sug-
gest that there might be some substance to Guyot' s and Wuarin' s objec-
tions. It might be preferable for Shoppers' Leagues to limit their
inquiries to the direct effects of buying in particular stores, and leave
matters of working conditions in factories to unions which are more
familiar with them (ibid., p. 722).
140Gide and Rist, p. 607n.
141_
T>eslandres, L'Acheteur
, p. 33. Other supporters were Paul
Cauw^s and Raoul Jay (see also p. 38). The constitution of 1904 took
a position of religious and political neutrality, however (p. 39).
142
Gide, Propagande
, p. 220.
143
La Coudraie, "Ligue sociale, " p. 588.
144
Deslandres, L'Acheteur, p. 63.
145
Gide, "La Consommation, " p. 245. See Paul Leroy-Beaulieu,
Traite, 4:202, on the same subject. Both equate the sexual distinction
between male and female with the economic one between producer and
consumer. Their conclusions are very different, however. Gide sees
feminism as the ally of consumerism, since both women and consumers
need to be restored to a position of dignity in society. Leroy-Beaulieu,
on the other hand, regards feminism as an incoherent attempt to assim-
ilate men and women, to confer male functions on females, when
social progress consists of men being more exclusively occupied with
production and women with consumption. The role of women is to be
good housewives, to look after upkeep (entretien) which as much as
increases in production adds to national wealth.
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Lriae, Propagande, pp. 168 195- ^-nr^ c -^^^ j
sommation, p . 83.
Soci^tes de con-
Miyajima, pp. 42-43.
148^.^
Gide, Propagande
, pp. 195-196.
14 9Gide, ''La Consommation," p. 245. Gaumont, p. 682, men-tions a Ligue des femmes cooperatives organized in May 1923.
See especially Henri Baudrillart, Histoire du luxe prive etp^ublic depuis I'antiquite iusqu'^ nos jours
.
4 vols. /Par..- \ AU^.i^, ^
Hachette, 1878-1880), 1:26-27, 90, l60, and 4:592, 660.
L,a. Coudraie, "Ligue sociale, " p. 588.
152
Deslandres, L'Acheteur, pp. 60-61.
153
Strat, p. 159; also 165-166.
154
Gide, Cours
, p. 721, discusses an example of environmental
abuse very similar to these modern concerns: the use of feathers in
hats from rare birds, leading to depletion of certain species.
155La Coudraie, "Ligue sociale, " p. 588.
156Georges Sorel, Introduction \ I'g'conomie moderne, 2nd rev.
ed. (Paris: Marcel Riviere, 1922), p. 131. See also pp. 165-182 on
"charlatanisme cooperative. " Gide himself cites this passage and
says it is directed at his book Propagande and especially at his lecture
"Le R^gne du consommateur " (Gide, CoTTrs, p. 722n).
^^"^Gide and Rist, p. 641 n.
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Rist in Revue des etudes cooperatives (April 1932), pp. 213-
214, cited by Lavond^s, p. 13. See also Gonnard, p. 233n.
159
Lavergne, Ordre, p. 3, says almost all political economists
had ignored consumption: Malthus, Ricardo, Mill, Fourier, Owen,
Proudhon, Marx, and Lassalle among them.
^^^This is the same sort of accusation directed against the Aus-
trians by Bukharin: see Part III, Chapter V, p. 372.
^^^See Lavergne, Ordre, pp. 2-6, for an illuminating discussion
of this point. See also Gide himself in Cours
, pp. 711-714, and in
Principes, pp. 539-62.
162Gustave de Molinari, "L'Automobile est-elle une richesse?"
in his Ultima verba, mon dernier ouvrage (Paris: V. Giard et Bri^re,
1911), pp. 161-162, reporting on Gide's response to an interlocutor.
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Cride, Propagande, p. 104.
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A
discussion of cooperativism as initiating aneconomic democracy comparable ^vith the advent of political democ-racy,_^see Lavergne, Ordre, p. I8n, and Lavergne- seamarks on
chapter ix
Smile durkheim
Durkheim and the Moral Crisis
fimile Durkheim concludes his study De la division du travail
£Ocial [bn the division of labor in society] (Paris: Alcan, 1893) with
these observations:
It has been said [and here Durkheim cites the introduction to
Beaus sire's L.es Principes de la moralel with justice that
morality-
-and by that should be understood not only moral
doctrines but customs --is going through a real crisis.
. . .
Profound changes have been produced in the structure of our
societies in a very short time;.
. . .Accordingly the morality
which corresponds to this (earlier) social type has regressed,
but without another developing quickly enough to fill the ground
that the first left vacant in our consciences.
. . .Our illness is
not, then, as has often been believed, of an intellectual sort;
it has more profo\ind causes. We shall not suffer because we
no longer know on what theoretical notion to base the morality
we have been practicing, but because, in certain of its parts,
this morality is irremediably shattered, and that which is
necessary to us is only in the process of formation. Our
anxiety does not arise because the criticism of scholars has
broken down the traditional explanation we use to give to our
duties; consequently, it is not a new philosophical system
which will relieve the situation. Because certain of our duties
are no longer founded in the reality of things, a breakdown has
res\ilted which will be repaired only in so far as a new disci-
pline is established and consolidated. In short, our first duty
is to make a moral code for ourselves. ^
This passage has been quoted at length because it establishes so clearly
a context for Durkheim's thought in the moral crisis widely sensed by
French intellectuals around the turn of the century. If Durkheim
became the father of modern sociology (and he is often labelled as such),
it is because he is convinced that a "new discipline" (and not simply a
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new intellectual system) has to be "established and consolidated- in
order
-to make a moral code for ourselves. " The moral crisis is so
profound that only an entirely new conceptual framework will resolve
it. Because the vocabulary of Durkheim's sociology tends to be so dry
and mechanistic, the moral passion which inspires his intellectual
efforts may be overlooked
-although this is certainly not the case with
his most recent and exhaustive biographer. Steven Lukes. ^ Durkheim's
goal is "to establish the science of ethics" based on the principle that
Moral facts are phenomena like others; they consist of rules of
action recognizable by certain distinctive characteristics. It
must, then, be possible to observe them, describe them,
classify them, and look for the laws explaining them. ^
The discipline of sociology thus interpreted will not only lead to a better
understanding of society but also will help resolve the social question,
which is basically a moral question,"^ for the science of ethics which
"teaches us to respect the moral reality (also] furnishes us the means
5
to improve it. " The development of sociology as a discipline is
Durkheim's contribution to the moral consolidation of the Third Repub-
lic, and it has proved more durable than the Republic itself.
When his work is seen in this light, Durkheim's kinship with other
less famous thinkers already discussed becomes evident. Like them he
is aware of an unprecedented change in society which makes old ideas
and verbal exhortations seem sadly inadequate. Like them his response
is to call for the scrapping of old notions and the fashioning of a wholly
new approach, and also like them he appreciates the extent to which the
moral crisis involves the need for an ethics of consumption. Certainly
his intellectual achievement goes far beyond the analysis of a basis for
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such an ethics, but on the other hand it is too little appreciated how
much he is concerned with this matter. His concern becomes more
obvious when we consider how much he resembles those thinkers
grouped together in the previous part as advocates of restraint. The
appropriateness of grouping Duekheim with thinkers like Anatole
Leroy-Beaulieu and Georges d'Avenel will become clearer as his work
is discussed in more detail, but the basis of their similarity may be
stated briefly as a shared conviction of the disparity between personal
happiness and material progress. This theme is sounded repeatedly in
De la division du travail, Durkheim's first major work, where he asks
".
.
.in fact, is it true that the happiness of the individual increases as
man advances? Nothing is more doubtful. Durkheim is well aware
that human needs have evolved to ever greater complexity and variety
as well as the means of satisfying them through science and industry.
His contention is that all this development may satisfy material needs
but does nothing to satisfy moral ones. Material goods do not make
man any happier. "To be sure, once these needs axe excited, they can-
not be suspended without pain. But our happiness is no greater because
7
they are excited.
. . . changes do not necessarily imply progress. "
Man's capacity for happiness is very limited. Each species, whether
simple or complex, is happy insofar as it attains a state of equilibriiim
with moderate, stable, regular pleasures. The savage who attains such
8
an equilibri\im is quite as happy as the normal civilized man. The
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clinching evidence that material progress does not entail moral improve-
ment is the fact that suicide, the ultimate admission of personal unhap-
piness, becomes increasingly prevalent as society becomes more and
9more advanced.
The Moral Dilemma of Modern Consumption: Durkheim's Analysis
Four years later Durkheim returned to consider further this
troubling correlation between suicide and material civilization in his
second major work La Suicide,
€tude de sociologie [Suicide: a study
in sociology] (1897). In this work he presents an analysis of the moral
dilemmas of modern consxamption in the course of describing the causes
of "anomic" (as opposed to egoistic or to altruistic) suicide. In this
section of the book Durkheim's similarity with other advocates of
restraint in consiamption is especially obvious, but he displays a con-
centration, clarity, and precision in discussing themes that these other
thinkers express only diffusely and vaguely. For this reason this
section of La Suicide is worth examining in some detail as a sximmary
statement by the most illustrious spokesman for limitation in
c onsumption.
Durkheim begins his discussion of anomic suicide by returning to
the idea expressed in De la division du travail that happiness is foxind in
eq\iilibri\im rather than in slc cumulation. The equilibrium that must be
sought, he now elaborates, involves a balance between the needs of an
organism and its means of fxalfilling those needs. With an animal this
balance is automatically attained, for "Its power of reflection is not
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sufficiently developed to imagine other ends than those implicit in its
physical nature. ""^^ The case is wholly different with human beings.
As soon as survival needs are satisfied, man at once imagines better
conditions of life and other desirable goals. This imaginative capacity
means that most of man's needs, unlike those of animals, "are not
dependent on his body, or not to the same degree.
.
.
""^^ But if man's
needs escape the automatic regulation of physical nature, how is he to
attain the state of equilibrium which alone can make him happy? There
is nothing in organic or mental make-up which sets a limit to "the
quantity of well-being, comfort or Ixixury legitimately to be craved by
13
a h\iman being. " Yet without any inherent limits, desires becomes
a source of torment rather than of happiness. ".
. .they constantly and
infinitely surpass the means at their command; they cannot be quenched.
14
Inextinguishable thirst is constantly renewed torture. " The person
who has no limits on his appetites is condemned to "a state of perpetual
15
unhappiness, " because partial satisfactions only stimxolate more
needs.
After this Malthusian analysis of hxaman needs, the reader
expects the familiar call for self-restraint, but Durkheim does not
think the solitary individual is capable of limiting his desires. He
thinks it is only futile to call for self- discipline because the individual
has no internal guide to the regulation of desire, no internal force
which can overcome it. Instead "this must be done by some force
exterior to him. "^^ That force is society. For Durkheim there is
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no autonomous self-discipline, only social discipline; no self-restraint,
only social restraint. In human life society plays the role of external
regulator which nature plays for animals, enabling the organism to
achieve a stable equilibrium between needs and means. Durkheim too
is awed by the beauty of necessity-
-not the spectacle of natural neces-
sity, for man has escaped its domination-
-but social necessity, which
man himself has created in building the social world. The paradox
that Durkheim, like other admirers of the beauty of necessity, keeps
repeating is that genuine liberty is found only in constraint. The iso-
lated individual, for from being in a state of liberty, finds himself
rather in a state of anomie, of restlessness and unhappiness which
can eventually drive him to suicide. Moral regulation is as necessary
for his survival as daily bread. Consequently in Durkheim 's thought
the social group takes on overwhelming importance because it alone is
1
8
the source of regulation for man.
Durkheim describes in more specific terms just how society acts
to regulate the desires of the individual:
... at every moment of history there is a dim perception, in the
moral consciousness of societies, of the respective value of
different social services, the relative reward due to each, and
the consequent degree of comfort appropriate on the average to
workers in each occupation. The different functions are graded
in public opinion and a certain coefficient of well-being assigned
to each, according to its place in the hierarchy. According to
accepted ideas, for example, a certain way of living is considered
the upper limit to which a workman may aspire in his efforts to
improve his existence, and there is another limit below which he
is not willingly permitted to fall unless he has seriously demeaned
himself. Both differ for city and country workers, for the domes-
tic servant and the day-laborer, for the business clerk and the
553
official, etc. Likewise the man of wealth is reproved if he livesthe life of a poor man, but also if he seeks the Refinements ofluxury overmuch.
.
.
A genuine regimen exists, therefore, althoughnot always legally formulated, which fixes with relative precisionthe maximum degree of ease of living to which each social classmay legitimately aspire. 19
This is how society limits individual passions and allows the attain-
ment of an equilibrium of happiness. Unlike sumptuary laws, which
Durkheim considers neither desirable nor possible, this extra-legal
regulation is powerful but neither rigid nor absolute. Within the limits
set by social opinion, individual desires have free range and experience
a moderate stimulus to improvement. Furthermore, as societies
grow richer the standards change so that what appears luxurious in one
7 1
age is deemed necessary by another. For this gentle but effective
restraint to function effectively, the rules governing the distribution
of the various levels of consumption must be considered just. In the
past, the regulative principle of social classification was almost
exclusively birth; at the present it is a combination of hereditary
fortune and merit; and if in the future inheritance were abolished,
there would still be a need for collective authority either to make the
less talented accept a lower standard of living, or to make the more
22
talented accept the same standard as those less capable. Under
normal conditions both the levels of consumption and the method by
which the different levels are distributed are accepted by most people
through respect rather than fear.
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Durkheim then turns to describe an abnormal situation whe:
society is so disturbed bv crisis that if ic r^r^ iuy ma It IS no longer able to impose its
influence on levels of consumption. The crisis may be a sharp one,
like a precipitious fall of the stock market. Such an event acts like
an abrupt "declassification" because some individuals suddenly find
themselves occupying a lower position in the hierarchy of consump-
tion.
.
.
they must reduce their requirements, restrain their needs,
exercise more self control.
. . . their moral education has to be recom-
23
menced. " The prospect of making such a great adjustment overnight
imposes strain and suffering to the extent that such economic crashes
are followed by a sharp rise in the suicide rate. Similar results
may be observed in the wake of a more beneficent and prolonged growth
25m power and wealth. In this case too the standard according to which
needs are regulated undergoes a change, and again adjustment to the
reclassification of people and objects takes time. Meaiwhile collec-
tive restraint on individual appetites becomes weak and confused.
"The limits are unknown between the possible and the impossible,
what is just and what is \injust, legitimate claims and hopes and those
26
which are immoderate. " This social state of deregvdation, or
anomie, is especially dangerous because traditional rules lose their
authority at precisely the time when increased prosperity inflames
individual desires: "the struggle grows more violent and painful, both
27from being less controlled and because competition is greater. "
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Durkheim concludes that suicides have increased regularly and
constantly in modern tinges because this latter condition of anomie has
become chronic. Until the nineteenth century a whole network of
social forces effectively regulated economic life: religion consoled
workers while restraining their masters, political life gave business
a relatively subordinate role, and within industry occupational groups
limited salaries and prices. But during the nineteenth century
industry was gradually freed from all such regulations, so that now it
is regarded as "the supreme end of individuals and societies alike. "^^
Modern society sanctions, indeed encourages, appetites rather than
providmg a check on them. First in the economic sphere and finally
in all of social life
the state of crisis and anomie is constant and, so to speak,
normal. From top to bottom of the ladder, greed is aroused
without knowing where to find ultimate foothold.
. .Reality seems
valueless by comparison with the dreams of fevered imagina-
tions. . , ^
But all those dreams, novelties, unfamiliar pleasures, and nameless
3
1
sensations can never form a solid foundation for personal happiness.
When the least reverse occurs, the individual has no capacity for
resignation and is more likely to resort to suicide than in a society
which furnishes moral regulation. The state of anomie, characterized
by society's insiifficient ability to restrain individual passions, is a
source of acute suffering and distress. This is the moral danger
32inherent in the increase of material prosperity.
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The Socialist Response: Dnrkheim's Critiri...
How can society reestablish its authority over individual desires?
Durkheim holds no hope that the old sources of authority, such as the
ones I^ePlayists looked to. could be revived. Ties of family, religion,
of familiar social authorities have weakened seriously, and no amount
of exhortation can compensate for that fact. Durkheim uses the term
conscience collective to refer to the mentality which makes those ties
possible, a mentality which accompanies a state of mechanical solidar-
ity wherein the mind of the individual is impregnated by the outlook
of the social group [see Part IV, Chapter Vn, p. 47l] . ^3 jhe
mechanical solidarity of similarity depends on daily, habitual contact
with the same concrete environment, and society has grown far too
large and diversified for that sameness to be possible any longer. The
phenomenon of the conscience collective
, of which religion is the
prime example, is no longer rooted in the reality of things. Attempts
to revive it are only indulgence in nostalgia; the real need is to fashion
new sources of authority to replace that of the conscience collective
.
This is the task that preoccupies Durkheim not only in De la
division du travail and in La Suicide but also in a series of lectures on
socialism he delivered between the writing of these two works. In
the nineteenth century socialist and communist thought as a whole pre-
sents a prolonged and determined effort to come to grips with the
relationship of economic life to social life, not only in terms of an
intellectual understanding but also in terms of a moral outlook. The
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latter aspect especially interests Durkhei... He becarne convinced that
the economic dogmas of socialism and communism are only matters of
detail, while at the heart of them both is a moral vision. Does that
vision suggest a new way for society to restrain the desires of individ-
ual to consume? To answer this question. Durkheim establishes
two ideal types (although of course this terminology was not then avail-
able), one of communism and one of socialism. For the communist
type. Durkheim has in mind examples like the ideal republic of Plato
or of Campanella. rather than any thing that would today be associated
with the term. For the socialist type he examines the system of
Saint-Simon. The series of lectures is unfortunately unfinished and so
does not include other socialisms such as the Marxist variety.
Durkheim concludes that despite outward similarities, the com-
munist model and the socialist one incarnate opposing moral perspec-
tives in matters of material well-being. The basis of communism is a
strict separation between industrial and public life, between economic
interests and the state. The reason is that economic interests are
seen as fundamentally anti-social. The role of the state is to constrain
economic development so that other more social forms of activity-
-
religious, military, artistic, or moral- -may flourish. Commvmistic
societies are fundamentally ascetic because they encourage people to
despise merely material well-being and to be content with material
necessities so non-material activities may develop. Communist
egalitarianism is that of leveling everyone downward to a Spartan
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level. Production remains in private hands because more efficient
methods of collectivized production would only stimulate desires.
Consumption, on the contrary, is socialized in order to combat the
egoism which results from private ownership. But to aim for moral
purity by getting rid of egoism, as communism tries to do, is to
attempt the impossible. Ascetic theories of communism never have
had and never can have much practical success:
[The communist ideaj is too speculative to exert much action.
Ihis is the same reason which gives a sentimental and artistic
character to all these theories. It is because even those who
treat the question are well aware that it does not admit of
practical solutions. Egosim is too essential to human nature
for it ever to be uprooted, insofar as this would be desirable.
One knows.
. .
it is a chronic illness of humanity. Therefore
when one wonders under what conditions it could be extirpated,
one cannot but be aware that one places oneself outside the
conditions of the real, and that one can only end with an idyll
of which the poetry may be agreeable to the imagination but
which cannot claim to be considered as fact. One feels the
charm of representing the world thus regenerated, all the
while knowing this regeneration is impos sible. ^"^
Socialism simply does not address the same issues. It is con-
cerned not with eternal moral questions like the source of egoism and
immorality, but with temporal economic questions. Socialism demands
not the suppression of economic desires but their rearrangement or
38
socialization. In socialist societies production would be collectivized
precisely to make it more efficient so that the highest degree of tem-
poral well-being may be attained. Far from separating the state and
industry, the two would practically be merged because social interests
are seen as eqmvalent to economic ones. The socialist goal is a sort
of leveling upwards, the elimination of poverty so everyone may
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satisfy his material appetites as completely as possible. Consumption
remains the province of the ego: no socialist doctrine refuses the right
of private property to the individual.
Durkheim-s study of Saint-Simonianism leads him to conclude
that this socialist "apotheosis of well-being"^^ is inherently self-
defeating. By sanctifying the passions, Saint-Simon permits no way
to restrain them. "K they are sacred things, there is nothing to do
but laissez-faire.
. .
when matter and material needs are divinized, by
what right can a brake and a rule be imposed on them? In Saint-
Simonianism earthly possessions are seen not as a means but as "the
only possible end of human activity. " The paradox is that material
interests can be truly satisfied only when subordinated to an end which
surpasses them. In and of themselves, desires can never be satis-
fied-
-and here Durkheim presents arguments which he was to expand
upon in La Suicide two years later, that desire knows no limits and that
partial satisfactions only inflate it more. According to this psychology,
men can be content only if making them content is not the self-
proclaimed end of society:
What is necessary for social order to reign is for the generality
of men to be content with their lot; but what is necessary for
them to be content with it is not that they have more or less, but
that they are convinced they do not have the right to have more.
And, for this to be, it is altogether necessary that there be an
authority whose superiority they recognize, and which tells them
their rights. The individual, abandoned to the pressure of his
needs alone, will never admit that he has arrived at the extreme
limit of his rights.
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Socxalism lacks such an authority. Saint-Simon wrongly assumes that
desires can be satisfied by a certain quantity of well-being, and so he
does not establish an authority of restraint. How could he? In his
theory the only end of society is to prosper economically, and there
is no principle above this one to appeal to in restraining wants. The
fallacy of Saint-Simon is to try "to construct a stable society on a
purely economic basis. ""^^
Eventually, Saint-Simon did try to provide another basis to
society by establishing a social religion. Durkheim finds the experi-
ment most intriguing because it demonstrates that this socialist, how-
ever confusedly, "felt the necessity of raising something above the
purely economic order which would limit it. "^^ Saint-Simon recog-
nized that in the past religion had been the main authority limiting
material desires and setting goals for society above purely economic
ones. Saint-Simon and his disciple Bazard did not want to revive
Christianity, for its dogmas anathematize the material world. Their
new faith would rehabilitate matter. But the religion they devised is
criticized by Durkheim as purely nominal, theocratic only in appear-
ance, in reality a sort of mystic pantheism. In the Saint-Simonian
religion God is simply a name given to the totality of reality. God is
the world. Logically it could not be otherwise because when terres-
trial things are made the end of society "they take on a value and a
dignity that they would not have if the divine were thought of as outside
45
the things of this world. " Far from constricting temporal interests.
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the Saint- Simonian religion only consecrates them. Industry becomes
a sort of cult, a way for man to enter into contact with the pantheistic
God. The basis of this religion remains purely economic, for its goal
is to create social harmony on earth and to forge a sense of collective
interest out of a mass of individual egos. But a vague sense of cosmic
iinity cannot draw people together nor rein in egoism. A faith which
depends not on a stable authority but on spontaneous bursts of univer-
sal love can never be effective. Durkheim summarizes Saint-Simon's
experiment as
a very vigorous attempt of industrialism to succeed at rising
above itself, but this attempt aborted. For when one begins
with the axiom that there are only economic interests, one is
their prisoner and cannot go beyond them.
The Corporatist Response: Durkheim's Proposal
Since neither communism nor socialism offer realistic responses
to the moral crisis, Durkheim suggests another alternative. He ven-
tures the prophecy that the very process of social evolution which has
destroyed old sources of authority based on the conscience collective
is also silently constructing new sources of social authority. The hope
of the future lies in identifying and encouraging these new sources
rather than reviving a sham version of the old, as Saint-Simon had
done, or escaping into iinrealistic idylls as Utopian communists prefer,
Durkheim describes the potential new sources of authority in his
lectures on socialism"^ and in La Suicide, but his ideas on this sub-
ject are developed most fully in De la division du travail. In this book
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he describes in some detail the evolution of society from primitive
forms of mechanical solidarity, where undifferentiated individuals
resemble each other and are linked by the conscience collective
, to
the organic solidarity of higher societies where distinctive individuals
are linked by an objective relationship so that the special contribution
of each is essential to the success of the whole. The increase of
specialization in economic life results in a sense of interdependence
far stronger than mechanical similarity. "It is the division of labor
which, more and more, fills the role that was formerly filled by the
common conscience. It is the principle foundation of social aggre-
49gates of higher types. " So the evolutionary process which com-
plicates the needs and desires of individuals also develops an authority
which can restrict those needs. In the long run, Durkheim is optimis-
tic about the evolution of civilization by which society, like an
organism, develops according to the law of increasing organization.
The evolution of the division of labor, which economists praise for its
greater efficiency in producing goods, is praised by Durkheim for its
higher purpose, its moral purpose, in creating a new social solidarity
which at once strengthens individual personality and provides effective
restraints over it.
All this is very abstract, and Durkheim is eager to demonstrate
how this solidarity may be realized in more practical terms. His
most detailed description of the new institutions which might incarnate
it is found in the preface he added in 1902 to the second edition of
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De la division du travail, titled "Quelques remarques sur les groupe-
ments professionnels
"
[Some remarks on occupational groups] . ^° To
exert influence solidarity has to be more than an idea, a theory; it has
to be embodied in an institutionalized authority. For Durkheim this
should be the occupational group, or corporation, which would include
all the workers in a given profession from the lowliest to the highest.
Because the term "corporation" is inherited from the pre
-revolutionary
bodies whose existence dates back to medieval times, Durkheim takes
pains to emphasize that he does not have in mind the revival of this
specific form which tended to be parochial, local, and reactionary.
His concept of the corporation is much more general. Through most
of history, he argues, the occupational group has existed as a quasi-
religious, quasi -familial institution providing moral discipline and a
sense of community for its members. Revived corporations would
certainly have their utilitarian functions --mutual assistance, insurance
schemes, setting quantities and conditions of production, fixing
renumeration- -but they too would surpass these functions to provide a
new sense of solidarity, a new "moral environment" for their mem-
51bers. Like Gide's proposal for consumer cooperatives, Durkheim
envisions an institution at once economic and moral in its aims. The
authority of the occupational group woxild moderate the strong and
soothe the protests of the weak; it would enumerate the duties of
individuals towards each other and towards the commxinity; and it
would decide the share of each so that appetites of individuals wovdd
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exceed certain limits. Its control would be omnipresent:
It follows workers wherever they go, which the family cannot do.Wherever they are. they find it enveloping them, recalling them
to their duties, supporting them in need. Finally, since occupa-
tional life IS almost the whole of life, corporative action malces
itself felt m every detail of our occupations, which are thus
given a collective orientation. Thus the corporation has every-
thing needed to give the individual a setting, to draw him out of
his state of moral isolation.
. .
The corporation should have recognized legal standing, but it would be
outside the government, a secondary association to help fill the gap
between isolated individuals and the remote state. According to
Durkheim. contemporary unions show the "formless and rudimentary"
beginning of such occupationcil groups. They deviate from his model
in many respects, however, especially in that workers and employers
are not included in the same organization. While this separation is,
in Durkheim 's view, "legitimate and necessary " at the present.
regular contact should be established between the two groups so that
eventually a common authority may be established to fix their relations
and to command obedience from both.
A Critique of Durkheim 's Proposal
Durkheim observes.
The work of the sociologist is not that of the statesman. We do
not have to present in detail what this reform should be. It will
be sufficient to indicate the general principles as they appear
from the preceding facts.
To be fair, then, criticism should be directed not at this or that detail
of Durkheim 's corporatist proposal but at the general principle of
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occupational groups. Durkheim's basic assumption is that moral
revival could best come about in the environment of the workplace.
The declining solidarities of family and religion should be replaced by
a solidarity created in common efforts of production. Ctlestin Bougl^
(1870-1940), one of Durkheim's own disciples, refers to this principle
as "what might be called the 'morality of the tool, "' because it looks
to the workplace to provide "a sort of vita nuova for consciences" and
to constitute "the best practical school of solidarity. "^^ This same
assumption is found in many other thinkers besides Durkheim, Bougie
adds, citing Georges Sorel in France and Sydney Webb in England.
The example of Camille Mauclair also might be added to show how
readily the morality of the tool coxild be grafted on to the decorative
arts revival. In all cases the professional association is intended to
provide at once a material purpose by organizing production and a
moral purpose in giving workers a sense of brotherhood and dedication
to the ends of the group beyond the self.
But just what are those ends? Durkheim criticizes Saint-Simonian
socialism for positing no higher end for society than "the apotheosis of
well-being" and concludes that an inability to direct h\iman effort to a
higher end is the basic cause of its failure. Yet Durkheim is well
aware that this apotheosis of well-being is characteristic not only of
socialism, but of modern society in general: in La Suicide he uses
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this very phrase to describe the anomic state of modern civilization.
The establishment of occupational groups would seem to do nothing to
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provide a higher end. Far from serving as a curb on economic inter-
ests, it would only emphasize those interests because the corporation
would be organized around them. Durkheim himself admits the occupa-
tional group would not "lay too heavy a yoke on industry; it is close
enough to the interests it will have to regulate not to restrain them too
severely. Its material interest then, is industrial, and while its
moral purpose may be to subordinate individual egos to the interests
of the group, that subordination still does not raise the interests of the
group beyond the level of material well-being. By mixing moral and
material purposes so intimately in the same institution, they become
confused and finally identified. This confusion is inherent in a more
general way in Durkheim 's thought. He sees two different needs of
modern society: one for an institutionalized, external, stable source
of authority to limit individual egos, and the second for a moral
principle to justify that limitation. The occupational group fills the
first need but not the second. Being based on economic interests, it
provides no goal beyond material ones and thus provides no principle
of limitation, except to the extent that the material interests of individ-
ual members might be limited in favor of the material interests of the
corporation, Durkheim's proposed furnishes a means of moral
authority, but not an end; a source of solidarity, without saying
solidarity for what.
Durkheim wants above all to confront social reality, to look
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squarely at the "social facts" of his time. The social fact seems to
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be that it is no longer possible to propose non-economic goals for
society. This is why religion, which does propose goals beyond
terrestrial well-being, is no longer possible:
..
.the essential principle of the only regulation to which it cansubject economic life is contempt for riches.
. . . If religionteaches that our duty is to accept with docility our lot as cir-
cumstances order it, this is to attach us exclusively to otherpurposes, worthier of our efforts; and in general religion
recommends moderation in desires for the same reason. But
this passive resignation is incompatible with the place which
earthly interests have now assumed in collective existence.The discipline they need must not aim at relegating them to
second place and reducing them as far as possible, but at
giving them an organization in harmony with their importance.
For religion today to preach asceticism is to indulge in dreams of
abnegation which have no basis in reality. The occupational group
certainly provides the organization of desires, but not their direction
towards a superior goal. It therefore entails the subordination of
individuals basically because they need subordination. Georges Palante,
who is one of Durkheim's sterner critics, would call this "the tyranny
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of the group. " Palante argues that it seems to be Durkheim's plan
for sociology "to take over the function previously assumed by religion,
namely, to restrain the individual in the interests of society.
"^'''
Durkheim, of course, takes pains to emphasize that constraints on the
individual are exactly what allow him to achieve his full personality:
".
. .not only does occupational reg\ilation.
. .hinder less than any other
the play of individual variation, but it also tends to do so less and
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less. " Yet when Durkheim describes the personality that would be
fostered by the occupational group, the ideal does sound somewhat
bleak:
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We can then say that, in higher societies, our duty is not tospread our activity over a large surface, but to concentrateand specialize it. We must contract our horizon, choose adefinite task and immerse ourselves in it completely, instead
of trying to make ourselves a sort of creative masterpiecequite complete, which contains its worth in itself and not inthe services that it renders. "3
To look above all at the services rendered is the morality of function-
alism, applied not to the realm of objects but to that of humanity-
-or
perhaps it involves seeing people as useful objects. But useful for
what? Just when industrial development is opening up new possibilities
and freeing people from past restraints of geography, education, age,
and sex, Durkheim proposes a world of artificial social necessity.
Certainly his moral vision would eliminate the pathology of a "creative
masterpiece" like des Esseintes, but it also seeks to eliminate whole
worlds of imagination-
-and the potent appeal of the dream world of
consumption suggests that the imagination might not be eliminated so
readily.
But then Durkheim 's is not an ethic of consumption, but of pro-
duction. According to him, the progress of civilization brings not only
more specialized work but also more continuous work. Animals and
savages work capriciously, he notes, only when they are compelled to,
and even in the Middle Ages many holidays interrupted work. Only in
advanced societies has "work become a permanent occupation, a habit,
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and indeed, if this habit is siifficiently strengthened, a need. " While
the liberating potential of some kinds of work should be appreciated,
the question is whether it is desirable for every one to be defined so
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exclusively by the tools he handles, to have his thoughts and moral
code tied so exclusively to occupation. Bougl€ thinks not:
To enclose a man too early in the trade is a danger. Not onlybecause such capacities of the individual may mirit being cul-tivated for themselves; but because social life, being in I largepart interprofessional and presupposing relations between dif-ferent types of producers requires a platform of common
notions on which to build.
Bougl€ fears a new parochialism, not geographic but occupational.
What is needed instead is a sense of citizenship as well as of profes-
sional identity so that the individual has a vision of the general good
above that of the group. Otherwise social life could be reduced to a
series of wars among occupational groups, or between producers and
consumers. A sense of citizenship entails an understanding of the
solidarity of different branches of production, as well as of production
and consumption, while solidarity narrowly based on the occupational
group could be harmful to society.
In bringing up these objections to a morality of the tool, Bougl^
suggests how much of society is left out of occupational groups. As in
the case of Louis Weber, Durkheim's moral code is by no means
universal, leaving out, among others, the aged, children, and women.
Yet they too have needs and interests. The omission of women is
especially damaging because Durkheim himself admits that there is
one type of suicide that coxild not be diminished by the establishment
of occupational associations, and this is "the form springing from
6 7
conjugal anomie. " The basic antagonism in the institution of
marriage is that the interests of husbands and wives are opposed
because
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the two sexes do not share equally in social life. Man is
actively involved in it, while a woman does little more thanlook on at a distance. His tastes, aspirations, and humorhave m large part a collective origin, while his companion's
are more directly influenced by her organism. His needs
therefore, are quite different from hers, and so an institutionintended to regulate their common life cannot be equitable and
simultaneously satisfying to such opposite needs.
Durkheim adds that marriages will become more harmonious only
when the psychological differences between the sexes diminish. The
establishment of occupational groups, on the contrary, would seem to
intensify those differences, at least in bourgeois marriages where the
wife does not work, which is the type of household Durkheim has in
mind. There the establishment of corporations would mean that the
husband would become even more identified with his occupational role
while the wife --whose traditional occupations of mothering and house-
hold are not encompassed by professional groups - -would be even more
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left out of social life. In these social circles the morality of the
producer is very much that of the male.
In Durkheim 's whole discussion there seems a disjunction be-
tween his diagnosis of the moral dilemmas of consumption, so cogent
and convincing, and his prescription, which is inadequate in so many
ways. H. Stuart Hughes suggests that Durkheim 's thought is inherently
restricted by his reliance on the positivistic , mechanistic vocabulary
of his immediate predecessors, so that he is always groping unsuc-
cessfully towards a more spiritual, even idealistic explanation of how
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society works. Certainly in his discussion of matters of consumption
his analysis of the spiritual cost of unlimited desire is followed by a
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rather mechanistic description of an institution to organize desire.
Yet if Durkheim is limited by his vocabulary, it is probably his
reliance on the language of biology which restricts his work even more
severely, especially in La Suicide and De la division du travail.
Durkheim habitually describes man as a biological being, as an
"organism, " to use his favorite term. Furthermore, he tends to con-
ceive of human society as a "social organism, " a sort of super-
organism, and this metaphor is the basis of his concept of social
solidarity: ".
.
.in more advanced societies, ^man's] nature is, in
large part, to be an organ of society, aiid his proper duty, consequently,
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is to play his role as an organ. " Such abstract language places a
great distance between Durkheim and the concrete individual who is an
historical, sentient, and imaginative being (among many other dimen-
sions) as well as a biological one. Durkheim refers repeatedly to the
"functions" of human beings but only in the sense of biological functions
necessary to maintain the health of the organism. Certainly he attaches
great importance to man's spiritual yearnings beyond the level of
physical existence, but in dealing with them he is still restricted by
his reliance on a vocabulary borrowed from biological science.
There is still another way to describe the limits of Durkheim's
vocabulary, and therefore of his conceptual framework. With terms
like "anomie" he tries to devise a vocabulary appropriate for phenom-
ena of consumption, but in the end he falls back on the more
familiar language of production. Certainly this is the central disjunc-
tion in Durkheim's work, that he analyzes the moral crisis of a
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consumer and then presents a moral solution suitable to a producer.
Does Durkheim mean to suggest, as Mauclair does, that people can
receive a moral education only in their role as producers? Perhaps
the dichotomy tells us rather how difficult it is to fashion a vocabulary
appropriate for modern consumption. Certainly Durkheim is far from
alone in his inability to find an adequate vocabulary, and indeed with
his concept of anomie he succeeds better than most of his contem-
poraries, who sense the phenomenon but express themselves in far
less lucid terms. But in suggesting a productive prescription for the
dilemmas of modern consumption, Durkheim seems to reach the limits
of this intellectual framework. The only vocabulary he knows which
would address directly the moral dilemmas of the consumer is that of
religion. But an appeal to this terminology would be anachronistic,
72for religion is the pre-eminent form of the conscience collective
and is therefore fading as a social fact. Attempts to revive it, as in
the case of the Saint-Simonian religion, are illusory. Religion might
provide an effective and direct answer to the moral dilemmas of con-
sumption, but there is no use talking of the necessity of what is
impossible.
The Role of Religion
But is it impossible? Durkheim first turned to a serious study
of religion while preparing a course on the subject in 1895, the core
of the period which also saw the writing of De la division du travail,
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the lectures on socialism, and La Suicide
. ^^^^^ ^^^^^
religion is present on the periphery as a form of experience which is
rapidly becoming extinct but is still too vital to be dispensed with
altogether. Only in 1912 did Durkheim finally make a major study in
which religion is at the center of the stage rather than lurking in the
wings, so to speak. This is Les Formes ^l^mentaires de la vie
religieuse: le systfeme tot^migue en Australie [The elementary forms
of religious life: the totemic system in Australia^ (Paris: Alcan).
As the sub-title suggests, much of the study is devoted to a summary
and discussion of ethnographic studies of native Australian religions,
for Durkheim feels the essential outlines of religious faith and practice
are to be grasped more readily in a primitive state than in a highly
developed example like Christianity. Certainly the specific totemic
beliefs of the Australian tribes seem strange and barbaric to Europeans,
but Durkheim argues that whether in primitive or civilized form
".
. .
religion exists; it is a system of given facts; in a word, it is a
reality. How could science deny this reality?"''''^ Here there is no
more talk of religion being an outmoded form of the conscience collec-
tive. It exists and continues to exist and therefore incarnates some
truth of human experience regardless of the validity of specific dogmas.
Its truth, Durkheim concludes, lies in the way religious experience
symbolizes social experience. He has not changed his mind that man
needs to have his ego limited by a force exterior to himself which is
society; now he adds that God may serve as a metaphor for that force
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above and beyond the individual. God "is only a figurative expression
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of the society. " Religious ritual may be understood as dramatizing
social relationships, as providing a sort of mythical sociology.
Furthermore, those rituals have a definite social purpose, which is to
"strengthen the bonds attaching the individual to the society of which
76he is a member. " It is less the ideas of the religion than its prac-
tice which maintains the sense of solidarity necessary for social and
therefore for individual life.
From this perspective Durkheim analyzes the function of rituals
of abstinence in religious life. Every religion involves some kind of
temporary or permanent prohibition on certain types of consumption,
the most obvious example being fasting. "It follows that asceticism is
not a rare, exceptional and nearly abnormal fruit of the religious life,
as some have supposed it to be; on the contrary, it is one of its
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essential elements. " The strict limitation of consumption is
essential because only when the believer makes an effort to cut his
ties with the profane world can he enter into commerce with the sacred.
By detaching himself from base and trivial matters, he sanctifies
himself and thereby prepares himself for access to a higher level of
experience than the everyday. To be sure, this effort entails
suffering:
We hold to the profane world by all the fibres of our flesh; our
senses attach us to it; our life depends upon it. It is not merely
the natural theatre of our activity; it penetrates us from every
side; it is a part of ourselves. So we cannot detach ourselves
from it without doing violence to our nature and without pain-
fully wounding our instincts. "^^
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In primitive religions like those of the Australians, this need for
suffering may be ritualized in repugnant ceremonies of mutilation.
Yet the same idea that suffering confers sanctity is also at the heart
of the Christian faith:
In both it is admitted that suffering creates exceptional strength
Lfor the believer] Suffering is the sign that certain of thebonds attaching him to his profane environment are broken- so
It testifies that he is partially freed from this environment! and,
consequently, it is justly considered the instrument of deliver-
ance. So he who is thus delivered is not the victim of a pure
illusion when he believes himself invested with a sort of mastery
over things: he really has raised himself above them, by the
very act of renoxincing them;.
.
.
"^9
The effects of these rites thus demonstrate Durkheim's contention that
religion is valid existentially wholly aside from questions of the validity
of its dogmas. It is true that in human experience religion strengthens
the individual and enables him to rise above the miseries and vexations
of life, to endure or even conquer them and eventually to feel the force
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of life more f\illy. Furthermore, these rites also demonstrate his
proposal that "religious interests are only the symbolic form of social
8
1
and moral interests. " Training in endurance and disinterestedness
is eminently necessary for social life in general, for society is made
possible only through a certain degree of sacrifice on the part of the
individual. The religious rituals both symbolize the need for social
discipline and reinforce social solidarity by being performed.
Durkheim concludes, "So there is an asceticism which, being inherent
in all social life, is destined to survive all the mythologies and all the
82dogmas; it is an integral part of human c\ilture. "
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As this last remark suggests, by the time he wrote Les Fo rmes
€l^mentaires de la vie religieuse, Durkheim was far less sure than he
had been that religion is an anachronism. It is eternally true that
society will have to find some way of instilling a sense of solidarity.
The rites of asceticism in some form are therefore indispensable, for
the training they give is essential to social stability. In concluding
that religious interests are symbolic of social ones, Durkheim does
not have to go far to assert that social bonds are f\indamentally
religious ones. Since the purpose of religion is to create society,
then society has to be understood as a religious phenomenon. Religion
8 3
will survive as long as society does. Durkheim himself is of two
minds on this point. He is willing to grant that there is "something
84
eternal" in religion, and yet he is also convinced that religion must
be transformed, in particular by giving up its claims to cognitive
validity. Durkheim looks forward to a religious revival but of a
85different sort of religion than that of the past.
In the end, Durkheim, like so many of his contemporaries,
returns to religious experience for a framework in which to compre-
hend the moral dilemmas of consumption. By seeing abstinence as a
fundamentally religious attitude, he goes beyond the comparatively
mechanistic and superficial solution of limiting consumption by the
occupational group. In his more mature consideration, asceticism
makes sense only in reference to a level of experience above that of
material well-being. When experience is restricted to one dimension,
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there is no principle which justifies the restriction of consumption.
The question remains open, however, whether "society" and "God"
can be used interchangeably to describe a higher level of experience.
To make society into a divinity suggests a sort of Saint-Simoninan
pantheism which sanctifies the things of this earth rather than positing
a separate higher realm of the sacred. Can society in the abstract be
understood as a religious being, or does Durkheim's equation of society
and God only lead to the tyranny of the group? Can consumption be
regulated with reference to the social goal of providing well-being for
all, when that end, although providing an end above that of the indivi-
dual ego, still rests on the material level? Are other social goals
possible which are not material ones, so that consumption may be
regulated with reference to a spiritual understanding of human society?
God may have to be redefined, but how?
Durkheim may not provide definite answers in his last book as
he had earlier with his proposal for occupational associations, but one
has the feeling that he comes much closer to defining the issues and the
social needs involved. The point should not be overstated. Even
after the tragic death of his son in World War I, Durkheim did not
embrace religion as a believer, and his attitude towards it always
remained deeply ambivalent. But in his analysis of the moral cost of
modern prosperity, and in stressing the necessity of religious bonds
for social life, in his own very muted way he too suggests a choice
between the muzzle of a gun and the foot of the Cross.
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CHAPTER X
GABRIEL TARDE
Tarde's Place in Intellectual Histo]1
Gabriel Tarde failed to heed Durkheim's prediction that the
future belongs to specialists. He was a student of economics, soci-
ology, philosophy, ancient and modern history, law, crime, and
politics, and in his books discussions of all these fields are juxtaposed
with allusions to physics, chemistry, music, painting, mathematics,
linguistics, and much more. He wrote on topical is sues
--the moral
crisis, solidarity, invention, educational reform, race, alcoholism
--as well on ones raised only by him (such as "the social role of joy"),
and he even published short stories and poetry. ^ As Durkheim fore-
saw, however, versatility is not a solid basis for intellectual reputa-
tion today. No discipline claims Tarde as its father. His relationship
to psychology, sociology, and economics is avuncxilar rather than
paternal: he is kindly, helpful, but off the main line of intellectual
genealogy. Tarde may be recognized as the progenitor of a theory
of imitation, but it seems a stillborn offspring. Stephen Lukes,
Durkheim's biographer, criticizes the "poverty and superficiality" of
2
imitation as an "explanatory framework" for sociology. This evalua-
tion is seconded by Terry Clark, who has done the most extensive
study of Tarde in English. In his book Prophets and Patrons Clark
confesses that his own previous efforts to demonstrate the importance
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of this and other non-Durkheimian sociologists "have not been particu-
larly convincing. As Clark notes elsewhere, Tarde's present repu-
tation rests on his role as a "whipping boy" of Durkheim. ^
Whatever the respective merit of their sociological thought, there
can be no quarrel with Clark's conclusion in Prophets and Patrons that
next to Durkheim, Tarde played a negligible role in the professionali-
zation of the social sciences. Tarde was isolated from professional
intellectual circles most of his life. He lived in a remote area of
southwest France (Dordogne), working as a magistrate and living the
life of a co\intry gentleman with leisure for voracious reading and long
riomination but with little opportunity for intellectual intercourse among
equals. Tarde very slowly amassed a reputation outside his locality
through his writings on criminology, which developed from his judicial
duties. Only at the age of fifty-one did he go to Paris, and then he
went to a bureaucratic post (Director of the Statistical Section in the
Ministry of Justice) rather than to a university position. Public
lectures at the College de France came only in the last several years
of his life. At Tarde's death in 1904, he left no coherent group of
disciples to carry on his work.
Very well: if Tarde cannot compete with Durkheim in practical
or theoretical significance as a sociologist, more justice might be
done to Tarde's versatility if we evaluate him as a philosopher. This
is the strategy taken by his most recent and exhaustive biographer,
Jean Milet, who argues that the debate about Tarde's importance as a
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sociologist has meant ignoring his more significant role as "an authen-
5
txc philosopher. " Tarde contributes to this misunderstanding, Milet
admits, by veiling his metaphysical convictions, either from modesty
or from awareness that philosophical specvdation was much less
popialar then than the sociological variety. Milet proceeds to extract
and organize the latent metaphysics in Tarde 's work and draws atten-
tion to some of his lesser-known philosophical writings. He concludes
that Tarde is an exceptionally gifted philosopher of history. As an
intellectual analysis Milet 's book is original and useful, providing a
much-needed fresh perspective on Tarde 's thought by giving a subor-
dinate position to the theory of imitation. As a biography, the book is
also valuable, especially in analyzing the effects of Tarde 's mental
isolation at a crucial stage of life (he suffered an eye disease which
kept him largely in solitude from age nineteen to twenty-four), one
result of which is profound indebtedness to Augustin Cournot, whose
works are among the very few Tarde read in those years. ^ But Milet
fails to demonstrate that Tarde is an authentic philosopher, at least
in the ordinary understanding of that term which reserves it for
thinkers who are characterized precisely by the rigor and explicitness
of their metaphysical assumptions. As we shall see later on, Tarde
is capable of intriguing philosophical speculations, but he never
follows through on them or develops them into a coherent philosophy.
So the problem remains of finding an appropriate category to
evaluate Tarde. If he is neither a sociologist nor a philosopher,
although he deals with sociology and philosophy, just what is he trying
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to do? Because he deals with so many disciplines, the suspicion
arises that there is no unifying category to encompass the prodigious
wealth of subject matter, that Tarde is, in brief
, an intellectual dilet-
tante. Durkheim accuses Tarde of pursuing only "intellectual amuse-
ment" (not to Tarde 's face, though), and this assessment seems some-
what confirmed by Tarde 's fondness for frequenting Parisian salons
and for dabbling in literary activities. Certainly his writing style
seems more amusing than serious: it is witty, graceful, imaginative,
g
vivacious, and often unsystematic. To Durkheim this style, so unlike
his own sober prose, allows "the reign of fantasy in the intellectual
order.
Yet this chapter would not be written were Tarde only a dabbler.
He is as deeply convinced of the validity of his intellectual approach as
Durkheim is of his much more positivistic one. Tarde himself recog-
nizes that through his own methodology he is trying to understand
social behavior in a way very different from Durkheim's. Tarde him-
self has difficulty finding a vocabulary to define his goals and methods.
At the outset he uses the expression "social psychology" to describe
his discipline and argues that sociology should be defined as social
psychology. In the course of polemics Vvdth Durkheim and others con-
cerning the scientific character of sociology, Tarde came to realize
that this formulation was inadequate. He invented the term "inter-
psychology" to describe his goal of a new science, distinct from
classical psychology, which would study not the individual mind but
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rather the mental actions and reactions between two people as well as
the niental action of a person on a group and the reaction of the collec-
tivity back on the individual. Interpsychology is also distinct from
sociology, "which it goes beyond, and which it explains
, but which it
does not constitute. Although the first and last courses given by
Tarde at the College de France dealt with interpsychology, he left
only the vaguest of outlines for establishing this discipline, in contrast
to Durkheim's success in establishing the new discipline of sociology.
Still, it does far more justice to Tarde to assess him not as a defeated
sociologist but as a pioneer of interpsychology. Tarde and Durkheim
take parallel rather tnen identical routes to the same intellectual goal
of trying to establish a new science to understand an emergent society
in a state of moral crisis. Tarde was wise to give up the argument
about whose is the "correct" sociology and to invent a new term
altogether.
As is indicated by the term chosen by Tarde, the fundamental
difference between his approach and that of Durkheim is that Tarde
detaches social science from biology and attaches it to psychology.
For Tarde society is not an organism but a mind, a brain with the
same functions as the individual one - - conscience
,
memory, imagina-
tion, judgment, will. Tarde himself says there are four basic ways
to think about society: social physics (favored by Comtean sociology
and by many economists), social biology (Spencer and his disciples),
social ideology (which could never be objective), and social psychology
(the most comprehensive). There is no need to debate here whether
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all these approaches can coexist in social science, or whether any one
of them is more valid than the rest. It is enough to say that for our
inquiry, Tarde's psychological approach is uniquely illuminating.
Tarde's interpsychology may be sketchy, but more than any other
methodology encountered so far, certainly more than Durkheim's
organic metaphors, it begins to come to terms with modern consump-
tion.
It is not only Tarde's psychological bent that enables him to
approach an understanding of consumer behavior. In that behavior we
have repeatedly noted a crucial component of imagination, of reverie,
of fantasy. To borrow Durkheim's terms, in matters of consumption,
fantasy is a social fact. In this light Durkheim's accusation that Tarde
succumbs to a "reign of fantasy in the intellectual order" is as reveal-
ing as inaccurate. Far from giving rein to every whim, Tarde is
intensely concerned with logic (partly the influence of Cournot, no
doubt), but it is an anti-determinist and anti- naturalist logic. While
Durkheim tries to be absolutely clear on every point, Tarde adopts
the maxim that "in social matters, every clear explanation must
1
3
necessarily be erroneous. " Tarde is serious: he tcikes fantasy
seriously. He does not spurn reality but refuses to limit his thought
to it, always insisting on the consideration of possibility as well. His
passion to discern the shape of future possibility does sometimes
express itself in the manner of the dilettante, such as when Tarde
amused lady friends in the salons by reading their palms and analyzing
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their handwriting. Even on this social level, though, Tarde's prog-
nostications could have serious results. He became a Dreyfusard,
and consequently was ostracized from some of those salons, in part
because his analysis of the penmanship of the famous bordereau con-
vinced him that Dreyfus did not write it. ^4 n^his was by no means the
only time that Tarde regarded a social problem as one requiring
decipherment. For him social reality is not self-evident or self-
explanatory but is a sort of cryptic message which must be decoded by
an imaginative observer open to various possibilities. History is not
a straight line of development but a series of intersections. The con-
sistent intellectual thread running through all Tarde's work is his
concern for imagination, change, potenticdity: "The real is explicable
only in connection with the immensity of the possible. "^^ "Hypothesis
fingo, " he boldly declares, and only the future can sort out the valid
hypotheses from the invalid. Durkheim would side with the original
Newtonian formulation "Hypothesis non fingo," and so he denovuices
Tarde as unscientific. According to ordinary scientific standards,
Durkheim is right. But Tarde does not pretend to adhere to those
standards. He shoxild be judged not as a scientist, not even as a
sociologist, but as a social prophet.
By this stajidard of evaluation it is relatively unimportant that
Tarde failed to establish an intellectual school. Social prophecy is a
vocation which does not lend itself to accumulating disciples. While
Durkheim 's method could form the basis of an intellectual industry.
591
Tarde's much more individual vision could not, and this fact should by
no means discredit the intrinsic merit of his ideas. The obvious irony
that the theoretician of imitation himself left no imitators can be mis-
leading. If his intellectual construction could not be reproduced in the
form of a scale model, so to speak, it could be quarried for raw
materials by other thinkers for use in constructing their own edifices
of thought. In this respect it is by no means clear that Tarde's
influence on others has been so negligible. The extent of his influence
has been dismissed as minimal before being given any carefxxl study.
For example, there seems to have been a good deal of intellectual
exchange between Tarde and Charles Gide in the development of a
psychological economics. Furthermore, Georges Palante was a great
admirer of Tarde, as were Gaston Richard and Ren^ Worms. ^"^
The following presentation of Tarde's ideas will be selective
rather than exhaustive. A general siimmary of his thought has been
1
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done ably by others, but our goal is rather to describe and discuss
those aspects of it that contribute to our understanding of the dream
world of consumption. Although Tarde's contribution to that goal goes
far beyond his theory of imitation, that is still the best place to begin.
Imitation
The essence of the universe is repetition. Over and over waves
lap at the shores, winds blow, living creatures are born and die, the
earth circles in its orbit, and galaxies turn in the void. In the social
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world as in the natural, the basic tendency is towards self-reproduc-
tion. Social repetition is called imitation. Through imitation, "the
reproduction, voluntary or involuntary, of a model. "^^ ^he social
world keeps copying itself. As the "action at a distance of one mind
on another, "^^ imitation is analogous to the action of gravitational
force across space; as the "pregnant relation between the inventor and
his copier, " imitation resembles biological "generation at a distance. "
In summary, the three great forms of universal repetition are vibra-
tion in the physical sphere, reproduction in the biological, and
imitation in the social.
On a less cosmological level, imitation provides the basis for a
psychology of social behavior because "the social being, insofar as he
is social, is in essence an imitator. "^^ Just what does it mean to be
an imitator? Tarde insists that his definition of imitation as the
"voliintary or involuntary" reproduction of a model accurately reflects
the nuances of consciousness:
Nothing.
. . is less scientific than this absolute separation.
. .
between the voluntary and the involuntary, between the con-
scious and the iinconscious. Does not one pass by insensible
degrees from reflective will to almost mechanical habit?
And what act changes absolutely in nature during this
passage? 2.3
Nor is Tarde convinced that rational, deliberate choice among models
is necessarily superior to imitation as unreflective impulse or habit.
Indeed the transition from "conscious, difficult, and discussed" imita-
tion to the habitual kind incorporated in social tradition may be a mark
of increased civilization rather than the opposite. " Whether
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conscious or unconscious, imitation is by no means wholly passive.
On some level it involves choice. From birth each individual is sur-
rounded by a multitude of examples
--at home, in schools, in work
and play, in reading and conversing-
-which he can imitate, or
counter-imitate. ("There are two ways to imitate, in fact: to do
exactly like one's model, or to do exactly the contrary. From all
these examples the individual chooses his own set of models (and
counter-models) to express his singular personality, and then pro-
ceeds to serve as a model himself.
To a great extent Tarde thinks by analogy-
-the very concept of
imitation being based on an analogy with repetition in the non-human
world- -and he turns to analogies to explain how imitation can be at
once active and passive, conscious and unconscious, rational and
intuitive. Imitation, he ventures, is "an action which consists in a
quasi-photographic reproduction of a cerebral negative on the sensi-
tive plate of another mind. ... I understand by imitation any print of
? ftinter- spiritual photography." Tarde discards this analogy, how-
ever, for another that he develops at much greater length: he com-
pares imitation to a hypnotic trance. Hypnotism was then the subject
of considerable interest among psychologists, and Tarde cites
numerous contemporary studies pointing to the conclusion that
27
"social man" is "a veritable somnambulist. " It is wholly in accor-
dance with rigorous scientific method, he goes on, to clarify the
complexities of social interaction by examining the more elementary
interaction between hypnotist and subject:
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The social state, like the hypnotic state, is only a form ofdream, a dream of command and a dream of action. Tohave Ideas only suggested and to believe them spontaneous-
such IS the illusion of the somnambulist, and of social man
as well. ^°
Hypnotism depends on intimidation, "a singular state" in which the
hypnotized person may want to resist but cannot sufficiently mobilize
his own inner resources to overcome the prestige of the hypnotist.
The same psychology operates in social life in the timidity felt by an
individual before a prestigious model. As in the case of the hypnotist,
the prestigious example does not have to speak to arouse latent beliefs
and desires. "It suffices for him to act, to make a gesture, however
imperceptible, " for it to be reproduced. Tarde compares social
timidity to a sort of conscious and incomplete hypnotism, like the
state of semi-hypnosis preceding a deep trance. In this state the
intimidated person begins to "leave himself" and becomes malleable
"under the gaze of someone else. "^"^ The emotion of intimidation
aroused by prestige is highly ambiguous:
Under the name of respect, intimidation plays.
. . an immense
social role, . . .Respect is neither fear nor love only, nor only
their combination, although there is a loving fear in he who
feels it. Respect, above all, is an exemplary impression
made by one person on another, psychologically polarized. 30
Because imitating a model is a sign of respect, general changes in
choices of models may indicate general changes in social conscious-
ness:
The man of the world who reflects the slang and untidy dress
of a worker, the woman of the world who reproduces in her
singing the intonations of an actress, have more respect and
deference for the actress and the worker than they would
themselves believe. ^1
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Indeed, cautions Tarde, people are generally very poor judges
of their own susceptibility to hypnosis. We cannot ourselves judge
how much we are entranced by prestige, for "to admit this truth in
what concerns us would be to escape the blindness that it affirms and
consequently to furnish an argument against it. "^^ In order to evalu-
ate the theory of social hypnosis, we have to consider civilizations
alien to our own, like ancient Sparta, Egypt, or Israel. The people
of those civilizations thought themselves independent and rational just
as we do, but to us they look like automatons controlled by their
ancestors, political leaders, and prophets. They were ruled not by
terror but by prestige. So are we moderns. While the authority of
prestige has become much more reciprocal and generalized, we should
not flatter ourselves that our greater equality means we are "less
credulous and less docile, in a word less imitative than our ancestors. '
Unilateral imitation is still the rule where imitation originates in the
family, for the father is "the first master and priest and model. All
33
society, even today, begins there. " On a larger scale, the fact that
society is still susceptible to hypnosis may be seen in the relatively
recent career of Napoleon, whose every gesture was obeyed by
34France. Both in the distant past and in the present, when truth
opposes traditional ideas inspired by prestige and faith, the latter
triumph. Civilization has not yet awakened from "this dogmatic
35 ...
sleep. " In fact modern man is even more prone to imitation
because he is more used to it, just as someone goes into a trance
more easily the more he has been hypnotized.
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That propensity may be glimpsed in modern society when a per-
son who lives in an environment relatively sparse in models is suddenly
thrust into surroundings relatively rich in them. "Not only a fresh-
man who arrives on a college campus, but also a Japanese travelling
in Europe, or a country person disembarking in Paris are struck with
stupor comparable to a cataleptic state. " Memory of the past envi-
ronment is paralyzed and attention to the new environment is so potent
and concentrated that "these stupefied and feverish beings invincibly
submit to the magic charm of their new environment; they believe
everything they see done. " Outward passivity masks an inner state of
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extreme excitation. This very state is less obviously but just as
truly the chronic situation of the city-dweller. The more a person
lives in an animated and intense society which furnishes a continual
flow of new books and conversations, of spectacles and concerts, the
more he gives up independent intellectual effort. "To think spon-
taneously is always more fatiguing than to think through others. " The
minds of city-dwellers become at once overexcited and numb:
The movement and the noise of the streets, the store windows,
the frenetic and impulsive agitation of their existence, affect
them like hypnotic spells. Now urban life, is it not social life
concentrated and taken to an extreme? . . . Society is imitation,
and imitation is a type of hypnotism; thus may this chapter be
summarized. ^"^
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Invention
Invention is the necessary complement of imitation, for it creates
the models which are then diffused through repetition:
... a human invention.
. . stands in the same relation to social
science as the birth of a new vegetable or mineral species(or, on the hypothesis of a gradual evolution, of each of the
slow modifications to which the new species is due) to biology
or as the appearance of a new mode of motion comparable with
light or electricity, or the formation of a new substance, to
physics or chemistry. 38
A human invention is always an idea, a "mental object" rather than a
on
physical one. ^ The terms "innovation" and "discovery" which Tarde
uses as synonyms for invention may better express his concept which
goes far beyond gadgets and machines to include any novel principle,
whether grand or nearly imperceptible, usually but not always anony-
mous, in art, religion, jurisprudence, politics, or any other area of
human activity. In short, he is concerned with the general phenomenon
of creativity in psychic life:
To innovate, to discover, to awaken for an instant from his
familial or national dream, the individual must escape momen-
tarily from his society. He is supra- social, rather than
social, in having this rare audacity. '^O
Imitation is the necessary and constant basis of social life, while
invention is the fortuitous and transient elevation above social life.
Invention requires imagination and is born of leisure. It is wholly
different in character from labor, which is an imitative, repetitive
behavior requiring little if any imagination.
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Yet the opposition between long spells of imitation and the inter-
mittent lucidity of invention should not be overstated. Not only does
the imitating individual innovate to an extent by composing a unique
medley of examples, but also an inventor works with waves of imita-
tion, juxtaposing ones that have been isolated to bring them together
in a novel way. Inventions result from the interference of repetitions
that cross to result in an unexpected conclusion. Thus every inven-
tion is a mixture of accident and logic. Some rationality is involved
in juxtaposing lines of imitation, but the particvdar way they intersect
is to some degree fortuitous. Consequently the evolution of inventions
presents a combination of necessity and contingency. Every invention
has its necessary antecedents (e. g., the discovery of the compass had
to precede the discovery of America), so there is a logical "family
42tree" of inventions. Yet inventions do not trace any straight line of
progress. "The possibilities of the future are always many; the
transition from one period of history to another could always con-
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ceivably be made in more ways than one. . . " Tarde mocks the
suggestion that modern inventions like the locomotive, telegraph,
torpedoes, Krupp g\ms, Wagnerian opera, and naturalistic novels
represent an inevitable and logical outcome of the progress of
civilization:
, . . one might as well say that from its very beginnings and
throughout all its metamorphoses, life tended to give birth
to certain predetermined forms of existence and that the
duck-bill, for example, or the lizard or ophrys or cactus or
man himself was a necessary occurrence. Would it not be
more plausible to admit that the ever fresh problem of life
was of itself undetermined and susceptible of mviltiple solutions?
44
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Instead the appearance of a railroad engine gives the same "double
impression of the logical and of the bizarre which is the whole mystery
of living individuality. ""^^
n development of invention in both nature and society is indeter-
minate, it is also irreversible. Once a certain possibility has been
realized, it opens up some possibilities and at the same time excludes
others forever. Although civilization could have unrolled in another
way, it cannot be rolled back again. Present inventions will never
disappear to allow a return to those of past centuries, but will only
give way to different ones, perhaps inferior but certainly new. Pro-
gression, not regression, is the normal course of invention. Once an
invention is imitated, it spreads endlessly in all directions in geometric'
progression unless something interferes with its proliferation.
"What are factors that might restrict the proliferation of an inven-
tion? Some inventions are more successful than others, to be sure,
and civilization may even be defined as the collection of the most
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successful ones. There must be a mechanism that selects the fittest
inventions, just as natural selection operates among living species.
Tarde hypothesizes "logical laws of imitation" to explain why some
inventions become widely imitated while others are not. When two
inventions compete for success, he suggests, there are two possible
outcomes: a "logical duel" or "logical coupling. " In a duel one inven-
tion is accepted while at the same time another is rejected. The duel
may involve two inventions responding to the same need- -for example,
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the competition between cuneiform and Phoenician writing, or between
beet sugar and cane sugar, or even between two different schools of
art.^*^ Less frequently the duel involves two inventions that serve
different needs, as when aesthetic needs conflict with love of ease or
with love of country. Whether the duel involves conflicting desires or
conflicting means of satisfying the same desire, it is experienced first
on a personal level and then on a social level. "It is when individual
irresolution ends that collective irresolution is born and takes shape. "^^
Once individual minds arrive at a decision, society in general then
becomes divided along the same lines as the individual mind previously
had been,
A duel is not inevitable when two inventions compete, for a
logical coupling is also possible unless the two are incompatible. The
dueling of inventions is more typical in religion, philosophy, and
politics, while in science and industry inventions more often unite and
strengthen each other. For example, the discovery of the wheel and
that of the domestic animal were coupled to form the horse-drawn cart,
an example of coupling through integration. Even more common is
coupling through accumulation, where inventions are superimposed on
top of each other without true \mion. Accumvilation, rather than sub-
stitution or integration, is the most common way that inventions inter-
act. Usually new discoveries do not replace old ones at once, even if
they are incompatible, but may coexist for a long time before that
incompatibility is noticed. And even when it is noticed, the old inven-
tion commonly loses ground very gradually and rarely disappears
altogether.
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Extra-Logical Influences; From the Inside to the Outside
Besides these logical laws of imitation, extra-logical influences
also determine the spread of inventions through imitation. They
pertain not to tiie inherent utility of an invention but to the functioning
of imitation in society. That functioning is coherent and predictable
by social experience, although not necessarily predictable by individ-
ual reason. The first of the three extra-logical laws of imitation is
^^^^ °^ ab interioribus ad exteriora : "Imitation.
. . proceeds from the
inside of man to the outside.
. .
"^9 The Latin phrase is borrowed from
Thomas ^ Kempis' The Imitation of Christ, a book which greatly
influenced Tarde and which he loved to quote. Thus its original
meaning refers to religious experience, whereby the inner spirit of
Christ is conveyed first, to be followed only later by imitation of the
exterior forms of that spirit. Tarde applies this same sequence to all
experience. Inner feelings are copied before exterior things; com-
munion of spirit precedes that of behavior; opinions are borrowed
before commodities; and the exchange of souls precedes that of goods.
Because of all feelings that of love is the most readily communicated,
52the beloved model is copied most readily.
As is his habit, Tarde first states this social law and then gives
examples of how it operates in many areas. He demonstrates that in
ethics, modes of judgment and of feeling are conveyed before habitual
behavior; in aesthetics, heartfelt appreciation of a school before the
talent to reproduce it; in thought, ideas before the means to express
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them; and in religion, the fervor of faith before ritual or dogma. "
As for economic behavior. Tarde deduces several important con-
sequences of the rule ab interioribus ad exteriora
. In the first place,
an inner desire or need is copied before the specific products that
fulfill the need or desire, since imitation of ends precedes that of
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means. In the second place, because imitation begins with the
spirit, higher spiritual needs are conveyed before lower corporeal
ones; desire for luxury is more contagious than simple appetites or
primitive needs. Finally, the idea or wish to consume an item is
antecedent to the desire to produce it. "This idea and this wish is the
hidden essence of which the product consumed is the form, "^^ and
essence precedes form. Tarde points to the example of colonial
countries which develop a taste for all sorts of consumer goods long
before they have the capacity to produce them. ^"^ In his view this dis-
parity has the benefit of breaking down barriers of nationality and of
fostering international exchange, since a country must buy abroad if it
cannot supply its own needs. "The imitative passivity of man there-
fore has this happy result of multiplying the commercial, political,
and intellectual ties of human groups, and to effect or to prepare for
their fusion. "^^
Extia- logical Influences: From Superior to Inferior
The theory of imitation presupposes the formation of a social
hierarchy:
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It was fated since the relationship of model to copier was conse-quently a relationship of apostle to neophyte, or master to sub-ject. Thus, by the very fact that imitation proceeds from theinside to the outside of the model, it must consist of a descent
of the example from the superior to the inferior. 59
The distinguishing mark of a superior elite lies not in noble birth but
in its initiative and inventiveness. Only an elite in decline defends
tradition rather than innovates. These superior souls enjoy the lei-
sure, social contacts, and exchange of ideas which encourage dis-
coveries. The underlying source of social prestige in any society
is control of crucial inventions
--economic, military, cultural, or
moral- -and the character of the elite depends on what inventions are
most significant in a society. A society that relies on a few inventions
will be dominated by a narrow elite, but one which depends on more
varied and complex inventions will have a more varied, sophisticated,
and specialized superior class.
This definition of social superiority, flexible enough to apply to
modern businessmen as well as to ancient or feudal nobility, may
even be extended from social group to geographic entity. In compari-
son to the country the city is an elite, and the same is true for the
relation of provincial centers to the capital. The flood of modern
industrial production and consumption, "that is, imitation on an
immense scale, " presupposes the dominance of certain great cities:
The course of the Ganges requires the Himalayas. The Himalayas
of France is Paris. Paris reigns royally, orientally, over the
provinces, . . .Every day, by telegraph or train, it sends into all
of France its ideas, its wishes, its conversations, its ready-made
revolutions, its ready-made clothes and furniture. This sugges-
tive, imperious fascination that it exercises instantaneously over
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SO profound, so complete, and so continuous
chrome el ^ '
"^^^^ hypnotism has become
In vain does the urban worker believe himself to be an egalitarian, for
he is considered an aristocrat by the admiring peasant. Not only
cities, but indeed whole nations may assume an impersonal but re-
doubtable elitist status. Although the development of new means of
transportation like steamships and railroads weakens the dominance
of the traditional hereditary nobility within a nation, it gives the
nation as a whole all the privileges of nobility-
-to travel widely, to
spread language and products, to indulge in proud self- admiration and
ambitious projects. In these national aristocracies ^noblesses
nationalesj like Germany and Great Britain may be discerned "the
appearance of an avatar, in a collective form, of the aristocratic
spirit prodigiously aggrandized, which gives a terrible confirmation
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to the law of historical amplification. "
This national superiority will not last long, however, because of
a corollary to the law of imitation from superior to inferior: over time
the character of imitation proceeds from the xinilaterial to the recip-
rocal. As soon as elites begin to serve as models, the distance
between them and their inferiors starts to lessen. For example,
Great Britain is being imitated to such an extent that she already
shows signs of being a nobility on the wane. The same diminution
of aristocratic power has long been observable within nations:
605
The march of imitation from top to bottom still goes on, but the
'
inequality which it implies has changed in character. Instead ofan aristocratic, intrinsically organic inequality, we have a dem-
ocratic inequality, of an entirely social origin, which we may
call inequality if we wish, but which is really a reciprocity ofinvariably impersonal prestiges, alternating from individual toindividual and from profession to profession. In this way, thefield of imitation has been constantly growing and freeing itselffrom heredity. => &
While the theory of imitation cannot allow a non- stratified society,
Tarde can conceive of one in which the various strata have become
broken up into small blocs and jumbled together. This is the case
in modern times:
There is no longer any man who is imitated in everything; and
he who is imitated the most is himself an imitator with respect
to some of his copyists. As a result, imitation is mutualized
and specialized in becoming more general. ^4
People tend to imitate the examples that are socially closest to them,
and while there used to be many intermediaries between the highest
models and the lowest imitators, today the lowest can copy the highest
65directly. Eventually the irreversible progress towards reciprocity
goes so far that the majority itself becomes "the superiority recognizee
by all, " and its prestige dominates society in the same way that the
example of the hereditary aristocracy used to do.
Tarde quotes de Tocqueville on the dangers of the rule of the
majority, but he does not share the misgivings of his predecessor.
For Tarde the appropriate metaphor to describe the democratization
of imitation is less that of leveling down than of opening up. Society
is composed of beings who imitate each other, and the increase in
reciprocity of imitation means the enlargement of society. Its
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"magic circle"^'^ is opened to groups which used to be excluded from
it, such as workers, peasants, women, minors, and so forth. This
is the genuine democratization of luxury-
-the democratization of the
time and inclination to participate in exchange of souls, the democra-
tization of a process whereby people come to resemble each other
spiritually because they copy each other. To put it another way,
Tarde sees the phenomenon of democratization not in the proliferation
of cheap imitation products, but in an unseen and mental imitation
which lessens psychological distance between superior and inferior.
Tarde also refers to Baudrillart's Histoire du Ixoxe ^^ for
examples of what Baudrillart calls the evolution of l\ixury, but once
again Tarde 's interpretation of the phenomenon is quite different. For
Baudrillart the evolution of needs involves their progressive develop-
ment upwards from simple to complex, from primitive to sophisti-
cated. The mechanism of this ascent is the general tendency of
organic life to become more complicated. Tarde refuses to use such
organic metaphors and instead proposes that imitation, a psychological
and social phenomenon, is the mechanism behind the complication of
needs. Accordingly that complication results from a slow descent on
the social ladder rather than an ascent on a biological one:
Go into the dwelling of a peasant and examine his belongings:
from his fork and his glass down to his shirt. . .there is not
one article of clothing, not one tool, which, before descending
as far as his cottage, did not begin by being a liaxury item
used by kings, or warrior chieftains, or ecclesiastics, then by
noblemen, then by bourgeois, then by neighboring landowners.
Have a peasant speak: you will not find in him a notion of law.
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arithmetic, not a family sentiment orpatriotic thought, not a hope or a desire, which was not
heJfh'Jc
^ % /""^^ innovation propagated from socialights, and gradually sank down to his depths. ^9
This process of downward diffusion has become much more
direct and rapid in modern times. The very prevalence of envy in
contemporary society indicates how greatly and how rapidly its magic
circle is expanding. When relations between superior and inferior
are rigid and unilateral, the inferior may obey and admire but he
never thinks of imitating the superior directly because he has no
resources to attempt a copy. Envy becomes mixed in with admiration
only when there is some possibility of imitation. Thanks to recent
technological progress, ability to copy has become much more wide-
spread. The reduction of objective inequality has transformed
obedience into envy:
Envy is the symptom of a social transformation which, in bringing
together the classes, in diminishing the inequality of their re-
sources, has made possible not only as in the past the transmission
of designs and thoughts from one to the other, their patriotic and
religious communion, their participation in the same cult, but
also the radiation of luxury and of well-being from one to the other.
Obedience engenders envy as cause and effect. "^^
Therefore the opening up of society has the initial effect of increasing
social unrest. Workers envy their employers, and peasants new to
the city envy the workers: the results are industrial unrest among
workers and urban crime committed by recent migrants. In both
cases desire to consume exceeds possibilities of employment, for on
all levels of society a group makes its demands according to the stan-
7
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dard of consumption it desires, not according to that which it enjoys.
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But these demands will lead to more equality in fact. Envy will
achieve its work of assimilation and gradually disappear, whereupon
"a need for individual divergence, of deassimilation
.
" will emerge and
society will attain a state where superiority is "parcelled out" rathe:
than stratified, unless new causes of inequality arise. "But, " adds
Tarde, "they always arise. ""^^
Extra-logical Influences: Custom and Style
A third extra-logical law of imitation, which emerges from the
preceding one, refers to the general type of superiority acknowledged
by a society- -either that of the native and past (the rule of tradition or
custom
[
^coutumej ), or that of the foreign and contemporary (the rule
of style or fashion
j
jnodej ). In a society subject to custom, people
take pride in their national traditions which they imitate faithfully
while innovating little. There may be a great deal of geographic
diversity in customs, but over time they are stable. Therefore con-
sumer goods may look very different in different localities, but every-
where they are made to last a long time. A society which accords
prestige to fashion, on the contrary, is fertile in invention. Its defer-
ence to the present is accompanied by deference to reason, individual-
ism, and nature. The consumer of style is motivated less by group
pride than by personal vanity. He tends to favor disposable items
since fashion changes qmckly in time, although it tends to be homo-
geneous in space. Far from being parochial, style welcomes foreign
models and the process of imitation accordingly reduces geographic
73diversity.
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Tarde applies these ideal types to languages, religions, govern-
ments, laws, economics, moral codes, and the arts. In the latter
area, for example, he comments that "The art of custom is born of
professional and national craft; the art of fashion, on the contrary, is
often useless and exotic. ""^^ Traditional art has its roots in crafts-
manship, being "not exactly industrial, but professional, " while in
ages of style those roots are lacking because "the forms of imported
art are presented detached from their stem, since the flower, not the
stem, attracts curiosity; art then becomes a craft more often than
craft becomes an art.
. .
""^^ Tarde also discusses the economic con-
sequences of the alternatives of tradition- imitation and fashion-
'
imitation. In each case economic life is characterized by a distinctive
cluster of habits both in consumption and production. The artisanal
production typical of an age of custom turns out a small nxunber of
durable products for local, internal distribution. Mass production is
impossible in an age of custom, for large-scale industry depends on
widespread, transient consumption, where quantity rather than quality
rules, and where the market is unlimited, contingent, distant, and
external. When a society industrializes, custom- imitation is gradually
replaced by fashion-imitation.
Style now rxiles Europe, but it will not reign forever. There are
three stages in a complete cycle in any society: a period of custom,
one of fashion, and finally a return to custom. In the middle phase
various styles compete to become established as part of tradition.
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Some of them succeed, so that when an age of custom returns it is an
enlarged and enriched custom. While fashion can lead to grotesque
excesses, yet it liberates society from the weight of imitation and com-
bats entrenched tradition with reason. Still, custom also is needed to
keep society from a breathless and frantic pursuit of novelty. Neither
element is good or bad in itself: their alternation is what is beneficial.
In the cycling of tradition and fashion, only the trend towards geo-
graphic uniformity is irreversible, for once spatial unity is established
the return to a state of fragmentation is inconceivable.
But we can well conceive.
. .that after a period of capricious
changes, or rather of hasty experiments, usages might become
fixed. Steadfastness in the case of habits is far from contra-
dicting in any respect their universality; it completes it. "77
Critical Remarks
So far the terms "consumer" and "consximption" have rarely
appeared, but the relevance of the concepts of imitation and invention
to our subject is obvious. Tarde's discussion of the hypnotic state of
imitation provides, perhaps for the first time, a description (if not an
explanation) of the psychology of the dream world of consumption. We
may recall de Vogue's similar description of the atavistic trance of
visitors to the 1889 exposition who are "melted down. . . into the sovd of
a perfect fakir" as they watch the lighted fountains; or we may recall
his warning after wandering through the grovmds of the defunct 1900
exposition that only "sleepwalkers" would take pride in the entertain-
ment it had provided and that the French people had better awaken
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from their trance before they find themselves hopelessly sunk in
national decadence. Tarde's analysis might also bring to mind
Charles Gide's lament that the contemporary consumer is so hypno-
tized by repeated advertising slogans that he buys goods he does not
really need. In particular, Tarde's description of the somnambulistic
response of a person suddenly thrust into an environment laden with
suggestibility reminds us of Denise and her brothers transfixed by
their first sight of a department store. In more general terms,
Tarde's exploration of the emotional ambivalence inherent in imitation
illuminates the psychological ambiguities of consixmer behavior-
-the
mixtures of fear and love, of obedience and envy, of imitation and
counter -imitation, and especially of activity and passivity, initiative
and submission, hyperactivity and paralysis. After reading Tarde, it
is no longer possible to view production as a purely active element in
economic life and consumption as purely passive. According to
Tarde's analysis, both activities involve imitation, and both are there-
fore combinations of activity and passivity. "The fixity of situations
gives way to the mobility of attitudes, to the diversity of roles, which
78implies the dynamism of the modern economy. " The consumer's
passive desire of possession is translated through his exercise of
imitative imagination into an active will to buy.
The concept of invention also has obvious application to consvimp-
tion, so much so that "invention" irresistibly takes on the meaning of
"product. " The laws of invention practically translate themselves
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into laws of the marketplace. Tarde himself cites commercial pro
ducts as examples of the law that inventions spread endlessly in all
directions (he cites statistics on the consuniption of coffee and tob
and on the use of the bicycle). "^^ His descriptions of dueling or
coupling reflect the working of marketplace competition. His analysi
of the logical duel is particularly suggestive in that it implies a
mechanism for the selection of the fittest products which is at work
the marketplace, and it therefore raises a host of questions regarding
the nature of the selective mechanism. The extra-logical laws begin
to answer those questions: they commence a sort of sociology of
advertising. According to the first extra-logical law, ab interioribus
ad exteriora
,
the idea of a certain type of consumption is transmitted
before the particular item incarnating that idea. In connection with
this point, Tarde remarks that the idea of capricious spending on non-
essentials, formerly reserved for the monarchy, has now become
diffused among the mass of consumers, who all fancy themselves
kinglets now in this respect. Spending in this royal manner, rather
than spending on specific items, therefore constitutes the essence of
Ixoxury, the items themselves being of secondary, "exterior" impor-
tance next to the pleasure of buying on a whim. This tinder standing of
consumer psychology is surely more subtle and accurate in coming to
terms with the democratization of Ivixury than what we have seen so
far. In particvilar, it is a reminder that the proliferation of credit
mechanisms has been just as crucial as the proliferation of cheap
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imitation goods in mass consumption. As for the law of imitation frc
superior to inferior, it is readily observable in the way products are
marketed by appealing to all sort of models of superiority-
-those of
beauty, fame, physical prowess, elegance, wealth, or even of down-
home virtues as may be seen in em\ilation of workers' dress.
The third extra-logical law regarding the alternation of tradition
and style brings a sense of order and comprehensibility to those
characteristics of mass consumption we have seen so often decried,
such as lack of durability, foolish and deceptive exoticism, geo-
graphic monotony, and vain self-display. Tarde relates all these
appearances to the central category of style and thus finds coherence
in what others often view only as chaos and frivolity. In particular
his application of this third law to the arts helps us understand the
decorative arts movement. In Tarde 's terms that movement repre-
sents a protest against the exoticism and inutility of the fashion-
imitation that dominates the modern economy. Decorative arts re-
formers wrongly claim that a great decorative style must have its
roots in the life of the people. In an age of fashion- imitation, the
flower of style is plucked while the roots are left behind, and these
flowers can be exchanged all over the world without having to be grown
again in native soil. The finished product of style can be imitated
without its developmental stages being recapitulated. Instead of
accepting the reign of fashion, these reformers attempt to substitute
an aesthetic based on craft, national heritage, utility, professionalism.
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in short, on tradition. The failure of the decorative arts movement
to maintain its integrity only confirms the triumph of style in modern
times. To alter that situation would require massive changes in pro-
duction as well as in consumption, since mass production techniques
require a market based on fashion- imitation. It is impossible for the
decorative arts movement to reverse an irreversible historical
development from the custom of the past to the fashion of the present,
but it could have an authentic role in anticipating the tradition of the
future.
Of course, Tarde never intended or foresaw that invention would
be equated with commercial product, or that imitation would become
synonymous with consumer hypnosis. He may cite consumer behavior
as examples of both categories, but he also uses examples from
politics, art, religion, and so forth. But it seems that the commer-
cial examples, instead of illustrating the categories, have come to
substitute themselves for and finally to define the categories altogether
Inventions have become more and more synonymous with consumer
products. Out of the great store of innovations introduced to society,
scarcely one remains that has not been transformed into a commodity.
The principle of fitness is retailed as jogging outfits, the idea of jus-
tice as a arhool curric\ilum, and hope for a better future as a
lottery ticket. The models of superiority imitated by the masses,
which used to be drawn variously from religious, military, political,
and other areas of activity, are now more and more provided by the
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marketplace, until heroes and heroines themselves become mere
products. In this respect Tarde's argument that imitation has become
more generalized is misleading. There may well be many more ex-
amples to copy, but that expansion of choice is illusory when nearly
all models are related to products or are themselves products.
It is not clear how much Tarde himself would have lamented this
commercialization of invention and imitation. He keeps reminding us
to take a balanced view in judging the modern operations of imitation.
If people tend to act by habit rather than by reason, this is not
necessarily a cause for alarm, but rather for awareness of the impor-
tance of instilling desirable habits. If people tend to imitate superiors
the results may be ludicrous but may also be beneficial. The fact that
a beloved model is the most readily copied suggests how to teach
effectively by setting a loving example, rather than a snobbish one.
Even envy and vanity can have desirable resiilts. Imitation may have
its regressive aspects, but it can also be liberating and individualizing
The dream world is not to be denied. By their innermost nature peopl(
are believers j~croyants[j , and there is no point trying to shake people
awake to daylight reason. No amount of preaching in the name of rea-
son or of anything else will have much effect on the gradual working
of imitation in society. The basis for a durable solution to social
problems lies not in sermons but in the development of mass communi-
cations and other inventions that will continue to enlarge the magic
circle of society. Tarde proposes no particular remedies for the
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current moral crisis because he is convinced a solution can only
emerge in time from among many possibilities which cannot be fore-
seen. He has little patience with Durkheim's pedagogy and ideology
of duty and patriotism and with his proposals to revive corporations.
For Tarde the only practical steps that can be taken are non-institu-
tional in nature, such as setting good examples, instilling desirable
habits, and above all strengthening the family, the fount of imitation.
On the whole he is less intent on finding practical remedies than on
arriving at a better understanding of how society functions.
But how adequate are the concepts of imitation and invention in
helping us understand the fxinctioning of modern society? As a des-
cription of social behavior, the concept of imitation in particvdar is
vague. Tarde himself keeps redefining and re-examining it, turning
it over and over in his mind and coming up with new analogies and
applications which, however, fail to clarify it to any great degree.
Tarde 's frustration with his own category finally led him to experiment
with an entirely different vocabulary for describing social reality, not
that of sociology at all but that of metaphysics. Like Louis Weber,
Tarde turns to traditional philosophy for help when more up-to-date
language fails him. In Tarde 's case the philosophical inspiration
comes from Leibnitz, who in turn was inspired by the atomistic theory
Q 1
of Empedocles. It was Leibnitz who aroused Tarde 's interest in the
mystery of pre-existing possibilities, and it was the German philoso-
pher's theory of monads that provided an alternative way for Tarde to
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express his vision of a universe, both natural and social, charac-
terized by a "luxury of variations, [an] exuberance of picturesque
fantasy and of capricious embellishments" while at the same time
being unified by an "austere apparatus of laws, of repetitions, of
secular rhythms.
. .
"^^ This paradox is explicable if nature is com-
posed of autonomous elements, monads, each of which shines in its
individuality and sim\iltaneously makes the rest sparkle with its
reflected glow. Thus the metaphysics of monads provides a philosoph-
ical language for Tarde to express his sociological insights. No
less an eminence than Henri Bergson recognized this:
From elements analogous in certain respects to the monads of
Leibnitz, but, different from Leibnitzian monads
,
capable of
modifying each other, this is what Tarde puts at the basis of
reality. Diverse from the beginning, they accentuate their
diversity ceaselessly, thanks to the action they exercise on
themselves. Therefore they compose a society where each
develops his own individuality and, by a sort of radiation, the
individuality of the others. S3
The theory of monads provides a logical basis for Tarde' s contention
that the elements of the social universe, taken as individuals, are
much more complex than the patterns they form when they interact
with each other. Society goes from heterogeneity to simplicity and
homogeneity, not the other way around.
Furthermore, from this monadology Tarde derives a meta-
physical theory of Having
j
^Avoir
jj
which applies to both natural and
social behavior. In trying to determine the essential nature of a
monad, it is futile to inquire into the nature of its being and impossible
for any one monad to deduce any existence but its own. Being
j
^trej
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cannot be verified, but Having can be; and from the certitude that
'
something has a property the fact that it is can be deduced. In science
"everything is explained by properties
, not by entities , " and if the
same metaphysics were applied in other areas of thought "so many
sterile debates, so many wanderings of the mind in place would have
been avoided. " Tarde suggests that instead of the formula "Cogito
ergo sum, " philosophy should adopt the motto "Je desire, je crois,
done j'ai" \l desire, I believe, therefore I am]
. The basis of
human behavior and indeed of universal behavior lies in desire to
appropriate:
Atomic or molecular adherence in the physical world, nutrition
in the living world, perception in the intellectual world, law in
the social world--possession in its innumerable forms does not
cease to extend from one being to other beings,
. .
.
^5
Because its innermost nature is the tendency to appropriate, each
monad represents latent desire.
Tarde and Political Econom
Could these speculations have been developed into a sort of
metaphysics of consumption? The possibility of apprehending con-
sumption on a philosophical rather than on a sociological plane is
tantalizing and exciting, but Tarde quit that plane after publishing his
861893 article on monadology and sociology. For whatever reason, he
did not linger long in the rarified atmosphere of metaphysics and ontol-
ogy (despite accusations of the Durkheimians to the contrary), but
returned instead to the level of abstraction on which he had developed
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the theory of imitation, that of social law. In the latter 1890's he
proposed two more social laws, universal opposition and universal
adaptation, to complement and complete the theory of universal
repetition. ^"^ Even on this level Tarde seems to have distrusted his
own bent to conceptualization. He insisted on returning to concrete
social experience for verification. His next major work, the two-
volume La Psychologie ^conomique [Economic psychology^ (1902)
applies the three major laws of imitation, opposition, and adaptation
to economic experience. Thus it is on the level of social psychology
and not that of metaphysics that Tarde gives us his most extended and
explicit treatment of consumption. Although his discussion of con-
sumption in La Psychologic ^conomique is not directly philosophical,
yet implicit in the book is a view of an economic universe composed of
desiring monads who are what they desire and believe. As the off-
spring both of metaphysical rumination and of a more complicated
theory of social laws, La Psychologic economique is Tarde 's most
88
ambitious and memorable substantive work.
Tarde 's interest in economics was of long standing. Before the
appearance of La Psychologic Economique he had published numerous
89
articles on related economic topics, including his earliest articles. ^
Here is an area of human behavior where factors of social psychology
are of paramount importance, but where they had been ignored entirely
or distorted into a ridicxilous model of homo oeconomicus motivated by
simple self-interest. Tarde scorns the psychological assvimptions of
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classical economists. Their abstract economic man is doubly
erroneous, in his opinion, because it divests an individual not only of
spontaneous and sociable emotions, but also of associations with any
group, corporation, sect, party, or country. "This last simplification
is no less mutilating than the other, from which it derives. Politi-
cal economy must learn to deal with interpsychology. Most economists
have treated goods rather than producers or consiimers, abstract
riches rather than consciousness. The cold calculations of a Ricardo
do not begin to explain the passionate and tumultuous nature of econom-
ic behavior. Tarde proposes to examine the psychology of the
worker and consumer with much more care. His contribution to eco-
nomic thought is therefore part of the late nineteenth- century intellec-
tual renovation which brings psychic factors to the forefront of inqviiry.
Tarde 's speculations, however, are largely independent in origin from
the more specialized work of Jevons, Menger, or Walras, among
others. What little he knows of their theories he seems to have picked
up from reading Charles Gide's Principes de I'e'conomie politique
,
which he praises for its appreciation of the significance of beliefs,
ideas, and judgments in economics. He borrows Gide's explanation
of the theory of marginal utility and presents it as a promising but
9
1
inadequate departure.
In order to put psychological factors at the center of his own
study, Tarde rejects the usual divisions of production, distribution,
consumption, and circiilation found in most contemporary treatises,
and instead uses as his major headings repetition, opposition, and
621
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adaptation. As repetitious elements of economic life he discusses
desires and beliefs and their combination in the form of needs; labor;
money; and capital. His examination of economic opposition is dom-
inated by a psychological theory of value defining it as a judgment
arising from the inner struggle of conflicting desires. Economic
adaptation, or the creation of harmony from opposition, depends on
the exercise of imagination, and Tarde concentrates on the harmonizing
roles of technological, social, and moral inventions. The following
discussion of La Psychologie ^conomique will not attempt to sximmarize
the whole book- -that would be a difficult feat considering its richness
of detail- -but will outline pertinent points under each of the three
major divisions.
Repetition: Desire
Tarde defines consiimption as the "reproduction of desires of
which certain riches are the object and judgment as to how those
riches will satisfy the desires. ' To reduce consumption to its
simplest terms, therefore, is to reduce it to desire and belief (or
judgment). These are the two fundamental elements of consciousness,
the only psychological elements that cannot be broken down into simpler
entities. Desire and belief, not material goods, are the primary
data of economic inquiry. Goods should be understood rather as the
material incarnations of these psychological entities. "The thing
which is invented, the thing which is imitated, is always an idea of a
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volition, a judgment,or a purpose, which embodies a certain amount
of belief and desire
.
"^^ In theory that amount is measurable. Alone
among psychological phenomena, desire and belief are quantitative,
for they are forms of energy or force which may be added, subtracted,
divided, and multiplied.
Tarde does not undertake such a psychological statistics, which
is only a distant ideal, but he does use mathematics (more specifi-
cally, geometry) to distinguish between two major types of desire, the
periodic and the capricious. Periodic desires, which involve organic
needs (e.g.
^
the desires to eat, drink, and sleep), form a circle.
Capricious desires, which refer to more purely social needs (e. g.
,
the desires to travel, to listen to music, or to adorn oneself) form an
open-ended parabola. The desires of an individual or society may be
imagined as the juxtaposition of a circle of periodic desires and a
parabola of capricious ones. In each case the relationship of the
closed and open curves may change markedly over time, but left to
itself the system tends towards stability. A closed curve tends to
stay closed, and even capricious fantasies tend "to enter the round of
97linked desires, to become fixed there as habit. " This self-
stabilization shows that "the hiiman heart is not infinitely elastic, and,
beyond a certain number of desires, it comes up against its insur-
mountable limit. "*^^ Only an exterior shock- -that is, exposure to a
foreign civilization, as when a peasant arrives in the city or when
Europe "inoculates" Japan with its "virus "--breaks open a stable
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system of desires. '^'^ In some cases, once the initial trauma is past,
the shock proves beneficial because it enlarges the system of desires
to make a society more civilized. But if the society submits too
readily or too quickly to the foreign influence, its old circle of desire
may be punctured with so many holes that it will never close again.
This situation is destructive of personal and social happiness, which
is found not in an open-ended succession of desires but in "a rotation
... of linked desires, periodically renewed and newly satisfied to be
renewed again, and so on indefinitely. "^^^
There are other ways in which desire tends to be self- regulating.
The multiplication of desires brings their moderation: civilization is a
state of numerous but temperate desires. The ones which are most
capable of expansion in scope are the least urgent. The desire to eat
is imperious but restricted in scope, whereas the less intense desires
of ambition or curiosity or vanity are so elastic they "seem almost
unlimited. ""^^'^ Furthermore, certain types of desires become less
intense the more they are satisfied. For example, Tarde distinguishes
positive desire for something from negative desire to avoid something,
and predicts that the appeal of positive desire will diminish as people
learn it is self-defeating:
In every pleasure. . . that is accompanied by a growing positive
desire, there comes a moment of sudden deception where, to
their great surprise, as if come back to earth in some manner,
or awakened with a start, or run aground in their illusory and
fantastic port, those who not long ago desired look for their
desire and no longer find it; and it is precisely the moment
when it would have seemed that it was going to be satisfied at
last. Every desire moves towards its own satisfaction as the
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animal does towards its shadow. The profound trap of nature
IS that the termination where desire hopes to find its abate-
ment IS or appears to be a pleasure, a joy, and that this isimpossible, since its abatement implies its disappearance or
Its decrease, and a pleasure supposes its increase. 102
After becoming aware of this trap through repeated experience, people
will turn away from positive desires (except for that of curiosity,
which is relatively benign) in favor of negative desires, which are
more rational because what they aspire to, the end of suffering, can
be attained. Art, science, and love, the "three great anesthetics of
suffering, will flourish. "^^"^
Tarde also distinguishes passive desires from active ones and
predicts that the former, which involve consumption, will decline over
time while the active ones of production will increase. ^^"^ By this
Tarde does not mean that people will work more. For him production
is by no means equivalent to labor, which is merely repetition, imita-
tion, re -production. Only invention is genuinely productive. The
paradox is that invention arises from leisure and the liberty of mind
encouraged by leisure, not from labor and the mental constraint of
subjection to a single occupation. Moreover, the desire to produce
social and artistic inventions rather than inventions responding to
organic needs will tend to exceed desiiesof consumption. Production
to meet non-essential needs will expand to such a point that "produc-
tion of things responding to the most imperious needs is diminished
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or altered. " The future subordination of consumption to production
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must be understood along with the simultaneous tendency for urgent
physical desires to be subordinated to less urgent, more flexible intel-
lectual ones. ".
. .
spiritual desires offer themselves to us as the great,
the immense outlet for human activity in the future, and progress tends
to the growing superiority of their development over those of physical
desires. "^^^ The luxury of the future does not involve bodily comfort
or vanity but the "interior luxury" of art.
^^"^
Together these tendencies
will combine to furnish a theoretical and practical solution to present
1 08economic antinomies.
By dissociating labor from production and consumption from
leisure, Tarde tears apart familiar intellectual associations to form
new ones. Production becomes linked not with labor but with creative
leisure, while consumption is seen as something akin to labor in that
it involves time-consuming, repetitious behavior necessary for life
maintenance. Tarde prophesies the decline of both production and con-
sumption for the satisfaction of physical desires in order to make room
for the satisfaction of social and artistic ones.
Repetition: Belief
In the consumer's mind desire and belief are inextricably joined.
but in the final analysis desire dominates the union. "A desire, in
effect, is always preceded by a perception or an idea, by a judgment
of feeling or of intellect of which the two terms are linked by a per-
1 09
suasion more or less strong. " Persuasion is the key. Not only is
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desire aroused by belief, but also desire for an object is translated
into resolution to buy only when the consumer is persuaded to have
confidence that the object will satisfy his desire. The decision to buy
comes down to a feeling of confidence, which is to say of belief or
faith, in the utility of the product. There is no objective utility, only
a believed utility jutilit^ crue^
.
The role of advertising in the modern marketplace is to win both
attention and confidence. It acts less on desire than on belief. The
authority to which it appeals to back up its claim for confidence is that
of the prestigious example. "It is the example of others which engen-
ders the required degree of confidence in the utility of the thing desired
and consequently transforms this desire into will to buy. "^^^ Adver-
tising sends out "rays of imitation" from elites, from capitals, to
households which have bought according to tradition and which are
encouraged to buy according to contemporary example instead. The
whole history of advertising- -which needs to be studied to emphasize its
crucial role in economic development- -involves its transformation "in
the direction of an ever larger, freer, and easier radiation. "^'^
Advertising used to be mainly acoustical but has become more and
more visual just because the latter form can reach a large audience
more readily. The form of modern art that really creates social
solidarity is the advertising poster. Another example of the potency
of modern visual advertising is the magazine, not just in its paid adver-
tisements but "the whole body of the magazine" which constitutes "a
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sort of giant advertisement that is continual and generalized.
"
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As important as advertising may be, a second stage is required
in the propagation of economic belief. This is conversation. U people
did not chat about what they read, magazines and posters would be
pointless. "By conversation I mean any dialogue without direct and
immediate utility, where people talk just to talk, out of pleasure, or
sport, or politeness. "^^^ Conversation is the intercourse of luxury,
not necessity. j-^ arises in leisure, and so once again we confront
the paradox that leisure is crucial to economic progress. Through
leisurely talk, human needs are born and propagated. Through
conversation, diverse desires and beliefs are channeled into a con-
sensus, without which there could be no large industry because its
existence presupposes similar demand over a large region. "Thus
the babble of individuals in leisure time, transformed into the con-
sensus of opinion, is the regulator of usages and needs, of tastes, and
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of customs, and consequently of industry. " Tarde proposes a
history of conversation to complement the history of advertising.
He also wants to study contemporary talk in all sorts of social group-
ings --not only in salons, where the habitues pride themselves on their
ability to converse in a witty and interesting manner, but also in clubs
and caf^s which Tarde feels have in truth done more for the art of
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modern conversation. And as civilization increases, there is less
difference anyway between the conversation of the salon and that of the
club.
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In a triily civilized society it does not suffice for the most useful
and humble furnishings to be objets d'art; it is also necessary
for the least word, the least gesture, always to join with their
useful character, without any affectation, a character of grace
or of appropriate beauty. 120
The democratization of conversation is synonymous with the democra-
tization of luxury:
. . .
to speak the same language, to have common knowledge and
ideas, to be at leisure, these are the necessary conditions of
small talk. Therefore everything that unifies and enriches
languages, everything that unifies educations and training.
. .
,
everything that increases leisure by shortening labor.
. . contri-
butes to the progress of conversation, '^l
Repetition: Needs
Needs are combinations of desire and belief. "We need an article
when we desire exemption from a certain evil or the acquisition of a
certain good and when we believe this article appropriate to attaining
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that goal. " There is no valid way to distinguish clearly between
real and artificial needs, between social and organic ones, or between
luxuries and necessities. Even the most refined needs are founded
upon organic demands, and even the most basic needs are expressed
according to the specializing refinements of social life. Needs are
inevitably "stamped by society. " The need to eat is always expressed
in a precise form such as in the need to eat rice, or potatoes, or
bread. The need to drink is refined into that of drinking beer in one
1 23
place and that of drinking wine in another. Just as the gradations
between organic and social needs are "insensible, "^^^ so are those
between productive and unproductive consvimptions , despite the
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distinction between them habitually nnade by classical economists.
Unproductive consumptions make up the whole charm of life and are
responsible for "all the grandiose or minuscule innovations which have
enriched and civilized the world. " So-called productive consumptions,
on the other hand, did not begin that way: ".
. . there is not an object of
first necessity, dress, shoes, hat, which did not begin by being a
liixury object. "''^^^
As in the case of desires, Tarde shrugs off what are to him
meaningless qualitative distinctions and prefers to analyze the geom-
etry of needs, particularly their cyclical character. The periodicity
of needs takes two forms: habit in the individual and custom in the
collectivity. Labor, that other repetitious element of economic life,
also traces a periodic cycle, but the labor cycle becomes ever simpler
as the worker becomes increasingly specialized, while the cycle of
needs, both in the individual and in society, becomes increasingly com-
plex. Needs which used to be exceptional and intermittent- -the need to
smoke, to travel, to buy new furniture or new clothes --have become
periodic. The disparity between the evolution of the cycle of needs and
that of the labor cycle has resxalted in a growing distaste for labor and
the desire to restrict it as much as possible, while needs are
encouraged to become ever more complicated.
The relationship between the two cycles is expressed objectively
in the form of budgets, of which the revenues represent labor executed
and the expenses represent satisfaction of needs. After praising
LePlay for his work in analyzing budgets, Tarde comments on how
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their evolution reflects the evolution of needs. ^^"^ The most striking
development has been the tendency towards greater regularity and
security in both income and expenditure. In comparison to past econ-
omies based on hunting or agriciilture
, the industrial economy pro-
vides many more sources of income, a general growth in public
wealth, and all sorts of insurance plans which combine to make
revenues more predictable. As for expenses, there too the non-
periodic and unforeseen have gradually diminished. By contrasting
ancient budgets with modern ones, it can be seen that expenses which
used to be accidental have become regvilar. For example, alimentary
needs are now far more predictable than they were in a hxmting econ-
omy. The same trend may be seen in the consximption of clothes and
furniture. Both used to be made to last indefinitely, and now both are
becoming regular expenses in most social classes.
As more and more formerly extraordinary expenses become
periodic, budgets grow irresistibly larger. This inflation seems so
inevitable that if retrenchment is necessary, it appears an anomaly
while "the peaceable and regular enlargement that had preceded it
1 28
passes for a healthy and normal development. " Although budgets
increase over time, each annual version retains its absolute limits.
A new need cannot be added without pushing out an old one which
struggles to retain its place. Thus budgets are a battlegroxind of
contending needs, and this observation brings us to the second major
division of La Psychologie ^conomique.
631
Opposition: Value
At the time Tarde wrote, economic thought was dominated by
two major theories of value. The Marxist theory held that value is
determined by the amount of labor inherent in a product, while
classical political economists contended that value is determined by
the law of supply and demand. Tarde rejects both theories for the
same reason: they propose a supposedly objective standard when value
is actually a wholly subjective judgment. There is no objective way to
measure the amount of labor inherent in a product, as Marxists claim,
for labor is not a quantitative entity but a psychological one definable
only in terms of sorrow, boredom, and pain. -^^9 Tarde is even more
intent on unmasking the supposed objectivity of the law of supply and
demand. To do so, he imagines a simplified market situation com-
posed of a monopolistic seller, theoretically free to fix prices wher-
ever he wants, and of buyers who all have identical desires, beliefs,
and incomes, all of which are known precisely by the seller. What
does the seller consider in fixing his price? Not how many potential
consumers there are, but rather how much they want the product. No
matter to what degree a seller controls the market, he is regxilated by
consumer psychology. The price he sets reflects not a pseudo-objective
relationship between number of products and number of consumers,
but a subjective relationship between intensity of desire and amount of
income on the part of the individual consiimer.
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The same situation obtains in the actual marketplace. The only
difference is that assessment of consumer psychology involves more
guesswork, because the incomes, desires, and beliefs of buyers differ
and are not known precisely by the seller, who must nonetheless set
one price for everyone. If that price is too high, desire for the pro-
duct and belief in it will submit to restrictions of income. If it is too
low, more people will act on their desire to buy, but the profit margin
will be cut. To maximize his profits, the seller must assess both the
hearts and the purses of his potential customers. This is a matter of
estimation, not of mathematical formiila. The seller does not change
his price according to the number of consumers he expects, but only
manufactures more or less accordingly. "Prices do not rise.
. in pro-
portion to the number of people who want to possess the article, but in
proportion to the intensity of their desire combined with the level of
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their financial resources. " A just price results when there is a
happy conjunction between the desire of the buyer and that of the seller
when both parties find an approximately equal satisfaction of their
dissimilar desires.
The origin of value thus lies within the individual consumer, who
invests an object with a particular value as he weighs his desires and
beliefs against his income. Price is the "denouement" of a "great
number of these interior combats, of these mute and hidden
132
crises, . , " Although the struggle takes place within each consumer
its outcome is to some degree influenced by contagion or suggestion
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from other consijmers. The desire of the individual is nourished by
the desire of others he wants to emulate. This relationship of secret
psychological sympathy among buyers is far more crucial in deter-
mining price than any competition among them. Still, in the final
analysis the decision is made by the individual. If he has a large
income, he does not have to undergo much of a struggle to decide
whether to buy, because most expenditures are relatively small com-
pared to his resources. Nor is there much inner conflict if desire is
so overwhelming that he is determined to possess something one way
or another. The real struggles arise in the middle ground, when
desire is less urgent and resources less abundant. Then each con-
sxxmer has to go through a sort of syllogism weighing what else the
money could be spent for, what woiold have to be sacrificed to possess
an object. "The theory of prices is the theory of value understood as
a struggle of desires and sacrifice of the lesser desire to the
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stronger. " At the basis of any decision to buy is the following
logical affirmation: the enunciation of a desire (major statement of
the syllogism), confidence in the means which are judged appropriate
to realizing the desire (minor statement), and desire to become
master of this means (conclusion). This reasoning may be instinctive
and vmconscious, but it is the foundation of value decisions. "... one
always returns to an approximate weighing and to a competition of
desires or of judgments, to the interior conflicts of implicit or
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explicit syllogisms. " Value rests on a comparison of mental states
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in which preference is given to one state over another, and so it rests
on an act of the spirit, of the invagination. Value is a quality like
color that we attribute to things but which in truth exists only in our
mental activity, as "a projection of ourselves on things. ""^^^
As the human spirit is many-sided, so is value. As long as
people project value on objects in different ways, there can be no
simple, xiniform standard. The first distinction to be made is between
cost-value, simply equivalent to price, and use -value, a moral stan-
dard xinrelated to price. "The more the habits of an individual are
reg\alated and oriented towards a superior end, the more any object
whatsoever consumed by him is worth, in the sense of use-value, no
136matter how miniscule its cost-value. " ° Within the general category
of use-value, furthermore, there are different ways to evaluate an
object. For example, something may be valued mainly for its utility
in satisfying belief. In general, people today tend to rate belief in the
future more highly than present desire in their scale of values. Such
belief- -in the sense of confidence in eventual satisfaction, of guaran-
tees, or at least insurance, against future evils --used to be sought in
religious faith, but is today sought in money. The modern scramble
for money reflects a sense of values in which belief is sought above
desire:
Faith in money can be as deceiving as any other faith. The
satisfactions expected from it can slip away. But, in the mean-
time, the security, justified or deceptive, that attracts us is a
productive force sine qua non. And that is why the thirst for
money is always growing. When people say off-hand, when they
repeat like an echo, from economist to economist, that the duty
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of the State is restricted to procuring security for its citizens,
they do not seem to suspect what a crushing burden they are
imposing on it. They might as well say that it is siifficient for
us all to get rich. 137
Value is heterogeneous not only because it encompasses both
desire and belief, but also because it includes value -utility, value-
truth, and value-beauty. The category of value-utility refers to the
wealth of a society measured by what have been traditionally regarded
as economic goods. Value-truth refers to the enlightenment of a
society; human beings have always recognized the paramount value of
information, ideas, and knowledge. They have also always desired
beauty, which confers value to still other types of objects. Until now
economic thought has studied mainly value - utility because this type is
most amenable to quantitative analysis. The other two types, however,
also deserve consideration by economists because
there is no agric\iltural or industrial or any other wealth. . .
which cannot be considered from the viewpoint of the knowledge
it implies, or the powers it confers, or the rights of which it
is the fruit, or of its more or less aesthetic or unaesthetic
character. . . The theoretical and the aesthetic aspect of all
goods is going to become more and more important, not at the
expense of, but above and beyond, their utilitarian aspect.
The economics of the future must encompass all types of value to
attain a theory of maximum, or optimxim, value. That task is
very complex because the values that must be coordinated and ordered
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are heterogeneous, although not incommensurate. Economic
thought must discover how to fit together dissimilar desires in a
harmonious hierarchy:
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What It seeks, more laboriously than fruitfully, it must be
admitted, is a theory of value that explains the hierarchy of
riches m any social state, their height or their depth along
the immense scale of human Desire, of human Judgment, and
which, by elucidating the causes of their ascent or descent,
allows m some measure the modification of their relative
values. -^40
Adaptation: The Harmonization of Desires and Beliefs
Like Bastiat and his heirs, Tarde believes in economxic har-
monies- -but with some important differences. To begin with, the
harmonies with which Tarde is concerned are not objective ones
involved with adjusting supply to demand, imports to exports, con-
sumption to production, or anything of that kind, but rather psycho-
logical ones involved with harmonizing inner beliefs and desires so
individuals and societies can live at peace with themselves. In the
second place, Tarde is convinced that economic harmony is created
through the exercise of imagination. It is not an inherent tendency but
a human achievement. An age poor in imagination is fertile in conflict,
while an inventive age creates the compromises and solutions neces-
sary to maintain order and peace. Not reason, not force, but inven-
tion resolves conflicts, and that is why "invention is the social name
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of adaptation. , . "
The first type of invention that serves to adapt oppositions is the
industrial kind. New technologies adapt nature to man, and men to
each other. Such inventions can reduce conflicts of desire in individuals
by cheapening the price of a product (which is equivalent to introducing
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a new product for certain classes) so that an old desire can be satis-
fied. By making it easier to satisfy urgent needs, industrial invention
makes them more reconcilable with less urgent, more artistic, "that
is to say social and truly human needs. "-^"^^ A similar redirection is
achieved when technology increases leisure time. Finally, harmony
is fostered when industrial inventions create entirely new products
which reveal whole new areas of taste and thought:
It is not necessary to distinguish between the creation of new
products and that of new needs; for each new product, although
it may seem only to satisfy an old need (a new fabric, a new
method of lighting, a new dish, a new game) enriches the human
heart with a new pleasure, object of a new direction of desire,
that is to say of a new need. And if it is above all given to the
artist and the poet to inaugurate superior sensations, new and
delicate combinations of complex feelings, which make each of
their masterpieces a true "revelation, " a sense added to hviman
sensibility, the industrialist participates in this privilege
although to a lesser degree and at an inferior level of the soiil.
As Tarde suggests here, artistic invention also reconciles beliefs and
desires. The aims of art, however, are distinct from the aims of
industrial invention, for aesthetic needs involve sympathetic or social
pleasure rather than the individual or egoistical type. By socializing
internal, chaotic, uncommunicated feelings, art increases love and
sympathy and so forges a disciplined and collective sensibility out of
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a welter of individual desires.
Associations are also forms of inventions that harmonize: "by
association, by federation, contraries become complementary, . . . co-
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adapted to a common end, like the wheels of a single machine.
"
The most fundamental association is the. family, which consequently
fills a crucial role in the adaptation of desires and beliefs.
"^^^ Outside
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the family one of the most common forms of association is the division
of labor. Tarde objects to Durkheim's theory that its development is
collective and spontaneous rather than the product of inspired individ-
uals. If a hundred workers weave together, says Tarde, it is because
their work began as the conception of a single inventor and was put
into practice by an individual entrepreneur. "^"^^ Tarde goes on to
analyze other types of associations or federations for their effective-
ness in creating economic harmony. He does not think that societies
to build cheap housing for workers, for example, are very helpful. A
worker might want to own a house to improve his family life, but this
desire cannot be reconciled with his need to move frequently in order
to find work. Nor does Tarde see much of a future for production
cooperatives, which are ill-adapted to large industry and which
require more rigorous discipline than an egalitarian age readily per-
mits. Insurance societies of all kinds are more promising forms of
association, for they meet a need for financial security which in
modern times has become so highly valued. Publicity agencies, off-
spring of the modern press, are also harmonizing inventions. These
associations satisfy a need for information as well as the curiosity of
modern society, while warning both producers and consumers of
imminent changes in the other which makes possible the adjustment
of products to needs. Cooperatives of consximption are also attractive
and vital forms of association. They help settle internal conflicts in
the consumer by permitting him more money to spend; instead of
having to choose between two complementary needs, he can satisfy
both.
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But sometimes the consumer is torn between two contradictory
needs, ones that imply "opposite conceptions of the universal order
and of the social order. "^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^ consumer association can-
not aid in resolving the struggle. Harmony may be attained only
through "a morality founded on solid convictions. No matter how
many industrial inventions are created, no matter how much art is
produced or associations are formed, at some point the consumer also
151reqmres "moral invention" to achieve inner harmony. Tradition-
ally moral invention has been the province of religious or philosophical
sects which propagate a strong faith which in turn forms the basis of
a durable morality:
. . .
churches
,
religious or quasi-religious, confessions of all
kind, including certain philosophical schools, Stoic ones for
example, should be inscribed at the head of the great procedures
of economic adaptation. By their general regulation and hier-
archization of desires under the yoke of dogmas, . . . they prevent
all the possible troubles of consumption, they resolve the ques- '
tion of luxury, and, by imposing predetermined bovmdaries and
forms for production, they oblige the latter to adjust to the
former. ^ ^2
Most contemporary economic oppositions covdd be resolved by a new
type of "grand and sovereign free association" for moral regulation,
or even by a "niimber of parallel associations, philosophical churches,
peaceable rivals. . .
But the invention of such moral institutions is not enough, for
they must rest on "a certain number of demonstrable and unshakeable
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truths. " Moral invention must include the creation of ideas, or
rather of an ideal. There is no use trying to revive institutions like
medieval corporations when we lack the common ideal that made them
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effective, for their faith in eternal salvation was the principle on which
their capacity to foster earthly solidarity depended. Modern institu-
tions will be ineffective unless they are "newly agreed, spontaneously,
in a common faith on certain capital points. "^^^ For society to attain
its goal of raising the use -value of things to a maximum while lowering
their cost-value to a minimum, people need more than technology,
more than the solidarity of labor, more than the multiplication of
exchanges: "a great wind of unanimous passion must come to lift up
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their hearts. " The modern moral problem is therefore intimately
linked to the modern intellectual problem, namely that of science and
religion:
An accord of strong and logical convictions though science,
become incontestable in certain regards, and not an equilibrium
of opinions made feeble and tolerant through skepticism; an
accord of strong and concurrent passions directed towards a
common ideal through lofty social morality, and not an equilib-
rium of petty needs and petty exchanges through industricdism:
this is the aspiration of human evolution. ^^"^
Economic activity finds its completion in the articiilation of a non-
economic ideal and in the spread of moral and aesthetic habits of
conduct.
Tarde proposes a new science of social teleology to be concerned
with the articulation of a common ideal. This science would study the
currents of desire in society and their combinations in order to rein-
force harmony among them. Along with social logic, social teleology
would be the basis of a future general sociology. Economic thought
would not be alone in contributing to this science, for morality,
jurisprudence, and politics also are concerned with the whole scale of
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human values. Tarde suggests that the development of social teleology
should commence by trying to identify the superior ideal of past
societies, the overriding passion to which all others were subordinated,
the "controlling desire":
It may be the desire to prepare for life after death, or the desire
to propitiate one's gods or to honor and embellish one's city, or
the desire to give expression to religious faith or kingly pride or
the desire to equalize society. The change in this highest aim of
all explains the sequence of those striking works in which a whole
period is epitomized, works like the Egyptian tomb, the Greek
temple, the Roman circus and triumphal arch, the medieval
cathedral, the palace of the seventeenth century, the railroad
stations or city structures of today. 159
One covuitry seeks glory, another land, another money: accordingly
its people follow armies, plows, or machinery. What is crucial is
that the student of social teleology distinguish between the controlling
desire of a society and the industrial means that serve it. At first
glance the means and the end of an industrial system seem inextricable
and interdependent. On closer analysis, it is obvious that the conjunc-
tion of particular means with particular ends is partly accidental. The
same ends could have been attained by different means, and the same
means could have served another end. Once this distinction has been
made, one sees that means remain and accumulate while ends succeed
each other only through elimination. For example, the primitive cart
survives in the carriage mounted on springs, and the carriage has
been absorbed in the locomotive, while
On the other hand, the Christian's desire for mystical salvation
did not absorb, but actually routed the Roman's desire for civic
glory, just as the Copernican theory banished the Ptolemaic
system. Industry in this sense is the matter of which the form
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is furnished by the reigning concepts of justice and beauty, ideas
as to the best direction for conduct. 160
What has passed away forever is the controlling desire that coordinated
the great "bundles of hximan actions" known to us as the industrial sys-
tems of Assyria, Greece, Rome, or the Middle Ages.
Without a controlling desire, without a "hierarchy of wants con-
secrated by unanimous judgment, " the forces of industry do not pre-
sent a "spectacle of internal harmony" like these of the past but only
162
chaos. What is true for a society is also true for the individual.
Each person finds harmony only through a controlling desire
or rather. . . a previous resolution which persists in us, and
which, born of a previous victory, always must undergo new
battles;. . . This is what is called mental stability in the case
of individuals, social stability in the case of nations. All
social or mental stability therefore supposes, as long it
lasts, an ideal. . . that morality defends and preserves.
Personal and social problems are interwoven because individual har-
mony is the precondition of social peace. The modern problem, both
personal and collective, is to relate industrial means once more to a
ontroUing end, to create form out of an abundance of matter. The
arch for means has greatly superseded that for ends. Things that
can be extended indefinitely- -vocabularies , facts, products, laws--
have been cultivated assiduously while things that are by nature
limited in extension--grammar, theory, principles of law, philosoph-
ical ideas, moral codes--have been neglected. Yet that
which is
inherently limited is far more essential than that which can
be
multiplied indefinitely:
c
se
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Grammar is the whole of language.
. . . The political concept is
the whole of government. Morality is all of labor, for industry-
is worth what its end is worth. And the ideal, surely all will
agree, is the whole of art. - -What use are words except to make
sentences? What use are the different crafts and products of a
co\antry except to serve the ends of the reigning morality?
But the modern age has preferred to accumulate means rather than
make the choices and sacrifices necessary to order them:
It is much easier to pile up neologism on neologism than to speak
one's language more correctly and thus to introduce by degrees
grammatical improvements; to collect observations and experi-
ments in the sciences than to supply it with more general and
more demonstrable theories;. . .to multiply needs, thanks to the
ever richer variety of consumptions supplied by the most diver-
sified industries, than to substitute for one's dominant need a
superior and preferable need, one more conducive to the reign
of order and peace; finally, artistically to unroll an inexhaustible
series of cleverness and feats than to obtain the least glimpse of
a new beauty, judged more worthy of arousing enthusiasm and
love.
But our modern Europe is somewhat carried away by the
attraction of deceptive ease. Therefore the striking contrast
. . .between its industrial exuberance and its aesthetic poverty
. . .
Industry has aroused on all sides artificial needs that it
satisfies pele-mSle without taking the trouble of a selection
[ triage] among them and of their better accord. ... It is necessary
for this activity that contemporary civilization liquidate this chaos
of heterogeneous needs, . . .All these discordant or poorly har-
monized needs which flourish at all points on the industrial soil
and their passionate worshippers constitute a sort of moral
fetishism or polytheism which aspires to spread out into a com-
prehensive and authoritative moral monotheism, in a new,
generous, and powerful aesthetic.
As proof that civilization has lagged behind industry, Tarde mentions
his trouble in finding a monument characteristic of modern society.
When he tried to think of one, he began to appreciate the strange
dichotomy between the grandeur of the means and the banality of the
ends characteristic of modem technology:
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It is a strange and rarely noticed thing that what industry builds
most grandiosely at the present are not products but industrial
tools, namely, great factories, immense railroad stations,
prodigious machines.
. . .how shabby are these works of our
industry next to their lodgings! How especially do the petty
splendors of our private and public luxury pale next to our
industrial expositions, where the only utility of products is to
display themselves !
Tarde does not venture to predict what the controlling desire of
future society will be. That outcome rests in the mysterious world of
possibilities:
What are the simple and fecund needs that the future will develop,
and which are the overgrown and sterile needs that it will prune
away? That is the secret. It is difficxilt to find, but it must be
sought. ^^"^
The two ideals of religion and patriotism, which have long dominated
society, are quickly fading. Perhaps they may be replaced by love or
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ambition, by a cult of pleasure or a taste for glory. Tarde himself
would like to see
a collective ideal which, without being either a religious and
deceptive illusion or a patriotic and murderous reality, would
have the virtue of arranging and tying up the bundle of souls
as energetically as religion and country have.
If such a grand ideal does not soon arrive, mankind will have none at
all and will be reduced to a decadent state of unrelated hopes and
170
desires, with nothing to love above life itself. At the moment,
instead of seeking a controlling ideal to provide a resolution for econom-
ic oppositions, the producers of the world are finding a temporary
solution in the pursuit of new outlets and in the stimulation of new
needs. But in choosing this course they are chasing "an ever -receding
mirage of social peace" because there are limits to growth:
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Is it necessary to recall that the earth is not infinite, and that
our civilization is close to having invaded it all?
The end of the Vv^orld
,
this great terror of the Middle Ages,
is destined to become a source of anguish again in another sense.
It is no longer in time but in space that this terrestrial globe
reveals itself to us as unextendable; and the deluge of civilized
humanity already hurls itself at its limits, at its new Pillars of
Hercules, these ones insurmountable. What are Vv^e going to do
when soon we will no longer be able to count on external markets,
Asian, African, to serve as a pallative or derivative for our
discords, as outlets for our merchandise, for our instincts of
cruelty, of pillage, and of prey, for our criminality as well as
for our overflovvdng birthrate? How v/ill we manage to restablish
among ourselves a relative peace which has had as its conditions
for so long our conquering projection outside ourselves, far from
ourselves?
The globe has its spatial limits, and the human heart has its limits
too in its ability to keep developing new desires. Before long there
will be only one place left for novelty, "the field of social experimen-
tation. " Society is just entering a phase of genuine --not deceptive or
temporary —adaptation. The world vnll turn in on itself, so to speak,
and the adaptive phase of hiiman history will commence with "the com-
plete and systematic possession of the planet by man and of man by
1 77
himself. This much can be foreseen: the future Vvdll bring the
solidarity of the human race.
The Sociability of the Future
Tarde occasionally uses the term "solidarity, " but he prefers
the word "sociability. " By this choice he affirms his kinship with
Guyau, who often used the latter term and whose description of
sympathetic vibrations may now be seen as a kind of crude forerunner
of Tarde 's theory of imitative waves. Tarde 's lack of enthusiasm for
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"solidarity" undoubtedly comes from its association with the legalisms
of L,€on Bourgeois or, worse yet, with the organic definition of it by
Durkheim. Tarde takes great pains to distinguish his idea of a specif-
ically human, psychological solidarity from DurkheimJs concept of a
corporal solidarity characteristic of all organic life. To speak instead
of sociability, with its distinct reference to human society, reduces
the danger that Tarde 's particular vision of solidarity will be confused
with radically different views. Tarde 's works are permeated by the
idea of solidarity, but it is defined in his own way as a qualitative
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alteration in the intensity of social life.
How will that alteration come about? The subordination of phys-
ical desires to spiritual ones, and that of passive desires to active
ones, will both tend to unify the human race. Unlike "the useless com-
plications of material existence" which divide people, spiritual desires
"bring us together [and] make us touch each other at our highest points
like the trees of the forests.
""^"^^ To cite an example, the material
effect of the railroad is to increase the disparity among nations and to
arouse new antagonisms, but its moral effect is to unify them by
increasing the exchange of people and ideas. Eventually the moral
unity will predominate over the disxinity caused by conflicting material
desires.
^'^^ The tendency that augments desire to produce while
diminishing desire to consume also increases unity because it brings
a "prodigious enlargement" of leisure. People will prefer productive
leisure over passive consumption: "Time, even more than energy
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l^
force ], is the stuff of which life is made. "^"^^ It is also the stuff of
which sociability is made, for its pleasures, now fully available only
to those with leisure, will come to include everyone in the exchange of
politeness and sympathetic regards. "And then everyone will txiily
know la joie de vivre
, when the civilized earth will be nothing but. . . an
immense salon, a lucid and liberal salon of the eighteenth century open
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to everyone. " Leisure will be used mainly in "spiritual contacts
and exchanges, in the pleasure of self-instruction and in affecting each
other reciprocally, in the intensive culture of a sociability at once
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refined and healthy. "
Nothing could be more opposed to Durkheim's concept of a soli-
darity born of labor. For Durkheim technological progress will
specialize people in labor, while Tarde foresees that it will eliminate
much labor altogether and instead assimilate people in leisure. For
Durkheim the role of labor will grow more and more crucial in the
moral life of society, while for Tarde it will diminish radically.
"Social evolution begins and ends by games and f^tes , " comments
Tarde, "Labor is a phase that has to be crossed between the lazy
insouciance of the primitives and the lively gaiety of future civilized
people. "^^"^ As far as Tarde is concerned, labor only isolates. In the
first place, our occupations specialize us rather than developing our
common humanity, and in the second place labor often involves the
relationship of man and machine which can never have a rapport like
J ^ 180 rj +
that between man and man, or even between man and nature. I3ut
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Tarde has an even more fundamental objection to Durkheim's concept
of solidarity originating in labor. Such a solidarity is based on the
organic level of necessity, whereas for Tarde only that based on lei-
sure attains a truly and uniquely human level. Not the utilitarian
exchange of services but only the free exchange of souls is worthy of
181human society:
By their labors men serve each other f s 'entre - servent"} ; by
their leisure, their fetes
,
and their games, they unite in a
truly free and triily social accord, and please each other
s 'entre-plaisent "1. 182
Tarde is no admirer of the beauty of necessity. The relationship that
ties a peasant to his landowner, or the worker to the employer, a
relationship instituted to serve natural necessity, inhibits rather than
serves sociability. It reduces society to the level of the commerce
between a sheep herder and his sheep. Insofar as relations submit to
organic laws, by so much is sociability hindered. Before society can
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spread its wings, it must burst out of the chrysalis of organic life.
This concern with supra-organic life is the basis of Tarde 's pre-
diction that "the social group of the future" will be what he calls the
"public. "^^"^ In the past social groups have been formed along lines
of religious, economic, political, or even aesthetic interest, and have
variously been termed sects, unions, schools, parties, or corpora-
tions. The public is a group formed in leisure and bound together not
by material utility or commonality of interest, but by the wholly
psychological tie of a shared state of mind. The public is best thought
of as a "purely spiritual collectivity, of which the cohesion is entirely
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mental. " Its members are united by sharing a controlling desire
or faith and by their awareness of this mental unity. Formerly such
cohesion was possible only in crowds united in the same place which
assumed common characteristics due to physical proximity. In both
publics and crowds
the tie of the diverse individuals who compose them consists not
in harmonizing with each other through their very diversities,
by the specialties that are useful to each other, but in reflecting
back and forth, in mingling in a simple and powerful unison their
innate or acquired similarities. . . 1S6
Today progress in communicaticns technology means the unison of the
crowd is increasingly less important while the "purely ideal suggesti-
bility, contagion without contact" of the public, "this spiritualized
crowd, " more and more replaces the "grosser and more elementary
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social life" that depends on physical proximity. Mental "action at
a distance" on the part of the public is made possible by the three
auxiliary inventions of the railroad, telegraph, and especially the
printing press. Through the m.edium of the press, a public comes
to share similar ideas by consuming the same books, periodicals, and
newspapers. Publicists take over the prestige that used to be enjoyed
by crowd leaders, and indeed their power is all the greater because
the size of a public, unlike that of a crowd, has no physical limita-
tions. The mental cohesion of this dispersed and enormous public
is the same kind that unites any commercial clientele. When consume
buy the same products or patronize the same stores and restaurants,
they develop a unifying sympathy:
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Each of us in buying what responds to his needs is more or less
vaguely aware of expressing and developing thereby his union
with the social class which eats, dresses, and satisfies itself
in every way in a nearly analogous manner. But how much more
intimate and deep is the tie that is found among habitual readers
of the same newspaper! Here, no one would dreaun of speaking
of competition, there is only a communion of suggested ideas
and the consciousness of this commxmion. ^90
If the public is a particiilar species of consumer clientele, then the
species is more and more tending to eclipse the genus.
As the soul is to the body, so is public opinion to the public.
Public opinion is
a momentary, more or less logical cluster of judgments which,
responding to current problems, is reproduced many times over
in people of the same coiintry, at the same time, in the same
• 4. 191society.
Through reading and conversation, a person becomes aware that his
judgment resembles that of others, and so individual opinion is trans-
formed into the social. In many respects Tarde's concept of public
opinion is similar to Durkheim's conscience collective , and in fact
Tarde sometimes uses the Durkheimian term as a synonym for public
opinion. But Tarde insists that he is referring to an aggregate of
individual opinions, not an impersonal social entity with a life of its
own above and beyond the lives of individuals. While this disagree-
ment as to the nominalism or realism of such social forces is central
to the dispute between Tarde and Durkheim, it is nonetheless true that
they are both trying to describe a social situation where people share
similar attitudes. Durkheim assumes this similarity is dying out
because such mental resemblance depends on daily exposure to the
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same physical environment, which is no longer the case in modern
society. So a mechanical solidarity based on a xinifying conscience
collective has been replaced by an organic solidarity of interlocking
diversities. Tarde, on the contrary, concludes a unifying conscience
collective (or something nearly equivalent to it) is just being born. The
solidarity of the future is that of "a simple and powerful unison [of]
. . .
innate or acquired similarities. "'^'^•^ As style spreads, material
environments are becoming more uniform, and, what is far more
crucial, a uniform social environment is being created in the form of
publics. So Durkheim's opposition between mechanical and organic
solidarity is deceptive. Not only does the division of labor depend on
a pre-existing community of belief, but also
its habitual resiolt is to develop and fortify, under new forms,
this intellectual and moral community, by multiplying the
objects of this common wealth and by singularly facilitating
their diffusion. The assimilation of individuals by imitative
contagion and their differentiation by cooperation in labor-
-
their assimilation as consumers of books, journals, clothing,
food, even of pleasures and of any satisfactions whatsoever,
and their differentiation as producers - -all these progress in
parallel and not at the expense of each other. 194
Because Durkheim and Tarde reach opposite conclusions about the
future possibilities of mental unison, they reach opposite conclusions
about a remedy for the present moral crisis, Durkheim seeks a new
basis for morality in occupational specialization because the old basis
in conscience collective is dying out. Tarde trusts that public opinion,
as a new type of conscience collective , can be the new basis of
morality. The moral code of the future, predicts Tarde, will be
founded on honor.
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this unconscious and profound respect for opinion which is
betrayed in the acts of the most solitary thinkers, despite
their illusions about themselves. Now, what is honor except
heroic, unreflective, and passive obedience to opinion?
In a very sociable environment the attention of the individual is
"exteriorized" so that he is preoccupied with others, and this pre-
occupation can be a moral force. Even vanity can be vmderstood as
a sort of superficial honor, . . . the first step towards honor. . .
the need to be regarded, to appear, leads to the need to be
considered. Consequently do not mock too bitterly the conta-
gion of vulgar luxury and of vain display which can bear good
fruit. 196
In the past morality has been based on the utilitarian conformity of
means to ends as determined by the individual; morality in the future
will be found in "a conformity of individual principles to the principles
recognized by the public, and of acts of the individual to his principles. "
The new moral authority is the dispersed, collective one of public
opinion, and the precondition of this new morality of honor is "a very
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intense conformism. "
So the growing irresistibility of the force of public opinion is not
a cause for despair. The increasing conformity to it does not indicate
that individuals have become morally or intellectually decadent: "When
the poplars and the oaks are felled by the storm, it is not that they have
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become more feeble, but that the wind has become stronger. " More
uniformity in thought and belief is simply the wind of the future.
According to the laws of imitation, every public will tend to enlarge
geometrically and indefinitely, and its opinion will accordingly become
more imposing. Its unifying action will accelerate as
communications
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become ever faster, and when this technology is highly developed the
transmission of a new idea will be "almost instantaneous," as is now
199already beginning to happen in scholarly and commercial publics.
When all humanity is in contact with the same sources of information,
the same examples will be admired by all and the old groups that
divided mankind will be replaced "by an incomplete and variable
segmentation, to indistinct limits, in a path of perpetual renovation
and mutual penetration. "^^^ The uniformity will be that of civilization,
not of government. Tarde has no sympathy for the socialist vision of
one vast collective association, which seems to him a modern version
of the ancient hope for a universal religion. He foresees not any
universal church or state but a peaceful, stable federation of nations
bound by a multiplicity of associations and by commonality of desires
^ u T ^ 201and beliefs.
Along with geographic uniformity will come uniformity in time.
The present reign of fashion will give way to the "final triumph" of
custom. Inventiveness will decline because the very social condi-
tions that favor rapid imitation--a busy, dispersed, urbanized life--
are contrary to those that favor innovation--an austere, traditionalist,
half-solitary yet inspiring life among family and countryside. This
decline in invention (which will never be an absolute cessation of it)
can be observed already. In the past few centuries no new languages
have been created, nor religions, while politics and law have
practi-
cally ceased to innovate. Scientific novelties have flooded
the world,
but they are of limited importance because they change the
means of
life but not its end. Even the discoveries of the steam
engine and of
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electricity have changed the outlook of humanity far less than the in-
vention of an Indo-European language or of a religion like Christian-
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ity. The world is headed for a "reassuring fixity of ideals" in time
along with a "peace-bringing uniformity" in space:^*^"^
The progress of civilization is unquestionably manifest in the
gradual leveling that it establishes over a territory always
more vast, so that someday, perhaps, the same social type,
stable and definitive, will cover the entire surface of the globe,
henceforth divided up into a thousand types of different societies,
strangers or rivals. But this work of universal uniformization,
in which we are taking part, does it reveal in the end a common
orientation of diverse societies towards the same pole? --Not at
all, for it has as its manifest cause the submersion of the
majority of original civilizations under the deluge of one of them,
whose rising flood advances in ever larger waves of imitation. 205
This is the solidarity of universal entropy. Not the increasingly com-
plex organization of an organism but the increasing disorganization of
inanimate matter is the fate of society. The heterogeneous becomes
more homogeneous, open curves tend to close, flights of innovation
are dragged down by inertia, energy dissipates, everything simplifies
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and levels out.
Yet this universal leveling will leave ample room for individual-
ism. Like Durkheim, Tarde is eager to demonstrate that individuality
and solidarity are compatible and indeed interdependent, but he recon-
ciles them in a very different way. For Durkheim individuality
blossoms in the pursuit of professional specialization and is reconciled
with solidarity by membership in a single productive association. For
Tarde solidarity is based on resemblance developed in leisure, and
individuality is fostered by participation in a wide variety of non-
productive associations. ". . . there will be for each individual a
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certain interlacing of different associations which will be particular
for him and which will be incarnated in him alone. "^^"^ As the civilizing
action of imitation keeps expanding, each person will have more and
more examples from which to choose. He can borrow not from one or
from a few (a situation that restricts individual expression) but from
thousands or tens of thousands
and this is, perhaps, the chief benefit of the prolonged func-
tioning of imitation. We might wonder what society, this long
collective dream, so often this collective nightmare, is worth
. . .
if this sorrowful discipline, this illusory and despotic
prestige did not serve precisely to liberate the individual by
arousing little by little in the bottom of his heart his freest
impulses, his boldest view of exterior nature and of himself,
and by developing everywhere.
. .not savage individualities,
but profound and harmonious nuances of the soul, as distinctive
as they are civilized, the flowering at once of the purest, most
powerful individualism and of complete sociability.
The paradox is that "the more ["people^ imitate each other socially, the
209more they differentiate themselves individually. " Universal
similarity in dress, in law, in knowledge, perhaps even in language
may have as its "unique raison d'etre" the birth of individual diver-
gences "more true, more intimate, more radical, and more delicate"
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than all the deceptive distinctions of the past. The future will bring
leveling but not mediocrity. Certainly society will be more democratic,
but it will be an unequal democracy. Aristocracy based on birth will
disappear while the aristocracies of love, intelligence, and beauty will
thrive to the benefit of all. And in the coming era when both personality
and sociability are at last liberated
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Then will unfold the highest flower of social life, the aesthetic
life,
. . . and social life. . . will finally appear as what it is, as
the consequence and complement of organic life; to realize, in
a long, obscure, and tortuous passage from elementary diver-
sity to personal countenance.
. . a mysterious alembic of count-
less spirals, where the latter is sublimed into the former,
where.
. .
from an infinity of ground-up elements.
. . is extracted
this essential principle which is so volatile, the profound and
fleeting singularity of people, their manner of being, of thinking,
of feeling, which happens only once and only for an instant.
A Fragment of Future History
Such is the portrait of the future that emerges from Tarde's
major treatises published from 1890 until his death fourteen years
later. Before any of them were composed, however, he had written
in 1884 an extraordinary short novel, the Utopian Fragment d'histoire
future [Fragment of future historyD , although it was published only in
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1896. "In it more than anywhere else he invents the possible. . .
The French word histoire can signify either "history" in the sense of
a factual record of the past, or "story, " implying an imaginative, even
fantastic tale. Not only this short novel but all of Tarde's works may
be regarded as "fragments of future history, " ambiguously placed on
an uncertain boundary between history and tale, present and future,
reality and possibility. There is a gradual transition, not a sharp
break, between the poetic prophecies in his treatises and the openly
fantastic Fragment , which has nonetheless a deeply serious purpose
in portraying the unfolding of "the highest flower of social life, the
aesthetic life. " For Tarde literature is not an alternative to social
science but its complement and completion. He is one of an ever-
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shrinking group of thinkers who still unite these two activities which
have generally gone their separate intellectual ways. In his Utopian
fantasy his social vision assumes concrete shape in a playful, ironic,
215but faithful manner.
The scene opens five centuries hence in an era of peace following
the establishment of a great Asiatic-American-European confederation.
Political stability is accompanied by rapid uniformization of customs,
ideas, and even language (Greek). The course of civilization, which
hitherto seemed confined within high riverbanks, burst through them
to spread over the whole world. With only three hours of work each
day, everyone enjoys a life of leisure and satisfies desires for wealth
and love. This is a peaceful, stomach-centered society whose noblest
monument is an iron statue of a bourgeois king set in the middle of a
cabbage garden. Is this utopia? No, for just as the universe begins
to breathe easily--or to yawn a little- -astronomers sound a terrifying
alarm: the sun, which had already shown signs of weakness, is
beginning to go out. As xinprecedented cold settles over the earth,
long-dormant glaciers revive, expand gigantically, and advance from
the Alps like
a moving cliff made of rocks and overturned locomotives, debris
of bridges, railroad stations, hotels, monuments carted along
pele-m§le, monstrous and heart-breaking brie b^ac whose
triumphant invasion is adorned as if with booty.
Crops freeze, millions die. Mass migrations trek to the warmest
parts of the globe, but ice invades even these havens. Finally the last
remnants of humanity find themselves huddled near the site of ancient
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Babylon. They are the flower of civilization-
-no university professors
only the assistants, no cabinet nninisters, only junior secretaries of
state, no mothers, only nnodels become inured to the cold by posing
in the nude. They all face extinction.
Then arises a hero, the genius Miltiades, who addresses the
bedraggled band. We must return to our mother earth, he exhorts the
numb audience, for deep within its bosom are sources of energy and
scattered centers of fire to provide light and heat superior even to that
of the sun:
Let us descend into these depths; let us make of these abysses
our refuge! The mystics had a sublime presentiment when
they said in their Latin: ab exterioribus ad interiora ! ^^"^
The fate now being faced by human beings, Miltiades continues, is afte
all the universal fate. Like the sun, every star in the universe will
eventually lose its heat and bank its fires. Does this mean that life,
thought, and love are restricted to the few parts of the universe where
there are light and heat?
In that case lifelessness
,
death, agitated nothingness would be
the rule, and life the exception! In that case nine -tenths, may-
be ninety- nine -one hundredths of the solar systems would turn
in the void, like absurd and gigantic wind-mills, useless encxom-
brances of space! That is impossible and senseless, that is
blasphemous, let us have more faith in the unknown! . . . when
stars have sown their wild oats, then the serious task of their
life begins, and they develop their inner fruit. ^18
With this stirring oration Miltiades inspires his listeners to action and
allays their doubts and fears. To prepare for their future neotrog-
lodytism, they have to gather up all the artistic and intellectual heri-
219
tage of civilization, "the true capital of humanity. " Unlike Noah,
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who filled his ark with wild beasts, scorpions, poisonous plants, a
"miscellany of living contradictions" all trying to devour each other,
these survivors will fill their ark only with man-made treasures.
Mining begins. Galleries hollowed out in the earth are methodically
filled with masterpieces gleaned from libraries and museums. The
job of packing and moving is backbreaking, but the work is done
voluntarily even by these dilettantes because
for the first time, the idea of duty to be done entered their
hearts, the beauty of sacrifice.
. . They devoted themselves
to the unknown, to what is not yet, to posterity towards which
all the wishes of their electrified spirits were oriented, as
7 7 1atoms of magnetized iron turn towards the pole.
When they finally enter the underground galleries to live and
shut themselves off forever from the surface of the earth, for the
first time a truly social life begins. Left behind are the seasons, the
countryside, peasants, flora and fauna, everything living but man.
Little had they realized how much organic life dragged down human
evolution! By burrowing in the earth, mankind finally broke the chains
of organic life. "The social environment could reveal and unfold for
the first time its own virtue, and the truly social tie could appear in
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all its force, in all its purity. " The artificial under gro\ind environ-
ment resembles a sociological laboratory to demonstrate what
happens when man is restricted to himself for his pleasures, occupa-
tions, and creative inspiration. The result is a charming social life.
Far from being bored, people live in a state of
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habitual surexcitation maintained by the multiplicity of our
relationships and our social tonics (shaking the hands of
friends, chats, encounters with charming females
,
etc.)
and which, among a number of us, became a state of con-
tinued frenzy under the name of troglodytic fever. ^^.3
This flcwering of social life depends on a drastic reduction of material
needs. People eat meat frozen in the ice and hardly need clothes
because the climate is so gentle. As for shelter, anyone can drill a
hole in the rock and have a rent-free home. Technological invention
is used not to multiply useless gadgets but to provide necessities--heat
from cauldron- volcanoes , lighting from the inner fires of the earth-
-
and leisure :
The part of the necessary being reduced to almost nothing, the
part of the superfluous can extend to almost everything. When
one lives with so little, there remains much time to think. A
minimum of utilitarian labor and a maximum of aesthetic labor:
is this not the essence of civilization ?
And so aesthetic life flourishes as people produce to serve souls
rather than to serve bodies. Instead of relationships between producer
and consumers based on exchange of services, people enjoy relation-
ships between artists and art-lovers based on exchange of admiration
or respectful criticism:
The place that the reduction of needs has left empty in the heart
is taken up by talents, artistic and poetic, so that every day
talents multiply and become more deeply rooted, become veri-
table acquired needs, but needs of production rather than of
consumption. I underline this difference. ... For the theoretician,
for the artist, for the aesthetician in all genres, to produce is a
passion, to consume is only a taste. ... The artist creates for
pleasure and only he creates in this manner.
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Each vocation develops its own mode of production. Scientists enjoy
the intellectual charm of endless polemics about the solar system they
never see. Chemistry and psychology are especially fertile disci-
plines. Chemists discover the psychology of the atom and the desires
of molecules, which look uniform but turn out to be distinct individuals.
"Thanks to [the chemists] we are no longer alone in a frozen world; we
feel that these rocks live and take life, we feel these hard metals that
ZZ6protect and warm us swarm fraternally. " Simultaneously psychol-
ogists develop an atomic theory of selfhood and deliver mankind from
fear of death, now recognized as the retirement of self to inner con-
sciousness "where it finds in depths more than the equivalent of the
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exterior empire it has lost. " Painters never weary of metamor-
phosizing traditional images like horses, trees, and flowers, which
they make all the more harmonious because they are \anhindered by
actual sight of these things. There is nothing usefxil in their production,
nor is there anything functional in the creations of architects, now
called excavators, who dig a wanton, picturesque series of burrows,
endless like an Oriental epic, an "artificial and truly artistic land-
228
scape" which is the "essence and cons\Hnmation of former nature.
The man-made environment is not the least rigid or planned. The
underground rooms resemble an infinite cathedral, laden with master-
pieces of fresco, enamel, goldwork, marble, and painting in the most
diverse styles.
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Outside these cities of art there is no countryside, only wilder-
ness. Boundless excursions can be taken in fantastic galleries of
crystal that have been pierced in the frozen oceans. There, gliding
on skates or on bicycles, wearing headlamps to light the way, tourists
can always find some strange vision to pique their curiosity. In this
aquamarine silence, among the reflections from icicles and pearls,
they glimpse frozen sea creatures, immortalized in death, trapped as
if in glass cages; or perhaps a piece of wreckage, or a steeple from
some prehistoric town. Locked in perpetual ice, the ocean still con-
veys a sense of mystery, solitude, and peacefvil changelessness.
But in underground life the highest charm is found in a social life
ruled by love. Love is the controlling ideal, the new religion.
Patriotism, corporatism, even family spirit have declined, but love,
which used to be held back by thirst for childish luxuries, finally
triumphs. Poetry, philosophy, psychology, and art all join in its
praise:
There is only one [passion^ , under a thousand names, as there
is only one sun above: it is love, soul of our soul, and the
source of our art. A genuine and dependable sun, this one. . . ''^^
Some heroic lovers who have a Platonic relationship spend their lives
together wandering through the cathedral-like cities and producing
artistic masterpieces. Most lovers are less ascetic, however, and
still feel the urges of the flesh. But food supplies are so limited that
procreating a child cannot be done without permission. The force of
public opinion, which threatens banishment for those who disobey,
regulates love and restricts procreation to cases where the
man has
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produced an artistic masterpiece under the inspiration of the
woman.
The wisdom of this regulation is manifest when an excavator
happens upon a tribe of Chinese who, it seems, also burrowed under-
groxand but allowed themselves to multiply enormously afterwards.
Although they grow diminutive vegetables in diminutive gardens and
raise diminutive pigs, still they must resort to cannibalism to feed
themselves. "In what promiscuity, in what a slough of rapacity, of
falsehood and theft did these unfortunate ones live! The words of our
230language are incapable of depicting their filth and grossness. "
After attempts to civilize the Chinese fail, the tunnel leading to their
dens is carefully and permanently sealed.
The underground society has its malcontents, mainly those dis-
pleased with its static purity. Once a report comes that the sun is
reviving and melting the ice; some people entertain the unhealthy
notion of returning to the surface. Luckily a scholar rummaging in a
forgotten corner of the archives comes across some phonograph
records and moving pictures of the sights and sounds of earthly nature
--thunder, wind, mountain streams, dawn, and darkness. Even the
most ardent partisans of returning to the surface are astonished and
disillusioned to find that actual nature is far less impressive than its
depiction by even their most realistic artists. So if the sun ever does
revive, only the most unruly part of the popxilation is likely to seek its
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deceptive advantages. That possibility is as unlikely as it is undesir-
able, however. As Miltiades said, the blessed stars are the extinct
ones:
We.
. .
continue to believe firmly that among stars as among men
the most brilliant are not the best, that the same causes have
led elsewhere to the same effects, forcing other humanities to
crouch in the bosom of their planets, to pursue there in peace,
in the singular conditions of absolute independence and purity,
the happy course of their destinies, and that finally, in the
heavens as on earth, happiness lives concealed.
Conclusion
Do we wake or sleep? When we read these words that conclude
Tarde's Fragment , we put down the book to awaken with a start, as it
were, to the realization that we have strayed far from sober sociology
In Tarde's work as a whole we have passed by imperceptible degrees
from social laws to social fantasy.
His seductive style lures us into a fairyland where aesthetic
individuality and social solidarity are perfectly reconciled. This
seductive quality calls to mind Durkheim's denunciations of Tarde for
succumbing to the "reign of fantasy in the intellectual order. "
Durkheim too ventures a prediction of harmonized individuality and
solidarity in his vision of corporations, but his tone is unvaryingly
prosaic even if his content is equally speculative, even Utopian. But
Tarde writes poetry in the Fragment d'histoire future. and so his
prediction evokes all the ambiguities of poetic truthfulness.
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Tarde beckons us into his dream world. The \inderground
galleries are his Fontenay, an ark crammed with aesthetic master-
pieces, a laboratory to experiment with the pursuit of spiritual rather
than physical needs (the latter being magically provided for), a refuge
from nature where artifice alone reigns and where the life of the mind
is liberated from organic bonds. The obvious difference is that
des Esseintes lives in solitary exile, while the \inderground dilettantes
(or are they decadents?) pursue an eminently sociable existence. They
do not drink in mute solitude but become intoxicated from "social
tonics. " Yet their very sociability is an artifice. The highest form of
art becomes hviman beings themselves, their conversation, their
bearing, they all become objets d'art When they please each other in
their uniqueness like masterpieces of living scvilpture. Tarde extends
des Esseintes' contention that artifice is the sign of genius from the
realm of objects to that of society. Consequently the neotroglodytes
generally escape the trap of reification that eventually clamps
des Esseintes in its jaws, for undergrovmd all objects are subordinate
to the spiritual ideal of love. Social interaction forestalls the develop-
ment of the unhealthy animism that devours des Esseintes, although
perceiving life in rocks indicates that the tendency is not altogether
absent.
Yet, for all this sociability, the inhabitants of the underground
remain isolated. Indeed their solitude is even more stark than that of
des Esseintes, for the rest of the world--the world that
depends on
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nature, that is subject to ever-repeating cycles of production ajid con-
sumption, that acconnodates social classes and marketplaces- -all this
is not just shut out, but destroyed. More or less, that is; even in its
non-existence, the sunlit world casts a shadow over the buried king-
dom. The bestial Chinese are reminders of organic life, and they are
shut out with as much horror as des Esseintes slams the door of
Fontenay in the face of the contaminating bourgeoisie. The accom-
plishments of the underground world depend on images and records
from a previous existence above ground, and are judged by reference
to them. The beauties of art, the intellectual achievements of science,
all derive from nature and yet are praised by comparing them to her
degradation. The system of justice depends on the threat of banishment
to the surface. The idea of returning to the surface always hovers
even when it does not resvdt in flight. As long as there is memory of
the real world, there is an alternative to the dream world. In Tarde's
version the refuge of Fontenay has become socialized, sanitized, but
it is no more capable of banishing reality or altering its status as
illusion.
And is it really true that Tarde's dream world is so healthy that
it has no potential for transformation into a nightmare? On the con-
trary, the tale ends with a reminder of a universe of extinct stars.
The belief is that stellar death shelters a hidden life; but if life is
concealed, only faith allows us to believe in its existence. The night-
mare thought is that the dead stars are truly dead. What if nothingness
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is the rule, and life the exception? What if the universe is indeed
composed of solar systems spinning around like absurd and inanimate
windmills, useless encumbrances of the void? What if the universal
process of entropy will finally make all stars cool down to dark and
motionless cinders? "That is impossible and senseless, " cries
Miltiades, "That is blasphemous, let us have more faith in the
unknown. " Such faith is precisely what is so hard to come by today:
Ah; but my courage fails me, and my heart is sick within me!--
Lord, take pity on the Christian who doubts, on the skeptic who
would fain believe, on the galley-slave of life who puts out to
sea alone, in the darkness of night, beneath a firmament illu-
mined no longer by the consoling beacon-fires of the ancient
hope. 2-^^
The theory of universal repetition, to which Tarde keeps returning in
cycles of his own, is no dream but a nightmare: nothing persisting,
everything repeating endlessly, automatically, with no meaning, no
goal, a universe of absurd monotony. A vision from Ecclesiastes
,
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perhaps, or "a vision of spleen, " in the words of Tarde 's own son.
Tarde himself asks in one of his poems:
Why the eternity of this inanity?
Why am I? Why are we? What is the use?
The heavens turn, the seas rock back and forth; mystery!
Truth, elegance, voluptuousness- -vanity ! ^34
In universal repetition there is certainly no place for human immor-
tality. The existence of the individual is part of eternal cycles, and
so it "happens only once and only for an instant. " There is no more
reason to believe that the soul retreats to hidden inner depths than to
believe that dead stars shelter life within. Here faith is just as
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necessary and just as difficult, when the whole question of limits
becomes subsumed in a confrontation with the final limit of death.
In the face of this absurdity, illusion is a necessity, not a super-
fluity. This is Tarde's conclusion. It is his answer to the question
raised in connection with des Esseintes' experience: no, there is no
alternative to illusion except nightmare. The void can be overcome
not through reason but only through imagination. On a social level the
imagination provides the controlling ideal necessary to animate collec-
tive existence. The modern moral crisis may be resolved only by
raising up
some great imaginary object, mystic heaven, patriotic glory,
which makes all the desires of all the people who keep colliding
against each other on earth converge in the void and accord
ideally with each other. Someone who is hallucinated or an
imposter points out this goal, suggests this vision; it dazzles
and blinds and makes them march towards victory in good
order. Where their eyes are opened, they will go pele-m^le,
groping, asking to have their dream back again.
This "need for certitude or for stable illusion"^-^°--Tarde equates the
two- -is an intensely personal requirement as well as a social one.
Individual existence is \inbearable without self-deception. We imitate
because we need "reciprocal feeding of our illusions about ourselves,
of confidence in ourselves, deceptive or not, a lie, if you will, it is
an increase of non- contradictory faith. . .
"^^"^ Deception is necessary
to face life and above all to face death. In one of Tarde's most re-
vealing poems he gives directions for his own funeral, asking that he
be buried among his ancestors on the plains of Dordogne, that his
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children and villagers accompany his bier, and that the local cur^
accord him the last rites of the Church:
For a divine hope raises itself on our shade.
Deceptive? perhaps, a lie? perhaps,
But, after all, among our countless lies,
One lie more or less matters not.
It is even more a lie, the most hypocritical kind,
For the false purity of the falsely ambitious
To be shocked by the hope evoked by the ancient rites,
The ancient and gentle hope which comes from our forefathers.
If this is lying, I want, after my death, still
To lie, as the poets always have,
As do April, youth, and dawn,
And our toil so long and our triumphs so short!
As an existential attitude, this is acceptable, even appealing.
When applied to intellectual inquiry it is less defensible. Where does
necessary illusion become unnecessary delusion? Where do social
laws turn into social fantasy, and fantasy into falsehood or madness?
If social prophecy includes both reality and possibility, how to dis-
tinguish possibility from dream? These ambigxaities in Tarde's thought
continue to nag no matter how much he may beguile us. At some in-
determinate point he seems to begin to deceive himself with \infounded
hope. As soon as he observes a social phenomenon, he interprets its
significance with unrealistic optimism. The unsettling result for the
reader is like looking through a pair of glasses which have remarkably
precise optics but which are distinctly rose-colored. With great
acuity Tarde foresees how technological change will vastly change the
relationship of consumption to production, but then he assumes people
will prefer leisure to goods and that they will use leisure creatively
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rather than passively. He perceives that the proliferation and inten-
sification of communications will lead to a geographical uniformity
which must be distinguished from uniform stages of economic growth;
but then he assumes this development will spread a genuine civilization
rather than a relentless torrent of incoherent messages. He prophesies
that personal singiilarity may develop along with this uniformity, but
trusts it will be a liberating form of distinction rather than a neurotic
and chaotic search for a sense of individual worth through consumer
fads and short-lived associations. Tarde foretells the antinomy where-
by developing countries want to consume what they are still unable to
produce, but interprets this situation as a benign one leading to inter-
national trade rather than as a dangerous one of economic dependence
and psychological frustration. Aesthetic and social life are supposed
to bloom despite a marked decline in inventiveness, and the possibility
that technological inventions may swamp a culture lacking in social
invention is not considered. The leveling process that Tarde interprets
as the opening of the charmed circle of society might just as well mean
the triumph of unimaginative methodology, of routine and detail, of
notions rather than ideas. It is never explained how the process of
social entropy will usher in- universal aristocracy rather than univer-
sal mediocrity; how it will end in a Utopia of aesthetic and social
accomplishment rather than a pseudo-utopia of dull complacency that
erects iron statues in cabbage gardens.
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In sum, is not the rising flood of imitation submerging the
various civilizations of the globe the very same foul flood of mass
culture that drowns des Esseintes? Could not the underwater voyage
and womb -like comfort of the underground fairyland turn into the
commercial fairyland of the expositions? Tarde's style of thought
resembles the decorative style of the expositions, seductive and
intoxicating. It should also put us on guard. His verbal facility may
lure us into acquiescence while he evades harsher interpretations and
less pleasing deductions. "One feels the charm of representing the
world thus regenerated, all the while knowing this regeneration is
impossible. " Durkt^eim's comment on the "sentimental and artistic
nature" of ascetic communist Utopias applies to Tarde's as well. But
we do not have to conclude that Tarde is wholly unreliable, that he
succumbs to a complete "reign of fantasy in the intellectual order. "
His optimistic interpretations may be modified or rejected without dis-
carding the remarkable perception that inspires them, for as a social
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seer Tarde is uniquely accurate.
The two social prophets, Gabriel Tarde and J.-K. Huysmans,
both see a flood of mass consumption. One interprets it as a blessing,
ajid the other as a disaster. This cannot be a matter of the truth lying
somewhere in between. This flood is simultaneously foul and fair, a
barbarizing pestilence and a civilizing cure. Every positive evaluation
has its dark underside, every negative judgment has a brighter aspect,
and there is no definitive "right side up. " Instead we have to keep
turning the phenomenon over and over in our minds and endure its
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ambiguity. This is the ambiguity of an exposition- - a grand bazaar and
a grand salon at the same time. Tarde and Huysmans also agree in
perceiving that the cause of this rising tide of mass consumption is
ineluctably related to man's need for an ark, a utopia, a saving illusion.
According to their analysis, the appeal of the dream world of consump-
tion, far from being difficult to explain, is overdetermined. Nearly
everywhere else in modern society illusion has been evicted, from
politics, philosophy, art, labor, above all religion. As more and more
entrances into imaginative life are barred, fantasy is increasingly
shunted into the realm of consumption. The irony is that the very
economic forces that have had so much to do with banishing ideals from
large tracts of cultural life, subordinating them to making money, have
gained from the displacement. Industrial capitalism herds people into
the dream world of consumption as if it were a sort of mental refugee
camp, and then exploits the inmates. But economic forces alone cannot
account for what has happened. Many other political, cultural, and
intellectual events have combined to concentrate in consumption the
expressions of imagination which used to roam more freely. To write
a history of this process would be to write a history of modern civiliza-
tion; here we are concerned with the response of some sensitive
thinkers to the res\ilts and prospects.
From this perspective we can see that closing the gates to the
dream world of consumption is no solution. It may be a degenerate
Utopia, but where is one better? Once the gates to the exposition
are
closed, what else is there to do besides wander around the
deserted
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grounds in a gray November rain? There should be alternatives, on
the one hand, to enduring the commercial exploitation of illusion, or, on
the other, to banishing illusion altogether. The problems of modern
consumption are to some degree political and economic in nature, that
is, concerned with social questions of exploitation, equality, justice,
and power. On this level solutions are difficult to come by, but con-
ceivable, and thinkers like Gide help point out possible courses of
action. There remains another plane on which cons\imption must be
confronted, an existential one that involves a sense of meaning in life.
On this level we are dealing not with practical solutions at all, but
with thought; and even then it is inappropriate to talk of thought that
leads to certain and verifiable knowledge, for matters of meaning,
unlike matters of truth, are inherently unknowable in this sense. They
can be dealt with in the language of metaphor or myth, which can be
more or less convincing to those who are searching for meaning but
which does not claim factual validity nor concern itself with realism.
On this level consumption is finally a religious problem, in a broad
sense of the term. Both Durkheim and Tarde recognize this when they
appeal at last to a social religion of duty in the one case and to an
aesthetic religion of love in the other. For life -maintenance to have
meaning--and life -maintenance includes both production and consump-
tion, both labor and needs, in one interdependent cycle- -there must
be
an end above the maintenance of life. "It is certain, " writes
Tarde.
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"that a society, like a man, needs above all a great love, and that if
it ceases to love something more than life, its life henceforth does not
merit being lived. " From this perspective, he adds, the expositions
are remarkable because for this first time they give the modern
masses a common goal besides warfare. "But behold, already people
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are growing tired of them.
. .
The final enigma of consumption is whether it can rise above the
weary futility of life itself.
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^^Tarde, P. E. , 1:115.
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pp. 51-55.
^*^^Tarde, P. E. , 2:116.
^^^Ibid.
,
1:295-296.
107
Ibid., 2:117. According to Tarde, luxury includes three dis-
parate elements: physical comfort, the "true luxury" of vanity and
costly pleasure, and art. The first is the least elastic, and art is
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overrate the importance of having these people understand and love
each other through conversation (Tarde, L' Opinion, pp. 124-126).
On this same subject, see a lively article by his son, Alfred de Tarde,
in a review of Henri le Chatelier's brochure Les Humanit^s et les
ingenieurs in Nouvell e revue francaise, no. 44 (August 1, 1912), pp.
560-364.
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Ibid., 1:113-114. A striking hydrological analogy Tarde uses
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Ibid.
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.
.
" The example that inspires Tarde' s definition of luxury is
not one of the usual ones (clothing, jewels, etc. ) but the example of
national military spending. Such spending, says Tarde, is certainly
an example of an unproductive, very expensive consumption that can-
not be understood in rational or objective terms. Like any other con-
sumption, it must be approached on a psychological level. How to
make sense of that fact that each nation feels it must keep buying sub-
marines, no matter how costly they are? The answer lies in motiva-
tion. A nation feels it must maintain its existence no matter how
ruinous the expense. Military expenditure becomes a genuine luxury
only when it is inspired by national megolomania rather than by
legitimate self-defense (Tarde, P. E. , 2:106).
^^^Ibid. , 1:209-210. Tarde' s discussion of labor as the other
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,
2:21.
131
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, p. 174; Roche -Agussol, pp. 66, 71; and Milet, p. 294.
It should be noted that Cournot also objected to the law of supply and
demand: see Roche -Agussol, p. 65.
Tarde' s son Alfred de Tarde wrote a fine study L'Idee du juste
prix: essai de psychologic ^^conomique (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1907),
which faithfully reflects and develops his father's ideas (it is dedicated
to Gabriel Tarde). On p. 11, for example, Alfred de Tarde writes,
"The idea of the just price is therefore the very form of the judgment
of value in the conscience, and the contents of this idea depends, like
the contents of the judgment of value, on the state of individual con-
sciences of which it follows the successive modifications." The author
further argues that the concept of the just price is not a special prob-
lem but a general one involving economic justice, one which shows
how closely morality and economics are intertwined. For discussion
of Alfred de Tarde' s book, see Dupont, pp. 224-229, and Strat, p.
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of the just price).
132Quoted by Dupont, p. 223.
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^^^Tarde, P. E. , 1:63.
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p. 416.
^^^Tarde, P. E. , 1:678. See Tarde, L'Opposition universelle, pp.
338-339, on the three types of value.
^^*^In "La Psychologie en ^conomie politigue" (October 1881), pp.
413-414 Tarde discusses at some length the guestion whether hetero-
geneous utilities can be coordinated to achieve a maximum of value,
as both classical and socialist economists had assumed. Tarde s
mentor Cournot had cautioned that no such maximum could be deter-
mined among species of products which are not effectively comparable
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used the analogy of the concept of optinnism in natural philosophy to
criticize the optinnism of economists that such a maximum could be
found. In nature, said Cournot, the observer can see that a certain
function or detail had been optimized by nature to help a species sur-
vive; but if the observer takes a larger view, he sees that what favors
one species destroys or restricts another. There is no way to say
that it is better for one or the other to exist, no maximum. An ele-
ment of finality, or a guiding thread, is introduced only when all
natural creation is considered in its relation to man. Then in the
relative order of things we can judge whether the fate of a species
is relatively better or worse. When we compare species of products
that are diversely useful, we are in a similar position. Man is so
different in his temperment, race, class, customs, time, and place
that again we find ourselves without a guiding thread to compare a
mass of things. Cournot concluded against the principle of optimism
in economics. Because of the incommensurate character of economic
goods, there is no possible optimum state. Against Cournot' s logic,
Tarde cites experience. Every person has to choose among hetero-
geneous tastes and needs and manages to find the solution to the prob-
lem that Cournot finds insoluble. "Each of us well knows which he
prefers more, tobacco or hunting, studying botanies or listening to an
opera, ambition or love. If each of us knows his preferences, how
could the majority of the public ignore its?" There is enough common
nature in economic goods to allow us to compare dissimilar tastes and
needs. "The notion of an optimum, of a maximum of value to be real-
ized, is therefore intelligible; the pole of political economy is by no
means imaginary" (ibid.
, p. 414).
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obtained by a minimum of labor" Tarde, "La Psychologie en 6conomie
politique" (October 1851), pp. 411-412 . Also on the subject of value,
see Tarde, "L'ld^e de valeur, " Revue bleue, 4th ser. , 16 (1901):545.
^'^^Tarde, L'Opposition universelle, p. 428. See also Tarde,
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, pp. 186, 254-255, and Milet, pp. 207-208.
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^"^^Ibid. Contrast with Griveau's analysis of the relation of inven-
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ter III, pp. 222-223.
^^"^Tarde's debt to Guyau is obvious. See Needham, pp. 261-263,
andDupont, pp. 60-61. For other aesthetic comments see Tarde,
Logique sociale, pp. 451-459.
687
145
Tarde, L'Opposition universelle, p. 428.
^^^Tarde, P. E.
,
2:446.
147
Clark (ed. ), Tarde , p. 145.
148
Dupont, pp. 297-301. Tarde sees four general forms of asso-
ciation for adaptation: (1) societies of co -production (to harmonize
internal conflicts of production); (2) associations of consumption (to
harmonize conflicts of consumption); (3) associations of exchange (to
adapt production to consumption); and (4) societies of credit (to adapt
money to its function of exchange, to end monetary conflicts). For
more on Tarde' s view of consumer cooperatives, see Roche -Agussol,
pp. 87-89. 93.
^'^^Tarde, P. E. , 2:412.
^^°Ibid.
^^4bid.
,
2:256.
152
Ibid.
,
2:413. For more on Tarde and Stoic philosophers, see
Milet, pp. 63, 66.
153
^^Tarde, P. E. , 2:413.
^^"^Tarde, Logique sociale , p. 384.
'"ibid.
^^"^
Tarde, P. E.
,
2:417. See also ibid., 2:256.
^^^Social teleology is described in Tarde, Logique sociale, pp.
1-86 (Chapter 1). Social logic and social teleology correspond to social
physics and social physiology in Comte's system.
One of those who heard Tarde' s call for a new science of social
teleology was Gaston Richard, already mentioned in note 17 as one of
Tarde' s unrecognized disciples. In a review of E. Trivero's La_
Teoria dei bisogni (Turin: Bocca fr^res, 1900) in the Revue phiT^o-
phique
—
51 (March 1 901 ):326 -328, Richard ends with these words:
'^T rive ro studies under the name of need what others call by the more
general term of tendency, but he clearly shows that a sociology which,
in order to conform to mechanistic prejudices, makes an abstraction
of tendency, conscious or unconscious, no longer has a definite
aim.
M Tarde has taught that one of the large parts of abstract sociology
would be social tele ology , that is to say the study of the unity of
social
facts which derive from desire (industry, art, government, law).
II
Trivero has not achieved this teleology, he has at least, not
without
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penetration, showed its conditions" (p. 328). The "mechanistic prej-
udices" referred to by Richard are those of Marxist sociologists who
put unconscious needs at the base of social life. The purpose of Tri-
vero's book, according to Richard, is to introduce a far more subtle
and varied understanding of needs and to argue that needs cannot be
abstracted from consciousness or in general from qualitative consid-
erations. Trivero seems to have outlined a theory of needs which is
far more sophisticated that anything attained by contemporary econo-
mists, either Austrian or French. His book was translated into French
(as La Th^orie des besoins), but I was unable to locate a French trans-
lation7~aTthougFT"3Td~nn3~^ Italian version. In a sort of follow-up
review in Revue philosophique 53 (February 1902):211, Richard notes
that Trivero has published a defense of his Th^orie des besoins in the
Rivasta de filosofia e scienze affini and remarks that most of Trivero'
s
severest critics have been Italian philosophers. "[Trivero"]) recognizes
that his thought has been better understood and appreciated with more
sympathy by French criticism than by that of his compatriots. In
analyzing his book here, we have praised M. Trivero for liberating
himself from the narrow and outdated views of historical materialism.
It appears that this emancipation has been judged with severity and
harshness by 'philosophers' who are neither historians nor econo-
mists. " So far I have been unable to locate other comments on Tri-
vero' s work by other French thinkers.
^^^^Tarde, Lois, pp. 194-195.
^^^Ibid.
,
pp. 195-196. Tarde's discussion of the replacement of
ends rather than their accumulation, suggests the relevance of Thomas
Kuhn's term "paradigm. " Tarde says that the conflicts between con-
trolling desires are not inventive duels, for they involve morality
rather than industry, "but," he adds, "morality, in a sense, is only
industry considered under its elevated and truly governmental aspect.
A government is only a special industry, appropriate or judged appro-
priate to satisfy the need, the major pattern, that the nature of the
productions and consumptions long preponderant, or of convictions
long reigning, has put beyond comparison in the heart of a people,
and to which morality desires that all others be subordinate (ibid. ,
p. 172).
^^4bid.
,
p. 194.
^^^Ibid.
,
p. 196.
^^^Ibid., p. 172.
^^^Ibid.
,
p. 197.
^^^Ibid., pp. 198-199.
^^^Ibid., p. 200.
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1
^"^'ibid.
, p. 199.
Tarde, P. E.
,
2:417n.
169
Tarde, Logique sociale, p. 384.
^"^^Milet, p. 327.
^'^^Tarde, P. E. , 2:418-419.
Ibid.
17 3
Dupont discusses whether or not Tarde is a solidarist in a
section titled "Tarde est-il un individualiste ? , " pp. 345-350. On
p. 350n Dupont refers to an article by Mahaim, "L'Econonnie politique
de M. Tarde, " Revue d'^conomie politique (1903) j^fuller citation un-
available]] which concludes that Tarde is the opposite of orthodox indi-
vidualism in econonnics and yet is not coUectivist, that his thought is
permeated by "the solidarism of the new school." Dupont qualifies
Mahaim' s statement by saying Tarde is indeed a solidarist, but of
a very different kind than Durkheim or Bourgeois, and that Tarde'
s
variety of solidarity is much closer to that of Charles Gide.
^"^^Tarde, P. E. , 1:187.
^"^^Ibid.
,
2:269-276 passim.
^"^^Ibid. , 2:253.
^"^"^Tarde, "La Psychologie en ^conomie politique" (October 1881),
p. 418.
^"^^Tarde, P. E. , 2:264. A good summary is found in ibid. , 1:120:
"The part of leiTuFe 'in life is the part of the heart, of the imagination,
of the family, of sociability and of original individuality at the same
time in their best forms. "
^"^"^Quoted by Dupont, p. 254. Tarde observes also that fttes are
totally different in character from holidays; the latter disperse people
while the former gather them, and the latter give rest while the former
give joy (Tarde, P. E. , 1:279).
^^°The relationship between man and living nature in labor (as
opposed to the relationship between man and machine m labor) is de-
saibed in Tarde, P^. , 1:272-278, in a section of great interest to
the present era of environmental consciousness.
181
Ibid., 1:119.
Tarde, P. E. , 2:256.
182,
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183
Bougie, "La Societe sous la terre, " pp. 334, 336.
184Quoted by Clark (ed. ), Tarde , p. 281.
185
Tarde, L' Opinion, pp. 18-19.
°°Ibid.
, pp. 28-29.
Ibid.
, p. 6.
188^,
Ibid.
, p. VI.
189
There was much interest in crowd psychology at the time,
most notably on the part of Gustave Le Bon. Tarde remarks, "The
psychology of crowds has been done; the psychology of the public
remains to be done..." (Tarde, L' Opinion, pp. 1-2).
190
Tarde, L' Opinion, pp. 18-19.
191
Ibid.
,
p. 68. Tarde suggests there are three elements to the
public mind: tradition (opinion of the dead, incorporated into custom),
reason (from the elite), and opinion. The last has developed most
recently but is growing much faster than the other two. The inter-
action of the three makes up the history of the public mind. The
positive mission of public opinion is to turn the reason of today into
the tradition of tomorrow (ibid.
, pp. 64-67).
192 For example, see ibid.
, p. 74.
1 93
Tarde, "Questions sociales, " Revue philosophique 35 (1893):
629. See also note 186.
i^^ibid.
^^^Tarde, "L'Avenir de la moralit^, " Revue philosophique 22
(1886):404. ( See also Tarde, Lois, p. 387.) Note how these comments
apply particularly to the heroism and morality of des Esseintes, that
solitary thinker.
^"^^Ibid.
,
p. 406.
l^^Ibid.
^"^^Tarde, L' Opinion, p. 158.
^"^"^Tarde, Laws, pp. 369-370.
^°°Tarde, L'Opinion, p. 60.
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Tarde, Lois, pp. 420-421. Elsewhere Tarde calls attention to
the importance of the spherical shape of the earth, sonae thing so
obvious, he says, that it is too often ignored. If the world were flat,
nations placed in the center would play a dominant role and inequality
would be permanent. But on a sphere no point is more central than
the rest, or, to put it otherwise, the center is everywhere. Equality
and unity are therefore possible (Tarde, P. E.
,
1:24-25). Tarde's
observations neglect important differences in climate and terrain
on different points of the sphere, however.
202
Tarde, Lois, p. 371,
Tarde, Les Transformations du pouvoir (Paris: F€lix Alcan,
1899), pp. 70-78! Tarde's description of the conditions favoring in-
ventiveness pretty much matches his own life in the provinces before
coming to Paris in 1890. See also Milet, p. 364.
^^"^Tarde, Laws, p. 346.
^^^Tarde, Lois, pp. 66-67.
Tarde himself uses the analogy in a number of places. For
example, in Lois, p. 417, he refers to the "famous conclusion deduced
by physicists" that in the universe as a whole sources of heat tend to
"a great universal equilibrium of temperature, superior to the present
temperature of interstellar space but inferior to that of the stars. " He
adds an analogy from the biological sciences, but it is not a comparison
based on the example of a single living organism. Instead Tarde notes
that species as a whole disseminate to populate the whole earth, which
is now very unequally inhabited, so that eventually it will be filled with
"a uniform layer of living beings. " In the same way, he says, "the
tendency to a cosmopolitan and democratic assimilation is an inevitable
propensity of history, and for the same reason that the uniform and
complete population of the globe and the uniform and complete heating
of space are in the desires of the living universe and of the physical
universe.
"
^^"^ Tarde, P. E. , 2:42L
^"^^Tarde, Lois, p. xx (preface to the second edition of 1895).
Tarde also stateTThat the influence of civilization is to multiply exam-
ples in number while weakening the influence of each one. "We are as
enslaved as our ancestors to surrounding examples, but we appropriate
them better by a more logical and more individual choice, more adap-
ted to our ends and to our particular nature. . . " (ibid. , p. 90).
209Tarde, "Questions sociales, " p. 632.
^^^Tarde, Lois, p. 422.
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211
Ibid.
,
p. 424.
212
See Milet, p. 21n, for information and dates regarding the
writing and publication of Fragment. In 1896 the work first appeared
in the Revue internationale de sociologie, and in the same year it was
published in Paris as a brochure (Giard et Bri^re). In 1904 a costly
posthumous edition appeared, and the following year was published an
English translation with a foreward by H. G. Wells under the unfor-
tunate title Underground Man. Quotations here are from the 1904
edition (Lyon and Paris: A. Storck et Qe. ).
^^^ Tarde, p. 66.
214 y
Tarde wrote two other short stories (Le Fils du resinier and
Les Grants chauves) which he intended to add to the Fragment to make
a book collectively titled Histoires possibles. This title would also
be a good way to summarize the ambiguity and general import of
Tarde's oeuvre. Worms, "Philosophie sociale, " p. 129n.
The importance of Tarde's book as a general guide to and
summary of his social thought was immediately recognized. See
Milet, p. 378 and 378n.
216
Tarde, Fragment, p. 32.
^^"^Ibid.
, pp. 46-47.
^^®Ibid.
,
pp. 52-53.
^^"^Ibid.
,
p. 61.
Ibid,
^^hbid.
,
p. 59.
^^^Ibid.
,
p. 74.
^^^Ibid.
,
p. 76.
^^^Ibid.
,
p. 80. Tarde remarks that socialists had dreamed of
this intense* social life but did not realize that it depends on the devel-
opment of aesthetic life, on a religion of truth and beauty which pre-
supposes the drastic curtailment of material wants. By rushing into
an exaggerated development of commercial life instead, socialists
went against the grain of their own stated goals (ibid., pp. 83-84).
^^^Ibid.
,
pp. 80-82.
^^^Ibid pp 119-120. Here Tarde may have been influenced
by
the studies of Alfred Binet (see note 27) in the mental life
of micro-
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organisms. See Binet's Psychic Life of Micro-organisms; a Study
i£i Experimental Psychology (Chicago: Open Court, 1897). from Binet'
s
Etudes de psychologie exp^rimentale
.
227
Tarde, Fragment, p. 12 0.
27 Q
Ibid., pp. 87, 126.
^^^Ibid.
, pp. 130-131.
^^°Ibid.
, pp. 109-110.
231
Ibid., pp. 137-138. Many provocative comparisons may be
made between Tarde' s Fragment and E. M. Forster's underground
dystopia in "The Machine Stops, " in The Eternal Moment and Other
Stories (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, Ltd.
,
1928), pp. 1-61. For -
ster's story was written before 1914.
^^^See Part I, Chapter II, p. 149.
233
Tarde, p. 35.
234
Ibid.
,
p. 32.
^^^In Tarde, La Criminalite compar^e (Paris: F€lix Alcan, 1886),
pp. 208-210, cited by Dupont, p. 84.
^^^Tarde, "La Psychologie en €'conomie politique" (October 1881),
p. 417.
237
Ibid.
,
pp. 417-418.
^ Dupont, p. 64. Other verses are quoted by Worms, "Philoso-
phie sociale, " p. 151. The poem was published posthumously in 1904.
Tarde' s funeral was conducted according to its directions.
^^^One of the very few who took this approach was Edmond Barth-
Memy (b. 1868), especially in his article "L' jfpicurisme scientifique, "
Mercure de France 83 (February 16, 1910):577 -609, and in "Litt^rature
et d€mocratie: les moyens, " Mercure de France 46 (June 1903):577-
598. Barthelemy evidently has great admiration for Tarde (and shares
Tarde' s dislike of Durkheim, who receives incisive criticism at Barth-
elemy' s hands), but he is far more pessimistic about the eventual
results of the social tendencies Tarde observes. Possibly this is
because BarthMemy's intellectual hero above all others is Thomas
Carlyle, whom he translated and introduced to a French audience.
Particularly noteworthy are BarthMemy's prediction that the action .
of imitation will transform ideas into "notions, " which will entail a
spiritual loss from the creative and personal into the unconscious,
routine, and anonymous; and his prediction that the vast process of
694
social harmonization will result in a civilization of means in which
all ideas become coordinated, mutually verifiable, and take on the
oppressive force of an inviolable sum of notions- -a very different
thing from truth (Barthelemy, "L' fipicurisme scientifique, " pp. 596-
597). Unfortunately little can be learned about Barthelemy other than
a partial list of his publications, many of them dealing with Carlyle.
He is one of those who should be investigated in assessing Tarde's
influence, and he also deserves investigation in his own right.
240
Tarde, Logique sociale, pp. 384-385 and 385n.
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